Monthly Repository. No. CXCIV.] FEBRUARY, 1822. [Vol. XVII. Mr. Cogan's Examination of Mr. Hume's Objection to the Argument for the Being of God. SIR, ONE NE of the most plausible objections to the arguments for the being of a God is that which is suggested by Mr. Hume, namely, that we have no experience in the origin of worlds, and therefore cannot safely conclude, because ships, cities, &c. are made by human art, that the universe must have had an intelligent Author. This objection I propose to consider. The universe exhibits in innumerable instances an adaptation of means to ends, or what, for the sake of brevity, I shall sometimes call contrivance, not meaning thereby to assume the matter in dispute. And this adaptation of means to ends seems to be as truly prospective as any thing which we call contrivance in the works of art. The eye appears to have been as manifestly formed for seeing, as the telescope for assisting the vision of the eye. The universe, then, is justly comprehended in the general description of works which indicate a fitness of means to ends; and if I may not, in the case of the universe, call this fitness intentional, I must maintain that it is strictly analogous to the effects of intention in the works of art. As far as relates to the appearance of design, the works of art have no advantage over the works of nature. The question, then, is, why I should not apply to the latter the reasoning which I apply without hesitation, and, as it seems, without error to the former. Is it not reasonable to maintain, as a universal truth, that such an adaptation of means to ends as was never known to be fortuitous must be referred to an intelligent Author? But I have had no experience in the origin of worlds. This is true; nor is this experience needed. I have seen, in cases innumerable, the connexion between intellect in a designing cause, and the marks of contrivance in the works which intellect has effected; and unless the human mind must be denied the privilege of reasoning from the clearest analogics, I may safely infer that this connexion must be universal. Contrivance is contrivance, wherever it be found; and the connexion between cause and effect is not more certain than the connexion between an effect which indicates contrivance, and an intelligent or designing cause. We gain our knowledge of both these connexious in precisely the same manner, or rather they are virtually the same, the latter being only a specific modification of the former. But Mr. Hume says, that all that we can pretend to know concerning the connexion of cause and effect is constant conjunction. That conjuction is all that we perceive is true; and a more harmless truth was never made known to the world For until some disciple of Mr. Hume shall assign a better reason for constant conjunction than that the things thus conjoined are necessarily connected, the human mind will go on to reason from effect to cause, as it did before Mr. Hume's discovery saw the light. Could Mr. Hume's observation disjoin what we see to be conjoined, it would do something; but the fact remains exactly as it was, and where we see that an effect is, there we cannot help concluding that a cause has been. And this is sufficient for all purposes of reasoning. And if any one shall choose to believe that cause and effect are always conjoined but never connected; for example, that, though a ball, when struck by a cricket-bat, is invariably put in motion, yet, for any necessity that operates, it might invariably remain at rest; he may, indeed, enjoy the satisfaction of not thinking with the vulgar, but assuredly he will not have the credit of thinking with the wise. But Mr. Hume farther observes, that "all reasoning from the relation of causes and effects is founded on a certain instinct of our nature, and may be fallacious and deceitful." If this proposition is intended merely to intimate a possibility that the reasoning in question may be fal. lacious, it amounts to no more than this, that this reasoning does not rise to absolute or mathematical demonstration. But if it is intended to imply that all reasoning from the relation of causes and effects probably is falla cious, it may be satisfactorily replied, that it does not follow because a thing possibly may be, that, therefore, it probably is. Moreover, if the observation were to be thus interpreted, it would imply, that the contrary conclusions to those which mankind have hitherto drawn from the relation of cause and effect would be more likely to be just; an extravagance to which no soberminded man can assent for a moment. In innumerable instances we rest with as much confidenee upon reasonings drawn from this source as upon the evidence of the senses or upon mathematical proof. And this, however it comes to pass, we cannot help doing. But to spend another moment upon Mr. Hume's proposition: were the reasoning from the relation of causes and effects founded upon instinct, this, I conceive, would be a presumption that it would not be fallacious. It is, however, founded on no such thing. It is founded on experience, on which Mr. Hume can place sufficient dependence when it suits his purpose. And the same experience which has taught us to believe that every effect must have a cause, has also taught us to look for a designing cause where there is an indication of