on in argument, though stated somewhat more in detail in the pleadings:

(1) Unfairness in failure of the board to call witnesses required by the petitioner in her hearing before it;

(2) Unfairness in her not being afforded counsel at the beginning of the hearing, or thereafter;

(3) Unfairness in the incompetence of the interpreter who translated questions and answers from English into Japanese or Japanese into English, as the case might be; particularly in that the interpreter was an Okinawa Japanese, speaking the Okinawa dialect of which the petitioner was ignorant;

(4) Denial of any admission of the commission of any crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude,-which includes not only (a) a denial of the fact of any such admission but also (b) a contention that what she is alleged to have admitted does not in law constitute any such crime or misdemeanor as is contémplated by section 2 of the immigration act, 34 Stat. 898, am. 36 Stat. 263;

(5) Denial that the petitioner is likely to become a public charge.

In view of my conclusion below, under ground (4), ground (5) will not be considered. I may say, though, that if this ground were determinative of the case, my conclusion would be very different.

Grounds (1), (2), and (3) I find nothing to sustain. And evidence has been adduced to make the solution of these questions very clear. Furthermore, as to ground (1), the evidence of what the two witnesses who are claimed to have been required would have testified to, was heard de bene because of the prospective absence of one and for the business convenience of the other, and it shows that they could neither of them say anything of any materiality in view of the petitioner's distinct admission discussed below under ground (4), or say anything except that the petitioner had been a faithful servant of each of them during her former residence in Honolulu and that they trusted her and would be glad to give her employment again. Their testimony

would have been very desirable under ground (5) above, if that ground had been conclusive.

[2] Aside from the want of facts to support grounds (1) and (2), the cases of United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161, 169, 170; Law Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U. S. 460, 469, 470, may be referred to, among others, as to the law governing ground (2), want of counsel. The decision in the case of United States ex rel. Buccino v. Williams, 190 Fed. 897, affirmed in United States ex rel. Falco v. Williams, 191 Fed. 1001, says:

"There is nothing in the statute which calls for the presence of counsel at the examination of aliens preliminary to admission; nothing to indicate that it was the intent of Congress that these investigations in hundreds of thousands of cases touching the qualifications of an alien seeking to enter were to be conducted as trials in court, with counsel present to represent the alien, witnesses called to testify, and elaborate examination and cross-examination of them. On the contrary, Congress relegated this question to administrative boards who might act summarily and expeditiously, and, to provide against an abuse of their discretion, accorded to the alien a right of appeal to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor. Nor do the rules provide for the presence of counsel at such examinations."

And see United States v. Greenwalt, 213 Fed. 901, 905; Ex. p. Chin Loy You, 223 Fed. 833, 838-839, also 836-838; Ex. p. Chin Kwock Wah, 224 Fed. 138, 139; Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 Fed. 745, 749, par. 3; In re Ryonosuke Sakaba, ante, p. 372.

[3] As to ground (3), I may express specially my confidence in the conscientiousness of the interpreter and also in his qualifications, and note that the careful reading over of the testimony to the petitioner before she signed it, together with the repeated call for her objection if everything was not correct, reduced the possibility of error to a minimum—particularly as the petitioner's admission was in effect repeated in her words last above quoted, "it just hap

pened after I got there" ("it" referring unmistakably to adultery), and the repetition was made at a time somewhat later in her examination than the time of the more direct admission. In other words, the later admission appears to be separate and distinct from, and perhaps uninfluenced by, the first admission. The circumstance that the interpreter was born an Okinawa Japanese, does not weigh against his extensive education and experience in the Japanese language, fully tested here in court by all counsel.

As to ground (4), subdivision (a), what I have just said indicates my satisfaction that the petitioner understood the interpreter and that she was correctly interpreted as having as a matter of fact made the admission of adultery-she being at the time of the offense a married woman and having a husband living.

