ing largely, or who sells Hudson because he knows it has a floating debt which will interfere with dividends, has some reason for his act which the faro gambler has not. But the bulk of the Wall Street operators buy and sell with very little more ground for the faith that is in them than the man who bets on the red, or "goes his pile" at poker.

All bulls, of course, are not like Marcus, and all bears are not Cassiuses. There is Trimalchio, for instance, a steady bear, but not a bad fellow in his way; he has made and lost three or four fortunes; is apt to strut and look over men's heads when he has made a hit, but is very friendly and polite when fortune deserts him: he alludes to the impending collapse with a sigh of sympathy, and, I dare say, would give a trifle to the widows and orphans whose ruin will make his fortune. Many men are bears from natural caution, and abstain from operating except in times of general excitement and speculation when values are inflated. The leaders of the street have generally been bears, from the veteran Jacob, who thought nothing of selling short the entire capital stock of a road in a morning, down to Mr. Slyboots, who knows so much more than other people that betting against him is like playing with loaded dice.

The true bull and the true bear are born so. They do not change. Marcus is a man you can place at a glance: a cheerful, jovial fellow, who thinks the world a good place to live in, and its arrangements generally satisfactory; who has faith in human progress, takes stock in new enterprises, believed in the telegraph, railroads, the oceanic cable from the first; is ready to help a poor fellow in distress, or to credit any reasonably probable good news. He looks on the bright side of things, and is a bull. He was a bull at his games at school, and will die a bull in Wall Street. He regards the crisis of 1857 Both classes of operators are useful and even as artificial, and all declines in values as the ne- essential. But for the bulls no enterprise would farious work of rascally speculators. When the ever be carried into effect. And when rogues bears have sway Marcus loses money and some- try to gull the public with fraudulent schemes, times temper. But his indignation is honest, and to foist worthless stock on' unsuspecting inopen, and manly. You can't persuade him that vestors, the bear looms up as the protector of men are all rogues and railroad reports all lies. his species, and by selling the trash "short" de"There's a good time coming, boys," is his fa-velops its want of value and warns the dupes of vorite air. He gets constantly imposed upon their danger. When values are too low, the bull by knaves, owing to his credulity; but experi- reinstates them. When they rise too high, the ence does not harden his heart. Genial old fel-bear interposes and checks the enthusiasm of low, he has hosts of friends and hardly an en- the sanguine. emy!

The bulls had their carnival in 1863 and the Cassius is a very different mould of man. He beginning of 1864. The bears had theirs in 1857, was born, bred, and lives a bear. Distrust is his and again in the later months of 1864, and the prominent trait. From his youth he was a commencement, thus far, of 1865. The contest doubter and scorner. He sneered at the tele- of 1857 was severe, though the result was never graph, and for a long time expected railways to doubtful. Our railroads were inefficiently manbe done away with and stage-coaches to be re-aged. There was not traffic enough for all of instated. He has no faith in men or things. them, and a large number were declaring diviThe former are generally knaves, the latter per-dends which had not been earned. Most of ishable. He sells railway stocks so confidently them were groaning under constantly increasing on the expectation of accidents that he is rather floating debts. Under these circumstances it disappointed when he don't find one in the morn- was clear that they must decline in public favor ing paper. He is ready to take the odds against as investments, and it was merely a question of the happening of any expected event which is time when the fall would come. An organizagenerally wished for. He don't believe in news tion of about a dozen large operators was formed unless it is bad news, or in men, unless, like under the title of "The Observatory," comprising himself, they are laden with distrust. Twenty a large proportion of the capital and financial years' indulgence in these feelings render him at skill of the street. They operated for the fall forty a sour, unsavory companion, apt to be snap- with vigor and ability. It is not a little curious pish in conversation, and uncongenial. For, to note, however, that their ultimate success was you see, he makes his money out of misfortune. due to an event which had by no means entered Bankruptcy, Civil Turmoil, Disaster, and Acci- into their calculations. They had based their dent, are the evil spirits which bring him riches. sales exclusively on the unsound condition of The sight of prosperity annoys him. A com- the railways, whereas the crisis of 1857, which panion who had listened impatiently, on a walk caused the great decline in values, was the redown Broadway, to his demonstration of the ut-sult of general overtrading and an excessive ter unsoundness of every thing and every body, and of the impending ruin of the whole commercial community, at last in despair pointed to Stewart's building on Chambers Street, and said:

"That building is substantial, at all events!" "Bet you it comes down in some storm," was the prompt answer.

drain of specie to Europe. The Observatory made a net profit of $1,500,000 @ $2,000,000 less than some individuals realized on the bull side in 1863. The loss to the public, exclusive of losses in merchandise, was not less than $200,000,000.

