*471 See United States Fidelity Sup. Ct. Rep. 142; United States use of Hill v. American Surety Co. 200 U. S. 197, 203, 50 L. ed. 437, 440, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 168. As we read the decision of the supreme court of appeals of Virginia, it is not held that a lien was fixed upon the dredge, if in fact the title thereto passed to the United States. In any event, it could not be tolerated that property of the United States could be seized or encumbered under state lien laws of the character in question. We are not now dealing with the right of state to provide for such liens while property to the chattel in process of construction remains in the builder, who may be constructing the same with a view to transferring title therein to the United States upon its acceptance under a contract with the government. We are now treating of property which the United States owns. Such property, for the most obvious reasons of public policy, cannot be seized by authority of another sovereignty, against the consent of the government. The Benyuard, as fast as constructed, became one of the instrumentalities of the government, intended for public use, and could not be seized under state laws to answer the claim of a private person, however meritorious. the supreme judical court of Massachusetts, | in this court. used this significant language (page 297) & G. Co. v. Golden Pressed Fire Brick Co. "If this were a suit brought by the build-191 U. S. 416, 425, 48 L. ed. 242, 246, 24 ers to enforce a lien for materials furnished for the construction of a ship under a contract directly with the government, or for repairs on a public vessel, the title of which was vested in the United States at the time the work was done or the supplies were furnished, the argument founded on public policy, and the suggestions arising from the inconvenience of causing delay and embarrassment to the public service, would be entitled to very great weight. It might in such case be open to grave doubt whether a lien on the property of the United States could be given by virtue of an enactment of the legislature of a state, or whether services rendered and materials supplied directly to the government must not be presumed to have been furnished exclusively on the faith and credit of the United States, to the exclusion of any intent to rely on a lien upon the public property. But considerations of this nature have no application to a case like the present. It would have been competent for the United States, if they wished to avoid the inconvenience or danger of delay arising from liens in favor of private persons, to make their contract in such form as to devest the builder of any title to the property in the vessel during the process of construc- Nor do we think the case one for the tion, or to stipulate for the application of application of the doctrine governing cases the purchase money to the extinguishment where the United States claims an interest of all claims for materials furnished to the in property lawfully in possession of a builder." court which is administering it, as in As we construe the contract for the con- equity or in admiralty, and the governstruction of the Benyuard, it did "devestment intervenes to protect its interest therethe builder of any title to the property in in. In such instances its rights must be the vessel during the process of construc-adjudicated in recognition of the rights. tion." The question in this aspect of the and demands of others interested in the case then becomes one as to the right of a same property. In this case the vessels. state lien law to fasten upon the property were released under a stipulation which of the United States, and that property a fully protected the rights of the United vessel intended for the use of the govern States, and the government claims the exment in carrying on its necessary opera-clusive right and title in the Benyuard as tions in the exercise of its governmental the parts were completed and paid for. authority. In the case of the Mohawk there is no such stipulation as to passing of the title on partial payments in the progress of thework as is found in the contract for the Benyuard. The Secretary of the Treasury was, in his discretion, to make partial payments under the contract during the progress of the work, not to exceed 75 per cent of the value of the labor and materials actually furnished and delivered, and a lien was reserved for such payments, in the following language: It was in recognition of the inability of contractors for labor and material to take liens upon the public property of the United States that Congress passed the act of August 13, 1894 (28 Stat. at L. 278, chap. 280, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2523), amended February 24, 1905 (33 Stat. at L. 811, chap. 778, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1909, p. 948), providing for bonds in favor of those who furnished labor or materials in the construction of public works. It was in view of this purpose to provide protec- "Provided, That a lien shall be, and heretion for those who could not protect them- by is, reserved to the United States upon selves by liens upon public property that the hull, machinery, fittings, and equipthe statute was given liberal construction ment of said vessel, and the materials on ⚫472 *474 473 hand for use in her construction, respec- | debted to other persons who should perform tively and collectively, for all moneys ad- labor or furnish materials in the building vanced on account thereof, and that such of the vessel, who might become entitled, lien shall commence with the first payment, by reason of such claims against the comand shall thereupon attach to the work pany, to liens upon the property. and the materials furnished, and shall in like manner attach from time to time, as the work progresses, and as further payments are made, and shall continue until the completion and acceptance of said vessel." This lien, it is asserted, was reserved in accordance with a joint resolution of Congress passed May 5, 1894 (28 Stat. at L. 582, 583), which is as follows: "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives *of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he hereby is, authorized to make partial payments, from time to time, upon existing contracts and all contracts hereafter