But in this country the question does not seem to be fully determined.1 The Merchants' Shipping Act2 provides that, "No owner or master of any ship shall be answerable to any person whatever for any loss or damage occasioned by the fault or incapacity of any qualified pilot acting in charge of such ship, within any district where the employment of such pilot is compulsory by law." It has been held that this act should be construed strictly as it deprives parties injured of a remedy they would otherwise have a pilot off Point Lynas, was brought to anchor in the Mersey, and lay there two or three days waiting, for want of water to dock. She was then conducted by the same pilot into dock, and on the way came into collision with another vessel through the pilot's fault. By law a vessel is obliged to take a pilot or to pay full fees. The pilot is required to cause the vessel to be properly moored in the Mersey, and to pilot her into a wet dock without any additional charge, unless his attendance is required while the vessel is at anchor, in which case he is entitled to five shillings a day. Held, that the taking of a pilot was compulsory, and that the compulsion continued until the vessel was in the dock. 1 It would seem to have been the opinion of Mr. Justice Curtis, in the case of The Carolus, 2 Curtis, C. C. 69, cited ante, p. 114, note 2, that had the vessel been homeward bound, so that the master would have been obliged to have taken the first pilot that offered, or have paid full pilotage, the owners of the vessel would not have been liable for the collision. Let us see, then, whether this opinion. is repugnant to the American authorities. In Yates v. Brown, 8 Pick. 23, and in The Julia M. Hallock, 1 Sprague, 539, the vessels were outward bound. In Bussy v. Donaldson, 4 Dall. 206, and in Williamson v. Price, 16 Mart. 399, it does not appear which way the vessels were going. In the case of The Bark Lotty, Olcott, Adm. 329, it was contended that the exemption from liability continued after the vessel was moored to the wharf by the pilot. But the court very properly decided otherwise. Smith v. The Creole, 2 Wallace, C. C. 485, was also a case of an outward-bound vessel. This case was argued at great length, and a very learned opinion pronounced by Mr. Justice Grier, to the effect that the Pennsylvania act, which provides that every vessel shall be obliged to receive a pilot, or in default thereof, shall pay a sum equal to half pilotage, is not compulsory. Such, also, is the opinion of Mr. Justice Story; Story on Agency, § 456, a, note 1. In Griswold v. Sharpe, 2 Calif. 17, it was said that when a vessel is properly in charge of a licensed pilot, the owner is not responsible for damages which may ensue for his negligence or misconduct. But in that case, the master being in fault, the owners were held liable. It will be seen that there is no decision in opposition to the suggestion thrown out by Mr. Justice Curtis, though it cannot be denied that the principles and reasonings, upon which the authorities are based, are against it. * 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, § 388. had.1 To exonerate the owners, the loss must be occasioned solely by the fault of the pilot;2 and the burden is on the owners of the vessel to prove this.3 The legislature of a country has no authority over foreign vessels on the high seas out of its jurisdiction, but may impose any conditions on a foreign vessel entering its ports, and may oblige foreign ships inward bound to take a pilot at a convenient station beyond three miles from the shore.4 If a ship neglects to take a pilot that offers, the owners will be answerable in damages to shippers or others, for any loss which may happen by reason of their neglect or refusal. And pilots 1 The General de Caen, Swabey, Adm. 9. In this case a French vessel coming up the Thames took on board a pilot, and, as none of her crew understood English, a waterman to take the wheel. The vessel came into collision with a barge, owing to the waterman disobeying an order of the pilot. Held, on the facts, that the waterman was not a servant of the pilot, and that the vessel was liable. 2 The Mobile, Swabey, Adm. 127; The Admiral Boxer, id. 193; The Borussia, id. 94. 3 In The Schwalbe, Lush. Adm. 239, the defendants' vessel was charged with improperly starboarding her helm. The defendants claimed that the helm was not starboarded, but was put to port. The master admitted that the pilot gave the order to starboard, but testified that the pilot immediately corrected it, and gave the order to port, which was obeyed. Lord Chelmsford, in the Privy Council, said: "The owners, to relieve themselves from liability, are bound to prove that an order to starboard the helm at this time was given by the pilot. But no such proof is anywhere to be found, except in the hasty expression (corrected, as the witness says, almost before the words were out of his mouth, and not acted upon), just at the moment of the collision. The owners, therefore, fail entirely in the evidence necessary to transfer the responsibility from themselves; and without considering whether there was any negligent act or omission on the part of the crew of the Schwalbe, their lordships think it sufficient to say, that the owners have not succeeded in establishing that the collision is to be attributed solely (if at all) to the fault of the pilot." In The Carrier Dove, Brow. & L. Adm. 113, it was held that it was not enough to show that the pilot was on deck giving general orders, but the owners must show that the particular order which caused the damage was given by the pilot. The Annapolis, Lush. Adm. 295. See M'Millan v. Union Ins. Co. 1 Rice, 248; Keeler v. Fireman's Ins. Co. 3 Hill, 250. And in an English case, where a vessel, seized on justifiable grounds, as appeared by the condemnation of a part of her cargo, was lost by the neglect of the captors to take a pilot on board, the Court of Admiralty decreed restitution in value against them. The William, 6 Rob. Adm. 316. But if no pilot can be themselves are answerable like other persons for any harm which they may do, by negligence or default.1 If a pilot refuses to board a vessel, he is liable for damages civilly and criminally.2 By some of the ancient marine ordinances the pilot was obliged to make full satisfaction, or to lose his head, in case of any injury happening through his fault.3 obtained, and the most judicious course is for the master to attempt to go into port without one, the owners will not be responsible for a loss happening in consequence of his so doing. Van Syckel v. The Sch. Thomas Ewing, Crabbe, 405. 