CHAP. XX. 1796. the ramparts, the victorious troops rushed into the town, which the peasants precipitately abandoned to its fate. Napoleon, wishing to terrify the insurgents, ordered the magistrates and leaders of the revolt to be shot, and the city to be delivered up to plunder; while the unhappy peasants, pursued into the plain by the French dragoons, were cut down in great numbers. The pillage continued the whole day; Thiers, and that opulent and flourishing town underwent all Napoleon, the horrors of war; but the terrible example crushed. 194. the insurrection over the whole of Lombardy, where 138. Botta, hostages were taken from the principal families, and despatched into France. viii. 275. Jomini, viii. i. 390, 394. In this act was displayed another feature of Napoleon's character, who, without being unnecessarily cruel, never hesitated to adopt the most sanguinary measures when requisite for his own purposes. Pillage and rapine, indeed, invariably follow the capture of a town carried by assault, and it is impossible to prevent it: but Napoleon in this instance authorized it by a general order, and shot the leading persons of the city in cold blood. It is in vain to appeal to the usages of war for a vindication of such cruelty; the words of Napoleon himself furnish his own condemnation :-" It is the first duty," said the Emperor, in his proclamation to the peasantry of France, in February, 1814, " of every citizen to take up arms in defence of his country: Let the peasantry everywhere organize themselves in bands, with such weapons as they can find; let them fall upon the flanks and rear of the invaders; and let a consuming fire envelope the presumptuous host Proclamawhich has dared to violate the territory of the great 28, 1814. nation."2 tion, Feb. Baron Fain, Having by this severity stifled the spirit of insur 142. CHAP. 1796. 28th May. enters Bre Venetian territory. rection in his rear, Napoleon continued his march, and, on the 28th, entered the great city of Brescia, situated on the neutral territory of Venice. MeanNapoleon while, Beaulieu experienced the usual fate of a rescia and the tiring army, that of being weakened by the garrisons necessary for the fortified places which it leaves uncovered in its retreat. He threw twenty battalions of his best troops into Mantua, and took up a defensive position along the line of the Mincio. There was assailed on the following day by Napoleon, who, 29th May. after forcing a bridge in front of his position, attacked his rear-guard at Valeggio with all his cavalry, and made prisoners, in spite of the bravest efforts of the Napoleon, Austrian horse, 1200 men, and five pieces of cannon.1 When the French army entered the Venetian ter139, 142. ritory, and it had become evident that the flames of war were approaching its capital, it was warmly disDebates in cussed in the Venetian Senate what course the Re iii. 202. Jomini, viii. the Venetian Senate on public should pursue in the perilous circumstances what should that had occurred. Peschiera had been occupied by be done. Botta, i. 403, 405. the Austrians, but being abandoned by them, was XX. 1796. Venice; that certain ruin, either from foreign vio- CHAP. lence or domestic revolution, was to be expected from their success; that the haughty tone even now assumed by the conqueror, already showed that he looked upon all the continental possessions of the Republic as his own, and was only waiting for an opportunity to seize them for the French nation; and, therefore, that the sole course left was to throw themselves into the arms of Austria, the natural ally of all regular governments. On the other, it was contended, that they must beware lest they mistook a temporary irruption of the French for a permanent settlement; that Italy had in every age been the tomb of the French armies; that the forces of the present invader, how successful soever they had hitherto been, were unequal to a permanent occupation of the Peninsula, and would in the end yield to the persevering efforts of the Germans; that Austria, therefore, was the natural enemy of Venice, and the power which coveted, and would, in the end, attempt to seize its territorial possessions; that their forces were now expelled from Lombardy, and could not resume the offensive for two months, a period which would suffice to the French general to destroy the Republic; that interest, therefore, equally with prudence, prescribed that they should attach themselves to the cause of France; obtain thereby a barrier against the ambition of their powerful neighbour, and receive, in recompense for their services, part of the Italian dominions of the Austrian empire. That in so doing, they must, it is true, to a certain degree, modify their form of government; but that was no more than the spirit of the age required, and was absolutely indispensable to secure the dominion XX. 1796. CHAP. of their continental possessions. A third party, few in numbers but resolute in purpose, contended, that the only safe course was that of an armed neutrality; that the forces of the Republic should be instantly raised to 50,000 men, and either of the belligerent powers which should violate their territory, threat1 Botta, i. ened with the whole vengeance of the Republic.' 