made for the construction of vessels for the Treasury Department, but not in excess of 75 per cent of the amount of the value of the work already done; and that the contracts hereafter made shall provide for a lien upon such vessels for all advances so made: Provided, That nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to hereafter authorize any partial payments except on contracts stipulating for the same, and then only in accordance with such contract stipulation." On behalf of the government it is contended that this resolution makes the lien of the government, reserved under the contract, an express statutory lien by authority of the United States, and consequently superior to any asserted rights under the lien laws of a state. But we cannot agree to this contention. The joint resolution, if it be conceded to have the effect of an act of Congress, does not undertake to create a statutory lien, but directs how contracts thereafter made shall provide with reference to liens upon such vessels. As to future contracts, it is directed that they shall provide for liens upon vessels for advances thus made. We think the lien mentioned is only one created by the terms of the contract, and is to be considered in the light of the other provisions thereof. The contract was made with the Virginia corporation, and it was intended that the bond required of the Trigg Company should protect the government against rights arising out of labor performed or material furnished in the construction of the vessel. Conceding it to be true for this purpose, as asserted by the counsel for the government, that the United States can make contracts providing liens of this character which shall be superior to the claims of any person for liens under state laws, it is none the less certain that it may, if it chooses, recognize the authority of the states to protect persons who may furnish labor or materials for the construction of government work. Indeed, such, as we have seen, is the policy of the government in respect to public buildings and structures, upon which liens cannot be taken under the laws of the states. In order that such claims may be satisfied, the United States has made provision for their protection by bonds upon which persons may recover damages, so that those who furnish property of which the government receives the benefit shall not entail a loss by so doing. Read in the light of this policy, so manifestly just and proper, and the requirements of this contract and bond, we think that the government did not intend that the lien which it reserved for itself should be superior to that of contractors for labor and material who had contributed to the work. The case of the Galveston is controlled by the same principles. In that contract there was no provision for taking title to the vessel; on the contrary, it was stipulated that, on certain conditions, the title should vest in the United States as collateral security, and the eighteenth clause of the contract provides for the release of liens before partial payments shall be required. This clause is distinct and clear in its requirements and reads: "When a payment is made under this At the time of entering into the contract, contract, as a condition precedent thereto, a bond was required and was given by the the Secretary of the Navy may, in his Trigg Company in the penal sum of $45,000, discretion, require, for the protection of conditioned for the proper construction of the party of the first part, evidence satisthe vessel according to the contract and factory to him, to be furnished by the party specifications, and that the Trigg Com- of the first part, that no lien or rights in pany should promptly make payments to rem of any kind against said vessels, or her other persons supplying labor and mate-machinery, fittings, or equipment, or the rials in the prosecution of the work. We material on hand for use in the construction think this requirement was a distinct thereof, have been or can be acquired for recognition on the part of the government or on account of any work done or any that the Trigg Company might become*in-' machinery, fitting, equipment, or material *475 476 already incorporated as a part of said vessel, or on hand for that purpose, or that such liens or rights have either been released absolutely, or so subordinated to the rights of the government as to make its lien for all payments paramount, so as not to encumber or hinder in any way the right of the government to accept or reject said vessel, and so as to become absolutely extinguished in case of the acceptance of the vessel." The effect which we give this provision is strengthened by the opinion rendered to the Secretary of the Navy by the Attorney General, that in his opinion the practice of the Navy Department in making such contracts recognized that liens of this class might be acquired on vessels where there was no provision in the contract for vesting title in the same in the United States. 23 Ops. Atty. Gen. 174, 176. as extending to a special tax in aid of another railway company, is conclusive on the Federal Supreme Court in determining, on writ of error to the state court, whether such constitutional provision impairs contract obligations. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 954-968; Dec. Dig. § 366.*] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 129*)—IMPAIRING CONTRACT OBLIGATIONS-TAXATION. 3. The obligation of a valid municipal grant of a special tax of 5 mills in aid of a all the taxable property in the parish, is not specified railway company, effective against unconstitutionally impaired by the subsequent adoption of a new state Constitution under which any property in the parish passing into the possession of any railroad thereafter constructed becomes exempt from the tax. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 388; Dec. Dig. § 129.