Opinion of DOUGLAS, J. 315 U.S. law would impose on the contractor in any event. Burke & James, Inc. v. United States, 63 Ct. Cls. 36, 57. That, too, would be a grant of public funds for which the United States would receive no quid pro quo. Hence it seems more reasonable to imply that Bethlehem was to render an additional performance for the additional compensation of $12,000,000. Such a construction of the contracts avoids the difficulties I have mentioned, as it gives the United States a quid pro quo for its promise to pay an additional $12,000,000. Cf. Dayton Airplane Co. v. United States, 21 F. 2d 673, 682-683. And it is supported by the testimony of the representatives of the two contracting parties who negotiated the contracts. In that view of the matter, Bethlehem would be put to its proof that it effected the savings which it now claims. Mere guesswork would not be enough. J. J. Preis & Co. v. United States, 58 Ct. Cls. 81, 86. Precise proof of each dollar saved might not be possible. But a reasonable approximation of Bethlehem's contribution to the savings would be necessary. Such burden of proof has been sustained in other cases involving similar contracts. Cohen, Endel & Co. v. United States, 60 Ct. Cls. 513; F. Jacobson & Sons v. United States, 61 Ct. Cls. 420. The Circuit Court of Appeals stated that there was "some evidence tending to show that savings resulted, in part at least, from increased efficiency." 113 F. 2d 301, 307. But there was no clear showing that special efforts were made to reduce costs and that the savings which resulted were traceable to such efforts. The necessary findings on that issue were not made. Argument for Petitioners. RILEY ET AL., EXECUTORS, v. NEW YORK TRUST CO., ADMINISTRATOR, ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF DELAWARE. No. 81. Argued December 16, 1941.-Decided February 16, 1942. 1. Consistently with the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution, when a state court in probating a will and issuing letters testamentary, in a proceeding to which all distributees were parties, expressly finds that the domicile of the testator at the time of his death was in that State, the adjudication of domicile does not bind one who is subsequently appointed as domiciliary administrator c. t. a. in a second State in which he will be called upon to deal with the claims of local creditors, including the claim of the State itself for taxes, and who was not a party to the proceeding in the first State; and in this situation, the courts of a third State, when disposing of local assets claimed by both the personal representatives, are free to determine the question of domicile in accordance with their own law. Pp. 348 et seq. 2. In the absence of a contrary ruling by the courts of Delaware, held that, by the law of that State, cases cited and relied on in an opinion of the highest court of another State-which opinion is properly in the record-may be considered as evidence of the law of such other State. P. 351. 16 A. 2d 772, affirmed. CERTIORARI, 313 U. S. 555, to review a decree determining the disposition of property belonging to an estate, which was claimed by each of two personal representatives appointed in other States. Mr. Dan MacDougald, with whom Messrs. James A. Branch, Robert S. Sams, and Aaron Finger were on the brief, for petitioners. In redetermining the question of decedent's domicile, the Delaware courts failed to give full faith and credit to the Georgia judgment. Thormann v. Frame, 176 U. S. 350; Overby v. Gordon, 177 U. S. 214; Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U. S. 43; Burbank v. Ernst, 232 U. S. 162; Baker v. Baker, Eccles Argument for Petitioners. 315 U.S. & Co., 242 U. S. 394; s. c. 162 Ky. 683; Thomas v. Morri sett, 76 Ga. 384; In re Fischer's Estate, 118 N. J. Eq. 599; In re Willett's Appeal, 50 Conn. 330. The Georgia courts had before them all possible distributees of the decedent's estate, and hence it was possible to have a single controlling decision upon the succession. See Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., supra. The Georgia judgment was binding upon the New York administrator. When decedent's husband, himself a party to the Georgia litigation, and during the progress of the Georgia litigation, had the administrator appointed in New York in ex parte proceedings, he could not thereby in effect nullify, in other States, the decision of the Georgia courts upon the factual question of domicile that was in issue and upon which the jurisdiction of the Georgia courts depended. The administrator acquired no interest in the succession above and unrelated to the interest of any possible distributee. A creditor or tax claimant is not entitled to be heard