and certain in its character, and so beneficient in its operations, for one so impracticable in its aspects. For the reasons thus briefly, and but partially given, the undersigned beg leave to report that they deem the adoption of the proposed amendment to the preamble of the Constitution of the State as unnecessary and inexpedient, and recommend that the petitions praying for the same do lie upon the table. CHARLES B. LASSELLE, JAMES HARRISON. [Senate Journal, Forty-fourth Session, 434.] The Committee on Rights and Privileges of the inhabitants of the State, to whom was referred a proposed amendment to the Constitution of the State, and to request our representatives and instruct our senators, to use their influence to have the same amendments incorporated into the Constitution of the United States, said proposed amendments acknowledging Almighty God as the source of all authority and power in civil government, the Lord Jesus Christ as the ruler among the nations, and His revealed will as of supreme authority, have had the same under consideration, and have instructed me to report thereon. First, as regards our State Constitution, the recognition of the great Creator is full and ample in the preamble, and that, as a general principle, the Christian religion has as full and complete a recognition in our laws, both primary and secondary, as is practicable or desirable, while your committee are of the opinion that it might be for the better for all the people to be Christian in faith and practice, and in addition to this fact it is the lesson of experience, that it is a very doubtful question if the cause of pure religion ever was, or in the nature and fitness of things, ever can be, properly advanced by connecting and wedding it to and with the civil government. A union of Church and State, is full of unmixed evil to both organizations; paralyzing to and destructive of the highest and greatest good of both; and as far as may be, to be prevented. There ought not to be, of right, any other qualification for office in a free people, than that of citizenship, and a freedom from crime; and errors of faith are not crimes, and of right ought not to be made so, by human enactment. Civil and religious liberty are the safeguards of individual liberty, harmonious and competent to effect the end aimed at in human government, while moving and operating in their appropriate spheres, but crippled and hindered whenever and wherever they are improperly joined together. Your committee are of opinion that any legislation upon the subject is unwise and inexpedient, and they ask to be discharged from any further consideration of the subject. They cannot lose sight of the great truth that such is not the fact, and that rights of conscience, and of faith, are rights which are not, and of right ought not, to be restrained, coerced or imperiled by human legislation. That these rights are above and beyond the dictum or arbitration of human law, and that for the use, or even the abuse of them, the individual is responsible to God alone. That while our government, both State and national, is, both in theory and in fact, Christian, and known as such in all the world, there are thousands upon thousands of citizens of the State, and the nation, that are not Christian; and in all human probability the proposed change would not in any degree tend to aid or assist their conversion or change of faith, however desirable such change may be; and it must be remembered that all of this class, or classes, have the same inalienable rights by the endowment of the great Creator; that the genius and spirit of our institutions absolutely forbid any and all interference, either direct or indirect, with these God-given rights upon principle. 233. Duration of a Regular Legislative Session-Ex-Parte Opinion (March 3, 1865). In 1865, the question of the duration of a legislative session was still controverted. Owing to the large amount of business to be transacted an extension of the session for a few days would enable the General Assembly to complete their work. Accordingly, Governor Morton asked the opinion of four of the judges of the Supreme Court and was advised that the sixtyone day limit fixed by the Constitution embraced "business days" only. This opinion was in contravention of the uniform legislative practice under the present Constitution and is significant as one of the few attempts in this State to obtain an ex-parte opinion of the Supreme Court by the General Assembly. The Governor sent a message to the two houses on March 3, embracing this opinion. [Senate Journal, Forty-fourth Session, 538.] A message from the Governor, to the Senate of the State of Indiana: The Constitution of the State limits the legislative term to sixty-one days. In counting these days heretofore, Sundays have been included. I am satisfied, however, from a careful examination of the Constitution in connection with several usages and principle of law, that are well recognized, that the practice has been erroneous, and that sixty-one working days are meant. By common consent in this and other States, Sunday is not considered a legislative day, and it is especially excepted from the three days, during which the Governor has time to consider a bill. In analogy to this, Sunday is not considered as a judicial day, to be counted in the term of court in any State where the common law prevails. It will not be deemed by any one that the legislation term established by the Constitution, as heretofore construed, is too short for the dispatch of the necessary business of the State; and if, by proper construction, it can be extended for a few days, it will be of great importance to the public