CHAP. XXII. 1797. iv. 233,234. sent their ultimatum to Napoleon, enjoining him not to admit its surrender to the Emperor; and declaring, that rather than have any share in such a perfidious act, they would see their armies driven over the Alps, and all their Italian conquests wrested from the Republic. At the same time, they had Conf. Cor. declared their intention, in the event of hostilities being resumed, of sending commissioners to relieve Napoleon of his diplomatic cares, and allow him to attend exclusively to his military duties. Napoleon, whose Conf. Cor. jealousy of the revolutionary government, established Hard. iv. at Paris by the Revolution of 18th Fructidor, had been 587. much increased by the appointment of Augereau in tory had forthe room of Hoche to the command of the army on the liation. Its Rhine, was so much disgusted by these restrictions on infamy rests his authority, that he wrote to Paris on the 25th Sep- on Napoleon. tember, offering to resign the command.* The Directory, on the 29th September, returned an answer, positively forbidding the cession of Venice to Austria, † iv. 233. The Direc bid the spo exclusively * " It is evident,” said he in that letter," that the government is re- 25th Sept. solved to act to me as they did to Pichegru. I beseech you, citizen, to 1797. appoint a successor to me, and accept my resignation. No power on earth shall make me continue to serve a government which has given me such a scandalous proof of ingratitude, which I was far indeed from expecting." yet * Confid. despatch, 25th Sept. iv. 169. † The resolution of the Directory after the 18th Fructidor not to spoliate Venice, was repeatedly and strongly expressed. Barras wrote to Napoleon on 8th September: "Conclude a peace, but let it be an honourable one; let Mantua fall to the Cisalpine republic, but Venice not go to the Emperor. That is the wish of the Directory, and of all true Republicans, and what the glory of the Republic requires." Napoleon an- Barras's swered, on the 18th September, " If your ultimatum is not to cede Ve.. Secret Desnice to the Emperor, I much fear peace will be impracticable, and patch, 8th Sept. 1767. Venice is the city of Italy most worthy of freedom, and hostilities will be resumed in the course of October." The Directory replied, "The go- Secret Desvernment now is desirous of tracing out to you with precision its ulti- patch, 18th matum. Austria has long desired to swallow up Italy, and to acquire Sept. iv. maritime power. It is the interest of France to prevent both these designs. It is evident that, if the Emperor acquires Venice, with its territorial possessions, he will secure an entrance into the whole of 164. CHAP. 1797. 1 Hard. iv. 529, 586, 890. Terms of mio. 265, 266. Daru, v. 432. upon which, Napoleon, seeing his authority slipping from his hands, and a doubtful campaign about to begin, without hesitation violated his instructions, and signed the treaty fatal to Venice on the 18th October. The whole infamy, therefore, of that proceeding rests on his head; the French Directory is entirely blameless, except in not having had the courage to disown the treaty to which his signature was affixed.' By this treaty the Emperor ceded to France, Flanders, and the line of the Rhine; he agreed to the the treaty of territory of the Republic being extendedto the sumCampo Formit of the Maritime Alps; he consented to the establishment of the Cisalpine republic, comprehending Lombardy, the duchies of Reggio, Modena, Mirandola, Bologna, Ferrara, Romagna, the Valteline, and the Venetian states, as far as the Adige, comprising the territory of Bergamo, Brescia, Crema, and the Nap. iv. Polesine. The Ionian Islands, part of the Venetian territory, were ceded to France, which acquired Lombardy. We should be treating as if we had been conquered, independent of the disgrace of abandoning Venice, which you describe as worthy of being free. What would posterity say of us if we surrender that great city with its naval arsenals to the Emperor? Better an hundred times restore to him Lombardy than pay such a price for it. Let us take the worst view of matters; let us suppose, what your genius and the valour of your army forbid us to fear, that we are conquered and driven out of Italy. In such a case, yielding only to force, our honour at least will, be safe; we shall still have remained faithful to the true interests of France, and not incurred the disgrace of a perfidy without excuse, as it will induce consequences more disastrous than the most unfavourable results of war. We feel the force of your objection, that you may not be able to resist the forces of the Emperor; but consider that your army would be still less so some months after the peace, so imprudently and shamefully signed. Then would Austria, placed by our own hands in the centre of Italy, indeed take us at a disadvantage. The whole question comes to this: Shall we give up Italy to the Austrians? The French government neither can nor will do so: it would in preference incur all the hazards of war."-See Confid. Corresp. de Napoleon, iv. 233, 235. XXII. Mantua, on the frontiers of the Imperial states in CHAP. Italy, and Mayence, the bulwark of the empire on the Rhine. 1797. On the other hand, the Republic ceded to the Emperor, in exchange for the states of Flanders, Istria, Dalmatia, the Venetian Isles in the Adriatic, the Mouths of the Cattaro, the city of Venice, and its continental possessions as far as the eastern shore of the Lake of Guarda, the line of the Adige, and that of the Po. By this arrangement, Verona, Peschiera, and Porto Legnago fell into the hands of the Austrians, who lost in Flanders and Lombardy provinces, rich, indeed, but distant, inhabited by 3,500,000 souls, and received in the Venetian states a territory of equal riches, with a great seaport, and 3,400,000 souls, lying close to the Hereditary States, besides an acquisition of nearly the same amount, which they had acquired during the war, on the side of Poland. The advantages of the treaty, therefore, how great 254, 256. soever to the conquerors, were, in some degree, also Nap. iv. extended to the vanquished.' 