Burkhardt's Admr. v. Striger, &c. the fire test of the oil. The flame moved across the surface of the oil should not exceed that of an ordinary match.” section 2202 provides that all oils and fluids specified in section 2202 that ignite or permanently burn at the temperature of 130 degrees Fahrenheit and upward shall be approved by the inspector, and the packages marked by him with his name, official character, and the words, "approved fire test," and all oils or fluids that ignite or permanently burn at a less temperature than 130 degrees Fahrenheit shall be condemned, and marked with his name, official character, and the words, "unsafe for illuminating purposes." There is a further provision in section 2207 that the oils or fluids of a fire test less than 130 degrees Fahrenheit may be used in the manufacture of gas conveyed through pipes and burnt through burners as ordinary coal gas is burnt. Section 2208 provides a penalty for selling any of the oils or fluids specified in section 2202 without having been inspected, and section 2209 provides a penalty for selling any of the oils or fluids specified in section 2202 that will ignite at a temperature less than 130 degrees, "to be consumed in this State for illuminating purposes." The chapter (71) provides for certain other inspectors than inspectors of oils, and in section 2190 provides, "Except the article of oil for lluminating purposes, no penalty shall be incurred for the sale or exportation thereof without inspection.” For appellant it is contended that, by virtue of the section last quoted (2190), it is not required that gasoline shall be inspected at all, except when sold for illuminating purposes; that it is not an illuminant, except in what is practically a gas machine; that appellant never sold gasoline for illuminating purposes, but, on the contrary, always kept a card upon the faucet of his tank wagon with the words, "Not sold for illuminating purposes." It is further Burkhardt's Admr. v. Striger, &c. claimed that until some 18 months before the suit the inspector never attempted to make the test provided for by section 2205, and that such test, while it could be mechanically made, showed nothing except what was perfectly well known before the application of the test, to-wit, that gasoline would ignite or permanently burn at any temperature above 10 degrees below zero, Fahrenheit. Appellant contends that there is no conflict between section 2190 and section 2202, the latter of which must be construed to provide for the inspection of oil and other fluids to be sold for illuminating purposes, and that section 2205 deals solely with the articles coming within the exception made in seetion 2190, viz., oil for illuminating purposes. We are unable to concur in the contention of counsel. In section 2190 the words "oil for illuminating purposes" seem to us evidently an abbreviation of the description given in section 2202 of "oils and fluids, the product of coal, petroleum or other bituminous substances, by whatever name called, which may or can be used for illuminating purposes." The article upon the subject of illuminating oils does not seem to us designed merely to provide a safe illuminant for the ordinary useful purposes of life, but to be also a police measure, designed to protect the public against attempting to use oils or fluids of the description given in the act which are not safe when used as illuminants in the ordinary mode, by requiring an inspection of all oils so produced, and giving warning to the prospective consumer that the more inflammable oils are not safe when used in such manner. The use of gasoline and similar fluids as illuminants in gas machines, portable or stationary-and the portable machines are frequently seen in use on the streets-is distinctly recognized by section 2207. Nor can we see much force in the contention that gasoline can not be used for Burkhardt's Admr. v. Striger, &c. illuminating purposes, because when used for the production of light it does not burn until transformed into vapor. It might as well be said that electricity is not used for illuminating purposes in the incandescent light, because the light is not given directly from the electricity, but from the heated carbon. It is quite true that in the case of a fluid as volatile as gasoline it is entirely unnecessary to heat the fluid in order to find out whether the temperature at which the oil ignites or permanently burns is above or below 130 degrees Fahrenheit, for the reason that gasoline will ignite at practically any temperature reached in this climate. In fact, the test provided by section 2205, subsec. 