contrivance in the effect. And hence we infer thus much with sufficient certainty, that if the universe is an effect at all, it must be referred to an intelligent cause. But, it seems, our experience does not reach far enough to justify the conclusion, that the universe, because it exhibits an adaptation of means to ends, must have had an intelligent Author. We want the only experience which the case demands, an experience in the origin of worlds. Were this principle carried to its full extent, it would follow, that when I see a work of art, which is altogether new to me, I must not confidently conclude that it had a maker. I know, indeed, that men exist, and though all reasoning from the relation of causes and effects may be fallacious, I think I know that the human intellect is adequate to the production of those effects which we call the works of art. But as my experi ence cannot reach to a novel ease, unless I may venture to call in the axiom, that similar effects must be referred to similar causes, I must draw my conclusion with diffidence and hesitation. But, as Mr. Hume observes, I have no experience of the origin of worlds. And if I had, what would be its precise value? "All reasoning from the relation of causes and effects may be fallacious and deceitful." But the argument from experience, which Mr. Hume says is wanting, would rest upon the presumption, that similar effects proceed from similar causes, in which presumption Mr. Hume ought to have maintained that in all cases there may be no force. Indeed, if all reasoning from the relation of causes and effects may be fallacious and deceitful, were a world constructed before my eyes, the possibility of doubt, as to its origin, would not be precluded! In opposition, however, to these extravagancies of scepticism, I maintain that experience affords a sufficiently certain ground of reasoning, and I farther maintain, that the experience which we have had of the connexion between contrivance and a contriver, abundantly justifies the conclusion, that the universe must have had a designing cause. To reject this conclusion is to set aside, without necessity,* one of the strong I said without necessity, because no difficulty attending the hypothesis of Theism can possibly be greater than the difficulty of conceiving that such an adaptation of means to ends, as is equivalent to contrivance, should exist without the operation of intelligence. Indeed, no human mind than those of contrivance ideas are more closely associated in the and a contriver. In contemplating the works of art, as connected with intelligence, we not only recognize the general relation of cause and effect, but are, moreover, led to acknowledge that the work effected corresponds to an archetype in the mind of the artist. And hence we seem satisfactorily to infer, that every thing which indicates contrivance answers to a certain model which previously existed in the mind of some intelligent with all their various and exquisite adapagent. And shall the works of nature, tation of means to ends, be regarded as answering to no model, as corresponding to no archetype? There is one point of difference, it is true, between the works of nature and the works of art, which is, est associations of the human mind, and to reason upon a principle, if a principle it can be called, which would subvert the foundation of all reasoning. If similar effects are not to be referred to similar causes, all ratiocination is at an end. It is in vain to urge that there is a difference between the works of nature and the works of art. As far as respects the adaptation of means to ends, and on this alone the argument rests, there is no difference, except that this adaptation, in the former, is far more curious and exquisite than in the latter. Were any one still to say that the experience of which I have been speaking is no certain guide in a case to which it does not itself extend, I should think it sufficient to reply, that it is the only guide which we have, and that it is absurd to relinquish this guide in order to wander in a field of vain conjecture, without a ray of probability to direct us. One thing we know, which is, that intellect can adjust means to ends, and produce effects which indicate contrivance; but that any thing else can produce these effects, we not only do not know, but have not even the slightest reason to believe. But men sometimes argue as if it were the perfection of human wisdom to follow the weaker probability instead of the stronger, or to set probability altogether at defiance, because it falls short of strict and mathematical demonstration.