reversed and the case remanded with directions to set aside the order of transfer, and to then transfer the case to some county which was not objectionable, an order remanding the case to the court whence it came, and a consent order by that court transferring the case to another court, were a substantial com- pliance with the opinion. Smith v. Commonwealth. ........ 19. 2. Ratification by Accused.-Defendant in a prosecution for homicide can not complain of an order to transfer the case to another circuit court, purporting to have been made by consent of his counsel, upon the ground that he was not present when the order was made, as he ratified the action of his counsel by failing to make any objection on that ground until after trial and verdict, though objecting on another ground. Idem. ........ 19 3. Only One Order of Removal.-Though Kentucky Statutes, section 1102, provides that there shall not be more than one order of removal of the same cause at the instance of the same party, came, in obedi- the case, when remanded to the court whence ence to the direction of the court of appeals, stood as if it had 19 never been removed, and the court then had power to make another removal. Idem. 4. Harmless Error.-An instruction directing the jury if they should find defendant guilty of manslaughter, "to fix his punishment at confinement in the State penitentiary for not less than two years or more than twenty-one years, in their discretion," was 19 not misleading, though the word "nor" should have been used instead of "or." Idem.
5. Dying Declaration-Admissibility.-The mere fact that deceased, at the time he made a statement as to the killing, expressed the 19 belief that he would not recover, was not sufficient to make it admissible as his dying declaration. Idem.
6. Indictment-Failure to Endorse Names of Witnesses Thereon.- An objection to an indictment upon the ground that no names of witnesses were placed at the foot thereof must be made by motion to quash, and not by demurrer. Commonwealth v. .....217 Brewer. 7. Forgery-Existence of Instrument Uncertain.-An indictment does not lie for the forgery of an instrument the existence of which ..217 is averred to be uncertain. Idem. 8. Making False Copy.-One who adds to a purported copy made by him signatures which were not appended to the original is not .....217 guilty of forgery. Idem.
9. Increased Penalty on Second Conviction-Sufficiency of Indict- ment. Where an indictment for a felony charged that in a certain court on a certain day, defendant was indicted for the
crime of maliciously shooting at and wounding another "with inte," a felony punishable under the laws of the State of Ken- tucky by confinement in the penitentiary, and that on a certain day he was found guilty of that offense by the verdict of a jury and his punishment fixed at confinement in the State peniten- tiary for the term of five years, and that afterwards on a cer- tain day judgment was rendered upon that verdict, and that the verdict and judgment are still in force, the number and style of the case being given, it sufficiently appeared from the indictment that defendant had been previously convicted of a felony, and the case in which the conviction took place was sufficiently identified, though the full statutory name of the offense was not given. Oliver v. Commonwealth. ..........228 10. Verdict As the court instructed the jury that they should fix defendant's term of confinement at ten years only in the event they found that he had been previously convicted of a felony as charged in the indictment, a verdict finding "the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment," and fixing "his punish- ment at ten years in the penitentiary," was a sufficient finding of the previous conviction to authorize the increased penalty. though the statute provides that "judgment in such cases shall not be given unless the jury shall find from the record and other competent evidence the fact of former conviction for felony." Idem... .228 11. Stallion-Standing Without License-Indictment-Allegations.— Under Kentucky Statutes, section 4201, providing for the punish- ment of any person "who shall engage in any business" for which a license is required before procuring a license, and pay- ing the required tax thereon, an indictment for standing a stud horse without license need not allege that defendant was "engaged in the business" of standing a stud horse, a single offense being sufficient to incur the penalty prescribed; nor is it necessary to state the amount of property or money received for the service, though section 4224 provides that the license tax shall equal the greatest sum charged for the service of the animal. Asher v. Commonwealth ...296 12. Same-Compensation.-There was a violation of the statute though the only compensation defendant was to receive for the service of the animal was the privilege of buying the colt, if one, at a certain price, that option being a valuable one and enforceable. But even though not enforceable, a contract for compensation violates the statute. Idem. .296
13. Embezzlement-Misappropriation of Taxes by Sheriff-Suffi- ciency of Indictment-Allegation of Demand.-Under Kentucky
Statutes, section 1205, providing that if any person having the control, custody or distinct possession of any money be- longing to or for the use of any county, and under any trust or duty "to keep, return, deliver, cancel, destroy or specifically apply the same, or any part thereof, shall, in violation of such trust or duty, willfully misapply, misappropriate, conceal, use, loan or otherwise wrongfully and fraudulently dispose of such money for his own purpose or use of another, with intent to de- prive the owner or authority of the same, or of any part there- of for the benefit of the wrongdoer cr of any other person," such person shall be confined in the penitentiary, an indictment. against a sheriff for embezzlement alleged to have been com- mitted by misappropriating the county levy collected by him need not allege that there had been a settlement with the de- fendant or any demand upon or direction to him to pay over the money in his hands. Commonwealth v. Fisher. ........491 14. Same-Commission.--An officer may be guilty of embezzlement, though he was entitled to a commission out of the money col- lected and used by him. Idem.