on the probate of a will; and hence, after the succession has been determined, can not dispute the title or right of possession of the personal representative whose title has been established in the probate proceeding. Hooks v. Brown, 125 Ga. 122; Dunsmuir v. Scott, 217 F. 200; Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U. S. 43; Schouler on Wills, Vol. 2, p. 846, § 746. Since the Georgia judgment is binding upon all possible distributees, including Hungerford, because he was a party to and participated in the Georgia litigation, it is also binding upon the New York administrator, the same person in law as Hungerford. See Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U. S. 611. The Georgia judgment determined that the Georgia administration was domiciliary and general and not ancillary or local. Such a judgment is conclusive where all persons interested in the distribution of the estate are parties. Thormann v. Frame, 176 U. S. 350; Overby v. Gordon, 177 U. S. 214; Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U. S. 43; Burbank v. Ernst, 232 U. S. 162; Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U. S. 394; Thomas v. Morrisett, 76 Ga. 384; In re Fischer's Estate, 118 N. J. Eq. 599; In re Willett's Appeal, 50 Conn. 330. The effect of the Delaware decision is that a dissatisfied litigant in such a proceeding may go into another State, have an administrator appointed in ex parte proceedings, and, ignoring the previous adjudication, have the question of domicile litigated all over again in a contest between the two sets of representatives in a third State where property of the decedent is located. Mr. Marion Smith, with whom Messrs. Hiram C. Todd, Clarence A. Southerland, Daniel O. Hastings, and J. Richard Bowden were on the brief, for respondent. Mr. Mortimer M. Kassell for the State Tax Commission of New York, as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court. MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court. Coca-Cola International Corporation, incorporated in Delaware, filed a bill of interpleader in a Delaware Court of Chancery against Julian Riley and Hughes Spalding, petitioners here, the Executors of Mrs. Julia M. Hungerford, with letters testamentary issued by the Court of Ordinary of Fulton County, Georgia, and against The New York Trust Company, the respondent, a New York corporation, as temporary administrator (afterward administrator c. t. a.) of the same decedent, appointed by the Surrogate's Court for New York County, New York. The Georgia executors and the New York administrator each claim the right to have transferred to them, in their representative capacity, stock in the Coca-Cola Corporation now on its books in the name of the decedent. The outstanding certificates are in Georgia, in the hands of the Georgia executors. The parties are agreed, and it Opinion of the Court. 315 U.S. is therefore assumed, that Delaware is the situs of the stock. In accordance with the prayer of the bill, the Delaware court directed the adversary claimants to interplead between themselves as to their respective claims. The Georgia executors assert that original domiciliary probate of Mrs. Hungerford's will in solemn form was obtained by them in Georgia, with all beneficiaries and heirs at law of testatrix, including her husband, Robert Hungerford, actual parties by personal service. These, it is conceded, were all the parties under the law of Georgia entitled to be heard on the probate of the will. The respondent administrator c. t. a. was not a party. The record of probate includes a determination by special finding, over the objection of the caveator, the husband, that the testatrix was domiciled in Georgia. The special finding was specifically approved as an essential fact to determine the jurisdiction of the Court of Ordinary by the highest court of Georgia in its affirmance of the probate. Hungerford v. Spalding, 183 Ga. 547, 189 S. E. 2. These facts were alleged by petitioners in their statement of claim to the stock filed below in response to the decree of interpleader. Exemplified copies of the probate record of the several Georgia courts were pleaded and proven, as were the applicable Georgia statutes governing domiciliary probate. From the facts alleged, petitioners inferred the conclusive establishment of the place for domiciliary distribution against "all persons," and prayed the issue to them of new certificates. An offer was made to pay all Delaware taxes or charges on the stock. At the trial, petitioners relied upon Article IV, § 1, of the Federal Constitution,' the full faith and credit clause, as determinative of their right to the new certificates. The "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." |