1 CHAP. XX. 1796. praise of liberty in words, and universal extinction of it in action; the stripping of churches; the robbery of hospitals; the levelling of the palaces of the great, and the destruction of the cottages of the poor ;-all that military license has of most terrible, all that despotic authority has of most oppressive.' Then did Botta, i. her people feel, that neither riches of soil nor glories of recollection-neither a southern sun, nor the perfection of art, can save a nation from destruction, if they have lost the vigour to inherit, or the courage to defend them. 3 298. 2 Frencharmy command, 1796. viii. 57, 59. Hardenberg, When Napoleon assumed the command of the army State of the in the end of March, he found every thing in the most when Napomiserable state." The efficient force under arms, and leon took the ready for offensive operations, did not exceed 42,000 27th March, men; but it was continually reinforced by troops Thiers, from the depôts in the interior, after Napoleon's suc- viii. 220. cesses commenced; so that, notwithstanding the losses of the campaign, it was maintained throughout at that amount. The artillery did not exceed 60 pieces, and Jomini, the cavalry was almost dismounted; but the garri- Napoleon, sons in the rear, amounting to 8000 men, could fur- ii, 135, 136. nish supplies when the war was removed from the iii. 306. frontier, and the arsenals of Nice and Antibes were well provided with artillery. For a very long period Napoleon, the soldiers of all ranks had suffered the extremity of want. Perched on the inhospitable summits of the Apennines, they had enjoyed neither tents nor shelter; magazines they had none; the troops had for a long time been placed on half a ration a-day, and even this scanty supply was for the most part procured by marauding expeditions of the soldiers into the neighbouring valleys. The officers, from the Thiers, effect of the depreciation of paper, had for years received only eight francs a-month of pay; and the staff 5 4 iii. 135. 5 viii. 220. 1 CHAP. 1796. iii. 151. 2 Ibid. iii. 135. 3 was entirely on foot. On one occasion, the Directory had awarded a gratification of three Louis-d'ors to each general of division; and the future marshals and princes of the empire subsisted for long on the Napoleon, humble present.' Upon assuming the chief command, the general-in-chief received, as a great stretch, 2000 Louis in gold, and a million in bills, part of which were protested. But, considered with reference to their skill and warlike qualities, the army presented a very different aspect, and were, beyond all question, the most efficient one which the Republic possessed. Composed, for the most part, of young soldiers, whom the great levies of 1793 had brought into the field, they had been inured to hardship and privations during the subsequent campaigns in the Pyrenees and Maritime Alps; a species of warfare which, by leading detached parties continually into difficult and perilous situations, is singularly calculated to strengthen the Ibid, viii. frame, and augment the intelligence of the soldier." "Poverty," says Napoleon, "privations, misery, are the Ibid. iii. school of good soldiers." Its spirit had been greatly elevated by the successful result of the battle of Loano; and its chiefs, Massena, Augereau, Serrurier, Character of and Berthier, had already become distinguished, and, like stars in the firmament on the approach of twilight, began to give token of their future light. 221. 136. its officers. Berthier. 3 Berthier, above forty years of age, son of a geographical artist, was chief of the staff, a situation which he continued to hold in all the campaigns of Napoleon, down to the battle of Waterloo. Active, indefatigable alike on horseback and in the cabinet, he was admirably qualified to discharge the duties of that important situation, without being possessed of the originality and decision requisite for a commanderin-chief. He was perfectly master of the geography XX. 1796. of every country which the army was to enter, un- CHAP. derstood thoroughly the use of maps, and could calculate with admirable precision the time requisite for the different corps to arrive at the ground assigned to them, as well as direct in a lucid manner the course they were to pursue.1 1 Napoleon, iii. 185. Massena. Massena, a native of Nice, was a lieutenant in the regiment of Royal Italians when the Revolution broke out, but rose rapidly to the rank of general of division. Gifted by nature with a robust frame, unsusceptible of fatigue, unconquerable in resolution, he was to be seen, night and day, on horseback, among the rocks and the mountains. Decided, brave, and intrepid, full of ambition, his leading characteristic was obstinacy; a quality which, according as it is right or wrong directed, leads to the greatest