as being unreasonable; but when the details of such legislation are not prescribed, an ordinance passed in pursuance of such power must be a reasonable exercise thereof or it will be pronounced invalid. (City of Lake View v. Tate, 130 Ill. 247; Hawes v. City of Chicago, 158 id. 653; Wice v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co. 193 id. 351.) It is said in the Tate case, on page 252: 'Where the power to legislate on a given subject is conferred and the mode of its exercise is not prescribed, then the ordinance passed in pursuance thereof must be a reasonable exercise of the power or it will be pronounced invalid.' In Hawes v. City of Chicago, supra, Mr. Justice Baker, in speaking for the court, in discussing the question when a court may rightfully hold an ordinance unreasonable, on page 658 said: 'Where the power to legislate on a given subject is conferred on a municipal corporation, yet if the details of such legislation are not prescribed by the legislature, there the ordinance passed in pursuance of such power must be a reasonable exercise thereof or it will be pronounced invalid.'" We do not agree with counsel for appellant that under this statute the city is given the power to prohibit the location of a garage anywhere within its corporate limits. Such. legislation by the city authorities would be so unreasonable as to render it invalid. Under this statute the city undoubtedly has the power, if it should see fit, to prohibit the location of a garage in a strictly residential district, and it necessarily follows that an ordinance permitting the location and maintenance of a garage in residential districts under the conditions prescribed by this ordinance cannot be said to be unreasonable. The requirement that the person desiring to construct or maintain a garage in any block in which two-thirds of the buildings on both sides of the street are used exclusively for residences shall procure the written consent of a majority of the property owners, according to frontage, on both sides of the street, is not unreasonable. In this case the court held, as a question of fact, that Chestnut place was not a residence street, and appellant contends that it is unreasonable to require him to secure frontage consent from the residents in that block on Chestnut street and Delaware place, these two streets being within one hundred feet of the place where it was proposed to erect the building. For the reason stated in City of Chicago v. Stratton, supra, we are of the opinion that this is not an unreasonable requirement. The place where it was proposed to erect this structure is also within two hundred feet of a church, and it is contended that this provision of the ordinance is an unreasonable restriction. The conduct of the affairs of a church, with its various meetings and assemblies in carrying out the purposes for which it is crganized, is of such a character that a city is warranted in making such a restriction. The conduct of the business of a public garage would be as offensive to the members of a church as it would be to the occupants of a private residence and would affect their comfort and welfare to the same extent. It is urged that the ordinance is invalid because it does not include private schools and other institutions similar to those mentioned in the ordinance. This is a question which does not concern appellant or affect his rights. Whether some institution not named in the ordinance in the class of hospitals, churches or public or parochial schools should be included is not involved here. Other reasons are suggested for the invalidity of the ordinance which are not involved and for that reason will not be noted. The ordinance is valid, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. MARGARET E. HUTSON et al. Plaintiffs in Error, vs. LOREN N. WOOD et al. Defendants in Error. Opinion filed April 23, 1914—Rehearing denied June 3, 1914. I. PRACTICE when right to change of venue is absolute. The right to a change of venue is absolute where a party brings himself within the provisions of the statute. 2. SAME when granting change of venue is discretionary. The statute requires reasonable notice of an application for a change of venue, but what shall constitute reasonable notice is left to the discretion of the judge to whom the application is made, to he determined by him in view of all the circumstances in the particular case, and this discretion will not be interfered with unless abused. 3. SAME-when refusal to change venue is not an abuse of discretion. It is not an abuse of discretion to refuse a change of venue in a chancery case on the ground of the judge's prejudice, where notice of the application was not given until 4:20 o'clock in the afternoon of the day preceding the day at which the case was set for hearing. 4. CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT—an affidavit proving execution of warrant of attorney is jurisdictional. In a confession of judgment in vacation the filing of an affidavit to prove the execution of the warrant of attorney is jurisdictional, and a judgment entered without it is void. 5. SAME when proof of execution of warrant of attorney is insufficient. An affidavit intended to prove the execution of a joint warrant of attorney does not authorize the entry of a judgment by confession in vacation, where the affidavit purports to prove the execution of the warrant by only one of its signers and where the jurat to the affidavit is not signed. 