Rolls, or of the Vice Chancellor, and desires, instead of appealing to the Lord Chancellor, to appeal direct from either of them to the House of Lords, he enrols the decree. Where a question of title has been decided, it is often prudent to enrol the decree, since the time allowed by the standing orders of the House of Lords to appeal, is computed from the enrolment, and not from the date of the decree. (General Orders, 24th March, 1725.)

An enrolment also prevents a party from rehearing a decree or order, on error apparent; or on discovery of new matter, from filing a supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review; and, in both cases, compels him to file a bill of review. It also enables a party, in case of another suit being instituted for the same purpose, to plead the former decree, which he cannot do, unless it has been enrolled.

In Staunton v. Oldham, Atk. 382, it is said, that the Court never suffers a decree to account, to be signed and enrolled, because it ties up their hands from relieving, if there should have been any defect in the directions of the decree. This case appears to have been altogether disregarded in practice; and in enrolling decrees no distinction has been made between decrees directing an account *and other decrees. The point was formally [ *4 ] brought to the attention of the Court in a recent case of Parker v. Downing, 1 M. & K. 634, and the doctrine laid down in Staunton v. Oldham disapproved, and the accuracy of the report questioned. The Lord Chancellor reviewed the cases on enrolment, and decided, that a decree directing an account might be enrolled.

Any person (although not a party to the suit) if interested in, and a party to an order, may enrol that order. The party desirous of enrolling a decree or order, leaves the same, or an office copy duly passed and entered, with his clerk in court, who will inform him what orders, reports and papers, will be required. From these and the pleadings in the cause, the clerk in court prepares the docquet of the enrolment, which is examined by the Six Clerk, and signed by him. The docquet is then left with the secretary of decrees for signature.

If the decree or order was made by the Master of the

Eng. Chan. Reps. viii. 417.

Rolls, the secretary procures his signature to the docquet, after which he procures the signature of the Lord Chancellor. If the decree or order was made by the Vice Chancellor, or by the Lord Chancellor, it is only signed by the Lord Chancellor. The docquet when signed, is returned to the clerk in court, and is afterwards copied on rolls of parchment. These rolls and the docquet, are preserved amongst the records of the Court.

If the decree or order proposed to be enrolled bears date six months before the time when the same is presented to the Lord Chancellor for signature, an order for liberty to enrol the same nunc pro tunc, is necessary. For this purpose, a petition is prepared by the secretary of decrees, who procures the same to be answered by the Lord Chan[5] cellor, *and the order is drawn up and entered by the clerk in court.(1) Lord Camden recognized, that six months is allowed to enrol, and after that an order nunc pro tunc. (Deloraine v. Browne, 3 Bro. C. C. 643.) ·

If no caveat has been entered, nor a petition of rehearing or appeal presented, the enrolment may be signed and perfected as soon after the decree has been passed and entered, as the party can procure the same to be prepared.

If a caveat has been entered, and the party does not present a petition of appeal or rehearing, within twentyeight days after the enrolment is presented to the great seal to be signed, and notice thereof given to the clerk in court of the opposite party, at the expiration of such

(1) The petition for liberty to enrol, nunc pro tunc, is answered by the Lord Chancellor at the same time that he signs the enrolment. Formerly no order was drawn up on this petition, but the petition was annexed to the docquet; at present, the order is drawn up. In Parker v. Downing, 1 M. and K. 634, the author is informed by the agent to the clerk in court, that the petition was answered in the usual way to enrol nunc pro tunc. As a precaution the same was left with the registrar, for the purpose of having the order drawn up. The order was prepared, leaving a blank for the date of the decree, which, according to the form then used, was not recited in the petition. When application was made for the order, the date of the decree was filled up in the order, and was inserted in the petition, and no fresh fiat obtained. In the mean time, a motion was made to vacate the enrolment, on the ground that it was a decree for an account, which was refused, but the enrolment was vacated, not, as appears by the judgment, on the ground of the petition having been irregularly altered; but because, at the time that the enrolment was signed, the order to enrol nunc pro tunc, being incomplete, there was no authority for the Lord Chancellor to sign. If this was the ground, every enrolment before and since this decision is bad, as it was and is still the practice for the Lord Chancellor, at the same time that he answers the petition to enrol nunc pro tunc, to sign the enrolment, and both are returned by the secretary to the clerk in court at the same time.

Eng. Chan. Reps. viii. 417.

twenty-eight days, the enrolment may be signed and perfected.

A petition of rehearing or appeal prevents the enrolment being signed. It does not appear to have been decided *whether presenting and procuring the petition to [ *6] be answered is sufficient to prevent the enrolment, or whether the order to set down the appeal or rehearing must be served. I infer from the cases, that if no caveat has been entered, the order must be served, to prevent the decree being enrolled; but that if a caveat has been entered, and a petition of appeal is lodged within the twenty-eight days, it is sufficient.

The death of a party, or the abatement of a suit, does not prevent the decree being enrolled. A decree being pronounced in Michaelmas term, and the defendant dying soon after, on a motion to have it enrolled, it was held by the Lord Chancellor to be a thing often done; and that it was like a judgment at law, which, if pronounced before, may be entered after the party's death, and the decree was enrolled accordingly. (1 Eq. Cas. Ab. 162.)