4, is not required to be applied in the case of gasoline, benzine and similar fluids; for, as will be seen by an examination of the subsection, it is only in case the oil does not ignite before being heated that the lamp is to be placed under the water cup. If the unwarmed fluid does ignite, the further test provided by subsection 4 is useless. We think the intent of the statute clear to require an inspection. of all the oils and fluids described in section 2202, and that all such oils are included within the exception in section 2190. It follows, therefore, that the inspector had the right to inspect the oils sold by appellant, and was entitled to his legal fees for such inspection. The court, therefore, properly dismissed appellant's petition, and the judgment is affirmed. Petition for rehearing by appellant overruled. Campbell County v. Trapp. CASE 17--ACTION TO RECOVER COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES. Campbell County v. Trapp. APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT. JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT APPEALS. REVERSED. BRIDGE COMMISSIONER-POWER TO FIX TERM-REVOCATION OF APPOINT- Held: Kentucky Statutes, section 4320, providing that the fiscal court of a county may appoint a special commissioner to let out and superintend the construction or repairing of any bridge or bridges, and fix his compensation therefor, did not authorize the fiscal court to appoint a bridge commissioner for a term of four years, and to fix his salary for that time, and therefore one who was thus appointed held the office subject to the right of the fiscal court to revoke the appointment, either by removing him from office or by abolishing the office. RAMSEY WASHINGTON, FOR APPELLANT. On December 21, 1897 the fiscal court of Campbell county elected G. L. Trapp, bridge commissioner of said county, for a term of four years. On January 5, 1898 a new fiscal court (which had been elected) at a special meeting removed Trapp from said office and discontinued the office. The same court at a regular term, on the first Tuesday in April, 1898, made the same order of removal and discontinuance of the office. Appellant contends that as the fiscal court is statutory, and a court of limited jurisdiction, everything necessary to give it jurisdiction and power to act must be affirmatively set out in the petition. In this case the petition of the plaintiff does not show that the order appointing him names any bridge that he was to repair or superintend the construction of, nor that there was any bridge to be built or repaired. The demurrer to the petition also questions the right of the fiscal court to elect a bridge commissioner for four years-being a court of limited jurisdiction it can only do that which the statute expressly authorizes it to do. We contend that the fiscal court exceeded its authority when it created an office for four years; that it only had the right to appoint such commissioner when there was a bridge to be 113 119 126 767 Campbell County v. Trapp. repaired or constructed, and that such commissioner was only the agent of the fiscal court to perform such work as it ordered, and said court had the right to remove him at pleasure. Kentucky Statutes, 4320; 21 R., 1246; Dillon on Corp., 204; 12 Bush, 433; 11 Bush, 18; Works on Courts and their Jurisdiction, 437. C. T. BAKER, ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE. The appellee alleges in his petition that he was appointed bridge commissioner for Campbell county, December 21, 1897, for four years, at a salary of $800 per year; that he qualified by taking the oath of office and executed bond on the same day, which bond was accepted and approved by the court; that he served notice in writing upon the county judge, that he was willing and ready at all times to perform any duty required of him; that he has performed all of the duties required of him by the fiscal court, and that there was due him December 21, 1898, $800; that on January 3, 1899, he demanded in open court, said $500 but was refused payment, and he now sues for said $800 with interest from January 3, 1899. The demurrer to the petition was properly overruled-defenses which deny appellee the office and plead his removal are inconsistent, and the court properly required an election. The fiscal court had no right to remove appellee without notice, cause, and trial, and not then unless he was guilty of malfeasance or misfeasance in office. AUTHORITIES CITED. Green v. Dudley, 6 R., 221; Lou. Hotel Co. v. Taylor, 10 R., 150; Hendrick v. Mitchell, 16 R., 769; Adams v. Johnson, 11 R., 137; Bentley v. Boston, 16 B. M., 686; Com. v. Cook, 8 Bush, 224; Prebels v. Chism, 5 T. B. M., 158; Lexington, &c. v. McMurry, 6 B. M., 215; Com. v. Williams, 1 J. J. M., 309; Taylor v. Tibbatts, 13 B. M., 182; 11 B. M., 147, McCarty v. McCarty, 8 Bush, 506; Cass Co. Comrs. v. Ry. Co., 88 Ind., 199; McDaniel v. Yuba Co., 14 Cal., 444; Page v. Hardin, 8 B. M., 672; Kentucky Statutes, secs. 1838, 1840, 4320, Gorham v. Luckett, 6 B. M., 149; Todd v. Dunlap, 18 R., 34, 329; Johnson v. Cavanaugh, 21 R., 1246. OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE GUFFY-REVERSING. The appellee instituted this action in the Campbell circuit court against the appellant, seeking to recover judg ment against it for $800, besides interest and cost. It is claimed in the petition that the fiscal court of Campbell |