*] [No. 38.] We think that this contract, as the one for the Mohawk, was made in recognition Argued November 4, 1910. Decided Novemof the rights of those who should furnish work or material for the vessel to secure their claims by liens which it was made the duty of the contractor to provide for in order to protect the title of the United States. Upon the whole case we reach the conclusion that judgment must be affirmed as to the Mohawk and Galveston, and reversed as to the Benyuard, and it is so ordered. The case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. (218 U. S. 431.) ARKANSAS SOUTHERN RAILWAY COM- V. ber 28, 1910. siana to review a decree which, revers N ERROR to the Supreme Court of Lou ing a decree of the District Court in and for the Parish of Winn, in that state, enjoined the collection from one railway company of a tax granted in aid of another railway company. Affirmed. See same case below, 121 La. 997, 46 So. LOUISIANA & ARKANSAS RAILWAY of the court: This is a writ of error to reverse a deCOURTS (§ 396*)-UNITED STATES SUPREME cision of the supreme court of Louisiana COURT-ERROR TO STATE COURT-DECI-granting an injunction to the plaintiff, the SION OF FEDERAL QUESTION-IMPAIRING Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Company, CONTRACT OBLIGATIONS. the defendant in error, against the collection from it of*a special tax in favor of the Arkansas Southern Railway Company, the plaintiff in error. 121 La. 997, 46 So. 994. The agreed facts are these: By art. 230 of the state Constitution of 1898, any railroad thereafter constructed before January 1, 1904, was to be exempt from taxation for ten years from completion, upon certain 1. A decree of a state court adverse to the contention that, if the state Constitution confers on one railway company an exemption from a special tax granted in aid of another railway company, it impairs contract obligations, is reviewable in the Federal Supreme Court, although the state court rested its decision in part upon the ground that the latter railway company had not acquired all of its contract rights before the adoption of the Constitution. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. 1080; Dec. Dig. § 396.*] STATE LAWS CONCLUSIVENESS OF 2. The construction given by a state court to the immunity of railway companies from taxation, granted by the state Constitution, conditions. The plaintiff built its road through the parish of Winn and gained the right to the exemption. The defendant, plaintiff in error, claims its rights under a vote of the same parish on February 1, 1898, granting a tax of 5 mills to a predecessor to whose rights the defendant has succeeded. This vote was valid, and effective *For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes *436 *435 437 against all taxable property in the parish. | satisfied and the right to the tax earned, James v. Arkansas Southern R. Co. 110 La. and that when earned it had the same 145, 34 So. 337. Act 35, § 6, 1886. Const. validity and force as if it had been gained 1879, art 242. By its terms the grant was before the Constitution was adopted. It for ten years from the completion of the appears further from what we have stated road, the police jury adding a condition that when the right to the tax accrued, the that the railroad should be completed into land now in the hands of the plaintiff's Winnfield within three years from the date road was liable to taxation. But these facts of the vote. Afterwards the police jury ex- and assumptions are not enough to make tended the time to May 1, 1901, on or before out the defendant's case. which date, and before the acquisition of its right of way and ground by the plaintiff, the road was finished. It was accepted by the police jury and taxes have been levied and paid in accordance with the vote, beginning with the year 1901. The defendant was proceeding to levy on the property of the plaintiff in the parish, and says that if the Constitution of 1898 is construed to confer an exemption from this tax upon the plaintiff, it impairs the obligation of contracts, contrary to art. 1, § 10, of the Constitution of the United States. The plaintiff says that there is no constitutional question before this court because the supreme court of Louisiana put its decision partly upon the ground that the defendant had not acquired all of its contract rights before the adoption of the Constitution of 1898. Of course, this court must satisfy itself upon that point, and and therefore has jurisdiction. Sullivan v. Texas, 207 U. S. 416, 423, 52 L. ed. 274, 277, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 215. On the other hand, the defendant asks us to review the construction given to the state Constitution as extending the immunity granted by the above-mentioned art. 230 to special taxes like this. Upon that point, equally, of course, we follow the state court. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 503, 508, 46 L. ed. 298, 302, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 95; Missouri v. Dockery, 191 U. S. 165, 171, 48 L. ed. 133, 134, 63 L.R.A. 571, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 53. Leaving these preliminaries behind, we come to the point of the case. No doubt a state might limit its control over the power of a municipal body to tax by authorizing it to make contracts on the faith of its existing powers (Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358, 26 L. ed. 395; Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. New Orleans, 215 U. S. 170, 54 L. ed. 144, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40), although, unless it did limit itself with a certain distinctness of implication, a subordinate body would contract subject, not paramount, to the power of the state (Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473, 480, 50 L. ed. 274, 278, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 127; Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville, 189 U. S. 434, 438, 47 L. ed. 887, 891, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 531). But there is no such limitation by the state, and no contract by the parish that implies it. An authority given by the state to promise and levy a tax in future years on the taxable property in the parish does not purport to limit the power of the state to say what property shall be taxable when the time comes, at least, by general regulations not aimed at aiding an evasion of the promise it has allowed. A vote by a parish to pay 5 mills on all the taxable property within its boundaries refers on its face to a determination by the sovereign as to what that property shall be. See Arkansas Southern R. Co. v. Wilson, 118 La. 395, 401, 42 So. 976. The notion that the statute and the vote, separately or together, precluded the state from erecting a jail that should be free from such claims, is untenable on its face. The same reasoning allows the state to go farther, as it has done. We agree with the Supreme Court that it did not transgress the Constitution of the United States. Decree affirmed. (218 U. S. 438.) JOHN B. FISHER, James M. Fisher, William G. Fisher, et al., Plffs. in Err., V. We shall not consider whether the vote is to be regarded as having been simply an offer at the time of its passage, in consideration of acts to be done thereafter, and as having become a contract only when the road was finished, that is to say, after the Constitution of 1898 went into effect. See Wadsworth v. Eau Claire County, 102 U. S. 534, 538, 539, 26 L. ed. 221, 223, 224. MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE CITY We shall assume, without deciding, that it became binding at once, by statutory authority, after the analogy of a covenant (see Wisconsin & M. R. Co. