lin and his heirs until a survey should be made and approved by the surveyor general, segregating his part from the public domain, and from conflicting claims. The survey of 1856 was not approved until May 9, 1900, when the receiver and register approved said survey, giving to Joplin and to conflicting claimants the tracts to which they were entitled under the confirmation. It was only then that the complete legal title was vested in Joplin and his heirs to the tract of land in controversy. It was only from this time that prescription com were denominated grants (§7), and they were required to designate a tract of land (§6). Section 7, it is true, provided for a survey. The provision is "that the tracts of land thus granted by the commissioners shall be surveyed at the expense of the parties, under the direction of the surveyor general," in all cases where authenticated plats of the land, as surveyed by the French, Spanish, and American governments, respectively, shall not have been filed with the proper register and recorder, or shall not appear on the public records of the territories. The surveying officer was required Is the contention of counsel justified? to transmit general and particular plats of They cite Langdeau v. Hanes, 21 Wall. 521,| land thus surveyed to the proper register 22 L. ed. 606, and Morrow v. Whitney, 95 and recorder, and copies to the Secretary of U. S. 551, 24 L. ed. 456. To determine the the Treasury. The duties of the officers application of those cases there are im- under the act may be summarized as fol. portant facts to be considered. The su- lows: (1) The commissioners to investi preme court of Louisiana said: gate the claim, and, if they confirmed it, to mences. "We do not think there is any dispute be-issue a certificate thereof, and transmit a tween the parties as to the facts. That, on transcript of their final decision to the Secthe 12th of March, 1812, the board of com- retary of the Treasury. (2) The register missioners appointed under 8 4 of the act and receiver, upon the filing of the certifi of Congress, approved March 3, 1807, con- cate with him and a plat of the land being firmed to Bennet Joplin under certificate also filed with him by the surveyor general No. 1,927, by virtue of occupancy and settle- or officer acting as surveyor general, should ment under Joseph Chevalier Poiret, 913.98 issue a certificate, which, being transmitted acres of land in Bayou Mallet woods, in the to the Secretary of the Treasury, would encounty of Opelousas. That on April 29, title the party to a patent. (3) The sur1816 [3 Stat. at L. 329, chap. 159], Con- vey of the land by the surveyor general or gress reciting the various acts bearing upon officer acting as such. (4) Reports by the the subject (act of March 10, 1812 [2 Stat. Secretary of the Treasury to Congress "for at L. 692, chap. 38], act of February 27, their final determination hereon, in the man1813 [2 Stat. at L. 807, chap. 38], and act ner and at the time heretofore prescribed of April, 1814 [3 Stat. at L. 121, chap. 52]) by law for that purpose." There is no evipassed an act for the confirmation of certain dence that the register and receiver issued land claims in the western district of the a certificate other than that mentioned in state of Louisiana, and that under § 1 of the patent. The commissioners performed that act it was enacted 'that the claims the duties required of them and the Secre marked "B," described in the reports of the tary of the Treasury performed his. And a commissioners for the western district of survey was made of the land in 1856. the state of Louisiana, formerly territory Under these facts did the title pass by the of Orleans, and recommended by them for confirmation expressed in the act of Conconfirmation, be, and the same are hereby,gress of April 29, 1816 (3 Stat. at L. 328, confirmed.' That the claim of Bennet Jop- chap. 159), or, at the latest, upon the surlin covered by certificate No. 1,927 of the vey in 1856, or did it pass by the patent in board of commissioners, was confirmed in July, 1900? For answer we may refer to favor of Joplin by that act of Congress. the cases cited by the plaintiff in error. That although the claim was so confirmed by act of Congress, no patent was issued for the land by the United States government until July 1900." In Langdeau v. Hanes, the contest was between a title claimed by virtue of the act of Congress, March 26, 1804 [2 Stat. at L. 277, chap. 35], which confirmed claims to In other words, the land claimed by Poiret lands in the district of Vincennes, and a was identified by his possession. It con- title claimed by adverse possession. It was tained a definite quantity. Fractions of provided by the act of Congress that a peracres were even regarded, and almost neces- son to whom land is confirmed, whenever his sarily. The right of a claimant depended claim shall have been located and surveyed; upon possession, and naturally its extent shall be entitled to the certificate from the was marked by definite boundaries. How register and receiver, which certificate shall else could a claim have any strength at all, entitle him to a patent. The tract in dis-any right to confirmation at all? The pute was surveyed in 1820, but a patent was certificates issued by the commissioners not issued until 1872. The defendant's 102 104 103 ment, and to inform the government of the quantity reserved to private parties from the domain ceded by Virginia. claim of title rested on an adverse posses-troversies at law respecting the land the nesion of thirty years. The state court held cessity of other proof, and would thus have that the act of confirmation of 1807 was a been to them an instrument of quiet and present grant, and became so far operative security. But it would have added nothing and complete as to convey the legal title to the force of the confirmation. The surwhen