XXII. 1797. CHAP. kened among the Venetians, it was too late; with their own hands they had brought the serpent into their bosom, and they were doomed to perish from the effects of their own revolutionary passions. With speechless sorrow they beheld the French, who occupied Venice, lower the standard of St Mark, demolish the Bucentaur, pillage the arsenal, remove every vestige of independence, and take down the splendid bronze horses, which, for six hundred years, had stood over the portico of the church of St Mark, to commemorate the capture of Constantinople by the Venetian crusaders. When the last Doge appeared before the Austrian commissioner to take the oath 18th Jan. of homage to the Emperor, his emotion was such that he fell insensible to the ground; honouring thus, by the extremity of grief, the last act of national independence. Yet even in this catastrophe, the fury of party appeared manifest, and a large portion of the people celebrated with transports of joy the victory over the democratic faction, though it was obtained 442, 443. at the expense of the existence of their country.1 1798. 1 Daru, v. Great sensa The fall of the oldest commonwealth in Europe excited a general feeling of commiseration throughtion excited out the civilized world. Many voices were raised, in Europe. even in the legislative body of France, against this fla by this event grant violation of the law of nations. Independently of the feelings of jealousy, which were naturally awakened by the aggrandizement of two belligerent powers at the expense of a neutral state, it was impossible to contemplate without emotion the overthrow of that illustrious Republic, which had contributed in so powerful a manner to the return of civilisation in Europe. No modern state, from so feeble an origin, had risen to such eminence; nor with such limited resources made so glorious a stand against the tide XXII. 1797. of barbaric invasion. Without enquiring what right CHAP. either France or Austria had to partition its territories, men contemplated only its long existence, its illustrious deeds, its constancy in misfortune; they beheld its annihilation with a mingled feeling of terror and pity; and sympathized with the sufferings of a people, who, after fourteen hundred years of independence, were doomed to pass irrevocably: under a stranger's yoke.' In contemplating this memorable event, it is difficult to say whether most indignation is to be felt at the perfidy of France, the cupidity of Austria, the weakness of the Venetian aristocracy, or the insanity of the Venetian people. For the conduct of Napoleon no possible apology can be found.* He first excited the revolutionary 1 Daru, v 436, 437. 1338. *The French entered the Venetian territory with the declaration"The French army, to follow the wreck of the Austrian army, must pass over the republic of Venice; but it will never forget, that ancient friendship unites the two republics. Religion, government, customs, and property, will be respected. The general-in-chief engages the government to make known these sentiments to the people, in order that confidence may cement that friendship which has so long united the two nations." * * Parl. Deb. On the 10th March, 1797, after the democratic revolt had broken xxxiv. out in Brescia, Napoleon wrote to the Venetian Governor of Verona. "I am truly grieved at the disturbances which have occurred at Verona, but trust that, through the wisdom of your measures, no blood will be shed. The senate of Venice need be under no sort of disquietude, as they must be thoroughly persuaded of the loyalty and good faith of the French government, and the desire which we have to live in good friendship with your republic." On the 24th March, 1797, he wrote to the Cor. Conf. Directory, after giving an account of the civil war in the Venetian states, ii. 475. "M. Pisaro, chief sage of the republic of Venice, has just been here, regarding the events in Brescia and Bergamo, the people of which towns have disarmed the Venetian garrisons, and overturned theft authorities. I had need of all my prudence; for it is not when we require the whole succours of Friuli, and of the good-will of the Venetian government, to supply us with provisions in the Alpine defiles, that it is expedient to come to a rupture. I told Pisaro, that the Directory would never forget that the republic of Venice was the ancient ally of France, and that our de CHAP. spirit to such a degree in all the Italian possessions of the republic, at the very time that they were fed XXII. 1797. 1 sire was fixed to protect it to the utmost of our power. I only besought him to spare the effusion of blood. We parted the best of friends. He appeared perfectly satisfied with my reception. The great point in all this 1 Cor. Conf. affair is to gain time." On the 5th April, he wrote again to Pisaro. " The French Republic does not pretend to interfere in the internal dissentions of Venice; but the safety of the army requires that I should not overlook any enterprises hostile to its interests."" ii. 549. 2 Ibid. iii. 30. 9th April, 1797. 9 Ibid. iii. 37. 4 Ibid. iii. 559. 5.Ibid. iii. 176. Having thus, to the very last moment, kept up the pretended system of friendship for Venice, Napoleon no sooner found himself relieved by the armistice of Leoben, on 8th April, from the weight of the Austrian war, than he threw off the mask. On the day after the armistice was signed, he issued a proclamation to the people of the continental possessions of Venice, in which he said,-" The government of Venice offers you no security either for persons or property; and it has, by indifference to your fate, provoked the just indignation of the French government. If the Venetians rule you by the right of conquest, I will free you; if by usurpation, I will restore your rights." And having thus roused the whole population of the cities of Venetian terra firma to revolt, he next proceeded to hand over all these towns to Austria, by the third clause of the preliminaries of Leoben, which assigned to the Emperor of Austria "the whole Venetian territory situated between the Mincio, the Po, and the Austrian states." Nor did the duplicity of Napoleon rest here. On the 16th May, he concluded the treaty with the Venetian republic, already mentioned, the first article of which was :-" There shall be henceforth peace and good understanding between France and the Venetian republic." "5 The object of Napoleon, in signing this treaty, is unfolded, in his secret despatch to the Directory three days afterwards. "You will receive," says he, "herewith the treaty which I have concluded with the republic of Venice, in virtue of which, General Baraguay d' Hilliers, with 16,000 men, has taken possession of the city. I have had several objects in view in concluding this treaty. 1. To enter into the town without difficulty, and be in a situation to extract from it whatever we desire, under pretence of executing the secret articles. 