The bulls had a carnival, based on the development of gold in California, which lasted

from 1852 to 1855, and made many fortunes. | less brilliant, but more meteoric. He, too, had But the most brilliant of their campaigns was read the signs of the times, and after feeling his that of 1863. Paper-money was its base; its way for some months, at length struck a vein. success was due to the large earnings of the He achieved fame and fortune in a few days. railroads caused by the development of internal His personal prestige was at one time greater trade. than was ever enjoyed by any man in Wall Street. People of all kinds thronged his office and begged him to give them just a hint-the least hint, and they would be his friends forever. If he whispered "Rock Island," scores of sensible men rushed to their brokers and ordered Rock Island bought. Not that they knew why they were buying it: they had a hint from the Great Man, and that was sufficient. A Company, respectable enough, and with a fine property which they were desirous of bringing before the public, actually paid him the enormous fee of $165,000 to allow the subscription books to be opened at his office, and his name to appear in the list of directors. Speculators paid him extravagant commissions to buy stocks for them, in the hope that the public might think he was buying them for himself. To his friends he was a generous fellow, and in his wild, extravagant way would tell them:

The crisis of 1857, and the short crops which followed, had impoverished the West, reduced railroad receipts to so low an ebb that they barely paid expenses, and destroyed public confidence in railroad property. Many railroads had passed out of the hands of their owners into those of receivers, and had been reorganized. Others were struggling painfully under an intolerable load of floating debt. The bountiful crops of 1859 and 1860 were beginning to restore them to something like prosperity when the war panic-which followed the election of Mr. Lincoln-again revived distrust, checked trade, and plunged holders of railroad property into despair. It was not till two years afterward that the depression began to be overcome. In 1862 the bulls showed their heads againfortified by paper-money and increased railroad earnings. Two brothers, not associated in business, but both clear-headed, bold, and with that instinct d'agiotage which a man must have to be very successful in stocks, began to attract attention by the boldness of their purchases. Another man, whom few persons knew, but who was said to have been an unlucky curbstone operator for some years, commenced dealing on a capital of two or three thousand dollars, and soon became a prominent figure at the "coal-hole." He enjoyed the acquaintance if not the patronage of a great millionaire; and when he was most audacious in his purchases, it was always suspected that he was acting for his potential friend-which helped his credit and gave him prestige to no sinal extent. Keen, shrewd, and now at last lucky, his first ventures were successful beyond his hopes; in six months his $3000 had swelled to one hundred times that amount, and he was recognized as a leader. When he rose in the coal-hole to bid, as he generally did, "seller three or thirty," with his eyes flashing, and his slender frame vibrating with excitement-an associate or friend beside him with book and pencil to note down his purchases-by-standers looked on with admiration, bears hastened to cover their shorts, and the large class of speculators, who get their thinking done by other people, lost no time in following in his track. A man with prestige can operate à coup sûr: he has always following enough to relieve him of his stocks at a profit if he repents his purchases. This was the fortune of this man; for a long time every thing he touched turned to gold, because he could make his operations certain. And his shrewdness did not fail him at the last. For some time before the great crash of April he had foreseen and foretold it. It found him prepared; and of the great fortunes won in 1863, his is one of the very few which has been preserved.

Another leading operator made a display not

"Boys, I'll make a million for each of you before I've done."

He was something more than a mere gambler. As an arithmetician he never had his equal in the street, and his grasp of financial questions was so true and comprehensive that, at one meeting, he persuaded one of our soundest Boards of railroad managers to depart from the policy they had established, and pursue a new one under his guidance. The misfortune with him was that at last he began to believe in himself. From that moment he was a doomed man. The moment a man in Wall Street begins to think he knows more than other people his ruin is a mere question of time. When this misfortune befell the operator of whom we speak, he determined to make not two or three millions but eight or ten; not to control one stock, but half a dozen. Bankers and banks were ready enough to humor him. Where he had borrowed a million they lent him two; and president and cashier slyly examined his collaterals, and laid in a couple of hundred each of the same sort for their private pocket. If Mr. Chase had not been seized with the fine notion of selling gold for greenbacks, and if nothing else of the like nature had happened, there is no saying how many millions this great operator might not have realized, and what income-tax he would have paid. Unfortunately, the dread day of April came, and found him expanded to the utmost extent. Banks and bankers called for their money, and would hear of no excuse. Private lenders called for more margin. Customers called for their balances. The struggle was brief. One morning the word was passed round:

smacks and other craft which had followed in cornerers of conspiracy, and denounced the corhis wake shared his fate.