the land was located and surveyed by vey required for the patent was only to sethe United States in 1820; second, the pat-cure certainty of description in the instru ent was not of itself a grant of the land, but only evidence of a grant; third, the adverse possession of the defendant was a bar to the recovery by the plaintiff. These prop- "The whole error of the plaintiff arises, ositions were affirmed by this court. The from his theory that the fee to the land in court held that the act of Congress of 1804 controversy passed to the United States by was a recognition and discharge of the obli- the cession from Virginia, and that a patent gation incurred by the government upon ac- was essential to its transfer to the claimquiring the territory from Virginia, to pro-ants, whereas, with respect to the lands covtect and confirm the possession and titles of ered by the possession of the inhabitants the inhabitants to their property. And it was held that it was competent for Congress to provide how that it should be done, and Congress required a presentation of the claims to the register and receiver of the land office, constituted them commissioners to pass upon the claims "according to justice and equity," and to transmit to the Secretary of the Treasury a transcript of their decisions with his report. The Secretary of the Treasury submitted the decisions and the report to Congress, as he has required to do, and Congress passed the act of 1807 to confirm them. The court said: and settlers mentioned in the deed of cession, the fee never passed to the United States, and if it had passed, and a mere equitable title had remained in the claimants after the cession, the confirmation by the act of 1807 would have operated as a release to them of the interest of the United States. A legislative confirmation of a claim to land is a recognition of the validity of such claim, and operates as effectually as a grant or quit-claim from the government." This doctrine was repeated in Morrow v. Whitney, 95 U. S. 551, 24 L. ed. 456. The "This confirmation was the fulfillment of question arose upon the ruling of the trial the condition stipulated in the deed of ces-court refusing to admit a patent of the sion so far as the claimants were concerned. United States in evidence. Sustaining the It was an authoritative recognition by rec- ruling, this court said: ord of the ancient possession and title of their ancestor, and gave to them such assurance of the validity of that possession and title as would be always respected by the courts of the country. The subsequent clause of the act providing for the issue of a pat-upon a survey by the government, it would ent to the claimants when their claim was located and surveyed took nothing from the force of the confirmation. "In this case, the patent would have been of great value to the claimant. It would have enabled him, without other proof, to maintain his title in the tribunals of the country. Founded as it would have been have removed the doubt as to the boundaries of the tract, which always arises where their establishment rests in the uncertain "In the legislation of Congress a patent recollection of witnesses as to ancient poshas a double operation. It is a conveyance session. It would thus have proved to its by the government when the government has possessor an instrument of quiet and securany interest to convey, but where it is is-ity, but it would not have added anything sued upon the confirmation of a claim of a to the interest vested by the confirmation. previously existing title it is documentary Ryan v. Carter, 93 U. S. 78, 23 L. ed. 807." evidence, having the dignity of a record, of These cases are not in conflict with Gibthe existence of that title, or of such equities son v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 93, 20 L. ed. 534, respecting the claim as justify its recog- as was observed in Langdeau v. Hanes. The nition and confirmation. The instrument is land in controversy had been part of the not the less efficacious as evidence of pre-public lands of the United States. The title viously existing rights because it also em- of Gibson was derived under the act of Conbodies words of release or transfer from the gress of February 17, 1815, for the relief of government. the inhabitants of the county of New Madrid, in the territory of Missouri, who had suffered by earthquakes. 3 Stat. at L. 211, chap. 45. James T. O'Carroll obtained permission from the Spanish authorities to settle on vacant lands in the district of New Madrid, in the territory of Louisiana, and "In the present case the patent would have been of great value to the claimants as record evidence of the ancient possession and title of their ancestor, and of the recognition and confirmation by the United States, and would have obviated in any con *106 in pursuance of the permission he settled | dicated and granted, and it was that title upon a tract embracing about 1,000 arpents which was confirmed by the act of April of land, in that part of the country which 29, 1816. afterwards comprised the county of New What element, then, is wanting? PlainMadrid in the territory of Missouri. The tiff in error says the identification of the land settled upon, to the extent of 640 acres, land,-its complete definition by boundaries, was confirmed to O'Carroll by different acts and until this was done the title was in of Congress. In 1812 the land was injured the United States. We need not dispute the by an earthquake, and, upon proof of the principle upon which the contention rests. fact, the recorder of land titles at St. Louis We think its conditions were satisfied. gave a certificate to that effect, which au- Poiret's title was obtained by occupation, thorized the location of a like quantity on and the right of his successor, Joplin, deany of the public lands of the territory of pended upon that, and by