which had so powerful a share in contributing to his downfall.* XX. 1796. the peasants at Lugo. After a short stay at Florence, Napoleon returned to Bologna, where Augereau took a severe vengeance Massacre of on the inhabitants of the village of Lugo, which had taken up arms against the Republicans, and killed and wounded some soldiers in a detachment sent for its reduction. The village was carried by assault, burnt to ashes, and the unfortunate peasants, to the number of 1000, put, with merciless severity, to the sword. This terrible example having struck terror into all the inhabitants of that part of Italy, he returned to the vicinity of Mantua, to superintend the operations of the siege, which Serrurier was now about to undertake in good earnest, with the battering train taken at the castles of Milan, Urbino, and Ferrara ; but for the relief of which place Austria was making the most vigorous exertions.' The resolution of Napoleon to stir up a quarrel 420. Napowith Venice was more and more clearly evinced, as 225. matters approached a crisis in the north of Italy. On the 25th July, he had a long and confidential conversation with Pesaro, the commissioner of that Republic; and such was the vehemence of his language, the exaggeration of his complaints, and the sternness of his manner, that he forthwith wrote to the Senate 66 The rapine and pillage of the French authorities consequent on this irruption into Tuscany, knew no bounds. "If our administrative conduct," said Napoleon, to the Directory, was detestable at Leghorn, our political conduct towards Tuscany has been no better."-Secret Correspond. of Napoleon, 11th July, 1796. His views extended even farther, for, on the 25th, he wrote to the Directory: "Reports are in circulation that the Emperor is dying; the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the heir to the throne, will instantly set out for Vienna. We must anticipate him, by taking military possession of the whole of Tuscany."Secret Despatch, 25th July. 1 Botta, i. leon, iii. CHAP. 1796. 1 Hardenberg, iii. 424. 2 Letter, Lallemand 1796. Cor 2 of St Mark that war appeared inevitable.' It was in vain that Pesaro represented, "that ever since the entrance of the French into Italy, his government had made it their study to anticipate all the wishes of the General-in-chief; that if it had not done more, it was solely from inability, and a desire not to embroil themselves with the Imperialists, who never ceased to reproach them with their partiality to France; that the Senate would do every thing in its power to restrain the public effervescence; and that the armaments, so much complained of, were directed as much against the English and Russians as the French." The determination of Napoleon in regard to Napoleon, to the Venetian Republic is revealed in his Secret 26th July, Despatches at this period to the Directory: "I have resp. Confid. seized," said he, " the citadel of Verona, and armed de Napoleon. it with the Venetian cannon, and summoned the senate to dissolve its armaments. Venice has already furnished three millions for the service of the army; but, in order to extract more out of it, I have found myself under the necessity of assuming a menacing tone towards their commissaries, of exaggerating the assassinations committed against our troops, of complaining bitterly of their armaments; and by these means I compel them, to appease my wrath, to furnish whatever I desire. That is the only way to deal with such persons. There is not on the face of the earth a more perfidious or cowardly government. I will force them to provide supplies for the army till the fall of Mantua, and then announce that they must farther make good the contributions fixed in your 3 Secret Des- instructions." patch of Napoleon, July No sooner had they received intelligence of the defeat of Beaulieu, and the retreat of his forces into Corresp. i. the Tyrol, than the Aulic Council resolved upon 327. the XX. 1796. trians for Wurmser through the 30,000 men. most energetic measures to repair the disaster. The CHAP. army of Beaulieu retired to Roveredo, where they threw up entrenchments to cover their position, Efforts of while 8000 Tyrolese occupied the crests of the the Ausmountains, which separated the valley of the Adige the relief of from the Lake of Guarda. Meanwhile, Marshal Mantua. Wurmser was detached from the Upper Rhine with 30,000 men, to assume the chief command of the Advance of army destined for the relief of Mantua; which, by that great reinforcement, and numerous detachments Tyrol with drawn from the interior, was raised to 60,000 effective troops. These great preparations, which were magnified by report, and had roused the aristocratic