XX.

CHAP. since been pursued with the greatest success Wellington in Portugal, and Napoleon himself at Dresden, and in the plains of Champagne.

1797.

But it will

against

But towards the success of such a system of openot succeed rations it is indispensable that the troops who undertroops equal- take it should be superior in bodily activity and and skilful. moral courage to their adversaries, and that the

ly brave

Causes of

the Disas

ters of the

general-in-chief can securely leave a slender force to cope with the enemy in one quarter, while he is accumulating his masses to overwhelm them in another. Unless this is the case, the commander who throws himself at the head of an inconsiderable body into the midst of the enemy, will be certain of meeting instead of inflicting disaster. Without such a degree of courage and activity as enables him to calculate with certainty upon hours, and sometimes minutes, it is impossible to expect success from such a hazardous system. Of this a signal proof occurred in Bohemia in 1813, when the French, encouraged by their great triumph before Dresden, threw themselves inconsiderately into the midst of the Allies in the mountains of Toplitz; but, meeting there with the undaunted Russian and Prussian forces, they experienced the most dreadful reverses, and in a few days lost the whole fruit of a mighty victory.

The disasters of the Austrians were mainly owing to the injudicious system which they so perseveringAustrians. ly adopted, of dividing their force into separate bodies, and commencing an attack at the same time at stations so far distant that the attacking columns could render little assistance to each other. This system may succeed very well against ordinary troops, or timorous generals, who the moment they hear of their flank being turned, or their communications menaced, lay down their arms, or fall

back; but against intrepid soldiers, and a resolute commander, who turn fiercely on every side, and bring a preponderating mass first against one assailant, and then another, it is almost sure of leading to disasters. The Aulic Council were not to blame for adopting this system, in the first instance, against the French armies, because it might have been expected to succeed against ordinary troops, and had done so in many previous instances; but they were inexcusable for continuing it so long, after the character of the opponents with whom they had to deal had so fully displayed itself. The system of concentric attacks rarely succeeds against an able and determined enemy, because the chances which the force in the centre has of beating first one column and then another, are so considerable. When it does, it is only when the different masses of the attacking party, as at Leipsic and Dresden, are so immense, that each can stand a separate encounter for itself, or can fall back in the event of being outnumbered, without seriously endangering, by such a retreat, the safety of the other assailing columns.

XX.

1797.

Reflections

Campaign.

The Italian campaign demonstrates, in the most General signal manner, the vast importance of fortresses in on the war, and the vital consequence of such a barrier to arrest the course of military conquest. The surrender of the fortresses of Coni, Alexandria, and Tortona, by giving the French a secure base for their operations, speedily made them masters of the whole of Lombardy, while the single fortress of Mantua arrested their victorious arms for six months, and gave time to Austria to collect no less than four powerful armies for its deliverance. No man understood this better than Napoleon; and accordingly, without troubling himself with the projects so ear

XX.

1797.

CHAP. nestly pressed upon him of revolutionizing Piedmont, he grasped the fortresses, and thereby laid the foundation for all his subsequent conquests. Without the surrender of the Piedmontese citadels, he would not have been able to push his advantages in Italy beyond the Po; but for the bastions of Mantua, he might have carried them, as in the succeeding campaign, to the Danube.

Unconquerable tena

It is melancholy to reflect on the degraded state of the Italian powers during this terrible struggle. An invasion, which brought on all her people unheard-of calamities, which overspread her plains, with bloodshed, and exposed her cities to rapine, was unable to excite the spirit of her pacific inhabitants; and neither of the contending powers deemed it worth their while to bestowa serious thought on the dispositions or assistance of the twenty millions of men who were to be the reward of the strife. The country of Cæsar and Scipio, of Cato and Brutus, beheld in silent dismay the protracted contest of two provinces of its ancient empire, and prepared to bow the neck in abject submission to either of its former vassals which might prove victorious in the strife. A division of the French army was sufficient to disperse the levies of the Roman people. Such is the consequence of political divisions and long-continued prosperity, even in the richest and most favoured countries; and of that fatal policy which withers the spirits of men, by habituating them to degrading occupations, and renders them incapable of asserting their national independence, by destroying the warlike spirit by which alone it can be permanently secured.