successes, or the most ruinous disasters. His conversation gave few indications of genius; but at the first cannon-shot his mental energy redoubled, and when surrounded by danger, his thoughts were clear and forcible. In the midst of the dying and the dead, of balls sweeping away those who encircled him, Massena was himself, and gave his orders with the greatest coolness and precision. Even after defeat, he recommenced the struggle as if he had come off victorious; and by these means saved the Republic at the battle of Zurich. But these great qualities were ' Napoleon, disfigured by as great vices. He was rapacious, sor- O'Meara, i. did, and avaricious; shared the profits of the con- 239. tractors and commissaries, and never could keep himself clear from acts of peculation. iii. 187. Augereau, born in the Fauxbourg St Marceau, Augereau. shared in the opinions of the democratic quarter from which he sprung. He had served with distinction both in La Vendée and the Pyrenees. With XX. 1796. CHAP. little education, hardly any knowledge, no reach of mind, he was yet beloved by the soldiers, from the order and discipline which he always enforced. His attacks were conducted with courage and regularity, and he led his columns with invincible resolution during the fire; but he had not the moral firmness requisite for lasting success, and was frequently thrown into unreasonable dejection shortly after his greatest triumphs. His political opinions led him to attach himself to the extreme Republicans; but no man was less fitted by nature, either to understand, or shine in, the civil contests in which he was always 1 Napoleon, so desirous to engage.' iii. 183. Serrurier. Serrurier, born in the Department of the Aisne, was a major at the commencement of the Revolution, and incurred many dangers in its early wars, from the suspicion of a secret leaning to the Aristocracy, under which he laboured. He was brave in person, firm in conduct, and severe in discipline; but though he gained the battle of Mondovi, and took Mantua, he was not in general fortunate in his operations, and became a Marshal of France, with less military glory than any of his other illustrious 2 Ibid. 190. compeers. State of the ces. On the other hand, the Allies had above 50,000 Allied for men, and 200 pieces of cannon; while the Sardinian army, of 24,000, guarded the avenues of Dauphine and Savoy, and was opposed to the army of Kellermann of nearly equal force. Their forces were thus distributed: Beaulieu, a veteran of seventy-five, with 30,000 combatants, entirely Austrians, and 140 pieces of cannon, was on the extreme right of the French, and in communication with the English fleet; while Colli, with 20,000 men, and 60 pieces, was in a line with him to the north, and covered Ceva and Coni. -3 Jomini, viii. 57. Napoleon, iii. 136. Generally speaking, the French occupied the crest of the mountains, while the Allies were stationed in the valleys leading into the Italian plains.' 1 CHAP. XX. 1796. Thiers, Napoleon, iii. 304, iii. 136. Napoleon arrived at Nice on the 27th March, and viii. 223. soon gave indications of the great designs which he ii. 134. was meditating, by the following striking proclama- Hardenberg, tion to his troops: -" Soldiers! you are almost 305. naked, half-starved: the Government owes you much, Napoleon, and can give you nothing. Your patience, your Napoleon's courage, in the midst of these rocks, are admirable, first proclabut they reflect no splendour on your arms. I am his soldiers. about to conduct you into the most fertile plains on the earth. Fertile provinces, opulent cities, will soon be in your power: there you will find rich harvests, honour, and glory. Soldiers of Italy, will you fail in courage?" mation to the cam 3 iii. 138. 224. The plan of the young general was to penetrate His plan for into Piedmont by the Col de Cadibone, the lowest paign. part of the ridge which divides France from Italy, and separates the Austrian from the Piedmontese armies, by pressing with the weight of his forces on the weak cordon which united them. 3 For this Napoleon, purpose, it was necessary that the bulk of the troops Thiers, viii. should assemble on their extreme right—a delicate and perilous operation in presence of a superior enemy, but which was rendered comparatively safe by the snow which encumbered the lofty ridges that separated the two armies. Early in April, the Thiers, whole French columns were in motion towards Genoa, while the French minister demanded from 1796. the senate of that city leave to pass the Bocchetta and the keys of Gavi, that being the chief route from the maritime coasts to the interior of Piedmont. 5 the same time Beaulieu, in obedience to the direc- Hardenberg, tions of the Aulic Council, was, on his side, resum viii. 138. April 5, 5 At Napoleon, iii. 138. iii. 307. |