party throughout Italy to great exertions, filled Napoleon with the most lively apprehensions. To oppose them he had only 55,000 men, of whom 15,000 were engaged in the siege of Mantua, 10,000 in keeping up his communication and maintaining garrisons in the conquered territory; so that not above 30,000 could be relied on for operations in the field. He had incessantly urged the Directory to send him reinforcements; but although 8000 men from the army of Kellermann had joined his standard, and Jom. viii. numerous reinforcements from the depôts in the interior, they were barely adequate to repair the losses 231, 232. arising from that wasteful campaign.' Nothing but the greatest ability on the part of the General, and courage among the soldiers, could have compensated for this inferiority in numbers; but the genius of Napoleon, and the confidence arising from a series of victories, proved adequate to the task. His success was mainly owing to the vicious plan of attack adopted by the Austrians, which, like all the others framed by the Aulic Coun 302, 303. Nap. iii. Th. viii. 360. CHAP. cil, was exposed to defeat from the division of their XX. 1796. ' Jomini, of the war. forces.1 The waters which descend from the southern ridges of the Tyrol, form two streams, flowing nearDescription ly parallel to each other, and issuing in the same theatre of latitude into the plain of Lombardy, the Mincio, and the Adige. The first forms, in its course, the noble sheet of water called the Lake of Guarda, flows through the plain immortalized by the genius of Virgil, swells into the lakes which surround Mantua, and afterwards discharges itself into the Po. The latter, after descending from the snowy ridges of the Higher Alps, flows in an open valley to a narrow and precipitous pass above Verona, next emerges into the open country, winds in a deep and rocky bed to Legnago, after which it spreads into vast marshes, and is lost in the dikes and inundations of Lombardy. Three roads present themselves to an enemy proposing to issue from the Tyrol to the Italian plains:The first, turning sharp to the left at Roveredo, traverses the defiles of the Val Sugana, and emerges into the open country at Bassano. The second passes by the upper end of the Lake of Guarda, and comes down by its western shore to Salo and Brescia; while the third descends the left bank of the Adige, and after traversing the gloomy defiles of Calliano and Chiusa, reaches the town of Verona. The space between the Adige and the Lake of Guarda, though only three leagues broad, is filled by the Montebaldo, whose precipices restrain the river on the one hand and the lake on the other. In this narrow and rocky space a road descends between the Adige and the lake, from Roveredo to the plain. It follows the right bank of the stream as far as Osteria della Dugana, when, meeting im practicable precipices, it turns to the right, and CHAP. ascends the Plateau of Rivoli.1 2 1 XX. 1796. Jom. viii. Nap. iii. tack. The entrance of all these passes were occupied by Th. viii. the French troops. Sauret, with only 4500 men, 362, 364. was posted at Salo, to guard the western side of the 305. Lake of Guarda, as the road there was not accessible to artillery. Massena, with 15,000, guarded the great road on the Adige, and occupied the Plateau of Rivoli; while Despinois, with 5000, was in the environs of Verona; and Augereau, with 8000 in reserve, at Legnago. Napoleon himself, with 2000 horse, took post at Castelnuovo, in order to be equally Th. viii. 4. near any of the points that might be menaced. 235. Wurmser's plan was to make demonstrations only Austrian against Verona, and the left of the Adige; and to plan of atbring down the bulk of his forces by the Montebaldo and the valley of Salo, on the opposite sides of the Lake of Guarda. For this purpose he detached Quasdanovich, with 20,000 men, to go round the upper end of the lake, and descend upon Salo, while he took the command of 40,000 himself, whom he distributed on the two roads which descend the opposite banks of the Adige; the one division was destined to force Corona and the Plateau of Rivoli, while the other was to debouche upon Verona. The whole columns were in motion by the end of July; rumour had magnified their numbers; and the partisans of Austria, and of the Aristocratic system, were already breaking out into exultation, Th. viii. and anticipating the speedy verification of the pro- 364, 365 verb-That Italy was the tomb of the French.3 3 Nap. iii. 233. In truth, the circumstances of the Republicans July 29. were all but desperate. On the 29th July, the Imperial outposts attacked the French at all points, and everywhere with success. Massena, vigorously |