third dissenting in a very learned and able opinion, to which we shall advert. The prevailing opinion The prevailing opinion is elaborate, and likens the exposure in this case to compelling a prisoner to remove a veil or mask. The distinction however is, that there the prisoner tries to conceal evidence which is ordinarily visible, and from which the jury have a right to draw a conclusion, and the removal simply restores that evidence. The prisoner has no more right to hide his face than to secrete his whole person. The court also liken the ruling to the searching a prisoner and finding false keys or stolen property upon him. The sufficient answer to that is, that such things are not part of his person, but are circumstances by which he has surrounded himself. When these circumstances are disclosed, it is not the man who is compelled to give evidence against himself, but the circumstances by which he has environed himself. The conclusion of the court is "that no evidence of physical facts can, upon any established principle of law, or upon any substantial reason, be held to come within the letter or spirit of the Constitution." This decision cited with approval the North Carolina decisions and distinguished the Tennessee case which we shall allude to. In Walker v. State, 7 Tex. Ct. App. 245, on the trial of an indictment for murder, the prosecution were allowed to prove that the examining magistrate had compelled the prisoner to make his footprints in an ash-heap, and that they corresponded with footprints found at the scene of the crime. Held, no error. Counsel acutely argued that "if this prisoner can be compelled to make an impression with his foot in order to see if it is similar to the impression made by the foot of the person who committed the crime, then if he were charged with forgery he could be compelled to take a pen, and write, in order to see if his handwriting was similar to that of the party who had committed the forgery." (This he may now by statute be compelled to do in England.) This decision is founded on State v. Graham, infra, and Stokes v. State, infra, is distinguished on the ground that there "the prisoner was asked in the presence of the jury to make evidence against himself". a perfectly futile distinction, as we shall see. The worst of this decision is that it permits secondary evidence of incompetent evidence-evidence of an experiment out of court, which, if tried in court, might not have been conclusive against the prisoner. In State v. Graham, 74 N. C. 646; S. C., 21 Am. Rep. 493, an officer, who had arrested a person charged with larceny, compelled him to put his foot in a track found near where the larceny was committed, and testified as to the result of the comparison. Held, no error. The court say, "no hopes or fears of the prisoner could produce the resemblance of his track to that found in the cornfield." They instance the case of a fragment of a knife-blade found sticking in a window, and its correspondence with the blade of a knife found in a prisoner's pocket; the similar case of gun-wadding found in a wound, and evidently torn from paper in a prisoner's pocket; the correspondence of marks on a prisoner's face with the wards of a key with which he was struck at the time of the commission of the offense; and ask: "If an officer arresting one charged with an offense had no right to make the prisoner show the contents of his pocket, how could the broken knife, or the fragment of paper corresponding with the wadding, have been found? If when a prisoner is arrested for passing counterfeit money, the contents of his pockets are sacred from search, how can it ever appear whether or not he has on his person a large number of similar bills, which, if proved, is certainly evidence of the scienter? If an officer sees a pistol projecting from the pocket of a prisoner arrested for a fresh' murder, may he not take out the pistol against the prisoner's consent, to see whether it appears to have been recently discharged?" They then instance a veil and a mask. This is fairly the substance of the opinion, and we have already sufficiently commented on this line of argument. In State v. Garrett, 71 N. C. 85; S. C., 17 Am. Rep. 1, at a coroner's inquest, upon the body of a person found dead, it was proved that defendant had said that deceased was accidently burned to death, and that defendant had burned her own hand in trying to put the fire out. Defendant being then in custody on suspicion of having murdered the deceased, was ordered by the coroner to show her hand, which she did, and it appeared uninjured. Held, that evidence of such fact was admissible upon the trial of defendant for the murder. This must be classed with the mask and veil as an instance of an attempt to conceal evidence ordinarily visible. The jury of course have a right to scrutinize patent facts, such as stature, shape, complexion, hair, features, scars, loss or peculiarity of members, etc. These are public matters, which the public cannot be prevented from viewing, and which the prisoner knows are liable to comment and compariOf these, witnesses who observed them may speak, or the jury may look at them in court. So if witnesses have observed the patent characteristics of gait and voice, they may testify to them, or the jury may observe the prisoner's gait as he naturally and voluntarily walks, or his voice as he voluntarily speaks. But will it be contended, that on a question of resemblance of gait, the court can compel the prisoner to get up and walk, or that on a question of voice, they can compel him to speak? son. The foregoing are the only cases holding this doctrine. On the other hand is Stokes v. State, 5 Baxt. 619; S. C., 30 Am. Rep. 72. On an accusation of murder, it being claimed that certain footprints were those of the prisoner, the prosecuting attorney brought a pan of mud into court, and placed it in front of the jury, and having proved