interest. Accordingly, I have asked the opinion of the four judges of the Supreme Court upon the question, which they have given to me in writing: Indianapolis, March 3d, 1865. To His Excellency, O. P. Morton, Governor: Sir: In response to your request for our opinion, whether the term of sixty-one days, to which the session of the legislature is limited by the Constitution, includes intervening Sundays, we beg to say that we have given the subject such consideration as time would permit, and that we deem the better opinion to be that business days only are embraced. Various considerations tend so strongly to support this view, that if a contrary practice had not heretofore prevailed, we would hardly entertain a doubt upon the subject. If the legislature should now be of the opinion above indicated, and should act upon it, of course it would go far to annul the influence of the former practice of that body as a precedent; and at any rate, if the question be deemed a doubtful one, the courts would not, it is well settled, be justified in holding void the action of a co-ordinate department. This being simply a question of public importance, which cannot, as we suppose, involve any party consideration, or mere private or personal interests, we have felt no delicacy in giving our view upon it. We have not meant, however, to depart from that rule of silence which we have prescribed to ourselves as to measures of legislation which may be pending. CHARLES A. RAY, R. C. GREGORY. I have also consulted the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, both able and learned lawyers, and find that they concur in the opinion expressed by the judges of the Supreme Court. In view of the importance of the subject, and the present condition of the business of the legislature, I have thought it proper to call your attention to the subject in a special message. O. P. MORTON, Governor of Indiana. 234. Minority Senate Committee Report on Duration of Legislative Sessions (March 6, 1865). By a vote of 33-14, the Governor's message was taken up for consideration by the Senate, and by a vote of 41-5 it was referred to the Judiciary Committee. On March 6, the committee submitted a divided report. Both reports agree in the conclusion that the duration of a legislative session is still sixty-one days, including Sundays. The minority report, submitted by Mr. John B. Niles, is as follows: [Senate Journal, Forty-fourth Session, 583.] The Judiciary Committee, to whom was referred the message of the Governor in regard to the right to prolong the present session of the General Assembly, report that they have spent considerable time in consultation on the subject without having arrived at a unanimous conclusion. But the committee are of opinion that it is not advisable to depart from the established usage, and to now unsettle what has been for fourteen years the practical construction of the Constitution. The committee, therefore, recommend that the session do not extend beyond sixty-one days, counting by revolutions of the earth on its axis. 235. Majority Senate Committee Report on Duration of Legislative Sessions (March 6, 1865). The majority report was submitted by Mr. Alexander C. Downey and was signed by three members of the committee. [Senate Journal, Forty-fourth Session, 584.] The majority of the Judiciary Committee, to whom was referred the question in regard to the length of the sessions under the Constitution, according to order report as follows: This session of the General Assembly began on the 5th day of January, 1865, and the question is, where must it end? The language of the Constitution on the subject is found in section 29 of article 4, and is as follows: "No session of the General Assembly, except the first under this Constitution, shall extend beyond the term of sixty-one days; nor any special session beyond the term of forty days." Words are to be understood in their plain and ordinary sense. A "civil day," or a day when mentioned in a Constitution or statute, means a period of twenty-four hours, beginning and ending at 12 o'clock at night. Sunday is a day as well as week days. There is no difficulty in arriving at what is meant by the word "session." It means, in this instance, the time during which the legislature sits, with occasional intermissions of a day or more, until its final adjournment. The word "term," used in this clause of the Constitution, and as used in eight or ten other places in the same instrument, means a period, or length of time, from one given date to another. To find the true meaning of the word when it is used in the Constitution, we must look at other parts of that instrument as well as the one under consideration. All parts of it were made at the same time and by the same persons. A strange use may be made of a word in an instrument, but if you find the word used in many other places in the same paper, in the same sense, it must have the meaning which from the whole instrument the party intended it to have. We do not mean to say that the word is improperly used in this instance. We think it is not. Let us look to its meaning in other places in the Constitution. In article 2, section 6, the word "term" is used with reference to the term during which a person may hold office. In Article 4, Section 3, it is said. senators shall be chosen for a term of four years and representatives for the term of two years. In Article 5, Section 9, the official term of the Governor and Lieutenant Governor shall commence, etc. In the same Article, Section 22, it is provided that the Governor's salary shall not be increased or diminished during the term for which he shall have been elected; and in Section 24, |