1 Yates v. Brown, 8 Pick. 24; Heridia v. Ayres, 12 id. 334; Campbell v. Williamson, 2 Whart. Dig. 680. See also Slade v. The State, 2 Carter, 33. In Lawson v. Dumlin, 9 C. B. 54, an action was brought against a pilot for negligently running into the ship of the plaintiff. The pilot, at the time, was in command of another vessel. He was held liable. In Stort v. Clements, Peake, 107, the general rule was admitted, but as the collision took place in consequence of the pilot steering the vessel according to the direction of the officer in charge, he was not held responsible. If a steamboat is hired for the purpose of towing a vessel, to which she is fastened, and both are under the direction of a licensed pilot, if the steamboat is injured in the course of the navigation, the owner of her is not entitled to damages, unless it was caused by the undue negligence of the pilot. Reeves v. The Ship Constitution, Gilpin, 579. ' Commissioners of Pilotage v. Low, R. M. Charlt. 298. CHAPTER XVII. OF THE LIMITATION OF THE LIABILITY OF SHIP-OWNERS BY STATUTE. IN 18511 an act of Congress was passed entitled "An act to limit the liability of shipowners, and for other purposes." The provisions of this act are of paramount importance to the mercantile community, though the main object of the act has been frustrated by the neglect on the part of its framers to embody this intent in intelligible language. We have already considered the liability of the owners of a vessel, and of the master, by the common law, and shall now treat of the limitation of this liability by the maritime law and by the various statutes that have been passed in England and in this country. By the general maritime law the responsibility of the owners of a vessel for the acts of the master and mariners, was limited to the value of the ship and freight; and, by abandoning them, or by their loss before the termination of the voyage, all liability ceased.2 The Marine Ordinance of France of 1681,3 provided that the owners of ships should be responsible for the acts of the master, but that they should be discharged upon abandonment of their ship and freight. There has been quite a discussion whether this provision applied to contracts made by the master within the legitimate scope of his authority as master, as where he borrowed. money for the necessary repairs and supplies of the ship.4 1 Acts of 1851, c. 43, 9 U. S. Stats. at Large, 635. Emerigon, Contrats à la Grosse, c. 4, § 11; The Rebecca, Ware, 188, 198; The Phebe, Ware, 263, 271. By the civil law each of the owners was bound in solido for the full amount of the obligations of the master, arising ex contractu. Dig. 14, 1, 1, 25; Dig. 14, 1, 2. But for obligations ex delicto, each was bound only for his part, that is, in proportion to the interest he had in the ship. Dig. 4, 9, 7, 5; The Rebecca, Ware, 188, 194; The Phebe, Ware, 263, 268. The contrary is stated in Stinson v. Wyman, Daveis, 172, 175, but apparently without reflection. 4 Ord. de la Mar. liv. 2, tit. 8, art. 2. ✦ Valin, book 2, tit. 8, art. 2, and Pothier, "Des Proprietaires," liv. 2, tit. 8, In England, the liability of the owners of vessels has been limited by various statutes to the value of the ship and freight.1 Several questions of great interest have been decided under these statutes, which may be referred to as aids in the true construction of the act of 1851. In 1818,2 the legislature of Massachusetts passed an act on this subject mainly based on the English statute of 7 Geo. II. This was followed by an act in Maine in 1821,3 which is nearly an exact copy of the Massachusetts statute. In 1836, the Massachusetts statutes were revised, and the statute of 1818 was entirely rewritten. In 1840, the Maine statutes were revised, and the provisions of the Revised Statutes of Massachusetts substantially adopted. 5 The Act of Congress of 1851 is principally taken from the English Act of 26 Geo. III., and from the forty-seventh chapter of the Revised Statutes of Maine of 1840. Section 1 relates to a loss by fire, and is taken nearly word for word from the second section of 26 Geo. III. c. 86. It provides generally that a shipowner shall not be liable for loss by fire, "unless such fire is caused by the design or neglect of such owner." Then follows this proviso, which is not in any previous act, "Provided that nothing in this act contained shall prevent the parties from making such contract as they please, extending or limiting the liability of ship-owners." art. 2, hold, on the one hand, that the provisions of the article above referred to, do not apply to the contracts of the master, while Emerigon, Traite à la Grosse, c. 4, § 11, is of the opposite opinion. The New Code de Commerce of 1807 adopts substantially the language of the Ordonnance, and this has occasioned another controversy. Pardessus, Cours de Droit Comm. tom. 3, tit. 3, c. 3, art. 663, supports the views of Valin, while Boulay Paty, Droit Comm. tom. 1, tit. 3, adopts those of Emerigon. The Court of Cassation has, however, decided that the owner of a vessel is indefinitely responsible for all the acts of the captain within the sphere of his authority, and especially for bottomry loans contracted in the course of the voyage. Tourrel v. Fabry, 19 Am. Jurist, 233. 1 Stats. 7 Geo. II. c. 15; 26 Geo. III. c. 86; 53 Geo. III. c. 159; 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, § 503, et seq.; 25 & 26 Vict. c. 63, § 54, et seq. Acts of 1818, c. 122. Maine Stats. 1821, c. 14, §§ 8-10. Rev. Stats. Mass., c. 32, §§ 1-4. This chapter was re-enacted with slight verbal changes in 1860. Gen. Stats. Mass., c. 52, §§ 18 – 21. Rev. Stats. Maine, 1840, c. 47, §§ 8-11. §§ 5, 6. See also Rev. Stats. 1857, c. 35, |