that the mud in the pan was about as soft as that where the tracks were found, called on the prisoner to put his foot in the mud in the pan. On objection, the court instructed the prisoner that it was optional with him whether he would comply. The prisoner refused, and the court instructed the jury that his refusal was not to be taken against him. The prisoner being convicted, held, that he was entitled to a new trial. It is impossible to distinguish this case. If the court had considered the evidence competent, it would have compelled the prisoner to "make tracks," or instructed the jury that his refusal might be considered against him. The court said: "In the presence of the jury the prisoner is asked to make evidence against himself." That is exactly what he was asked to do in the tattoo case, and what he was compelled to do in the Graham case. It is immaterial whether he is compelled to do it out of court or in court. The distinction drawn by the court in the Walker case against the Stokes case, would apply just as well to the Graham case. In People v. Mc Coy, 45 How. Pr. 216, an indictment of a woman for murder of an illegitimate child at birth, the coroner had directed two physicians to go to the jail and examine her private parts to determine whether she had recently been delivered of a child. She objected to the examination, but being threatened with force, yielded, and the examination was had. Their evidence was offered on the trial, and ruled out. The court said the proceeding was in violation of the spirit and meaning of the Constitution, which declares that "no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." "They might as well have sworn the prisoner, and compelled her, by threats, to testify that she had been pregnant and had been delivered of a child, as to have compelled her, by threats, to allow them to look into her person, with the aid of a speculum, to ascertain whether she had been pregnant and been recently delivered of a child." "Has this court the right to compel the prisoner now to submit to an examination of her private parts and breasts, by physicians, and then have them testify that from such examination they are of the opinion she is not a virgin, and has had a child? It is not possible that this court has that right; and it is too clear to admit of argument that evidence thus obtained would be inadmissible against the prisoner." truth, and the result would have verified the statement. Suppose, instead of the hand and bust of a woman, he had written upon his breast, in India ink, the words, 'I am Ah Chuey,' why could those words be shown with more propriety than the words in the diary, and could they not have been shown if was proper to compel him to exhibit the mark?" "Had the identifying mark been upon some portion of the body not concealed, and had the jury scen it by reason of the defendant's presence in court, I do not say that they could not have acted upon the fact so observed. What I say is, that whether the mark is concealed or not, the court cannot compel a defendant, for the purpose of identification, or any other, the tendency of which is to criminate, to exhibit himself or any part of himself before the jury as a link in the chain of evidence." "Had the district attorney asked the defendant whether he had on his right forearm the tattoo mark described, and had the court, against the defendant's consent, compelled him to answer that he had such a mark, there can be no doubt that such action would have been a grave error. Could the court, at the trial, in the presence of the jury, by other and forcible means, accomplish indirectly what it could not do by direct means?" Neither Wharton nor Bishop expresses any opinion on this question, but it seems to us that on principle a prisoner cannot be compelled to say any thing, nor do any thing, nor submit to any act addressed to his actual person, which may tend to criminate him. LIABILITY OF SHERIFFS BEFORE RETURN DAY OF EXECUTION. A fieri facias issues from the fall term of a Superior Court, returnable to the ensuing spring term of the same. In a week after its issuance, the sheriff collects the money thereunder. Is the execution plaintiff entitled to that money upon demand, and does the sheriff expose himself to an action by refusing to pay it over? This is a question upon which there seems to be a dearth of adjudication. Does the money as soon as it goes into the hands of the sheriff become the money of the plaintiff? Greenleaf, in the second volume of his Law of Evidence (Redfield's edition), p. 515, Leonard, J., dissenting in the tattoo case, said among other things: "I think the framers of the Constitution, and the people who adopted it, intended, that at criminal trials, the accused, if such should be his wish, should not only have the right $587, says that, "the money, in this case, as soon as it to close his mouth, but that he might fold his arms as well, and refuse to be witness against himself in any sense or to any extent, by furnishing or giving evidence against himself, whether testimony under oath or affirmation, or confessions or admissions without either, or proofs of a physical nature." "If witness Rhoades had testified that he knew the defendant was Ah Chuey, because he was a good English writer, and had for years kept a diary; that he wrote in it every day, and signed his name 'Ah Chuey,' to each entry; that he saw the book a few minutes before coming into court; that defendant then had had the book on his person, would any one say that the court, without error, could have compelled him to show the book to the jury? And yet why not, on principle, if he could be compelled to exhibit a private, harmless mark, for the same purpose? The object would have been to ascertain the comes into the officer's hands, is money had and received to the creditor's use." On the other hand, the North Carolina court, in State v. Lea, 8 Ired. 94, hold