received from her $50 for making the loan. That money was received with the knowledge of Mrs. Bobb, but she left the matter entirely in the hands of the respondent, relying upon him to see that she got her money back. He took a note dated January 2, 1912, signed by Lulu Munger, for $550, payable to the order of Mrs. Bobb in monthly installments of $10 each, at his office, with interest at seven per cent, payable semi-annually, and to secure the payment of the note Lulu Munger made a chattel mortgage on some office property and assigned the lease of her room. The property was not worth more than $100, and only $10 was ever paid on the note, which was on February 5, 1912. Shortly after the note was made the landlord distrained all of the property of Lulu Munger for rent and the note was worthless. On January 8, 1912, the respondent, without the knowledge of Mrs. Bobb, loaned Irving A. Weekes $85 on his note, due in six months, payable to her order, with interest at seven per cent. On January 13, 1912, the respondent, with the knowledge of Mrs. Bobb, loaned to Weekes an additional $60 on his note, payable in six months to her order, with interest at seven per cent. The respondent received from Weekes for fees and expenses in making these loans $15. As security for the loans the respondent held an unrecorded deed to twenty acres of Michigan land and an unrecorded mortgage of Michigan land securing the payment of notes of William F. Nutt, trustee. On March I, 1912, Mrs. Bobb withdrew her notes, papers and business from respondent, and afterward, on November 22, 1912, $29 was credited on the second note of Weekes, paid to Mr. Coy, who had the note for collection, and it is agreed. that after the evidence in the case was taken $79 has been realized out of the Weekes loans. On January 8, 1912, the respondent gave a check to Taylor A. Snow for $725 for the purchase of a note of that amount, payable in monthly installments and secured by second mortgage on real estate in Cook county. This is known as the Raedell loan, and the

payment of the note was guaranteed by Taylor A. Snow, who was solvent and good for the debt. The respondent introduced Mrs. Bobb to August Renner, and she went to work for him in his printing office and worked four or five weeks at four dollars per week. On January 18, 1912, the respondent loaned $400 of her money to Renner on his note, due in one year, payable to her order, with interest at six per cent, and took a chattel mortgage on machinery and the outfit of the printing establishment. The mortgage was the third mortgage on the property, and on January 15, 1913, one mortgage was foreclosed on most of the property, and on January 18, 1913, another mortgage was foreclosed taking the remainder, excepting an electric motor, which was rented from the General Electric Company. The general reputation of the respondent for honesty and integrity during the years 1911 and 1912 was good.

These are the facts from which it is to be determined whether the respondent is a proper person to hold the license of this court to practice as an attorney. Mrs. Bobb saw his advertisement in the "Wanted" columns of a daily newspaper as an attorney and called at his office and told him about the divorce proceedings, claiming that $3000 had been allowed her, instead of $2000 and temporary alimony in fact allowed. He made a contract with her by which he was to receive one-half of all he secured over $2000, and a reasonable fee if only $2000 was recovered. He obtained a copy of the decree and found that she had been allowed only $2000, with temporary alimony until it should be paid, and that $2023 was on deposit with the clerk of the circuit court. He then learned that she had no claim against her attorneys, and from that time his only efforts in her behalf were to have the money paid over. He rendered no services requiring any legal knowledge and no substantial service of any kind. He had nothing to do with the payment of the money except to send the receipt and satisfaction of the decree, and the only service rendered