1 Jom. ix. 266. Daru, v. 432, 433. cles of the Beside these public, the treaty contained many secret articles of nearly equal importance. The most Secret artimaterial of these regarded the cession of Salzbourg, treaty. with its romantic territory, to Austria, with the important towns of Inviertil and Wasserburg on the Inn, from Bavaria; the free navigation of the Rhine and the Meuse, the abandonment of the Frickthal by Austria to Switzerland, and the providing equivalents to the dispossessed princes on the left bank of the Rhine, on the right of that river. But it was expressly provided that " no acquisition should be proposed to the advantage of Prussia." For the arrangement of these complicated objects, a convention was appointed to meet at Rastadt to settle XXII. CHAP. the affairs of the empire. Finally, it was agreed, "that if either of the contracting powers should make acquisitions in Germany, the other should 254, 255. receive equivalents to the same amount." 1 1797. 1 Jom. x. Nap. iv. 266, 267. Hard. iv. 591. Thus terminated the Italian campaigns of Napoleon -the most memorable of his military career, and which contributed so powerfully to fix his destinies and immortalize his name. The sufferings of Italy in these contests were extreme, and deeply did its people rue the fatal precipitance with which they had thrown themselves into the arms of Republican ambition. The enormous sum of 120,000,000 francs, or about L.5,000,000 sterling, was levied on its territory by the conqueror, in specie, in little more than twelve months; a sum equal to L.12,000,000 in Great Britain; and the total amount extracted from the Peninsula, in contributions and supplies, during the two years the war lasted, was no less than 400,000,000 francs, or L.16,000,000 sterling. This immense burden fell almost exclusively on the states to the north of the Tiber, whose republican ardour had been most decided. Its territory was partide Nap. i. tioned; its independence ruined; its galleries pillaged; the trophies of art had followed the Car of Victory; and the works of immortal genius, which no wealth could purchase, had been torn from their native seats, and violently transplanted into a foreign soil.* 2 Jom. Vie 256. Nap. iv. 281. Hard. y. 11. 2 It is remarkable how strongly, even at this early period, the mind of Napoleon was set upon two objects, which formed such memorable features in his future life, the expedition to Egypt, and interminable hostility to Great Britain. "Why," said he, in his letter to the Directory, of 13th September, 1797, "do we not lay hold of Malta? Admiral Brueys could easily make himself master of it: 400 knights, and, at the utmost, 500 men, compose the whole garrison of La Valette. The inhabitants, who amount to (100,000, are already well disposed towards us, for I have confiscated all CHAP. XXII. 1797. Horror in the publica treaty. No words can paint the horror and consternation which the promulgation of this treaty excited in Venice. The democratic party in particular, who had allied themselves with the French, compelled Venice at the government to abdicate, in order to make way tion of that for a republican régime, and received a French garrison within their walls, broke out into the most vehement invectives against their former allies, and discovered, with tears of unavailing anguish, that those who join a foreigner to effect changes in the constitution of their country, hardly ever escape sacrificing its independence. But whatever may have been the unanimity of feeling which this union of imperial rapacity with republican treachery awa the possessions of the order in Italy, and they are dying of famine. With Malta and Corfu, we should soon be masters of the Mediterranean. "Should we, on making peace with England, be compelled to give up the Cape of Good Hope, it will be absolutely necessary to take possession of Egypt. That country never belonged to any European power; the Venetians even had there only a precarious authority. We might embark from hence, with 25,000 men, escorted by eight or ten ships of the line, or frigates, and take possession of it. Egypt does not belong to the Grand Seignior."-Letter Confid. 13th Sept. 1797-Corresp. Confid. iv. 175. His inveterate hostility to England was equally early, and strongly expressed. In enumerating the reasons which induced him to sign the treaty of Campo Formio, he concludes :— Finally, we are still at war with England; that enemy is great enough, without adding another. The Austrians are heavy and avaricious; no people on earth are less active or dangerous, with a view to our military affairs, than they are; the English, on the contrary, are generous, intriguing, enterprising. indispensable for our government to destroy the English monarchy; or it will infallibly be overturned by the intrigues, and the corruption of these active islanders. The present moment offers to our hands a noble enterprise. Let us concentrate all our activity on the marine, and destroy England; that done, Europe is at our feet."—Letter Confid. to the Directory, dated Passeriano, 18th October, 1797- Confid. Corresp. de Napoleon, iv. 212. In truth, it was his desire to acquire the harbour and naval resources of Venice, for his projected expedition against Egypt and Great Britain, that was one main inducement with Napoleon to treat with such upexampled severity that unhappy republic. |