CHAP. 1797. 1 Corresp. Confid. de Nap. iv. 289. Jom. x. 120, 121. Botta, ii. 191. Nap. iv. 129. appearance of neutrality, he gave orders to General Kelmaine to direct all the officers and soldiers under his command, to give neither counsel nor assistance to the disaffected.1 Landrieux undertook a double part; while, on the one hand, in obedience to Napoleon's commands, and 189, 190, in conjunction with the ardent democrats of the Italian towns, he excited the people to revolt, and organized the means of their resistance, on the other, he entered into a secret correspondence with the Venetian government, and despatched his agent, Stephani, to Ottolini, the chief magistrate of Bergamo, to detail the nature and extent of the conspiracy which was on foot, and inform him that it went to separate entirely its continental possessions from the Venetian republic. By this double perfidy did this hypocritical chief of the staff render inevitable a rupture between France and Venice; for while, on the one Des. Conf. hand, he excited the democratic party against the Conf. Corr. government, on the other he gave the government too good reason to adopt measures of coercion against 226, 228. the democratic party and their French allies.2 de Nap. iv. 289. Hard. iv. It is an easy matter to excite the passions of democracy; but it is rarely that the authors of the flame can make it stop short at the point which they desire. The vehement language and enthusiastic conduct of the French soldiers, brought on an explosion in the Venetian territories sooner than was expedient for the interests either of the general or the army. Napoleon's constant object was, by the terror of an insurrection in their continental posses * Landrieux," said Napoleon, in his Secret Despatch to the Directory," instigated the revolt in Bergamo and Brescia, and was paid for it; at the same time he revealed the plot to the Venetian government, and was paid for that also by them."-Corresp. Confid. iv. 289. CHAP. XXII. 1797. breaks out tian pro sions, to induce the government to unite cordially in a league with France, and make the desired concessions to the popular party; but having failed in his endeavours, he marched for the Tagliamento, leaving the seeds of an insurrection ready to explode in all the provinces in his rear. On the morning of the Democratic 12th March, the revolt broke out at Bergamo, in insurrection consequence of the arrest of the leaders of the insur- in the Venerection; the insurgents declared openly that they vinceswere supported by the French, and despatched couriers to Milan and the principal towns of Lombardy to obtain succour, and besought the Republican commander of the castle to support them with his forces, but he declined to interfere ostensibly in their behalf, though he countenanced their projected union with the Cisalpine Republic. A provisional government was immediately established, which instantly announced to the Cispadane Republic that Bergamo had recovered its liberty, and their desire to be united with that state, and concluded with these 1 Jom. x. words: "Let us live, let us fight, and, if necessary, ix. 79, 80. die together; thus should all free people do ; let us Nap. iv. then for ever remain united; you, the French, and Bot. ii. 192, ourselves." 1 122. Th. 130-1. 194. all the chief The example speedily spread to other towns. Brescia, under the instigation of Landrieux, openly which soon threw off its allegiance, and disarmed the Venetian spreads to troops, in presence of the French soldiers, who towns. neither checked nor supported the insurrection. At Crema, the insurgents were introduced into the gates by a body of French cavalry, and speedily overturned ' Jom. x. the Venetian authorities, and proclaimed their union 122, 123 with the Cispadane Republic. 2 These alarming revolts excited the utmost consternation at Venice; and the senate, not daring to 200. CHAP. act openly against insurgents, who declared themselves supported by the Republican commanders, wrote to the Directory, and despatched Pesaro to tion at Ve- the headquarters of Napoleon, to complain of the 1797. Consterna nice. Venetians ties to Napo leon. His duplicity, countenance given by his troops to the revolt of their subjects. The Venetian deputies came up with send depu- the French general at Gorizio; he feigned surprise at the intelligence, but endeavoured to take advantage of the terror of the republic to induce them to submit to increased exactions. They represented that the French armies had occupied the principal fortresses and castles of the republic, and that having thus obtained the vantage-ground, they were bound either to take some steps to show that they disapproved of the revolt, which was organized in their name, or to cede these places