ing from $10,000 to $40,000. After he had so testified, depositions of the officers of the Corn Exchange Bank were taken, and showed that during the months of April, May and June, 1910, Carpenter had an unvarying balance to his credit of $8.56. Carpenter testified he did not know the law required the capital stock to be paid up before the certificate of organization could issue, and that he intended to draw money from his funds in sums of from $1000 to $5000, as needed, to make loans by the corporation, and claims Rogers explained to him he would not have to pay the money in until it was necessary to use it in the business of the company. He could give no explanation why he was not elected treasurer of the corporation. Respondent claims that in organizing the United States Trust Company he was not acting in his individual capacity and in a business venture of his own, but was acting as attorney for the incorporators. He excuses his conduct in swearing to the report of the commissioners by saying that while it might not be strictly defensible, no injury resulted to anyone as no stock was ever sold or attempted to be sold and no business was ever transacted by the corporation. Carpenter claimed to have lost confidence in Rogers immediately after the corporation was organized and refused to have anything further to do with the company.

We think the evidence justifies the conclusion that Carpenter did not have the money to pay up the capital stock of the corporation, but it is not shown that this was known. to the respondent. Respondent claims he believed and relied upon the representations of Carpenter that he had the money to pay up the capital stock at once, and felt justified, under the circumstances, in making oath that it was paid in. He claims to have acted in entire good faith and with no fraudulent motive or purpose. He claims that from his knowledge of the organization of corporations by other persons he did not understand he was committing a legal or moral wrong in making the affidavit.

The character of evidence that will justify the permanent disbarment of an attorney has been frequently defined by this court. In People v. Matthews, 217 Ill. 94, it was said only clear and satisfactory proof would justify a decision from which would flow consequences of such grave nature. In People v. Harvey, 41 Ill. 277, it was said the case made to justify disbarment must be clear and free from doubt, not only as to the act charged but as to the motive. These rules have been adhered to in many other cases too familiar to require citation. Under the rules announced in previous decisions, to justify permanent disbarment of respondent it would be necessary for the proof to show, beyond reasonable doubt, that he was guilty of the crime of perjury. It is true the affidavit he made was false, but we are not satisfied, beyond doubt, that he intended to commit deliberate and willful perjury. He was not justified in making the oath, but we cannot say the evidence shows, beyond reasonable doubt, that he knew he was committing perjury. We cannot say that if he were indicted and tried for that crime the evidence before us would result in his conviction. The discretion of courts in disbarment proceedings is not to be exercised in an arbitrary manner but in accordance with legal rules and principles for determining the guilt of the party charged. The man Lyman W. Rogers is in some way connected with every charge made against respondent. He was an unprincipled and untruthful schemer, and it was very unfortunate for respondent that he did not discover Rogers' true character at an earlier date and sever all relations with him. While endeavoring conscientiously to do no injustice to respondent, we cannot escape the conclusion that his acts and conduct in connection with the HorneBowser loan and in swearing that the capital stock of the United States Trust Company had all been paid up render it necessary for the, good of the profession and the public that respondent should be disciplined, and after careful deliberation we have concluded that the ends of justice and

the public good will be served by a suspension of respondent from practice as an attorney for a period of two years and until a further order of this court, and it is so ordered. Respondent suspended.

THE PEOPLE ex rel. Maxwell Edgar, Plaintiff in Error, vs. THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF COOK COUNTY et al. Defendants in Error.

Opinion filed April 23, 1914.

1. MANDAMUS-the pleading and practice in mandamus are the same as at law. The pleading and practice in mandamus are according to common law rules, mandamus being a common law action, and the record is the same as the record in other common law actions.

2. APPEALS AND ERRORS-bill of exceptions is necessary to review proceedings taken subsequent to judgment. A common law record ends with the judgment of the court, and if executions or other writs have been issued by the clerk to carry the judgment into effect, or if any action has been taken by the court in regard to such writs which it is desired to review, the fact of the issuance of the writs and the facts on which the action of the court is claimed to be erroneous can be brought to the consideration of a reviewing court only by bill of exceptions stating the evidence.

3. SAME bill of exceptions is necessary to bring up for review action of the court on motions. Where a motion to vacate certain orders and strike the cause from the docket has been sustained, it is necessary that the evidence heard on such motion, the facts found and the reasons existing for making the order be shown by bill of exceptions, and they cannot be preserved for review by the clerk's recitals in the record.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. JOHN P. MCGOORTY, Judge, presiding.

sel.)

MAXWELL EDGAR, pro se, (OSSIAN CAMERON, of coun

CHURCH, SHEPARD & DAY, (FRANK L. SHEPARD, of counsel,) for defendant in error National Box Company.

D. W. SULLIVAN, (JOHN BARTON PAYNE, and Ralph M. SHAW, of Counsel,) for other defendants in error.

Mr. JUSTICE DUNN delivered the opinion of the court:

Maxwell Edgar presented a petition to the circuit court of Cook county against the board of review of Cook county, the persons composing that board and certain corporations, praying for a writ of mandamus commanding the board of review to value and assess the capital stock and franchises of the said corporations and of all other companies and associations organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of this State for purely manufacturing and mercantile purposes or for either of such purposes, or for the mining and sale of coal, or for printing or for the publishing of newspapers, or for the improving and breeding of stock, the main offices of which are located in the county of Cook, for the year 1909 and for all prior years in which said companies and associations have been incorporated in Illinois and ought to have been assessed for purposes of taxation according to law. The petition was amended, and later a second amended petition was filed on October 16, 1909. The board of review answered the petition, the National Box Company (one of the corporation defendants) demurred to it, and certain of the other corporation defendants filed a joint and several answer. The demurrer of the National Box Company was overruled and judgment was rendered on the petition and the answer of the board of review, awarding a peremptory writ of mandamus commanding the board of review to value and assess the capital stock of the National Box Company for each of the years from 1899 to 1909, inclusive. The judgment was affirmed by this court. (People v. National Box Co. 248 Ill. 141.) Upon the filing of the mandate in the circuit court, a writ of mandamus, and subsequently an alias writ, were issued, and returns were made to them, respectively, by the board of review. On December 2, 1911, the petitioner filed a

petition for a rule upon the persons composing the board of review to show cause why they should not be attached for contempt of court, but the court, on July 13, 1912, denied the petition and entered an order approving the return. In the meantime replications had been filed to the answers and a rejoinder was filed by the board of review. On July 29, 1912, the plaintiff made a motion to dismiss the defendant corporations which had answered the petition and to proceed against the board of review alone, but the court denied the motion, and sustained a motion made by the said defendant corporations to vacate and set aside all proceedings as to such defendants subsequent to June 27, 1910, and to strike the cause from the docket. The plaintiff has sued out a writ of error, and the errors assigned question an order of the court expunging certain parts of the second amended petition, the order overruling the application for a rule to show cause why the members of the board of review should not be attached and approving the return to the writ, and the order vacating the proceedings subsequent to July 27, 1910, and striking the cause from the docket.

As to the two last mentioned orders the defendants in error insist that the questions are not before the court for review because not preserved by a bill of exceptions in the record. For the plaintiff it is insisted that the record shows an exception in accordance with the Practice act. The most that the plaintiff claims, however, is that the orders were excepted to. There is no pretense that there is any bill of exceptions containing any evidence upon which the action of the court was based, but the plaintiff claims that the facts showing that those orders were erroneous appear upon the face of the record. We cannot agree with that view. So far as the National Box Company is concerned, and so far as the board of review is concerned with it, the record closed with the judgment which was affirmed by this court. The writs of mandamus which were issued after the affirmance of that judgment,