The evidence shows that the switch could not be opened without unlocking it with a key. The evidence further showed that there was no switch light at this switch and that none had been there for several years previous to the accident. The night was clear, and if a light had been there it could have been seen for a considerable distance before the switch was reached. The train upon which appellant's intestate was engineer was running about thirty-five miles an hour. It is also shown that the passenger train could have been stopped before reaching the switch if there had been any signal light indicating that the switch was open. The evidence shows that the deceased was a prudent and careful man. Appellee proved by employees that appellant's intestate had been engaged in running trains past this switch for several years. The purpose of this testimony was to show that the deceased knew that there was no switch light maintained upon this switch, and consequently the deceased assumed the danger of operating an engine under the conditions which he must have known to exist. Appellee also introduced a release in evidence, which is as follows: "THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD CO. RELEASE ON ACCOUNT OF DEATH BENEFIT. "Whereas, David O. Hemmick, deceased, lately in the service of the Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern Railroad Company, was a member of the relief fund of the relief department of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company under application No. 505,672, and the death benefit payable from the said relief department on account of such membership, amounting to twenty-five hundred dollars, ($2500,) with unpaid disablement benefit amounting to ..... dollars ($......,) is upon the condition of the execution of this release, as provided in the said application, payable to his wife, Sarah E. Hemmick, and Lenora Mildred Hemmick. "Now, therefore, we, the undersigned, do hereby acknowledge that the payment of the said amount by the said relief department, as aforesaid, which payment is hereby acknowledged, is in full satisfaction and discharge of all claims or demands on account of or arising from the death of said deceased, which we now have or may or can hereafter have against the said the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, operating the said relief department, and the Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern Railroad Company, and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, or any other company owning or operating branches or divisions of either of said companies above named, or any company over whose railroad, right of way or property the said the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, the Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern Railroad Company, or any company owning or operating branches or divisions of either of said companies above named, shall have the right to run or operate its engines or cars or to send its employees in the performance of their duty, or any company on whose railroad such injury or death occurred which has contributed to the maintenance of the relief fund and whose employees are members of the relief department of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, and do hereby release and forever discharge the Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern Railroad Company, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company and the said other companies from all said claims and demands. "The undersigned hereby admits that under the terms of the said application and the regulations of the relief department the acceptance of said benefits of itself operates as a full release of all the claims of the undersigned for damages by reason of said injuries against any of the said companies above referred to. "Witness our hands and seals this 25th day of March, A. D. 1911. "In the presence of T. W. Ashley, Alonzo Hoff, J. D. Marney. SARAH E. HEMMICK. [Seal.]" (Signing as widow and beneficiary, as administratrix and as guardian.) The only question that need be considered is whether the release is a bar to appellant's action. It will be noted that the release is executed by appellant as widow and beneficiary of the deceased, as administratrix of his estate and as guardian of his only child and beneficiary. The release purports, on its face, to be a release in full of all claims and demands upon the appellee company on account of the death of appellant's intestate, and it is recited in the release that "the undersigned hereby admits that under the terms of the said application and the regulations of the relief department the acceptance of said benefits of itself operates as a full release of all the claims of the undersigned for damages by reason of said injuries against any of the said companies. above referred to." While neither the application nor the certificate of membership was offered in evidence, still there is in the language above quoted an admission that the application and regulations of the relief department make the acceptance of the benefits a release of all claims on account of the injury received. In Eckman v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. 169 Ill. 312, this court held that a contract of an employee was valid by which he agreed that the acceptance of benefits in the relief department of his employer and the payment by the company of the amount stipulated to be paid by the relief department operated as a release of any cause of action that might otherwise have been maintained against the employer, and the doctrine of that case was re-affirmed in Pennsylvania Co. v. Chapman, 220 Ill. 428. There is no contention that the execution of the release was procured by fraud, and being under seal it must in an action at law be presumed to have a consideration to support it. For the purposes of this suit this release must be held valid and a complete bar to appellant's cause of action. (Mills v. Larrance, 186 Ill. 635.) The fraud which will impeach a release under seal in an action at law must relate to the execution of the instrument and not merely to the nature and extent of the consideration. (Hartley v. Chicago and Alton Railroad Co. 214 Ill. 78.) There is no pretense, here, that the execution of this instrument was procured by fraud. Appellant makes the point that she, as administratrix, is not named in the body of the release. This is not necessary, since the rule is that every person who signs an instrument becomes a party thereto. (9 Cyc. 301, and cases there cited.) There being no error in this record, the judgment of the Appellate Court for the Third District is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. THE SPRING LAKE DRAINage and LevEE DISTRICT et al. VS. WILLIAM H. STEAD, Attorney General, et al. (EDWARD S. HAAS, Plaintiff in Error, vs. THE SPRING LAKE DRAINAGE AND LEVEE DISTRICT et al. Defendants in Error.) Opinion filed April 23, 1914. 1. COURTS when lower court may enter different decree from that directed by court of review. Although upon the remandment of a cause with special directions the only course open for the lower court is to make effective the decree or the judgment of the higher court, yet parties may consent to the entry in the lower court of a decree different from that directed by the higher court's mandate or that the taking effect of the decree directed and entered shall be postponed to a future date. 2. STIPULATIONS-power of Attorney General to bind relator. A stipulation by the Attorney General to postpone the operation of a decree in a consolidated case will bind a party who does not sign the stipulation, where he is defendant in one of the cases and relator in the other and where his interests are the same in both cases and are not antagonistic to those of the Attorney General, who is justified, under the facts, in consenting to such postponement. WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Tazewell county; the Hon. T. N. GREEN, Judge, presiding. NOLEMAN & SMITH, and GEORGE B. FOSTER, for plaintiff in error. Page, Wead, HUNTER & SCULLY, for defendants in error. Mr. JUSTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the court: This case was before this court at a former term on appeal from a decree of the circuit court of Tazewell county. The decree of the circuit court was rendered in two cases pending in that court which had been consolidated and tried as one case. One of these cases was No. 3272 on the docket of the circuit court, and was a suit in chancery brought by the Spring Lake Drainage and Levee District and the commissioners of said district against William H. Stead, Attorney General, Edward S. Haas (plaintiff in error here) and others, to enjoin them from interfering with certain work by said commissioners of said drainage district. The other suit was an information filed afterwards in said court by the Attorney General on the relation of Edward S. Haas and others, on behalf of the People of the State of Illinois and the canal commissioners, against the Spring Lake Drainage and Levee District and the commissioners thereof. This suit was No. 3275 in the circuit court, and was brought to restrain the drainage district and the commissioners from interfering with the waters of Spring lake in any manner except as provided in a certain stipulation made in October, 1905, between the parties. The two cases were consolidated and tried as one before Hon. T. M. Harris, Judge, presiding. A final decree was rendered in said consolidated case in favor of the drainage district and the commissioners, from which an appeal was prayed to this court by the People and the canal commissioners, represented by the Attorney General. The final decree of the circuit court of Tazewell county was reversed by this court at the February term, 1912, and the cause was remanded to said circuit court, with directions to enter a decree perpetually enjoining the appellees, the Spring Lake Drainage and Levee District and the commissioners thereof, from proceeding in violation of said stipulation above mentioned and from interfering in any way with Spring lake except in accordance with the terms of the said stipulation. The stipulation, together with the other matters involved in said cause, is fully set out in the opinion of the court. (People v. Spring Lake Drainage District, 253 Ill. 479.) Pursuant to that decision the mandate of this court was issued and filed in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of Tazewell county, due notice was given, the case was re-instated and re-docketed, and at the December term, 1912, of said |