Finally, this campaign evinced, in the most signal eity of the manner, the persevering character and patriotic Austrians. spirit of the Austrian people, and the prodigious

XX.

1797.

efforts of which its monarchy is capable, when roused CHAP. by real danger to vigorous exertion. It is impossible to contemplate, without admiration, the vast armies which they successively sent into the field, and the unconquerable courage with which they returned to a contest where so many thousands of their countrymen had perished before them. Had they been guided by greater, or opposed by less ability, they unquestionably would have been successful; and even against the soldiers of the Italian army, and the genius of Napoleon, the scales of fortune repeatedly hung equal. A nation, capable of such sacrifices, can hardly ever be permanently subdued; a government, actuated by such steady principles, must ultimately be triumphant. Such, accordingly, has been the case in the present instance: aristocratic firmness in the end asserted its wonted superiority over democratic vigour; the dreams of Republican equality have been forgotten, but the Austrian government remains unchanged; the French eagles have retired over the Alps; and Italy, the theatre of so much bloodshed, has finally remained to the successors of the Cæsars.

CHAP. XXI. 1796.

CHAPTER XXI.

CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN GERMANY.

ARGUMENT.

Great Difficulties of the French Government at the Commencement of this year -But her Foreign Relations had signally improved-Triple Alliance of Austria, Russia, and England-Painful division of Opinion in England on the war-Violence of the Parties in the close of 1795-Attack on the King when going to Parliament-Arguments of the Opposition on the war-Answer of the Government -Real objects in view by the different parties-Supplies voted by ParliamentBills against Public Meetings-Arguments against and for them-They pass into Laws-Reflections on these Statutes-Proposals for Peace by the British Government, which are rejected by the Directory-Operations of Hoche in La VendéePrevious successes of Charette and Stofflet during the winter-Death of StoffletCharette is defeated and made Prisoner-Heroic conduct of Charette-But he is at length taken and shot-His Death and Character-Fine Observations of Napoleon upon him-Termination of the War in La Vendée-Preparations of the Austrians-Archduke Charles put at the head of the Army in Germany-Forces of the contending Parties on the Rhine-Designs of the Aulic Council-Plan of the Republicans-They cross the Lower Rhine, and gain some success-But are driven back across that river by the Archduke-Operations of Moreau on the Upper Rhine-His Origin and Character-Organization of his Army-Passage of the Rhine by Moreau-Admirable skill shown in that operation-Cautious Movements of Moreau-He advances towards the Black Forest-The Archduke hastens to the scene of danger-Indecisive Action on the Rhine-The French gain success on the Imperial Right—The Archduke resolves to Retreat into Bavaria-Operations on the Lower Rhine-Erroneous Plan of the Campaign by the Directory-Admirable Plan of the Archduke to counteract it-He retires through the Black Forest-Indecisive Action at Neresheim-Operations of Jourdan-He advances into Franconia-The Archduke joins Wartensleben, and falls with their united Force on Jourdan-Who is defeated at Amberg-He is again routed near Wurtzburg-Great effects of this Victory-Continued and disastrous Retreat of Jourdan-Archduke again defeats him, and drives him across the Rhine-Severe struggle of Latour with Moreau on the Danube-Archduke threatens Moreau's retreat at Kehl-Moreau resolves to retreat, which he does in the most firm and methodical manner-Defeats Latour at Biberach-And retires leisurely through the Black Forest Battle of Emmindingen, between Moreau and the Archduke-Retreat of Moreau-Austrians refuse an Armistice on the Rhine-Long and bloody siege of the Kehl-Fall of the Tête-du-pont at Huningen-Reflections on this