that "a sheriff cannot apply to the satisfaction of an execution against a person, money which he received on an execution in favor of that person," for the reason, that "until it be paid over to the party, it is not his goods." For the purposes of the present discussion, it is not necessary to attempt a reconciliation of these apparent contradictions, as the question here is, not whether the money is the plaintiff's before it is paid over, but whether he has a right to have it paid over as soon as it is collected. Upon principle it would seem that the creditor has the right to demand the money. The general rule is undeniable, that the principal who constitutes one his collecting agent has a right to demand of his agent at any time such moneys as he may have in hand, less the agent's expenses, charges and commissions. That the sheriff is in contemplation of law the agent of the execution creditor is obvious from the fact that an injunction to restrain proceedings under the execution is directed to the creditor, and it is irregular to direct THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL. such injunction to the sheriff. In Jarman v. Saunders. * * * It is difficult to imagine any reason why this agent (the sheriff) appointed by law, should be less amenable to his principal (the execution creditor), than an agent voluntarily selected by him. It has been suggested that as the fi. fa. directs the officer to "have the money" at the ensuing term of the court, he must retain it until then, so as to be able to respond to the exigency of the writ. To harmonize the adjudications, however, it is not unfair or unreasonable to resort to construction, and to give the terms of the precept the effect of a command to have the money by the next term of court. The vacation between the terms is, probably, deemed a sufficient time for raising the money, and that time, but no more, is allowed the officer. For the officer's convenience, the interval between the terms of court is allowed him for raising the money, but if he raises it sooner, no good reason appears why he should be compelled to withhold it from the party entitled to it until the return term. Reason and good conscience would seem to dictate a course analogous to that pursued in the settlement of estates by executors and administrators. The North Carolina statute allows them two years to settle, upon the supposition that many estates which are complicated cannot be settled in less time, but this was intended as an indulgence to them, and where there are no debts due from the estate and no complications, equity will compel an immediate settlement with the legatees or distributees. Turnage v. Turnage, 7 Ired. 127. It is clear that in North Carolina the sheriff is not obliged to keep the money until the return day. In Whitehead v. Hellen, 74 N. C. 679, the court uses "If an execution be satisfied soon after this language: the adjournment of the court from which it issued, why should the sheriff be compelled to retain the money in his own hands until the term to which the execution is returnable? Would it not be better for all concerned that he should pay the money, either into office or to the party entitled thereto?" The return term "is the limit beyond which he may not delay, but there is no good reason why he should delay so long, if no useful purpose is to be served thereby.' If the sheriff delays to pay the money to the party "for doing so, entitled when there is "no good reason is he not in default? This is the strongest expression on the subject to be found in the North Carolina Reports. In Patten v. Mann, 13 Ind. 444, Pearson, J., [the sheriff acting under says: "It may be that if he " a fi. fa.] "had received the money, he was bound to pay it over to the plaintiff on demand," but this was merely obiter. While there may be some difference of opinion as to whether the money collected by execution belongs to the creditor as soon as it comes into the officer's hands, it appears to be held with great confidence, by several text writers, and courts of high authority, that the plaintiff in the execution can entitle himself to it by demanding the money of the sheriff. In 2 Greenl. Ev., § 587, p. 515, it is said that "where the precept does not otherwise direct him, he [the sheriff] is bound to pay it over to the creditor on the return day of the process 'under which it was levied, without any demand, and earlier if demanded; upon failure of which an action lies." Freeman says in his work on Executions, § 448, p. 740, that "the liability of officers before the return day has not been discussed with much frequency. The rule in force in Massachusetts is, that where money has been collected before the return day, the officer is at once liable to the plaintiff if the latter demands payment; but that in the absence of such demand, no liability arises until after the return day." A careful scrutiny of the Massachusetts cases referred to in the note to this paragraph discloses no reason why the doctrine there announced should be treated as of local application. It is true that one of the cases, Rogers v. Sumner, 16 Pick. 387, was a suit to recover a statutory penalty for failure to pay over money before the return day of the execution, but the penalty only was the creature of statute, the right which was involved was left as if the enactment had never been. In this case (Rogers v. Sumner) the court say: "It is objected that the actions were prematurely brought, having been commenced before the return day of the execution. But where the party is injured by the officer's misfeasance, he is not obliged to wait until that day. Here the officer had the money in his hands, the goods having been sold under mesne process, and it must be considered as having been applied to these executions. In many cases the officer is able very early to obtain the money due upon an execution, and the question is whether