It was a bad time for Uncle Sam's incometax commissioners. The decline was so rapid that not only did speculators lose, but brokers, money-lenders, and others, who had no interest in the operations of the day, were involved in the general catastrophe. Stocks fell 15 per cent. on Saturday, and then, though every body said they would naturally react on Monday, they fell 15 per cent. more on that day. No such decline had ever been witnessed in Wall Street, and people were new to the alternate inflations and panics which are the characteristics of paper-money eras. Very few had time to save themselves. Several thousands of individuals who had made during the year preceding fortunes varying from $25,000 to $250,000 found themselves stripped in a week. Of those who survived the subsequent decline slaughtered the greater part. Speculation in stocks received a blow from which it has not since recovered.

A few figures will explain the extent of the losses which have fallen upon stock gamblers since last 1st of April. Erie, which sold when the war began at 30, rose to 130, fell in April to 105, and has since sold at 66. Reading, which sold in 1861 at 55, rose to 160, and has since sold at 102. Toledo sold at 28 in 1861, at 160 in 1863, and at 103 since. Michigan Southern sold at 30 in 1862, at 118 in 1863, and at 61 since. Pittsburg rose from 22 to 129, and has since fallen to 80. Rock Island rose from 40 to 150, and has since sold at 88. It will be remembered that the figures at which these properties sold at the beginning of the war were in gold, and that the roads were not then earning money; whereas the subsequent figures are in a currency worth 50 per cent, in gold, and the roads are all earning dividends.

ner as a piece of roguery; the bulls retorted by inquiring why their antagonists had sold that which they did not possess and apparently could not procure. After much altercation, the dispute was referred to the Board of Brokers, and that body, new to such points, actually decided in favor of the shorts, pronouncing a verdict which virtually relieved them from the necessity of fulfilling their contracts, on the ground that the corner was a conspiracy.

The Board has grown wiser since then. In our time, if a man is cornered, he can get neither relief nor sympathy by applying to the Board. He must deliver or break. The trouble with the parties who cornered Morris Canal was that, like Galileo, they were before their time.

There have been three great corners within the past year or two; one in Hudson River, one in Harlem, one in Rock Island-each of the three organized by a master of the art. Of these the most profitable was the one in Hudson River, the most thorough the one in Harlem.

Hudson came to be cornered accidentally. In a dull, inanimate state of the market the chronic bears were amusing themselves by "hammering," i. e., pressing down the price of Hudson, which did not happen to have any particular friend in the Board. This pastime of theirs was not relished by a large holder of Hudson, then disporting himself during the dog days on board his yacht; and chancing to revolve the matter in his head as he lay with a friend on a pile of deals on a wharf in the North River one morning between four and five, it occurred to him that with proper ingenuity a rod might be set in pickle for these trespassers. Orders went that morning to confidential brokers to take all the sellers' options in Hudson. This was repeated for several days, until the buyers had a pretty large pile of options. Cash stock was then taken as quietly as possible, until the Every body knows what the corner of a street market was bare. A brief caleulation showed is, or the corner of a room. A Wall Street that the buyers had secured either as cash or "corner" has no affinity with either of these. contract stock, all the Hudson in existence, with It is derived from the popular verb to "corner," the exception of a very few shares which were i. e., to embarrass beyond chance of escape. A not likely to come on the market. A new stock operator is cornered when he has sold stock manœuvre was then developed. Application short which he can not procure for delivery, and was made to several leading bear houses to a stock is said to be cornered when a bold opera-"turn" Hudson; that is to say, to buy it for tor or a clique buys it all up, and then calls upon the bears who have sold it short to "stand and deliver." Great corners are among the memorable events of the street.

OF CORNERS.

The first great corner on record was engineered some twenty or thirty years ago in Morris Canal stock, a long since forgotten fancy. Most of the operators in the Board and in the street believed it to be ruling above its value and sold it short. On this a shrewd clique bought up all the loose stock and locked it in a trunk. The shorts discovered, as their contracts matured, that there was no stock to be had except of the cornering clique, and they demanded an exorbitant price. Dismay prevailed on all sides. There was no precedent for the case. The bears accused the

cash from the cornering party, and to sell it back to them on buyers' option for ten, twenty, or thirty days. This indicated or was regarded as indicating weakness on the part of the cornerers; it looked as though they were short of money; the bears eagerly "turned" several thousand shares for the usual difference, and instantly threw on the market the cash stock, which the cornerers privately bought.

All being now ripe, the trap was sprung. Many of the sellers' options began to mature. There was no Hudson to be had. On that morning when the chief of the party lay on the deals thinking of his margins Hudson was 112; it now rose to 180. On one hundred shares, thoughtlessly sold, the loss was $6800. There