408, 409. Thiers, viii. the hostility Had the Venetians possessed the firmness of the 276, 279. Roman Senate, they would have adopted the first course; had they been inspired by the spirit of the Athenian democracy, they would have followed the second; had they been animated by the courage They merely of the Swiss Confederacy, they would have taken deprecate the third. In either case, the Republic might have of France. been saved; for it is impossible to consider the long and equal struggle which ensued round Mantua, between France and Austria, without being convinced that a considerable body, even of Italian troops, might have then cast the balance. They had 3,000,000 of souls; their army could easily be raised to 50,000 men; thirteen regiments of Sclavonians in their service were good troops; their fleet ruled the Adriatic. But Venice was worn out and corrupted; its nobles, drowned in pleasure, were destitute of energy; its peasantry, inured to peace, were unequal to war; its defence, trusted merely to mercenary troops, rested on a tottering foundation. They adopted in consequence the most timid course, which, in presence of danger, is generally the most perilous; they made no warlike preparations; but merely sent commissioners to the French General to deprecate his hostility, and endeavour to secure his good-will. The consequence was, what might have been anticipated from conduct so unworthy of the ancient fame of the Republic; the Commissioners XX. 1796. were disregarded; the war was carried on in the CHAP. Venetian territories, and at its close the Republic was swept from the book of nations.1* 1 Botta, i. Napoleon, viii. 278, denberg, iii. Massena entered the magnificent city of Verona, 408, 413. situated on the Adige, and a military position of the iii. 204, highest importance for future operations, in the 205. Thiers, beginning of June. Its position at the entrance of 280. Harthe great valley of the Adige, and on the high-road 357. from the Tyrol into Lombardy, rendered it the advanced post of the French army, in covering the June 3, siege of Mantua. He occupied, at the same time, 1796. Massena enPorto Legnago, a fortified town on the Adige, and ters Verona, which, along with Verona, strengthened that stream, leon is estawhose short and rapid course from the Alps to the blished on Po, formed the best military frontier of Italy. There and Napo the Adige. 2 361. In adopting this course, Napoleon exceeded the instructions of his government; and, indeed, on him alone appears to rest the atrocious perfidy and dissimulation exercised in the sequel towards that Republic. The directions of the Directory were as follows: "Venice should be treated as a neutral, but not a friendly power; it has done nothing to merit the latter character." But to the Venetian Commissioners Napo- * Corresp. leon, from the first, used the most insulting and rigorous language. Secret. 7th “Venice," said he, "by daring to give an asylum to the Count de Lille, a May, 1796. pretender to the throne of France, has declared war against the Republic. I know not why I should not reduce Verona to ashes-a town which had the presumption to esteem itself the capital of France." He Hardendeclared to them that he would carry that threat into execution that very berg, iii. night, if an immediate surrender did not take place. The perfidy of his views against Venice even at this early period, was fully evinced in his Secret Despatch to the Directory on 7th June. " If your object," said he, "is to extract five or six millions out of Venice, I have secured for you a pretence for a rupture. You may demand it as an indemnity for the combat of Borghetto, which I was obliged to sustain to take Peschiera. If you have more decided views, we must take care not to let that subject of discord drop; tell me what you wish, and be assured I will seize the most fitting opportunity of carrying it into execution, according to circumstances, for we must take care not to have all the world on our hands at once." 4 + Corresp. The truth of the affair of Peschiera is, that the Secret de Venetians were cruelly deceived by the Austrians, who demanded a passage for fifty men, and then seized the town. Napoleon, i. 232. |