* that the latter are put together by the application of mechanical powers, whereas the former are many of them evidently produced by the action of certain laws, which are called the laws of nature. But this circumstance of difference by no means counterbalances the circumstances of resemblance, and, therefore, does not avail to set aside the analogy. And what are the laws of nature but a certain mode of operation? Does the law in any case design and anticipate the effect? It may not be altogether foreign to the argument to observe farther, that the laws of nature, together with all real existences, must be, in themselves considered, the objects of knowledge. And yet from the hypo- thesis of the Atheist, it will follow that no being exists by whom these laws are understood. * If any one should say that probability is not a reasonable ground of confidence, should only desire him to carry this From the view which has been now taken of Mr. Hume's objection to the being of a God, it appears that the reasoning which ascribes the universe to an intelligent Author, rests upon precisely the same foundation as that which attributes what is denominated an effect to that which is denominated a cause. Contrivance is the thing to be accounted for, and that reasoning, founded on experience, which has led us to conceive that every effect must have a cause, has led us to demand an intelligent cause for every effect which indicates such an adaptation of means to ends, as could not, in our apprehension, be the result of chance or accident. And against this reasoning I do not see what can be urged, except that it does not amount to such a demonstration as would exclude all possibility of doubt. If the argument does not amount to the highest probability, I do not know what probability is. And Mr. Hume's reasonings only shew that this probability is not absolute and incontrovertible proof. That this may appear more clearly, I will deduce from Mr. Hume's observations the only conclusions which would be formidable to the hypothesis of Theism, and leave the reader to judge whether these conclusions are legitimate. Between cause and effect we perceive only conjunction; therefore the probability is, that cause and effect are not connected! All our reasonings from the relation of causes and effects may be fallacious; therefore the probability is, that they are fallacious! We have no experience in the origin of worlds; therefore it is probable that the universe, which shews throughout an adaptation of means to ends, is not the work of an intelligent Author! principle as far as it will go, and to act upon it. I need not point out what consequences would follow. But shall that evidence, upon which mankind do not scruple to act in ordinary concerns, be considered as unsatisfactory only in concerns of the highest importance? The practice of demanding absolute demonstration where it is not to be had, and where it is not needed, has done much mischief. It has given rise to an unreasonable scepticism on the one hand, and to an absurd appeal to common sense an the other. If these are just conclusions, Mr. Hume's reasonings carry with them more weight than has been hitherto attributed to them. But, in spite of Mr. Hume's subtleties, mankind will continue to reason with confidence from the relation of cause and effect. They will also assume to themselves the privilege of generalizing their ideas, and from similarity in different effects will infer similarity in their causes. And unless it shall be shewn by some solid argument, that an organized universe is not an effect, they will think that they cannot err in ascribing it to an intelligent though invisible Cause. But it may, perhaps, be said, that we may as well rest in a self-existent universe as ascend beyond it to a self-existent God. Were the universe a mass of matter, without any indication of design, it might, for any thing that I am able to allege, be self-existent. But the marks of design, which it every where exhibits, stamps upon it the character of an effect which could be produced only by a designing cause. Between a harmonized universe and the idea of self-existence there is a repugnance, a repugnance founded on the experience which we have had of the connexion between contrivance and a contriver, between effects which indicate an adaptation of means to ends, and an intelligent agent by whom this adaptation was devised. But between the notion of intelligence and selfexistence there is no repugnance, and, for any thing that either experience or reason suggests to the contrary, intellect may exist uncreated. Something uncreated there must be; but as analogy forbids us to suppose that this something is an organized system, which seems to testify the operation of an intelligent contriver; it consequently leads us to conclude that this something is that incomprehensible Being whom we call God. I will conclude with the sentiment of the poet, in which even an Atheist will not refuse to join, And if a God there is, that God how great! SIR, E. COGAN. Exeter, TH the strict unity of God than our Lord's answer to the Scribe, respecting the first commandment of all, Mark xii. 29, Kupios ε05 μar Kupios is 851, yet the opinions of learned men by no means agree as to the just translation of these important words, and I must confess myself not quite satisfied with any comments I have been able to consult. I am, therefore, induced to offer, with diffidence, to your readers the observations which have occurred to me upon it. The rendering of our authorized Version is, "The Lord our God is one Lord." The Improved Version, after Vitringa, Dr. Campbell and others, translates thus: "The Lord is our God: the Lord is one." A difference, the discussion of which has chiefly occupied commentators on the passage, yet it may, perhaps, be a question of still greater interest, and which involves in it the other, what is the most suitable translation of the words in this connexion. Our Lord answers the Scribe in a quotation from Deut. vi. 4, and in relating the discourse, the Evangelist Mark, according