15. Same-Repeal of Special Law Punishing Crime.-Constitution, section 59, subsection 4, prohibiting the Legislature from pass- ing local or special acts to regulate the punishment of crimes, in conjunction with Kentucky Statutes, section 1202, providing for the punishment of the offense of embezzlement by any officer or agent of any bank, operated to repeal a bank charter granted by special act of the Legislature prior to the adoption of the Constitution, to the extent that it provided for the pun- ishment of the offense of embezzlement of the bank's funds by any of its officers or agents. Commonwealth v. Porter...575 16. Same.-As Kentucky Statutes, section 1202, provides for the punishment of the offense of embezzlement by any officer or agent of any bank, whether incorporated or unincorporated, a bank cashier indicted for embezzlement can not complain that the statute, in so far as it relates to the officers of insti- tutions other than banks, discriminates against the officers of incorporated institutions. Idem. .....575
17. False Swearing-Sufficiency of Evidence.-To establish the of- fense of false swearing, it is sufficient either that there are two witnesses, or that the testimony of the one witness is corroborated or sustained by other facts appearing in the case or testified to by other witnesses; and the additional evidence need not be such as alone would justify a conviction in a case where the testimony of a single witness would suffice for that purpose. Williams v. Commonwealth. ..$52
CRIMINAL LAW-Continued. 18. Drunkenness as Defense.-Under Kentucky Statutes, section 1174, providing for the punishment of any person who "shall willfully and knowingly swear falsely," the accused is entitled to an acquittal if at the time the false testimony was given, he was so intoxicated from the use of cocaine or whisky as to incapacitate him to understand the testimony he gave, or to wilfully and knowingly swear falsely; and the court should so instruct the jury where the evidence is sufficient to author- ize such an instruction. Idem. ...
19. Homicide-Degrees of the Offense-Verdict for Manslaughter - As the common-law offense of manɛiaughter has been subdivided by carving out of it the statutory crime of voluntary man- slaughter, leaving involuntary manslaughter to be dealt with as at common law, the term "manslaughter" is now a generic term, covering two degrees of homicide; and therefore a verdict, under an indictment for murder, finding defendant guilty of manslaughter, finds him guilty of two offenses included in the charge of murder, and so can not be construed as an acquittal of all offenses included therein. Spriggs v. Commonwealth...724 20 Error in Instruction-Failure to Move for New Trial-Effect.- An error in instructions, though it would have been sufficient to entitle defendant to a new trial if he had made a motion therefor, was not sufficient to entitle him to a discharge from custody as acquit. Idem. ... ........724 21. Appeal-Necessity of Exceptions.-Under Cr. Code, section 340, as amended by act of March 4, 1880, providing that "a judg- ment of conviction shall be reversed for any error of law appearing on the record, when, upon consideration of the whole case, the court is satisfied that the substantial rights of the defendant have been prejudiced thereby," there can in general be no reversal for an error not excepted to, though apparent on the record, and to the defendant's prejudice; but this rule does not apply to instructions, for error in which there may be a reversal though there was no exception, for the reason that it is the duty of the court, though not requested to do so, to give the whole law of the case in a criminal prosecution. Buskles v. Commonwealth ...795 22. Safe Means of Escape.-It was error to instruct the jury that there could be no acquittal on the ground of self-defense un- less defendant had no safe means of escape. Idem. ....795
23. Arrest by Deputy Sheriff-Evidence of Deputy's Appointment.- As the sheriff can not appoint a deputy without the approval of the county court, such approval must be shown to make the appointment valid, and it was therefore error in the absence
of evidence of such approval to give an instruction assuming that the deceased was a deputy sheriff, and had, the right to arrest for disorderly conduct committed in his presence. Idem.796 24. Conspiracy to Defraud-Degrees of Offense.-Under Cr. Code, sections 262-265, relating to offenses of different degrees, and providing, among other things, that "if the proof show the de- fendant to be guilty of a higher degree of the offense than is charged in the indictment, the jury shall find him guilty of the degree charged in the indictment," defendant was properly con- victed of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, under an indict- ment charging that offense, though the offense thus charged is a misdemeanor, and the facts alleged showed that the acts done pursuant to the conspiracy amounted to a conspiracy. Wait, ete., v. Commonwealth. ... .....821 25. Instruction to Jury.-The general statement in the instruction to the jury that a conspiracy may be proved by testimony tha it was actually entered into, or may be "inferred" by the jury from the facts and circumstances in evidence, was not prejudi- cial to defendant, as the jury were, in effect, directed by the subsequent part of the instruction that they must believe be- yond a reasonable doubt from the facts and circumstances in evidence that a conspiracy existed. Idem. .... .821 26. Evidence-Fraudulent Intent.-As defendants undertook, for a stipulated sum, to run the bank, they were charged with con- spiracy to defraud, and to keep the books, testimony as to entries in the individual ledger kept by clerks under their control, was admissible to show their fraudulent intent. Idem. 822
1. State Dental Association-Discretion of Board of Examiners- Evidence of Genuineness of Diploma.-Under the various acts defining the powers and duties of the State Dental Association, the board of dental examiners is not vested with discretion to refuse a certificate to an applicant who presents a diploma from a dental college authorized by law to issue same, but the board may refuse a certificate in the absence of proof that the diploma is genuine or was issued by a dental college authorized by law to do so. Smith v. State Board of Dental Examiners........212 2. Mandamus-Evidence to Support It.-A mandamus to compel the State board of dental examiners to issue plaintiff a certificate was properly refused where the paper purporting to be a dip- loma was not signed by any one or attested by the seal of the university in another State by which it purported to be issued, and there was no evidence that plaintiff was a graduate of the
« AnteriorContinuar » |