CHAP. XX. 1796. illusion by the French contributions. 17th May. But this illusion was of short duration, and Italy was soon destined to experience the bitter fate and cruel degradation of every people who look for Cruel dispel their deliverance to foreign assistance. In the midst ling of the of the general joy, a contribution of twenty millions of francs, or L.800,000 sterling, struck Milan with astonishment, and wounded the Italians in their tenderest part-their domestic and economical arrangements. So enormous a contribution upon a single city seemed scarcely possible to be realized; but the sword of the victor offered no alternative. Great requisitions were at the same time made of horses for the artillery and cavalry in all the Milanese territory; and provisions were amassed on all sides, at the expense of the inhabitants, for which they received nothing, or Republican paper of no value. Nor did the Duke of Modena escape more easily. He was compelled to purchase peace by a contribution of ten millions of francs in money, or stores for the army, and to submit to the exaction of twenty paintings from his gallery for the Republican museum.' Liberated Italy was treated with more Yomini, viii. severity than is generally the lot of conquered states. Thus commenced the system "of making war support war," which contributed so much to the early success of the Republican arms, which compenWar made to sated for all the penury and exhaustion of the Republican territory, which raised to the clouds the glory of the Empire, and occasioned with certainty its ultimate destruction. France, abounding with men, but destitute of resources, incapable of supporting war from the entire stoppage of domestic industry, but teeming with a restless and indigent population, found in this system the means of advancement and opulence. While the other armies of the 1 Thiers, viii. 265. 130. Napo leon, iii. 183. support war. XX. 1796. Republic were suffering under the horrors of penury, CHAP. and could hardly find food for their support, or clothes for their covering, the army of Italy was rolling in opulence, and the spoils of vanquished states gave them every enjoyment of life. From that time there was no want of soldiers to follow the career of the conqueror; the Alps were covered with files of troops pressing forward to the theatre of glory, and all the chasms occasioned by the relentless system of war which he followed, were filled up by the multitudes, whom the illusion of victory brought to his standard.1 1 Thiers, 265, 266. But the Republican soldiers were far from antici- viii. 137, pating the terrible reverses to which this system of spoliation was ultimately to lead, or that France was destined to groan under exactions, as severe as those she now so liberally inflicted upon others. Clothed, fed, and lodged at the expense of the Milanese, the soldiers pursued with thoughtless eagerness the career of glory which was stretched before them. The artillery, the cavalry, were soon in the finest condition; and hospitals established for 15,000 sick in the different towns in the conquered territory; for to that immense number had the rapidity of the marches, and the multiplicity of the combats, swelled the hospital train. Having amply provided for his own army, Napoleon despatched several millions by the route of Genoa for the service of the Directory, and one million over the Alps to Moreau, 266. to relieve the pressing wants of the army of the i. 159. Upper Rhine. These great successes already began to inspire the of his power, French government with jealousy of their lieutenant, orders Napoand they in consequence transmitted an order by march to which Kellermann, with 20,000 men, was to com- refuses. VOL. III. 2 D 2 Ibid. viii. Nap. Cor. The Direct ory, jealous leon to Rome-He 1 XX. 1796. CHAP. mand on the left bank of the Po, and cover the siege of Mantua, while Napoleon, with the remainder of the forces, was to march upon Rome and Naples. But he was both too proud to submit to any division of his authority, and too sagacious not to see that by thus separating the forces, and leaving only a small army in the North of Italy, the Austrians would speedily regain their lost ground, drive their inconsiderable opponents over the Alps, and cut off without the possibility of escape, the corps in the south of the Peninsula. He therefore at once resigned his command, accompanying it with the observation, that one bad General is better than two good ones; but the Directory, unable to dispense with the services of their youthful officer, immediately reinstated him, and abandoned their project, which was indeed in itself so absurd as to throw great doubts on the military capacity of Carnot, the minister at war; if it was not in reality suggested by the wish to extinguish the Thiers, rising ambition of Napoleon.' * viii. 269. Napoleon, iii. 184. 