would have been performed by any banker for a trifling. fee. He knew that she was a poor woman, for he wrote that she had no money to take the trip to Wisconsin and get the money in the clerk's hands which belonged to her. The money was ready for her, and he knew that she could have gone to Wisconsin and obtained the money herself at the expense of a few dollars. All that he did was to save her the expense of a journey to Richland Center, Wisconsin, or the small charge of a banker. Twice he secured a place for her at four dollars per week, from which she had to meet her living expenses, and for transferring all her worldly possessions from the clerk of the court to himself he deducted $225. The respondent testified that he spent fifty hours' time in attention to the business of Mrs. Bobb, and attorneys appeared before the commissioner and testified that the services stated by him were reasonably worth $225, but the commissioner gave no credence to either testimony and was right in not doing so. There was no legal question involved and no investigation required except to learn the facts by writing letters, and the respondent could not have employed fifty hours in doing that. The courts are not bound by opinions of attorneys concerning what is a reasonable charge for legal services, but are responsible to litigants for the use of their own knowledge of the value of such services, and ought to, and will, take into consideration such knowledge. (Goodwillie v. Millimann, 56 Ill. 523; Metheny v. Bohn, 164 id. 495; Gentleman v. Sanitary District, 260 id. 317.) And the question in such cases is what the usual charge would be between parties competent to contract and free to do so. (Reynolds v. McMillan, 63 Ill. 46; McMannomy v. Chicago, Danville and Vincennes Railroad Co. 167 id. 497.) We cannot understand by what process of reasoning attorneys could conclude that a woman who had $2023 when she employed an attorney, and two months and four days after the attorney received her money, when she withdrew her papers

and business from him, she had received $80.34 from him, and had, at most, the prospect, if existing loans should be paid, of finally receiving about $1000, was the beneficiary of services worth $225, or that any business man or woman capable of contracting would have agreed to pay $225 for all of the services rendered, from first to last, by the attorney. We are sure that opinions of that kind do not generally prevail among attorneys, and we agree with the views of the commissioner on that subject.

We also agree with the commissioner that the making of the loan to Lulu Munger on chattel property worth less than one-fifth of the loan was a gross neglect of duty; that the act of taking $50 from her for making the loan was reprehensible, and that the knowledge of an ignorant client did not excuse respondent. He had no right to occupy a position where his interest conflicted with his duty to his client, even if she knew it while relying upon him to see that the money was securely loaned. The loans of Weekes and Renner were without such security as any person of ordinary judgment would have required, and the purchase of the second mortgage notes of Raedell were not proper investments with the funds of a client such as Mrs. Bobb, although the amount might finally be recovered by redemption from the first mortgage, which she would be unable to make, or be recovered on the guaranty of Snow. The respondent well knew that his client was a poor woman, unable to earn a comfortable living, and that the means in his possession constituted her whole estate. The proper function of an attorney is to conserve and protect the interests and property of his clients and not to divest them of their property and estate. The facts found justify but one conclusion, which is, that the respondent ought not to bear the license of this court to practice the profession of law and thereby induce persons requiring the services of an attorney to repose confidence in him and entrust their property and interests to his care.

The report of the commissioner is confirmed. The rule is made absolute, and the name of the respondent will be stricken from the roll of attorneys of this court.

Rule made absolute.

W. E. STEVENSON, County Treasurer, Appellant, vs. MALINDA B. MONTGOMERY et al. Appellees.

Opinion filed April 23, 1914.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-provisions of the statute for administration of estates of persons presumed to be dead are not invalid. The provisions of sections 20a and 78, added in 1911 to the general Administration act, which provide for the administration of the estates of absent persons upon proof of such facts as raise the legal presumption of death, are not unconstitutional, as an attempt to confer jurisdiction upon county courts to administer the estates of living persons.

2. SAME-provisions of sections 20a and 78 of Administration act are within the title of such act. The provisions of sections 200 and 78, added in 1911 to the general Administration act and relating to the administration of the estates of absent persons presumed in law to be dead, are within the title of the act, which is, "An act in regard to the administration of estates," even though it is true that the "estates" contemplated by the act are estates of deceased persons, and that if the person presumed to be dead is, in fact, alive, he is not affected by the distribution of his estate after the payment of costs, expenses and claims.

3. ADMINISTRATION-letters may be granted upon estate of a person presumed to be dead. If a person has been absent from her last place of residence without having been heard from for seven years by those who would naturally hear from her if she were alive, and if diligent but ineffectual search has been made wherever there is a reasonable probability that she might be found or information obtained leading to the discovery of her whereabouts, a presumption of death arises and authorizes letters of administration to issue upon her estate.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Warren county; the Hon. GEORGE W. THOMPSON, Judge, presiding.

J. W. CLENDENIN, for appellant.