ter Burton on January 2, 1896, and the appraisement was made and the order assessing the tax entered in 1899. In our opinion section 22 has no application to a case like this, nor to any case for the collection of a tax as against the person liable for its payment under the statute. By section 22 the lien of the tax is continued until the tax is settled and satisfied and is limited to the property chargeable therewith, provided it is sued for within five years after it is due and legally demandable, but if it is not so sued for it "shall be presumed to be paid, and cease to be a lien as against any purchasers of real estate." It seems to us clear it was not intended that unless the tax was sued for within five years from the time it became due and demandable the People should be barred from its collection from the person liable for the tax. The object of the statute was to bar the lien against the property liable for the tax in the hands of purchasers unless it was sued for within five years. If that is not so the last clause of the proviso is meaningless. The first sentence in the statute makes the tax a lien until settled and satisfied. The first proviso limits this lien to the property chargeable with the tax. The second proviso is, that if the tax is not sued for within five years after due and demandable, it shall be presumed to be paid "and cease to be a lien as against any purchasers of real estate." The language just quoted would be meaningless if it were intended to bar the collection of the tax from the person liable if not sued for within five years. If the collection of the tax from the person liable is barred within five years, then there would have been no necessity for saying that the lien of the tax, as against purchasers of real estate, should cease after five years. Necessarily, if the person liable was released of his liability the lien ceased. What the legislature was dealing with by section 22 was the lien for the tax against the property chargeable therewith. That continued for five years to be a lien against the property, but if it was not sued for

within that time the person liable was not relieved, but the property chargeable with the tax in the hands of a purchaser was relieved of the lien created by the statute. If no bar had been placed to the lien against the property it would have interfered with its sale and transfer, but if the tax was not sued for within five years a purchaser of the property took it discharged of the lien for the tax but the personal liability did not cease. This construction was placed upon a similar statute of the State of Pennsylvania. (In the Matter of Estate of Cullen, 142 Pa. St. 18.) A contrary construction was given a similar statute of Tennessee in Miller v. Wolfe, 115 Tenn. 234, but the reasoning in the opinion in the latter case is not convincing. Under our construction of section 22 it was not a bar to this proceeding.

The court ordered the amounts respectively assessed against appellants to be paid within ten days, together with interest thereon at the rate of six per cent per annum from the death of S. Lester Burton, and also taxed an attorney's fee of $50 to Adah F. Burton Morgan and an attorney's fee of $75 to Robert C. Burton. In this there was no error, as both are authorized by the act of 1895 and the act of 1909 now in force.

Other objections are urged, but they are without merit and are not of sufficient importance to warrant any specific

mention thereof.

The order of the county court is affirmed.

Order affirmed.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTER having entered certain orders in this case in the trial court took no part in the decision of

FLOYD MCKINSTRY et al. Appellants, s. ARTHUR E. PRICE et al. Appellees.

Opinion filed June 16, 1914.

1. WILLS-codicil will be held to revoke will only when necessary. Courts will endeavor to construe a codicil so as to reconcile it with the will as far as possible, and the codicil will be held to revoke the will only when necessary to give effect to the provisions of the codicil.

2. SAME-what provision of will must be regarded as revoked by codicil. A provision of a will requiring the executor to have full control of certain devised land until an existing encumbrance thereon is paid from the rents and profits must be regarded as revoked by the provision of a codicil giving the land to the executor in trust, to sell and convey the same when he shall deem it for the best interest of the estate to do so.

3. TRUSTS-when purchaser of trust property is not required to see to application of purchase money. The purchaser of land from a trustee is not required to see that the money is applied to the purposes of the trust even though he knew the land was trust estate, where the beneficiaries, who were all of age and under no disability, and without any fraud being practiced upon them, executed quit-claim deeds to the trustee to enable him to make the sale.