TO VACATE AN ENROLMENT.

In some few cases, and under particular circumstances, the Court has allowed the enrolment of the decree to be vacated. If there has been any irregularity in the enrolment, or if the docquet has been left for enrolment after a petition of appeal, or of rehearing has been presented, or again, if there has been mala fides, or any thing approaching to it in the opponent, so that a party intending to appeal has been lulled into security, and confiding in a mutual understanding that the decree would not be enrolled, has not entered a caveat against it, the Court will vacate the enrolment.

To vacate an enrolment on the last ground, the opponent *must have done or written something to [ to [7] induce the other party to believe that he acquiesced in the understanding that there was to be an appeal or rehearing. A bare communication of an intention to appeal is not considered sufficient to prevent the other party from Eng. Chan. Reps. iv. 527.

proceeding to get his decree enrolled. (Barnes v. Wilson," 1 R. & M. 492.) But if he enters upon the subject, and discusses as to the effect of the appeal, or in any way mentions the question of appeal as a thing mutually understood, as by saying, "let no time be lost in presenting the appeal," (Stevens v. Guppy, T. & R. 178,) the Court will open the enrolment. This was the view taken of the question by Lord Lyndhurst in a recent case of Whitaker v. Leach, before him 4th Dec. 1834, which is supported by all the modern authorities, none of which have followed the decision of Lord Hardwicke, in Anon. 1 Ves. 325, where one of the grounds for opening the enrolment was that though strictly regular, it was done too quickly.(1) On this point, the decision of Lord Lyndhurst, in Barnes v. Wilson, 1 R. & M. 492," wherein he says a party has a right to use as much expedition as he chooses in enrolling a decree, is conclusive.

In Kemp v. Squire, 1 Ves. 205,(2) the enrolment of the decree was opened, the defendant only having obtained his majority six weeks before the decree. In that case two authorities were cited in support of the application, but it appears that in both, the decree (the enrolment of which was opened) was not pronounced on the merits. [ *8 ] *In Stevens v. Guppy, 1 T. R. 178, the decree was pronounced on the 30th March, 1822; on the 6th Dec. 1822, the plaintiff presented a petition of rehearing; the order for rehearing was dated on the 7th Dec. 1822, and was entered with the registrar, and served on the 12th Dec. 1822. The decree was enrolled on the 10th Dec. Previous to the month of December, several conversations had taken place between the solicitors of the plaintiff and the defendant, in which intimation had been given of the plaintiff's intention to appeal from the decree; and in a conversation which passed a few days before the petition of rehearing was presented, the solicitor for the plaintiff had informed the solicitor for the

(1) As the leading reason in this case for opening the enrolment was the mistake of the party, in applying to the Rolls chapel to enter a caveat, instead of at the secretary of decrees, the observation that the enrolment was too quick may be regarded rather as a dictum than a decision.

(2) It appears that the solicitor for the infant plaintiff neglected to instruct counsel to appear on the hearing, and there appears strong reasons to suppose that he acted collusively. See Dick. 131.

Eng. Chan. Reps. iv. 527.

defendant that the petition was prepared; to which the latter had answered, by desiring that no time might be lost in presenting it. Lord Eldon said, "I have no difficulty in saying that it is a surprise, if the party enrolling the decree has said that which might lead the other party to believe that the decree would not be enrolled."

In Whitaker v. Leach, 4th Dec. 1834, an enrolment was vacated by Lord Lyndhurst under the following circumstances. Soon after the order on further directions, which dismissed the bill, had been pronounced, the plaintiff's solicitor wrote to the solicitor of the defendant, that he intended to appeal, and also on the subject of possession of a house being given up. The defendant's solicitor, in answer, said he could not take any notice of the appeal, and a correspondence ensued on other subjects connected with the points in dispute. In one of these letters, dated 24th July, 1834, the defendant's solicitor thus expressed himself to the plaintiff's solicitor :-" It may be as well to settle the amount of rent previously, which is to be paid, subject to the decision on the appeal.” The petition of *appeal was presented 7th August, [ *9 ] 1834; on the 9th August, 1834, the deposit was paid, and on the 14th of August the order was served. No caveat was entered against the enrolment. The docquet of the enrolment was signed on the 12th August. A point was made on the argument that no notice had been given of passing the order, and that it was drawn up by the defendant's solicitor, instead of by the plaintiff's solicitor. This was not decided, but the enrolment was vacated on the ground that the defendant's solicitor, by the above passage in his letter, led the other party to suppose that he acquiesced in his appealing, and induced him not to enter a caveat. In his judgment, Lord Lyndhurst said, a misapprehension on one side, not produced by the acts of the other side, is not a ground to vacate an enrolment. In Barnes v. Wilson, 1 R. & M. 486," the enrolment was left at the proper office about noon on Monday, and sent down to Brighton to the Lord Chancellor, who signed it late that night. In the course of that evening, a caveat was tendered, but the party was told that the enrolment had been forwarded to the Lord Chancellor. It was

Eng. Chan, Reps. iv. 527.