to the republic, and permit them to exert their own strength in restoring order in their dominions. Napoleon positively declined to do either of these things; but constantly urged the deputies to throw themselves into the and refusal arms of France. “That I should arm against our against the friends, against those who have received us kindly, insurgents, and wish to defend us, in favour of our enemies, Venetians against those who hate and seek to ruin us, is impossible. Never will I turn my arms against the principles of the revolution; to them I owe in part all my success. But I offer you, in perfect sincerity, my friendship and my councils: unite yourselves cordially to France ; make the requisite changes in your constitution; and, without employing force with the Italian people, I will induce them to yield to order and peace." They passed from that to the contributions for the use of the army. Hitherto Venice had furnished supplies to the French army, as she had previously done to the Imperial. The to act or let the do so. CHAP. XXII. 1797. Venetian deputies insisted that Napoleon, having now entered the Hereditary States, should cease to be any longer a burden on their resources. This was far from being the French general's intention; for he was desirous of levying no requisitions on the Austrian territories, for fear of rousing a national war among the inhabitants. The commissaries, whom the Venetian government had secretly commissioned to furnish supplies to the French army, had ceased their contributions, and they had, in consequence, commenced requisitions in the Venetian territories. "That is a bad mode of proceeding," said Napoleon; "it vexes the inhabitants, and opens the door to innumerable abuses. Give me a million a-month as long as the campaign lasts; the Republic will account to you for it, and you will receive more than a million's worth in the cessation of pillage. You have nourished my enemies, you must do the same to me." The envoys answered that their treasury was exhausted. "If you have no money," said he, "take it from the Duke of Modena, or levy it on the property of the Russians, Austrians, and English, which are lying in your depôts. But beware of proceeding to hostilities. If, while I am engaged in a distant campaign, you light the flames of war in my rear, you have sealed your own ruin. That which might have been overlooked when I was in Italy, becomes an unpardonable offence when I am in Germany." Such was the violence with which this haughty conqueror treated a nation which was not only neutral, but had for nine months furnished gratuitously all the supplies for his army;11 Jom. x. and such the degradation which this ancient repub- Bot. ii. 201. lic prepared for itself, by the timid policy which Th.ix.85-7. hoped to avoid danger by declining to face it. 1 124, 125. Nap. iv. 87. CHAP. XXII. 1797. Venetians at The Venetian government at length saw that they could no longer delay taking a decided part. A formidable insurrection, organized in the name and last resolve under the sanction of the Republican authorities, was against the rapidly spreading in their continental possessions, insurgents. great part of which had already joined the Cisalpine to act Republic, and the general-in-chief, instead of taking any steps to quench the flame, had only demanded fresh exactions from a state already exhausted by his contributions. They resolved, therefore, by a large majority, to act vigorously against the insurgents, but without venturing to engage in hostilities with the French forces; a fatal step, the result of timidity and irresolution, which exposed them to all the perils of war, without any of its favourable chances; which irritated without endangering the enemy, and allowed the French general to select his own time for 210, 211. wreaking upon the state, alone and unbefriended, the whole weight of Republican vengeance.' 1 Bot. ii. Jom. X. 125. The retreat of the French from the valley of the Hostilities Adige, and the irruptions of the Croatians into between the Friuli, encouraged the Venetian government to comtwo parties. mence hostilities on their refractory subjects. But break out before that took place tumults and bloodshed had arisen spontaneously, and about the same time, in many different parts of the territory, in consequence of their furious passions, which were roused by the collision of the aristocracy on the one hand, and the populace on the other. Matters also were precipitated by an unworthy fraud perpetrated by the Republican agents at Milan. This was the preparation and publishing of an address, purporting to be from Battaglia, Governor of Verona, calling upon the citizens faithful to Venice to rise in arms, to murder the insurgents, and chase the French soldiers |