4. ESTOPPEL-when beneficiaries are estopped to set aside sale because the trustee has not accounted to them. Beneficiaries who are all of age and under no disability, and who execute quit-claim deeds to the trustee of the land in order to enable him to sell the land, and who later, after the purchaser has been in possession of the land for almost a year, execute quit-claim deeds to him, without any fraud on his part, in order to enable him to obtain a loan on the land, are estopped to have the sale set aside on the ground that the trustee has not accounted to them for the purchase money.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Kankakee county; the Hon. DORRANCE DIBELL, Judge, presiding.

W. R. HUNTER, and WALTER C. SCHNEIDER, for appellants.

H. K. & H. H. WHEELER, and DEFREES, BUCKINGHAM & EATON, for appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE FARMER delivered the opinion of the court: Appellants, three of whom are grand-daughters of John Bennett, deceased, and daughters of George M. Bennett, executor and trustee under the will of John Bennett, and the husbands of the two who are married, filed their bill to the May term, 1912, of the Kankakee county circuit court, asking for the rescission of a sale of real estate by George M. Bennett, as trustee, to Arthur E. Price and Edward C. Curtis, on July 30, 1908, who, together with George M. Bennett, were made parties defendant. Other parties were made defendants to the bill but no relief was asked as to them. The bill sets out, in substance, the will of John Bennett, deceased, which will be more fully referred to hereafter, and alleged that in the year 1906 George M. Bennett became heavily indebted to the Grant Park National Bank, of which appellee Curtis was a stockholder and the cashier; that at the suggestion of Curtis a number of persons gave the bank their accommodation notes to take the place of Bennett's notes, and Bennett gave said persons. his notes in equal amounts; that among such persons giving such accommodation notes for Bennett were appellee Arthur Price and his brother, David Price; that each of them gave their notes to the bank for $5000 and took from Bennett his notes in equal amounts, indorsed by Curtis. The Grant Park Trust and Savings Bank succeeded the Grant Park National Bank and became the owner of its assets, including the accommodation notes referred to. The bill alleges that while said notes were so held by the bank, Arthur Price, Curtis and George M. Bennett fraudulently conspired and agreed that Price should purchase from Bennett, as trustee, the land described in the sixth, seventh and eighth paragraphs of the will of John Bennett, and that said Price did thereafter purchase said land; that a part of the consideration agreed upon was the $10,000 of Bennett's indebtedness to the bank for which it held the accommodation

notes of Arthur Price and David Price, and that the said conspiracy was carried out. The bill alleges that no other consideration was paid for the land by Price than the cancellation of Bennett's indebtedness to the bank, but it is not now claimed the proof sustained that allegation. It is claimed that $10,000 of Bennett's indebtedness to the bank for which the bank held accommodation notes of the Prices was canceled and satisfied as a part of the consideration for the sale of the land, and that when these notes were surrendered to the Prices they delivered up the notes of Bennett held by them and which were indorsed by Curtis. The bill further alleges that Price knew appellants had an interest in the land, and that he, Bennett and Curtis conspired to defraud them, and that they were ignorant of the said conspiracy; that during the spring or summer of 1908 George M. Bennett, conspiring with Price and Curtis to deceive and defraud appellants, represented to them that it was necessary for them to execute a quit-claim deed for the land to Bennett to enable him to give a perfect title when he sold the land in accordance with the terms of the will, and appellants were thereby induced to execute and deliver to Bennett quit-claim deeds; that at that time appellants were ignorant of the fact that Bennett had contracted for the sale of the land to Price. The bill further alleges that March 29, 1909, David Price, at the request and on behalf of Arthur Price, and pursuant to their fraudulent schemes, represented that Arthur Price was the bona fide owner of the lands; that he was desirous of making a loan thereon, and that the person from whom he was getting the loan required a deed to him from the heirs and devisees of John Bennett, and relying upon these representations they were induced to, and did, execute a quit-claim deed to Price. The bill set out encumbrances placed on the land after the sale to Price, and alleged the conveyance by George M. Bennett to Price was made with full knowledge of and in fraud of appellants' rights; that they have never received