[1b] There remains, then, the sole question, one of law, whether or not adultery is "a felony or other crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude". The cases of United States v. Sibray, 178 Fed. 144; United States v. Uhl, 211 Fed. 628, and Ex parte Isojiki, 222 Fed. 151, are cited for the proposition that it is not.

The identical question was before me in In the Matter of Tome Tanno, ante, p. 266, decided June 22, 1913, when I held adultery to be an offense involving moral turpitude; though not then having the advantage of reference to the decisions of other courts above cited. I there disposed of the matter rather summarily:

"It should require no discussion to establish to the mind of any one of moral sense, according to standards to which social policy can admit no exceptions, that her questioned act [adultery] was one of moral turpitude."

I then cited, without quoting, Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U. S. 225, which says at page 228:

"Beyond all doubt, offences of the kind involve moral turpitude," referring to adultery, see page 227.

I also cited, without quoting, United States v. Bitty, 208 U. S. 393, which says at page 401, what is pertinent and suggestive:

"Was that [concubinage] an immoral purpose within the meaning of the statute? . . Beyond question Congress had in view the protection of society against another class of alien women other than those who might be brought here merely for the purpose of 'prostituion"."

Also, at page 403: "The statute in question, it must be remembered, was intended to keep out of this country immigrants whose permanent residence here would not be desirable or for the common good, and we cannot suppose either that Congress intended to exempt from the operation of the statute the importation of an alien woman brought here only that she might live in a state of concubinage with the man importing her, or that it did not regard such an importation as being for an immoral purpose.'

And I cited the case of United States v. Uhl, 203 Fed. 152, which says at page 154:

'Moral turpitude' is a vague term. Its meaning depends to some extent upon the state of public morals. A definition sufficiently accurate for this case, however, is this: 'An act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the pri vate and social duties which a man owes to his fellow-man or to society."

Also cited without quotation was Gomez v. Hawaiian Gazette Co., 10 Haw. 108, which says at page 111:

"Moral turpitude is defined to be an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow-man or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man", quoting Newell on Defamation, and ruling that to charge a person with selling opium, an offense [which may perhaps be said to be in some degree merely malum prohibitum] punishable by imprisonment at hard labor, is to charge him with an offense involving moral turpitude.

Also, adultery is regarded as such an offense in Ranger v. Goodrich, 17 Wis. 80, 82-83.

The three decisions cited by petitioner's counsel, though the conclusions of able courts, cannot prevail as against the authorities just quoted. The court's discussion in the Isojiki case, 222 Fed. 151, seems unconvincing, and the court in the Sibray case, 178 Fed. 144, I respectfully submit, shows its misconception when it says, at page 150: "The answer is that the police power of the State of Pennsylvania must have control of those who offend against her laws." But this is not the "answer" at all; for it is not, of course, a case of Congress' administering the police power of any State but a question of Congress' right to say who may be admitted as desirable immigrants: Congress must let the State exercise its own police power unhampered, but in addition to any punishment to which an offender may be subject under such authority, Congress may punish the offender further by providing that his infraction of local laws shall make him, if an alien who has left the country, an undesirable person who cannot return.

If the decalogue, the moral precepts of the ages, and the rules of ecclesiastical law from early times, do not indicate that adultery is an offense involving moral turpitude, then our common teachings are hypocrisy. Note the following language of In re Hopkins, 103 Pac. 806, 806:

"This presents a question of right conduct from a purely moral standpoint, independent of the fact that the law prescribes a punishment for the making of such false statements. "Thou shalt not bear false witness' was not only one of the ten commandments of the Mosaic law, but finds sanction in the teachings of Jesus as a standard of right under the new dispensation. Indeed, this standard of right seems to be a part of the moral consciousness of the race, and to be recognized by all peoples with any appreciation of moral ideals."

If we may not judge of moral turpitude by these standards, by what standards are we to judge of it? Even though adultery was not a crime at common law, a fact which counsel urge to be significant and controlling,-it still re