Mary Schultz $50 per year during her life, which was made a charge against that portion of his estate devised to George M. Bennett. By the eleventh paragraph the testator devised his residuary estate to George M. Bennett, who was named executor in the will. Subsequently the testator made a codicil, by the first paragraph of which he gave to the Baptist church of Grant Park $200, annually, for five years next after his death. By the second paragraph he gave to the Union Corner's cemetery, near Grant Park, $50, annually, for the next five years succeeding his death. The third paragraph of the codicil is as follows: "The land mentioned in clauses 6, 7 and 8 I give and devise to my son, George M. Bennett, as trustee, for the following purposes: To sell and convey the same when he shall deem it for the best interests of the estate so to do, and from the proceeds of such sale or sales shall set aside and loan, upon unquestionable real estate security, a sufficient sum which at a low rate of interest will produce more than sufficient funds for the annuities hereinbefore in my said will and this codicil thereto specified to be paid, and the residue shall be distributed among the following persons: To my granddaughter Nellie B. Ferree and her husband, Dr. Ferree, one-third part; to my grand-daughter Georgia H. Bennett one-third part, and to my grand-daughter, Coralie B. McKinstry, and her husband, Floyd McKinstry, one-third part; and at the death of my wife, Nellie Bennett, then such fund remaining from the payment of annuities shall be divided into three equal parts and be distributed in like manner as the residue herein is distributed. Intending that the annuities herein provided shall be a lien on the real estate left by me and shall be paid first from the income or proceeds derived therefrom."

It will be seen the codicil makes no provision that the existing encumbrance be first paid out of the rents and profits before the land can be sold, but gives the trustee power and authority "to sell and convey the same when he

shall deem it for the best interests of the estate so to do." A strong effort will be made to construe a codicil so as to reconcile it with the will as far as possible, and the codicil will be held to revoke the will only when necessary to give effect to the provisions of the codicil. (Page on Wills, sec. 269.) Construing the will and codicil together as one instrument, as giving effect to the testator's intention, we think the provision in paragraph 9 of the will requiring the trustee to pay off an existing encumbrance on the land out of the rents and profits derived from the land before sell-. ing the same must give way and be superseded by the later provision found in the third paragraph of the codicil, giving the trustee power to sell when "he shall deem it for the best interests of the estate so to do." It is not possible to reconcile these provisions, and such being the case, the later of the two must prevail. Dickison v. Dickison, 138 Ill. 541.

It is contended that Price, and Curtis, who was to get one-half interest in the land, knew the land was trust property; that they were bound to take notice of the scope of the trustee's authority, and were bound to see that the purchase money was applied to the proper discharge of the trust. The proof shows Price and Curtis knew the land was trust property, at least at the time the deed was made, but in our opinion the proof in this record does not make a case where the duty is imposed upon the purchaser to see to the application of the purchase money to the proper discharge of the trust. (Dickson v. New York Biscuit Co. 211 Ill. 468; Seaverns v. Presbyterian Hospital, 173 id. 414.) But even if the case were one in which the purchaser from a trustee was bound to see to the proper application of the money, the purchasers in this case were relieved of that duty by the beneficiaries of the trust executing quit-claim deeds. The beneficiaries were all of age and under no disabilities. For the purpose of enabling their father to consummate the sale, they at his request, in May, 1908, executed to him quit-claim deeds. Before