133. Napoleon on this occasion wrote to Carnot:-" Kellermann would Jomini, viii. command the army as well as me; for no one is more convinced than I am of the courage and audacity of the soldiers; but to unite us together would ruin every thing. I will not serve with a man who considers himself the first general in Europe; and it is better to have one bad general than two good ones. War is, like government, decided in a great degree by tact." To the Directory he observed," It is in the highest degree impolitic to divide into two the army of Italy, and not less adverse to the interests of the Republic, to place at its head two different generals. The expedition to Leghorn, Rome, and Naples is a very inconsiderable matter, and should be made by divisions in echelon, ready at a moment's warning, to wheel about and face the Austrians on the Adige. To perform it with success, both armies must be under the command of one general. I have hitherto conducted the campaign without consulting any one; the result would have been very different, if I had been obliged to reconcile my views with those of another. If you impose upon me vexations of every description; if I must refer all my steps to the commissaries of government; if they are authorized to change my movements, to send away my troops, expect no farther success. If you XX. 1796. In less than ten days after the occupation of Milan, CHAP. National Guards in the Republican interest were organized in the whole of Lombardy; revolutionary authorities were everywhere established, and the country rendered subservient to the military power of France. The garrison of 2000 men, which Beaulieu had left in the citadel of Milan, was closely invested, and the headquarters moved to Lodi. But 25th May. an event here occurred which threatened great danger to the French army, and was only averted by the decision and severity of their Chief.' 1 Napoleon, iii. 191. Opinions were much divided in Italy, as in all Thiers, viii. states undergoing the crisis of a revolution, on the 272. changes which were going forward. The lower classes in the towns had been moved by the equality which the French everywhere proclaimed; but the Alarming peasantry in the country, less liable to the contagion at Pavia. of new principles, and more under the influence of insurrection weaken your resources by dividing your forces; if you disturb in Italy the unity of military thought, I say it with grief, you will lose the finest opportunity that ever occurred of giving laws to Italy. In the position of the affairs of the Republic, it is indispensable that you possess a general who enjoys your confidence; if I do not do so I shall not complain, and shall do my utmost to manifest my zeal in the service which you intrust to me. Every one has his own method of carrying on war; Kellermann has more experience, and may do it better than I; but together we would do nothing but mischief. Your resolution on this matter is of more importance than the 15,000 men whom the Emperor has just sent to Beaulieu."" But Napoleon did not intrust this important matter? Corresp. merely to these arguments, strong as they were. Murat, who was still Secret de at Paris, received instructions to inform Barras, that a million of francs Napoleon, i. were deposited at Genoa for his private use; and the influence of Josephine was employed both with him and Carnot to prevent the threatened division, and the result was that it was abandoned. "The Directory," said Carnot," has maturely considered your arguments; and the confidence which they have in your talents and republican zeal, have decided the matter in your favour. Kellermann will remain at Chambery, and you may adjourn the expedition to Rome as long as you please."HARDENBERG, iii. 49, 351. 160, 162. XX. 1796. CHAP. the nobility and priests, were still firmly attached to the ancient régime, with which the Austrian authority was now identified. When men's minds were in this divided state, the prodigious contributions levied upon Milan, and the vast requisitions of provisions and horses which had been made for the use of the army, inflamed the rural population to the highest degree. The people of Lombardy did not consider themselves as conquered, nor expect to be treated as such they had welcomed the French as deliverers, and now they found a severer yoke fastened about their necks than that from which they had just escaped. Roused to indignation by such treatment, a general insurrection was rapidly organized over the whole of that beautiful district: An attack, in concert with a sortie from the garrison of the castle, was made on Milan; and though it failed, the insurgents were more successful at Pavia, where the people rose against the garrison, forced it to capitulate, admitted 8000 armed peasants within their walls, and closed their gates against the French troops.' 1 Thiers, Storm and sack of that city by the French troops. The danger was imminent; the tocsin sounded in all the parishes; the least retrograde movement would have augmented the evil, and compelled the retreat of the army, whose advanced posts were already on the Oglio. In these circumstances, prudence prescribed temerity; and Napoleon advanced in person to crush the insurgents. Their vanguard, posted at Brescia, was routed by Lannes; the village burnt, and 100 of the peasants killed; but this severe example having failed in producing intimidation, he marched himself next day to the walls of Pavia, with six pieces of light artillery. The grenadiers rushed forward to the gates, which they broke open with hatchets ; while the artillery cleared |