2. To be in a situation, if the treaty with the Emperor should not finally be ratified, to apply to our purposes all the resources of the city. 3. To avoid every species of odium in violating the preliminaries relative to the Venetian territory, and, at the same time, to gain pretexts which may facilitate their execution. 4. To calm all that may be said in Europe, since it will appear that our occupation of Venice is but a momentary operation, solicited by the Venetians themselves. The Conf. Des. Pope is eighty-three, and alarmingly ill. The moment I heard of that, I pushed forward all the Poles in the army to Bologna, from whence I shall advance them to Ancona." His intentions towards Venice were far iii. 169. 19th May, 1797. XXII. and clothed by the bounty of its government, that CHAP. disturbances became unavoidable, and then aided the 1797. ther summed up in these words, in his despatch to the Directory of 25th 1 Conf. Des. May: Venice must fall to those to whom we give the Italian conti- iii. 294. nent; but meanwhile, we will take its vessels, strip its arsenals, destroy 25th May, its bank, and keep Corfu and Ancona.” 1 "2 1797. 2 iii. 294. Still keeping up the feigned appearance of protection to Venice, Napoleon wrote to the municipality of that town, on the 26th May. "The treaty concluded at Milan may, in the meantime, be signed by the municipality, and the secret articles by three members. In every circumstance, I shall do what lies in my power to give you proofs of my desire to consolidate your liberties, and to see unhappy Italy at length assume the place to which it is entitled in the theatre of the world, free and independent of all strangers." Soon after, he wrote to General Baraguay Ibid. d'Hilliers, 13th June:-" You will, upon the receipt of this, present yourself to the provisional government of Venice, and represent to them, that, in conformity to the principles which now unite the Republic of France to that of Venice, and the immediate protection which the Republic of France gives to that of Venice, it is indispensable that the maritime forces of the republic be put on a respectable footing. Under this pretext you will take possession of every thing; taking care, at the same time, to live in good intelligence with the Venetians, and to engage in our service all the sailors of the republic, making use constantly of the Venetian name. In short, you must manage so as to transport all the naval stores and vessels in the harbour of Venice to Toulon. By a secret article of the treaty, the Venetians are bound to furnish to the French Republic three millions worth of stores for the marine of Toulon; but my intention is, to take possession, for the French Republic, of ALL the Venetian vessels, and all the naval stores, for the use of Toulon." : These orders were too faithfully executed; and when every article of naval and military stores had been swept away from Venice, Napoleon, without hesitation, assigned away his revolutionary allied republic, which he had engaged to defend, to the aristocratic power of Austria. The history of the world contains no blacker page of perfidy and dissimulation. It is in vain to allege, that the spoliation of Venice was occasioned, and justified, by their attack on the rear of the French army at Verona. The whole continental possessions of the republic were assigned to Austria by Napoleon at Leoben, four days before that event took place, and when nothing had occurred in the Venetian states, but the contests between the aristocratic and democratic factions, which had been stirred up by the secret emissaries of Napoleon himself. His conduct throughout this transaction appears to have been governed by one principle, and that was, to secure such pretexts for a rupture Ibid. iii. 305. CHAP. rebels, and made the efforts of the government to crush the insurrection the pretext for declaring war XXII. 1797. with Venice, as might afford a decent ground for making its territories the holocaust which would, at any time, bribe Austria into a peace, and extricate the French army from any peril into which it might have fallen. Twice did the glittering prize answer this purpose; once, when it brought about the armistice of Leoben, and saved Napoleon from the ruin which otherwise must have befallen him, and again at Campo Formio, by relieving him from a war, to which he himself confesses his forces were unequal. When M. Villetort, the secretary of the French legation at Venice, remonstrated with Napoleon upon the abandonment of that republic, he replied, in words containing, it is to be feared, too faithful a picture of the degradation of modern Italy. "The French Republic is bound by no treaty to sacrifice our interests and advantages to those of Venice. Never has France adopted the maxim of making war for the sake of other nations. I should like to see the principle of philosophy or morality which should command us to sacrifice forty thousand French, contrary alike to the declared wishes of France and its obvious interests. I know well, that it costs nothing to a handful of declaimers, whom I cannot better characterise than by calling them madmen, to rave about the establishment of republics everywhere. I wish these gentlemen would make a winter campaign. Besides, the Venetian nation no longer exists. Divided into as many separate interests as it contains cities, effeminated and corruptConf. Cor. ed, not less cowardly than hypocritical, the people of Italy, but espeiv. 405. cially the Venetians, are totally unfit for freedom." 1 1 Letter, 26th Oct. 1797, The same idea is expressed in a letter about the same period to Talleyrand. "You little know the people of Italy: they are not worth the sacrifice of forty thousand Frenchmen. I see by your letters that you are constantly labouring under a delusion. You suppose that liberty can do great things to a base, cowardly, and superstitious people. You wish me to perform miracles; I have not the art of doing so. Since coming into Italy I have derived little if any support from the love of the Italian people for liberty and equality. I have not in my army a single Italian, excepting 1500 rascals, swept from the streets of its towns, who are good for nothing but pillage. Every thing, excepting what you must say in proclamations and public speeches, is here mere romance." -Letter to Talleyrand, Passeriano, 7th Oct. 1797; Corresp. Confid. iv. 206. It only remains to add to this painful narrative of Italian duplicity, that having no farther occasion for the services of Landrieux, whom he had employed to stir up the revolt in the Italian cities, and having discovered evidence that he had been in correspondence with the Venetian government, Napoleon himself denounced him to the Directory. Authentic evidence had been discovered of the double part which he |