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tion. The Code Napoleon is much influenced by the principles of the Roman law as regards the powers of married women; but the Scottish law goes in the very opposite direction. The systems which are least indulgent to married women are invariably those which have followed the canon law. The doctrines of the English common law, as well as the Scottish, are largely borrowed from the Canonists. Recent legislation has very much softened the rigors of the common law in England; it has done much in America.

In the United States the common-law disability of a married woman to make contracts very generally prevails where no statute has changed the rule. Several of the States have provided for the protection of married women. Wherever such statutes exist the courts have given full effect to them. It is generally held that such statutes do not enlarge the general powers of the wife as to all contracts, but only as to such as affect her property or estate. She may now make bargains, carry on any trade or business, and perform labor and services on her own separate account as if she were unmarried; and the earnings and profits belong to her exclusively. She may sue and be sued in relation to her separate business as if she were a feme sole. Foster v. Conger, 61 Barb. 145. The tendency of legislation and the adjudication of the court is to extend the rights and powers of married women beyond those given by the common law. Ordinarily the husband is entitled to the personal services and earnings of the wife, unless it is earned in a business carried ou upon her sole and separate account. The statutes in some of the States are broad enough to give the wife the earnings of her personal services in all cases and all the rights which she would have had unmarried, and her husband's creditors cannot reach them on their avails. Marshall v. Marshall, 2 Bush (Ky.), 415; Hoyt v. White, 46 N. H. 45; Oglesby v. Hall, 30 Ga. 386; Whiting v. Beckwith, 31 Conn. 596; Abbey v. Deyo, 44 N. Y. (5 Hand) 348. As a general rule in this country the wife's earnings belong to the husband and may be taken for his debts unless some statute gives them to the wife. The common law does not permit husband or wife to be a witness for or against the other in civil actions. In some of the States they have enacted special laws by which the wife or husband may sometimes be witnesses for or against each other, but it is generally held that. statutes which merely declare that interest shall not disqualify, do not remove the common-law disabilities of husband and wife, which are founded or principles of public policy.

In New York (Laws 1869, ch. 887), in civil actions or proceedings a husband or wife is competent and compellable to give evidence for or against each other the same as other witnesses, except in actions for adultery, for criminal conversation or confidential communication between them. Southwick v. Southwick, 49 N. Y. (4 Sick.) 510. After a dissolution of the marriage by a divorce or by death, either party may be admitted as a witness, unless as to confidential communication made during marriage. Although the general rule seems clearly settled yet there are a few cases which seem opposed. After a divorce a woman is still incompetent to testify against her former husband in a matter between him and a third party. Having lived in illicit cohabitation does not render the one incompetent as a witness for or against the other. In case of bigamy the second wife is a competent witness. In criminal cases neither can be a witness for or against the other. A wife may act as agent for her husband or he as agent for his wife. A wife who leaves her husband without good cause cannot bind him to pay for necessaries furnished to her by a person who knows that they are living separate and apart. Neither is a husband liable for goods sold to the wife upon her separate credit as feme covert trader, who has never as

sumed to pay for such goods. The common-law liability of a husband civilly for the torts of his wife prevails very generally in this country, unless some statute has changed the rule. The courts will sanction a valid agreement of separation between husband and wife; and if the husband makes in such agreement a provision of a specified sum for the support of the wife and makes the payment accordingly, the wife cannot create any debts against him for such support. At common law a husband is entitled to the personal property and chose in action of his wife, and they are vested in him at her death whether reduced to possession or not, in virtue of his marital right, and not of his right to administration. The liability of the husband for the debts of his wife which were contracted before the marriage is a joint one, and it terminates on her death, unless enforced during coverture by a judgment or joint action against both.

The rigor of the common law has been very much softened with every advancing step made in the knowledge of the principles of the Roman law. Its principles have been found readily suitable in every age to the requirements of an advancing civilization. Led by their theory of natural law the jurisconsults of ancient times assumed the equality of the sexes as a principle of their Code of Equity. The codified jurisprudence of Justinian was a powerful solvent of those barbaric principles that inhered in the laws in relation to women throughout Europe. The legal status of woman was read rather by the light of the canon law. This was inevitable since the canon law nearly everywhere prevailed. In some of the French provinces married women obtained all the powers of dealing with property which Roman jurisprudence had allowed and the local law was largely followed by the Code Napoleon. Although the Scottish law, which shows such a scrupulous deference to the doctrines of the Roman jurisconsults, has been very slow in its progress in mitigating the disabilities of married women.

A reactionary movement is now taking place. The tendency of legislation is to give married women the power of acquiring, holding and managing their own property.

LIABILITY OF TAX COLLECTOR FOR FALSE

RETURN.

MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT, APRIL 21, 1880.

RAYNSFORD V. PHELPS.

A tax collector who held a warrant for taxes assessed upon land which was mortgaged to plaintiff made a false return that there were no goods upon such land to satisfy ho tax, whereby it became a lien on the lands to plaintiff's loss, he being obliged to redeem at the ta sale of the land. Held, that the tax collector was liable to plaintiff for the amount of such loss.

A

CTION for loss resulting from a false return by a tax collector. The opinion states the facts. Defendant had judgment on demurrer to a complaint below.