he shall pay it over immediately to the creditor, or retain it in his own It may be questionable hands until the return day. whether he is bound to pay it sooner without demand, but upon a demand being made, we think it is his duty to pay it over." This question has received some consideration in New York. Armstrong v. Garrow, 6 Cow. 465, was assumpsit against a sheriff for the amount of a note taken by him in satisfaction of an execution (ca. sa.) in favor of the plaintiff against a third party. Suit was brought against the sheriff before the return day of the execution and sustained by the court, Savage, "The general C. J., delivering himself as follows: principle is not denied that this action lies in all cases where any one has received the money of another and I can see no reason why an refuses to pay it over. officer who has collected money on an execution, and refuses to pay it to the owner, should not be liable as for money had and received. The sheriff has received the money for the plaintiff's use; and having refused to pay it, is rightfully prosecuted." One other consideration is suggested. When the sheriff collects the money on an execution, the judgment and execution are satisfied and the creditor can no longer have reçourse on the execution defendant. Henry v. Rich, 64 N. C. 379; Hunt v. Breading, 12 Serg. & Rawle, 37. Interest on the judgment debt then stops, and if the sheriff can rightfully retain the money until the return term, the plaintiff is in a worse condition by getting judgment than he was before; for if the sheriff had not collected, interest would have continued to run against the judgment debtor. Such an anomaly and such a hardship is not in keeping with the spirit of the law. HUGH F. MURRAY. RATIFICATION BY PEOPLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS. INDIANA SUPREME COURT, JUNE 17, 1880. MATTER OF INDIANA CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS. The Constitution of Indiana provides, in reference to the adoption of amendments thereto, among other things, that "it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to Α' submit such amendment or amendments to the electors of the State, and if a majority of said electors shall ratify the same, such amendment or amendments shall become a part of this Constitution." An act of the General Assembly, proposing certain amendments and submitting them to the people, at an election when certain officers were to be chosen, provided that "any qualified elector at the time he votes for officers or at such election, if he does not vote for any officers, may vote for or against any amendment," and "that if a majority of the electors shall then ratify any of said amendments, the same shall be a part of the Constitution." There was no means provided by the act by which the whole number of votes cast at the election could be ascertained. Held, that the Constitution requires at least a majority of all the votes cast at the same election to ratify a constitutional amendment; that the act in question was defective in not providing for a count of the aggregate number of votes cast throughout the State on the day of election; that there was no source from which the court could ascertain whether the amendment received a majority of the votes cast at the election; that it must be presumed that other votes were cast at the election than those for or against the amendment, and that the Constitution must remain as it was before the amendment, until it shall affirmatively appear that the amendment was rati fied. And as it does not thus affirmatively appear, the court hold that the amendment was not ratified by a constitutional majority. The court hold that the Constitution requires a majority of the electors of the State to ratify an amendment to it, but that the whole number of votes cast at the election at which the amendment is submitted may be taken as the number of electors in the State. PPEAL from a decision sustaining as valid certain amendments to the Constitution of Indiana submitted to the vote of the people of that State by an act of the Legislature, passed March 18, 1879. The opinion discloses sufficient facts. BIDDLE, J. The State presents two questions for our consideration: 1. Was the proposed amendment, according to the facts stated in the reply to the special answer, ratified by a majority of the electors of the State, and did it thereby become a part of the Constitution, and if such proposed amendment was so ratified, was James V. Kelso a legal voter of the precinct named in the indictment at the time he presented his ballot to the appellee and offered to vote? A doubt is suggested in limine by the counsel for appellant, as to whether the general question of this ratification of the constitutional amendments is properly presented by the record. They insist that proof or admitted facts in the individual case as to the whole amount of votes cast at the election of April 5, 1880, and the number cast for and against the amendments, does not present the general question, but that our decision therefore would bind only the parties to this suit, and would not become matter of public law upon the ratification of the amendments. But we do not feel embarrassed by this question. The courts take notice of the public census taken by authority of law, in the archives of the State, and of the number of votes cast at a general State election upon all questions of public affairs that affect the State. From those sources we must know all the facts necessary to the decision of the question whether the amendment is constitutionally ratified or not. In our opinion the questions discussed by the counsel of the respective parties are properly in the record and before us. By the first section of the act of Congress of April 19, 1816, the inhabitants of the Territory of Indiana were authorized to form for themselves a Constitution and State government, which State