that the award Missouri, a sale of which was authorized by of the commissioners could only have been law. Under this certificate the land in dis- measured. It is not conceivable that the pute was located. The land located had boundaries of the tract were not ascertained been previously surveyed, but for some by them. Their certificate, as was seen, excause the survey and plat were not returned pressed an exact quantity, 918.98 acres, and to the recorder until August, 1841. The re- having a frontage of 1,080 arpents. The corder then issued a patent certificate to evidence before the commissioners is not ex"James T. O'Carroll or his legal representa-hibited, but there was a survey in 1856. tives." The survey was not approved by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, because it did not show its interferences with The remarks of the supreme court of Louisi ana are, therefore, apposite: "It is evident that Poiret was shown to conflicting claimants. A new survey and the board to have already occupied and setplat were made, showing interferences, and tled a particular body of land for the time were filed with the recorder on the 26th of *stated, and to have already had an existing March, 1862, and a new patent certificate right or privilege to a particular tract. The issued. In the following June the patent identity of the tract confirmed must have of the United States was issued to Mary Mc-| been fixed by evidence before the board, and Ree, who had acquired the interest of the lo- the survey which followed was unquestionacator by various mesne conveyances. In bly based upon that evidence, preserved and August following she conveyed to Gibson. made known to the surveyor. The Joplin Against the title thus acquired, among claim under Poiret was not based upon the other defenses, adverse possession for the survey, but the survey was based upon the period prescribed by the statute of Mis- existing claim, and simply identified the souri was pleaded. The plea was sustained. land to which Poiret and Joplin were enti. The judgment was reversed by this court. tled by antecedent occupancy and settlement." It is obvious that there is a clear distinction between the case and Langdeau v. Speaking of the survey, the court said: Hanes and Morrow v. Whitney. The act of “If, however, a survey of the claim was 1815 did not confirm to O'Carroll the tract necessary in order to complete the transfer of land which he obtained from the Spanish of ownership of this property to Joplin, we authorities. It only enabled him or his rep-are satisfied that a survey of the same was resentatives to locate a like quantity of the made and approved by the surveyor general, public land, and a segregation of that quan- W. J. McCulloh, as far back as 1856. The tity and its exact identification were neces- present surveyor general of Louisiana resary, and this did not occur until the issue fers to the survey and field notes of Phelps of the patent in 1862. The patent, there- as having been approved, but not as a matfore, was not the mere formal assurance of ter of original approval by himself, as the a title that had been conveyed by another plaintiff seems to contend. In the act of government, but it was the conveyance of sale of this land under which the plaintiff the title of this government after condi- claims from James W. Joplin to James H. tions performed, which authorized but did Houston, Jr., the land transferred is renot anticipate it, nor were they its equiv- ferred to as a 'Spanish grant' with the alent. The case at bar, therefore, does not added words (see parish map and a list of come under the precedent of Gibson v. Chou- private land claims, where the above deteau; it comes under that of Langdeau v. scribed property is well defined as belong Ilanes and Morrow v. Whitney. ing to Bennet Joplin). We have before us a copy of the parish map here referred to, with the different private claims (among others that of Bennet Joplin) distinctly set out, and the surveys on which they were located minutely detailed, certified to as far Plaintiff in error claims under Joplin, who claimed under Poiret, who claimed under the French government. And it was the title to a tract of land thus claimed that the commissioners under the act of 1807 adju *112 back as 1856 by the surveyor general. It may be that it is not strictly and technically in evidence, but it is before us by reference in one of the acts, and were we not to act upon it the only effect would be to remand uselessly the case in order to have it formally introduced." The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opin This suit was brought by the plaintiff in error against the defendants in error, who were officers of the city of Denver, to restrain them from enforcing an ordinance of the city on the ground that the ordinance was "contrary to the provision of the Constitution of the state of Colorado and amendments thereto, and contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of the United States," and "contrary to the laws of the state of Colorado, guaranteeing civil rights to all persons, and contrary to other statutes of the state of Colorado." Bennet Joplin, it was testified, died be-ion of the court: fore the assessment was made upon which the tax sale upon which the title of the defendants in error depended, and the validity of the assessment, therefore, is denied, because it was not made in the name of the owner, as required by the statute of the state of 1870. The assessment is also at tacked for nonconformity with the statutes in other particulars. In passing on the questions thus raised the supreme court of Louisiana construed the statutes of the state differently from plaintiff in error, and answered all the questions on grounds not Federal, and which, therefore, we need not discuss. Judgment affirmed. (192 U. S. 108) DANIEL CRONIN, Plff. in Err., v. FRANK