6. SAME―unsigned jurat to affidavit proving the execution of warrant of attorney to confess judgment cannot be amended by parol evidence. In confessions of judgment in vacation the evidence of the execution of the power of attorney must unequivocally appear in the record, and that record must be tried by itself and its validity cannot be made to depend upon evidence aliunde, and hence evidence is not admissible to prove that an unsigned jurat to the affidavit purporting to prove the execution of the warrant of attorney was, in fact, sworn to before a deputy clerk, who omitted to sign the jurat. (Kruse v. Wilson, 79 Ill. 233, Cox v. Stern, 170 id. 442, and Bickerdike v. Allen, 157 id. 95, distinguished.) 7. SAME-proof of execution of note construed. A statement in an affidavit intended to prove the execution of a promissory note, that affiant knows "M. E. Hutson, the maker of the annexed note," amounts to the certification of affiant's acquaintance with the maker but does not amount to a statement, under oath, that such maker executed the note. 8. SAME when judgment by confession is void. A judgment by confession entered in vacation must be for the precise amount, neither more nor less, confessed by the plea of cognovit actionem, otherwise it is void; and it is error to include the costs for entering up judgment, where the plea merely says that the plaintiff has sustained damages on occasion of the non-performance of the several promises and undertakings mentioned in the declaration, and does not say that the plaintiff has sustained the damages mentioned in the declaration or damages to the amount mentioned in the declaration. 9. JUDICIAL SALES-purchaser acquires no title at void judicial sale. The power of a sheriff to sell land upon execution and to convey the land sold is statutory and depends upon a valid judgment and process, and if the judgment is void, the execution, the sale and the deed are necessarily void and a purchaser at the sale obtains no title. 10. SAME-purchaser at void sale cannot recover money paid. In the absence of statute the purchaser at a judicial sale cannot recover, either at law or in equity, the money paid for a defective title or for a title which is void for want of power to make the sale, the rule of caveat emptor being applicable to such sales. II. SAME-purchaser at void sale may be reimbursed for payment of encumbrance. A purchaser in good faith at a void execution sale, believing that he was acquiring a good title, who is in possession of the real estate and who has paid an existing encumbrance on the land, is entitled, in equity, to be re-paid the amount of such payment by the real owner before the latter can recover possession from the purchaser. 12. PARTITION-complainant may be required to reimburse purchaser at void execution sale amount paid to remove encumbrance. Upon a bill for partition asking to have removed as a cloud upon the title a deed based upon a void execution sale, the court, on the principle that he who seeks equity must do equity, may compel the complainant to reimburse the purchaser the amount paid to relieve the land of an encumbrance, as a condition to granting the relief prayed. 13. PLEADING when cross-bill is germane to the original bill. A cross-bill is germane to the original bill where the cross-complainants could not otherwise obtain the relief sought thereby, and where the cross-bill, if sustained, would prevent the relief sought by the original bill. 14. SAME when cross-bill is not multifarious. A cross-bill is not multifarious where it relates to a single transaction involving several parcels of real estate and where all the parties and all the land could not properly be investigated piecemeal. 15. PARTIES who is a proper party to cross-bill. A party who is connected with others in a single transaction concerning several pieces of real estate and whose rights might be affected by a complete disposition of the case is a proper party to a cross-ill relating to such transaction. 16. LACHES when owner of land is not barred by laches short of Statute of Limitations. The owner of land sold under a void execution sale and out of possession may sue for the recovery of the land at any time within the period of limitation fixed by statute, where there is no question of estoppel involved. WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Franklin county; the Hon. JACOB R. CREIGHTON, Judge, presiding. W. P. SEEBER, and D. G. THOMPSON, for plaintiffs in error. GEORGE B. GILLESPIE, GEORGE B. HOLMES, ROYAL B. CUSHING, W. S. CANTRELL, and WILLIAM H. HART, for defendants in error. Mr. JUSTICE DUNN delivered the opinion of the court: In 1907, and before, Margaret E. Hutson was the owner of lot 23 in the original town of Benton, and her husband, E. G. Hutson, was the owner of lot 24 and of eighty acres of land in Franklin county. On January 12, 1907, they both executed a mortgage on all this real estate to secure their joint note to J. T. Chenault for $1000. On May 13, 1907, they both executed a mortgage on the same property to secure their joint note to J. T. Chenault for $10,000. A decree foreclosing both mortgages was rendered at the November term, 1908, of the Franklin county circuit court, and on January 30, 1909, all the mortgaged premises were sold under this decree by the master in chancery to J. T. Chenault for $13,704.13. On August 18, 1908, in vaca |