when formed should be admitted into the Union upon the same footing with the original States. The second section defines the boundaries of States. Section third provides the qualification of electors and authorizes them to choose representatives to form a convention, defines the number allowed to each county, and fixes the time of holding the election on the second Monday of May, 1816. The fourth section is in the following words: "Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, that the members of the convention thus duly elected be and they are hereby authorized to meet at the seat of government of the said Territory on the second Monday of June next, which convention when met shall first determine, by a majority of the whole number elected, whether it be or be not expedient at that time to form a Constitution and State government for the people within the said Territory; and if it be determined to be expedient, the convention shall be and hereby is authorized to form a Constitution and State government, or if it be deemed more expedient the said convention shall provide by ordinance for electing representatives to form a Constitution or form a government, which said representatives shall be chosen in such manner and in such proportion and shall meet at such time and place as shall be prescribed by the said ordinance, and shall there form for the people of said Territory a Constitution and State government; provided, that the same when formed shall be republican and not repugnant to the articles of the ordinance of the thirteenth of July, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven, which are declared to be irrevocable between the original States and the people of the Territory north-west of the River Ohio; excepting so much of the said articles as relates to boundaries of the States therein to be found." R. S. 1813, p. 33. Under this act the members of the convention were elected on the second Monday of May, 1816, met in convention at Corydon on the second Monday of June, 1816, and proceeded at once to form the Constitution by the authority of Congress, without an ordinance of the Territory. The Constitution was completed on the 29th day of June, 1816, unanimously adopted by the members of the convention and signed by all except one member from Clarke county and one from Warrick county. The Constitution went into effect upon its adoption by the members of the convention which formed it, and the first session of the General Assembly held by its authority met at Corydon on the first Monday in November, 1816. The Constitution of 1816 remained in force without further amendment until the first day of November, 1851. An act was passed January 15, 1849, to provide "for taking the sense of the qualified voters of the State on the calling of a convention to alter, amend or revise the Constitution of this State." At an election held under the authority of this act "a large majority of all the votes given at said election was in favor of holding said convention." The Legislature was unwilling even to call the convention without first obtaining the authority from a majority of all the voters of the State. On the 18th day of January, 1850, the Legislature passed "An act to provide for the call of a convention of the people of the State of Indiana to revise, amend or alter the Constitution of said State." Acts 1851, 29. By authority of this act delegates were elected who assembled in convention at the capital, in the city of Indianapolis, on the first Monday in October, 1850, and completed the labor of forming the present Constitution on the 10th day of February, 1857. By the thirteenth clause of the schedule to this Constitution it was provided that when it was submitted to the electors for their approval or disapproval, the article in relation to negroes and mulattoes should be submitted as a distinct proposition, “and if a majority of the votes cast be in favor of said article then the same shall form a part of this Constitution; otherwise it shall be void and form no part thereof." On the 14th day of February, 1851, an act was passed amending the act of January, 1850, providing that a vote of the people should be taken on the first Monday in August thereafter on the adoption or rejection of the Constitution, and said separate article, the fourth section of which amendatory act provides that: "If it shall appear that a majority of all the votes polled at such election were given in favor of the adoption of said Constitution, it shall then become the Constitution of the State of Indiana from the first day of November, 1851; but if it shall appear that a majority of all the votes polled for or against the adoption of said Constitution and said separate article were given against the adoption of said Constitution, then the same shall be and remain inoperative and void." Acts 1857, 3. Section 1, article 16, of the Constitution, by the authority of which the amendment in question was proposed by the General Assembly for ratification by the electors of the State, is in the following words: "Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in either branch of the General Assembly, and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members elected to each of the two houses, such proposed amendment or amendments shall, with the yeas and nays thereon, be entered on their journals, and referred to the General Assembly to be chosen at the next general election; and if, in the General Assembly so next chosen such amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by a majority of all the members elected to each house, then it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to submit such amendment or amendments to the electors of the State; and if a majority of said electors shall ratify the same, such amendment or amendments shall become a part of this Constitution." The first amendment proposed and ratified under this