to the general custom of the New-Testament writers, employs the exact words of the Alexandrian Greek Version, which may be considered as having been, from its universal use, in a manner, an authorized version of their Scriptures, among all the Jews who spoke the Greek language at that period. The precise words spoken by Jesus himself, we cannot know: it is not unlikely they were taken from a Targum, somewhat resembling the later Chaldee one, which we now possess; but however this may be, Mark has done what is commonly done amongst us in translating religious books, he has copied the texts of Scripture in the translation generally known and valued by his readers. As our best chance for obtaining satisfaction respecting the real meaning of the words under our consideration, we will revert to the original Hebrew of Deuteronomy, of which they are the ; יהוה אלהינו יהוה אחד-translation where the substantive verb being omitted, it must be determined by the sense whether the words make one clause or two, which seems to me to depend entirely on the question, whether 8, one, is immediately connected with mors: as both the Common Translation and that of the Improved Version equally connect it with Jehovah, of which name the Greek Kupios, is the representative, they are both almost equally objec tionable. Jehovah, the proper and peculiar name of the God of Israel, being an appellative, and from its nature denoting one object, would not have the attribute of singleness ascribed to it, which supposes the possibility of its including more than one. It would be just as rational to say, "George our king is one George," as if any one could need to be informed of his unity. The only supposition on which the language of the Common Translation or Improved Version could be justified is, that it was intended directly to contradict the doctrine of the Trinity, which will be embraced neither by its advocates nor by those who believe it to have been first devised in a later age. There is no other passage of Scripture in which unity is predi cated of the name Jehovah, except Zech. xiv. 9, in which I conceive the translation to be incorrect. Dr. Geddes has, I think, translated the words of Moses more successfully than his predecessors-"The Lord, the Lord only is our God;" where, though for the sake of clearness and conciseness, the one is changed into the adverb only, the quality of unity belongs to the word God, which is equally applicable to false as to the true God. The meaning is, "Jehovah is our God, Jehovah is the only God." The Hebrew Lexicons, to which I have access, do not indeed give to the word , the sense of only or alone; but there can be little doubt of its allowableness, as it is but a different application of the same idea, which is often expressed by the same word, not only in the kindred languages but in many others, besides which there occur to me some instances in justification of it. Job xxiii. 13: 1, "But he is the only one," i. e. the Supreme God (vide Dathe in loc.); or, perhaps, though he be alone, who can hinder him?" Song of Solomon vi. 9: “This my dove, my most excellent is alone," ns, unrivalled in beauty-above all the queen's concubines and virgins spoken of in the preceding verse. "She is the only one (nn) of her mother, the most beloved of her parent.' (Dathe in loc.) Ezech. vii. 5: "There is an evil, an only evil," nns. In Zech. xiv. 9, our Common Version is, The Lord shall be king over all the earth, In that day there shall be one Lord, and his name one. But as the intention plainly is to prophesy of the authority of Jehovah being acknowledged, and his name adored, to the exclusion of other gods, it will certainly be a great improvement to render 8 as in the above examples : i. And Jehovah shall be king over all the In that day shall Jehovah be alone : And his name shall be the only one: sc. which shall be reverenced and honoured. that the translation I have adopted is If it be allowed, as I think it must, justifiable from the original words, difficulty with the ancient versions. I we shall not, I apprehend, find much believe they all meant to convey the same sense. The Targum of Onkelos and the Samaritan Version are liable to exactly the same remarks as the original. The other translations insert which it has been inferred, that they the substantive verb at the end, from took the whole to be one clause. The Latin unus, the Greeks, (vide Schleusner in verb.) and the Syr. may all signify "only" or one alone." "The Lord our God, the Lord is the one, or the only," sc. God, is a just translation of the Greek words, and that this was our Lord's meaning may appear, probable, from the echoing reply of the Scribe, " Well, Master, thou hast said the truth; for there is one God; and there is no other but he." The argument also drawn from the words, for the exclusive love of Jehovah, is plainly directed against the worship of many gods. On the whole, there is a material difference between the propositions, "There is one God," and "God is one." The former is opposed to the opinions and practices of Pagans, and is a simple and important truth-the latter must appear a mere truism, unless in reference to the doctrine of the Trinity, which all who disbelieve it hold to have arisen much too late to be directly contradicted in Scripture ; but, as in the text under our conside |