ADAMS, John T. Bottom, and William H. Griffith, Constituting the Fire and Police Board of the City of Denver, and Hamilton Armstrong, Chief of Police of the City of Denver. Constitutional law-validity of police regulations excluding females from saloons. ▲ municipal ordinance which prohibits liquor sellers from providing wine rooms or other places where females may be supplied with liquor, and from permitting females to be or remain for that purpose where liquor is sold or in any place adjacent thereto or connected therewith, and from employing females to wait or attend upon any person therein, and which forbids females from remaining in any such place and waiting and attending upon any person, or soliciting drinks therein,-is a valid exercise of the police power, not repugnant to the Federal Constitution. [No. 100.] A preliminary injunction was allowed. It was made perpetual upon hearing, by decree of the court. The decree was reversed by the supreme court of the state, and this writ of error was then sued out. Sections 745 and 746 of article 15 of the ordinance of Denver, which are complained of and attacked, are as follows: "Sec. 745. Each and every liquor saloon, dram shop, or tippling house keeper, who shall have or keep, in connection with or as part of such liquor saloon, dram shop, or tippling house, any wine room or other place, either with or without door or doors, curtain or curtains, or screen of any kind, into which any female person shall be permitted to enter from the outside, or from such liquor saloon, dram shop, or tippling house, and there be supplied with any kind of liquor whatsoever, shall, upon conviction, be fined as hereinafter provided. "Sec. 746. No person . having charge or control of any liquor saloon or place where intoxicating or malt liquors are sold or given away, or any place adjacent thereto, or connected therewith in any manner whatsoever, either by doors or otherwise, shall suffer or permit any female person to be or remain in such liquor saloon, dram shop, tippling house, or other place where Argued and submitted December 16, 1903. intoxicating or malt liquors are sold or IN Decided January 4, 1904. N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado to review a judgment which reversed a decree of the District Court of Arapahoe County perpetually enjoining municipal officials from enforcing an ordinance excluding females from saloons. Affirmed. given away, for the purpose of there being supplied with any kind of liquor whatsoever. No person owning or having charge or control of any liquor saloon, dram shop, or tippling house shall employ or procure, or cause to be employed or procured, any female person to wait or in any manner attend on any person in any dram shop, tippling house, or liquor saloon, or in any place See same case below, 29 Colo. 488, 69 Pac. adjacent thereto 590. 1. See Constitutional Law, vol. 10, Cent. Dig. 150, 629, 648, 711, 725; Intoxicating Liquors, vol. Cent. Dig. § 18. or connected therewith where intoxicating or malt liquors are sold or given away, nor shall any female person be or remain in any dram shop, tippling 114 house, liquor saloon, or place adjacent | the courts of every state, considered as the thereto or connected therewith, and wait or attend on any person, or solicit drinks in any such place." The supreme court held that those sections did not violate the Constitution of the state, and that they were authorized by the statutes of the state, and sustained the validity of the ordinance against the contention that it violated the Constitution of the United States, on the ground that it was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the state. Declaring the laws of the state in regard to liquor selling, the court said: proper subject of legislative regulation. Not "Under the license laws of this state no (192 U. S. 115) DANIEL CRONIN, Piff. in Err., v. CITY OF DENVER. cluding females from saloons. This case regulations, and if he applies for a license Cronin v. Adams, ante, 219. is governed by the decision in under which only he may lawfully sell, he is held to take that license with whatever restrictions or limitations are imposed by [No. 101.] ary 4, 1904. the authority which, and which only, can Argued December 16, 1903. Decided Janugive him the coveted privilege. One of the conditions which the charter of Denver requires to be inserted in every liquor license is the one of which plaintiff complains." ERROR to the Supreme Court of the [29 Colo. 495, 69 Pac. 592.] This, the court decided, disposed of the complaint of plaintiff in error. In other words, that the restrictions of the ordinance were conditions of his license, and by accepting the license he accepted the conditions, and no rights of his were infringed. "The traffic in it (liquor) is unlawful without a license, and it may be prohibited in Denver," was the unequivocal declaration of the court. What cause of action, then, has plaintiff in error? He is not a female nor delegated to champion any grievance females may have under the ordinance, if they have any. The right to sell liquor by retail to any body depends upon the laws of the state, and they have affixed to that right the condition expressed in the ordinance. But even if plaintiff in error were not in such situation he cannot resist the ordinance. We said in Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 34 L. ed. 620, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 13: "The sale of such liquors in this way [by retail] has therefore been, at all times, by State of Colorado to review a judgment which affirmed a judgment of the County Court of Arapahoe County, affirming a conviction in the Police Court of the city of Denver for the violation of a municipal or dinance excluding females from saloons. Affirmed. Sce same case below, 29 Colo. 503, 69 Pac. 1125. The facts are stated in the opinion. |