article of the Constitution was section 7 of article 10, in reference to the Wabash and Erie canal. By the act of the General Assembly of January 28, 1872 (Act 1873, p. 83), the governor and secretary of State were required to examine the election returns and declare the result of the election; "and if it shall appear from said examination that a majority of all the votes cast at said election were in favor of the adoption of said proposed amendments, then and thereupon the said amendments shall be and become a part and parcel of the Constitution of the State of Indiana, and the governor of this State shall, as soon as practicable, issue his proclamation embodying the said amendment therein, and declaring and proclaiming the same has been duly ratified by the people, and is therefore a part of the Constitution of the State." In pursuance of this act the governor and secretary of State declared the returns of the election, and the governor issued his proclamation declaring that the proposed amendment had received the requisite constitutional majority in its favor, necessary to its ratification, and had become a part of the Constitution of the State, as section 7 of article 10 thereof, which section is now printed by authority in the Constitution. The matter, therefore, having been decided and proclaimed according to law by the executive department, a co-ordinate branch of the government, has now become res adjudicata. By the first section of the act of March 10, 1879, it is declared that each of said proposed amendments shall be submitted to the electors of the State at the election to be holden on the first Monday of April, 1880, for their adoption or rejection. Section third provides that: 66 Any qualified elector at the time he votes for officers, or at such election, if he does not vote for any officer, may vote for or against any amendment, by depositing one of said ballots in the ballot-box." The same section also provides that, if a majority of the electors shall then ratify any of said amendments, the same shall be a part of the Constitution; but no elector shall vote more than once, and if he votes for any officer shall, at the same time, vote on such amendments. Acts 1879, p. 25. The above statement shows that by the act of Congress it required "a majority of the whole number elected" of the members of the convention to decide upon the expediency of adopting the Constitution of 1816; and that by the act of the Indiana Legislature it required "a majority of the votes polled at such, election" to adopt the Constitution of 1851. It also appears that it required "a majority of all the votes cast to ratify article 13 of the Constitution of 1851, which was submitted to the electors as a separate proposition; and that it required "a majority of the members elected to each of the two houses of the General Assembly at two successive regular sessions to propose an amendment or amendments to the Constitution, and when so proposed "it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to submit such amendment or amendments to the electors of the State, and if a majority of said electors ratify the same such amendment or amendments shall become a part of this Constitution." And by section 25 of article 4 of this Constitution, it requires "a majority of all the members elected to each house" to pass a bill or resolution. We can find no authority, either in the Constitution of 1816, or in the Constitution of 1851, or in the legislative acts upon the subject, by which a Constitution or any of its separate articles, or any amendment thereto, could be adopted or ratified by a plurality of the votes of the electors, or by one less number than a majority of the whole number cast at that election. If there were any doubts of the construction, upon its face, of the section under which the amendment before us was proposed, they would disappear upon the examination of the debates in the convention which formed the Constitution. The proposition was first introduced substantially in the words in which it ultimately passed. After receiving some discussion and several amendments it was referred to the committee "On Future Amendments to the Constitution." This committee reported as follows: "That whenever twothirds of all the members elected to each branch of the General Assembly shall think it necessary to call a convention to alter or ameud this Constitution they shall recommend to the electors at the next election of members of the General Assembly to vote for or against a convention, and if it shall appear that a majority of all the electors of the State voting for representatives have voted for a convention, the General Assembly shall at their next session call a convention for the purpose of revising, altering or amending this Constitution." A second section was then offered authorizing two-thirds of the members of the two houses of the General Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, and when thus proposed to submit them "to the people at the next general election for their adoption or rejection in such manner as may be prescribed by law; and if a majority of all the electors voting at said election for members of the House of Representatives shall vote for such amendment or amendments, the same shall become part of the Constitution." Mr. Owen, of Posey, prepared a substitute in almost the exact words in which it now stands in the Constitution. This substitute was fully discussed by leading members of the convention, and accepted by a large majority. It was then put upon its passage, carried and referred to the committee on revision. This committee changed the phraseology of the section slightly by substituting the words "General Assembly" for the word "Senate" and "House of Representatives," and the word "electors" in one instance instead of the words "qualified voters;" and it was then adopted as it now stands, as a part of the Consti |