the purpose of introducing any new or additional liability, but to qualify and explain clauses (a) and (b). A tax or an assessment might be "levied, imposed or assessed" upon the property which for some reason might be illegal and so adjudged upon exceptions or objections filed to the same. Manifestly it was not in the contemplation of the parties that the lessees should pay, indiscriminately, every charge or tax "levied, imposed or assessed" upon the premises, but only such of these charges as the property was, in fact, liable for and which the lessor might be required to pay by reason of or on account of his interest in said land. The purpose of clause (c) was to differentiate between taxes and charges "levied, imposed or assessed" for which the property was, in fact, liable and those for which it was not liable, and to limit the general language of clauses (a) and (b) to such taxes, only, as were legally and properly levied or assessed against the property.

Appellant's contention is, that the language of clause (c) expands the meaning of the previous language of the covenants so as to include not only a governmental tax imposed upon the property itself, but also the liability to pay an inheritance tax. We are unable to concur in this construction of the language under consideration. An inheritance tax is not a tax at all upon property. It is a condition which the State imposes upon the right or privilege of succeeding to the ownership of property by descent or will. (Kochersperger v. Drake, 167 Ill. 122; In re Estate of Graves, 242 id. 212; National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 250 id. 584.) This doctrine has been uniformly adhered to in this State and appears to be the general rule elsewhere. Mack's Estate, 46 Colo. 79; Kennedy's Estate, 157 Cal. 517; Booth's Exrs. v. Commonwealth, 130 Ky. 88; State v. Hamlin, 86 Me. 495; Swift's Estate, 137 N. Y. 77; Finnen's Estate, 196 Pa. St. 72; Knox v. Emerson, 123 Tenn. 409; Beals v. State, 139 Wis. 544; Magoun v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283.

The right to take property by descent or devise is purely a statutory right. The whole subject of the disposition of property upon the death of the owner is subject to the will of the legislature. In Kochersperger v. Drake, supra, the court say: "The laws of descent and the right to devise and take under a will within the State of Illinois owe their existence to the statute law of the State. The right to inherit and the right to devise being dependent on legislative acts, there is nothing in the constitution of this State which prohibits a change of the law with reference to those subjects at the discretion of the law-making power. The laws of descent and devise being the creation of the statute law, the power which creates may regulate and may impose conditions or burdens on a right of succession to the ownership of property to which there has ceased to be an owner because of death, and the ownership of which the State then provides for by the law of descent or devise." The same doctrine has been re-affirmed in later cases. (North v. Graham, 235 Ill. 178; Selden v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 239 id. 67.) The legislature having the undoubted power to regulate the subject of the devolution of property, may, by enacting a law for that purpose, provide that a certain portion of a decedent's property shall vest in the State. This, in effect, has been accomplished by what is known as our Inheritance Tax law. That act, in effect, provides that under conditions therein specified a certain per cent of the estate of a deceased person shall vest in the State. The State acquires title to its portion of the estate immediately upon the death of the owner. (National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, supra.) That portion of the estate which under the Inheritance Tax law vests in the State by mere operation of law becomes severed from the remainder of the estate and cannot pass either by descent or devise. While such portion of the property of a deceased person as is reserved to the State is often treated as a tax and is ordinarily denominated an inher

itance tax, still, under all the authorities, it is not a tax upon the property but is a charge upon the right or privilege of receiving it, and when the right to receive the property is considered it is apparent that it is something distinct and separate from the property itself, and it is this right to receive property by descent or devise that the State taxes. In the light of the above authorities, if we read paragraph 2 of the lease it seems to be clear that the covenants therein imposed on the lessees referred to taxes, charges and assessments which might be imposed upon the property itself, and would exclude the idea that the lessees were bound to pay inheritance taxes, which, as we have seen, is a thing wholly apart from the property itself. Again, we think that this view is strengthened by the circumstance that there is an absence of any express words in the lease which directly, in terms, refer to inheritance taxes. When the well chosen terms in which the parties sought to express their agreement in this lease are considered, it is strange, if it had been the intention to cover the payment of inheritance taxes and to impose that burden upon appellee, that a matter of such importance should be left to a mere inference from doubtful and ambiguous language. While not of controlling importance, it is to be noted that the lessor in his will made a provision for the payment of any inheritance taxes that might be charged against his estate. In so far as any argument can be drawn from this circumstance, it indicates that the testator did not consider that he had disposed of that subject in the lease by laying the burden upon the lessees.

We are of the opinion that the appellee is not required, under the terms of the lease in question, to reimburse appellant for the inheritance taxes paid.

The judgment of the Appellate Court for the First District is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

C. P. KIMBALL & Co., Appellant, vs. WILLIAM L. O'CONNELL, County Treasurer, Appellee.

Opinion filed April 23, 1914.

TAXES-the board of assessors cannot change assessment after completing the work and attaching affidavit to books. Where the board of assessors has completed the revision of its assessment of the personal property of a manufacturing or mercantile corporation and has attached to the assessment books the affidavit required by section 23 of the Revenue act of 1898 it has no further power to change the assessment or alter the assessment books so as to change or affect the taxes for that year, and any subsequent assessment by such board of the capital stock of the corporation is without authority and is void.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. JESSE A. BALDWIN, Judge, presiding.

ELLIS & LEWIS, for appellant.

CARL R. CHINDBLOM, County Attorney, and WILLIAM F. STRUCKMANN, for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE DUNN delivered the opinion of the court:

The appellant, C. P. Kimball & Co., filed a bill to restrain the county treasurer of Cook county from collecting taxes extended upon a capital stock assessment made by the board of assessors of Cook county for the year 1912. The cause was heard upon the bill, answer and replication and a stipulation as to the facts. The decree dismissed the bill for want of equity, and the complainant appealed.

Several questions have been presented by the argument of counsel, but since the board of assessors, in our opinion, was without authority to make the assessment, that is the only question we shall consider.

The appellant is an Illinois corporation organized for purely manufacturing and mercantile purposes, and its capital stock is subject to assessment by the board of assessors.

(The Hub v. Hanberg, 211 Ill. 43; Consolidated Coal Co. v. Miller, 236 id. 149.) The stipulation states that between April 1 and June 1, 1912, the board of assessors made an assessment against the personal property of the appellant and on July I returned the assessment made by them to the board of review, having attached to such assessment the affidavit required by section 23 of the act of 1898 for the assessment of property. Afterward, on September 12, 1912, the board of review, having reviewed the assessment, affixed the affidavit required by section 38 of the act of 1898. On October 2, 1912, the board of assessors made an assessment against the capital stock of the appellant of $16,667 assessed value, which the board of review confirmed on October 23 and delivered to the county clerk.

Section 23 above mentioned requires the board of assessors to meet on the third Monday in June for the purpose of revising the assessment of personal property and to finish such revision on or before the first day of July. When such revision is complete and the change and revision entered in the assessment books, it is provided that an affidavit shall be appended to each of such assessment books in the form required by law, signed by at least two of such assessors, and upon the signing of such affidavit the board of assessors shall have no further power to change the assessment or alter the assessment books so as to change or affect the taxes for that year. Section 38 provides that the board of review shall, on or before September 7, annually, complete its work, and make, or cause to be made, the entries in the assessment books required to make the assessment conform with the changes made therein by the board of review, and shall attach to each of said books an affidavit signed by at least two members of such board, provided that in counties containing 125,000 inhabitants or more the board of review shall also meet from time to time, and whenever necessary, to consider and act upon com