that time the contract for the sale had been made between George M. Bennett and Price, and Price was in possession of the land. The claim that these deeds were procured by fraud is not sustained by the proof. After Price had received his deed and had paid for the land in the manner before stated, he wished to borrow $16,000 on the land to pay off existing encumbrances. The man he was negotiating with for the loan would not agree to let Price have that much money, secured by a mortgage on the land, unless appellants would make Price a quit-claim deed for the land. This they did March 29, 1909, at the request of Price, without any fraud being practiced upon them, so far as shown by the evidence. They knew the deeds they made to Bennett were desired by him for the purpose of enabling him to make the sale, and almost a year after the sale, and with knowledge the purchaser was in possession, they at his request made him a quit-claim deed. Even if their act in making the first quit-claim deeds would not estop them from asking that the sale be set aside on the ground that they did not know the trustee would not distribute the money to them, certainly their deed to Price would estop them, for they knew when that deed was made there had been no distribution to them of any part of the purchase money by their father, the trustee. It is apparent appellants were willing to release the land from liability to them and rely upon the trustee. While the quit-claim deeds to Bennett did not give him the power to sell the land, (he derived that power from the will,) Price and Curtis would not buy it unless appellants released the land from liability to them, and the sale would not have been made but for appellants' act in making the quit-claim deeds. The quitclaim deeds are, in our judgment, as effective to estop appellants as receipts for their respective shares of the trust fund would have been. No fraud or collusion on the part of the purchasers was proven, and whatever appellants' rights might have been if they had not chosen to release

the land from liability to them for the purpose of facilitating its sale, they are now in no position to disaffirm the release. They, by executing the release, evidenced their intention to look solely to the trustee for the distribution of the fund and thereby induced the purchaser to buy and pay for the land, and after the sale they re-affirmed the release by the quit-claim deed to Price. It would be most inequitable now to permit them to disaffirm their release, rescind the sale and subject the land to their claims.

We are of opinion the decree of the circuit court was right, and it is affirmed. Decree affirmed.

BARBARA SCHOTTLER, Admx., Appellee, vs. ELLEN M. QUINLAN et al.—(JACOB GLOS, Appellant.)

Opinion filed June 16, 1914.

I. CLOUD ON TITLE—what is not sufficient prima facie proof of ownership. The mere introduction in evidence of a deed from a person who is not otherwise shown to have had possession of or title to the property, and without proof of possession taken or the exercise of acts of ownership over the property by the grantee, is not sufficient prima facie proof of title to authorize the setting aside of a tax deed as a cloud on such title.

2. SAME―administratrix must prove ownership by deccased on petition to sell land for debts and to remove cloud. The probate court has jurisdiction to remove a cloud from the title of real estate sought to be sold by the administratrix to pay debts of the estate, but it is essential, in such case, that the administratrix make prima facie proof that the deceased had title to the land at his death.

APPEAL from the Probate Court of Cook county; the Hon. DANIEL H. GREGG, Judge, presiding.

JOHN R. O'CONNOR, for appellant.

HENRY N. STOLTENBERG, for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE FARMER delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from the probate court of Cook county on a petition to sell real estate to pay debts. The petition alleges the property described therein belonged to Michael F. Quinlan, who died intestate July 17, 1912, leaving a widow but no children. He left no personal property to pay the widow's award, which was fixed at $1000. The original petition was filed May 16, 1913, and alleged that Jacob Glos, who, with others, was made a party defendant, bought the land described in the petition September 21, 1910, at a tax sale and received a certificate of purchase therefor; that two years had elapsed since the sale was made and that no redemption had been made from the sale. A supplemental petition was filed on September 26, 1913, which alleged that since the filing of the original petition Jacob Glos had applied for and received a tax deed for the property, dated August 23, 1913, but the petition alleges the tax deed is invalid and sets up several grounds upon which this allegation is based. The petition alleged the premises were vacant and unimproved. The answer of Jacob Glos denied all the material allegations of the petition except that he had bought the land at tax sale and had received a tax deed therefor. The answer denied that the deed was invalid, and alleged that Glos had a good title in fee simple to the premises by reason of his tax deed and that he was the owner of the property described in the petition. Upon a hearing of the issues made by the petition and answer a decree was entered for the sale of the property as prayed in the petition. The court found the tax deed of Glos was a cloud upon the title to said premises and decreed it be set aside and the title to said premises be quieted. The decree found the amount paid by Glos for the premises at the tax sale, the amount of taxes paid thereon since said sale, together with interest on said payments, and ordered the administratrix or the heirs of Mich