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379, 386, 48 L. ed. 229, 231, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 107), although liable to be defeated by the nonperformance of the condition attached. We assume also that the condition was OF NEW ORLEANS. COURTS (§ 396*)—UNITED STATES SUPREME The contention that an attempt in the State Constitution to limit taxation impairs the obligation of contracts with a municipal For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes *438 $439 school board does not present a case for a Dig. 1080; Dec. Dig. § 396.*] [No. 43.] supreme court of the state decided the case were that the relators had been guilty of laches, and that the act of 1873 did not authorize contracts to be made by the school board in such wise as to bind the city to levy the tax. The court did not purport to rely upon the Constitution of 1898, or any subsequent legislation, for the result. It did not purport to enforce any later * law; it simply denied the existence of the right alleged. Therefore, on the face of the decision, there is no warrant for coming here. But it is said that this court is not limited to the mere language of the opinion, but will consider the substance and effect of the judgment (McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U. S. 102, 116, 117, 'Argued November 9, 10, 1910. Decided No- 43 L. ed. 382, 387, 388, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. INS vember 28, 1910. 134; Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. New Orleans, 215 U. S. 170, 175, 54 L. ed. 144, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40), and that this court will decide for itself, with due respect for the 'N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana to review a judgment which affirmed a judgment of the Civil Dis-state decision, whether a contract had been trict Court of the Parish of Orleans, denying mandamus to compel the levy of a special tax to pay claims and judgments based on contracts made with the New Orleans school board. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction. made and what it was (Sullivan v. Texas, 207 U. S. 416, 423, 52 L. ed. 274, 277, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 215). Both of these statements are true, of course, and are relevant when the judgment really gives effect to a later act of the state that would impair See same case below, 121 La. 762, 46 the obligation of the contract if the conSo. 798. tract were as alleged. But the mere allegaThe facts are stated in the opinion. tion of a later constitution or statute imMr. Charles Louque for plaintiffs in er- pairing the obligation of the contract gives no jurisdiction to this court to see that Messrs. St. Clair Adams and I. D. the contract is enforced according to its Moore for defendant in error. ror. tenor, irrespective of the supposed interference of the later law. The jurisdiction *Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opin- extends to doing away with such an interion of the court: This is a petition for mandamus to direct the levy of a special tax of 14 mills to pay claims and judgments against the New Orleans school board, based on contracts made by the board with teachers and others during the years 1874, 1875, and 1876, under the Louisiana act 36 of 1873. The ground of the petition is that, under the act, the contracts were authorized and were payable out of a special tax, unlimited in amount; that an attempt to limit taxation in article 232 of the state Constitution of 1898 is void as to them, because it impairs their obligation, contrary to article 1, § 10, of the Constitution of the United States (Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. New Orleans, 215 U. S. 170, 175-178, 54 L. ed. 144, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40); and that a sufficient amount has not been levied for the years mentioned. The supreme court denied the mandamus (121 La. 762, 46 So. 798), and this writ of error was brought. The plaintiffs in error are met at the outset by a denial of the jurisdiction of this court. The main grounds upon which the ference, but not to remedying an erroneous construction of contracts, or to seeing that they are carried out according to the interpretation of this court, apart from it. Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 207, 218, 219, 41 L. ed. 132, 136, 137, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1023; New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana, 185 U. S. 336, 350, 351, 352, 46 L. ed. 936, 943, 944, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 691; Weber v. Rogan, 188 U. S. 10, 14, 47 L. ed. 363, 365, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 263; Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103, 110, 111, 40 L. ed. 91, 94, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 80. Therefore the present writ of error must be dismissed unless there is more in the case than the opin ion has disclosed. We discover nothing. If it was true that there was no contract binding the city to levy an extra tax, or that the parties demanding it had lost any rights they might have had by laches, there was no occasion to invoke or enforce any law later than the act of 1873. Obviously, however much we consider the substance of the judgment, it discloses no question of rights under the Constitution any more than does the opin *For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes *440 |