Johnson v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of Ky., &c. spection of the record of the two conveyances. Johnson and wife to Bartlett and Bartlett to Darwin W. Johnson; that the purpose of the parties was to make the wife's property liable to the husband's debts in spite of the provisions of the father's will giving her the property; that the subsequent purchaser or mortgagee must be charged with notice of the facts; and that the conveyances are void. Waiving for a time whether the wife might not, by a deed of gift, properly executed, have invested her husband with the title to this property, we come to an examination of appellant's contention above outlined. We have stated, and it will not be gainsaid, that Mrs. Johnson had the legal right to sell her property, her husband joining. Suppose she had sold it for $15,000 in fact, which was really the husband's means and, to satisfy the notion of counsel, say they caused the conveyances to be made exactly as appears in this case, what is there in the will quoted that prevents the title from passing" It undoubtedly would have been a valid transaction in law and equity. We may as well say here that there is no question of bad faith, or fraud practiced or attempted against the wife, nor question that $15,000 was a fair and adequate consideration for the property. What was there in the appearance of this transaction to indicate other than that the husband was buying this property, and actually paying for it, and took this method of taking over the title, from the fact that the wife's conveyance direct to her husband might be void, because of her lack of ability, under the statute, to convey her separate estate, unless the husband joined in the instrument as grantor? To our minds, the conveyances do not present such an appearance as should arouse the suspicions of an ordinarily cautious inquirer. But if they had aroused this suspicion, to what Vol. 113-56 Johnson v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of Ky., &c. would this inquiry probably have led him? For it is to be noted that the purchaser put on inquiry is chargeable, not necessarily with the truth, but with such knowledge as he would probably have gained had he inquired. Here he would likely and most reasonably have gone to the contracting parties. To learn what? Whether the recited consideration had actually passed? That question they had already answered. Fach of them had said—the wife on privy examination before the officer taking the acknowledgment-that the consideration named had been paid at the time the deeds were made. These statements were as unequivocal as any other the parties could have made on that subject, and were such as to settle, and not to raise, doubts. If these statements could not be believed, then why ask them any questions? Nor could the inquirer have gone to the draftsman of the deed. if a lawyer, even if known (there is nothing showing who the draftsman was). for his information gained from his clients was privileged, and he could only have referred him to the parties. We hold that this transaction presented no such peculiar feature as to reasonably raise a doubt of the bona fides of the transaction, and that a subsequent purchaser had the right to accept as true what the parties to the transaction had unequivocally asserted to be the truth. This section of the General Statutes (chapter 52, art. 4, section 17) was passed to enlarge the rights of married women with respect to their separate estates. It was the evident purpose of the Legislature to remove those, restrictions contained in the Revised Statutes that had been found burdensome to married women because they hampered the use, and defeated in many instances the practical enjoyment of this class of property by its owners. When the Legislature determined to again permit married women to deal Johnson v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of Ky., &c. with and sell their separate estates, subject only to the "veto right" of the husband, in requiring that he should join in the conveyance, it must be presumed that it was intended by the lawmaking body to facilitate, and not to uselessly embarrass or impair, this new privilege. When she was thus allowed to sell her property, it would be to frustrate the beneficent purpose of the Legislature to hold that the purchasers of a married woman's separate property would be subject to harassing doubts, and possible litigations and losses not involved in similar transactions with unmarried women or men. It would be to detract from its selling value in proportion to the doubts and difficulties, encountered by purchasers. The rule is, statutes are lib. erally construed in order to effectuate their purpose. Sec. tion 460, Kentucky Statutes. Therefore a construction of a statute intending to enlarge the property rights and contractual ability of a class will be rejected which tends to destroy or impair the value of those very rights and privleges. The circuit court based its judgment in part upon the principle of estoppel. It is claimed that, appellee having acted upon the faith of the recitals in Mrs. Johnson's deed that she had received the full cash consideration of $15,000 recited in the deed, she would not be heard now to say to appellee that her previous statement was not true, and thereby reclaim the property from appellee. The question is, to what extent may a married woman, by her conduct or statements, estop herself from subsequently asserting the contrary, where the rights of those misled by her are to be affected? It is not questionable that a single woman, or a man, would have been estopped by the concurrence of facts shown in this case. Why not the married woman, too? But for her conduct, her voluntary and willful statement, solemnly declared, and made a public record Johnson v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of Ky., &c. for the purpose of being acted on, and with the knowledge that it would be acted on by others in dealings with refer ence to this property, appellees would not have parted with their money upon these mortgages. The courts have not been uniform in applying the doctrine of estoppel to acts of married women. We shall not attempt a discussion of the question further than it affects her separate property. Pom. Eq. Jur., section 418, thus states the matter: "Upon the question how far the doctrine of equitable estoppel by conduct applies to married women, there is some conflict among the decisions. The tendency of modern authority, however, is strongly towards the enforcement of the estoppel against married women as against persons sui juris, with little or no limitation on account of their disability. This is plainly so in States where the Legislature has freed their property from all interest or control of their husbands, and bas clothed them with partial or complete capacity to deal with it as though they were single." In Herm. Estop. ,section 1105, it is stated: "Under various statutes removing the common-law disabil ities from married women, corresponding liabilities have necessarily been imposed on them. They take the civil rights and privileges conferred subject to all the incidental and correlative burdens and obligations, and their rights and obligations are to be determined by the same rules of law and evidence by which the rights and obligations of the other sex are determined under like circumstances. To the extent and in the matters of business in which they are permitted by law to engage they owe the same duty to those with whom they deal and to the public and may be bound in the same manner as if they were unmarried. Their common-law capacity can not serve as a shield to protect them from the consequences of their acts, where they have Johnson v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of Ky., &c. statutory capacity to act. A married woman is sui juris to the extent of the enlarged capacity to act conferred by statute, and may be so estopped by her acts and declarations, and is subject to all the presumptions which the law indulges against others with full capacity to act for themselves." In Bigelow on Estoppel it is observed: "At common law a married woman, according to the weight of authority, is not estopped by law or in equity by her covenants of warranty or by her recitals, except in regard to her equit able separate estate." Page 329. As to statutory separate estates, substantially the same doctrine is applied. Kelly v. Turner, 74 Ala., 513; Harden v. Darwin, 77 Ala., 472. This question seems to have been discussed by this court only incidentally, and we might say collaterally, some two or three times. In Wright v. Arnold, 14 B. Mon., 638, 61 Am. Dec., 172, the wife stood by without objection, and suffered her husband to sell her chose in action. She did not controvert her husband's right to sell it. The court said "She must be regarded as having induced the purchaser to make the contract, and under such circumstances it would be clearly inequitable to deprive him, at her instance, of the benefit of the purchase." The court further declared that "the doctrine is well settled that neither infancy nor coverture will constitute any excuse for conduct which in other persons would, as it regards purchasers for a valuable consideration, be deemed unjust and fraudulent " In Heck v. Fisher, 78 Ky., 646 (1 R., 336), it was said: "While it is true, as said in Kennedy v. Ten Broeck, 11 Bush, 251, that a feme covert can only dispose of her lands in this State in the manner pointed out by the statute, it does not follow that she may not be estopped to assert title which her conduct has misled innocent parties to their prej udice." In that case the wife had suffered the husband |