C. G. & W. W. Hyde, for plaintiff in error.
Simonds & Fletcher, for defendant in error.

COOLEY, J. It was decided in Royoming v. Goodchild, 2 W. Bl. 906, that a public officer having ministerial duties to perform, in which a private individual has a special and direct interest, is liable to such individual for any injury sustained by him in consequence of the failure to perform such duties. It was an officer connected with the postal service who was held liable in that case, and the decision is followed in this country. Teal v. Filton, 1N. Y. 537; S. C., in error, 12 How. 284. Election officers have been held liable on the same ground (Ashby v. White, Lord Raym. 938; 1

Salk. 19; Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350; Jeffries v. Ankeny, 11 Ohio, 372); and so have commissioners of highways (Hover v. Barkhoof, 44 N. Y. 113; Hathaway v. Hinton, 1 Jones [N. C.] 243); and so have inspectors of provisions (Hayes v. Porter, 22 Me. 371. Mickerson v. Thompson, 33 Me. 433; Tardes v. Bozant, 1 La. Ann. 199); and so have tax and other officers (Army v. Supervisors, 11 Wall. 136; Tracy v. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 80; Brown v. Lester, 21 Miss. 392; Bolan v. Williamson, 1 Brev. 181). It is immaterial that the duty is one primarily imposed on public grounds, and therefore priшarily a duty owing to the public. The right of action springs from the fact that the private individual receives a special and peculiar injury from the neglect in performance, which it was in part the purpose of the law to protect him against.

It is also immaterial that a failure in performance is made by the law a penal offense. Hayes v. Porter, 22 Me. 371. The exceptions are of those cases in which the functions of the office are judicial, or partake of the judicial. Sage v. Laurain, 19 Mich. 137; Goelchens v. Mattheroson, 61 N. Y. 420; Bevard v. Hoffman, 18 Md. 479; Harrington v. Commissioners, etc., 2 McCord, 400. But even in these cases the officer is responsible if he acts maliciously. Gordon v. Farran, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 411; Bennett v. Fulmer, 49 Penn. 82, 157; Gregory v. Brooks, 37 Conn. 365; Stichfadden v. Lipprick, 49 Ill. 286.

The principle is as familiar as it is sound. It is nevertheless insisted that the present case is not within it. Tax collectors, it is truly said, are chosen because the machinery of government must be kept in motion, and to that end it is essential that the public revenue should be collected. They are chosen, therefore, and their duties imposed on public grounds, not on private. If through any negligence on the collector's part, the State loses a portion of its dues, the officer is responsible to the State for the loss; but it is denied that he owes any duty to individuals, except to abstain, as every citizen must, from committing trespasses on their rights. The question of negligence, in the performance of public duties, must always concern the public good.

But conceding that the law creates the office of collector in order that public revenues may be collected, it does not follow that it leaves that officer at liberty to disregard private interests in their collection. When the law prescribes who shall be liable for the payment of taxes, and whose property may be levied upon therefor, it at the same time, by implication, forbids the officer to seize upon the property of others, or by act or omission, make the tax a charge upon such property. The implied prohibition creates a duty in favor of the person whose property is the subject of it, and he is at liberty to buy and sell in reliance upon the duty being performed. He has a right to understand that the officer is commissioned by the law to act only with due respect to the rights of individuals, and that if he acts otherwise and causes special injury, he disobeys his commission, and is not within the protection the commission might otherwise give.

The plaintiff owned a mortgage on lands on which a tax was assessed for the year 1874. A warrant was issued for the collection of this tax, and was placed in the hands of defendant for service. The plaintiff's case is that during the life of this warrant, and while the defendant held it, there was personal property upon the land, belonging to one French, who had purchased the equity of redemption after the first Monday of May, and before the first Monday of December, of that year, from which it was the duty of defendant, under the express provisions of the statute, to make collection. Comp. Laws, § 1006. Instead of performing this duty he falsely made return of no goods, whereby the tax became established as a lien upon the land, and the land was sold for its satisfaction. Mean

time, the plaintiff had foreclosed his mortgage and became owner of the lands, and was compelled to redeem from the tax sale.

Is the plaintiff wronged by this false return? We think he is. It was his legal right that the goods of French should be sold to satisfy the tax, and the law always intends that legal rights shall be respected. Moreover, he alone suffered injury from the false return. The public suffered nothing, for the lien on the land remained and was enforced, and the only injurious consequence of the misfeasance in public office was that the tax was collected from one man, when the command of the law was that it should be collected from another.

If there is no wrong without a remedy, then it would seem that this action should be supported, for the defendant is the only wrong-doer. It may be suggested that the plaintiff might have a cause of action against French for money paid to his use, but this is not clear. The statute does not make the purchaser of land, under such circumstances, personally liable; it only renders his property subject to seizure during the life of the tax warrant. Payment by defendant did not release the property of French, for it was released by the neglect of the officer which is complained of in this suit. The general rule is that taxes can only be enforced by means of the statutory remedies. Crapo v. Stetson, 8 Metc. 393; Shaw v. Pichett, 26 Vt. 482; Camden v. Allen, 26 N. J. 399, Packard v. Tisdale, 50 Me. 376; Carondelet v. Picott, 38 Mo. 125. But whether or not the rule applies here is immaterial, as this action, in either case, is well grounded in common law principles.

The judgment must bo reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded, with leave to defendant to withdraw his demurrer and plead, on payment of the costs of demurrer.

(The other justices concur.)

BEQUEST OF BONDS DOES NOT INCLUDE OVERDUE COUPONS.

NEW YORK COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, SEPTEMBER 16, 1880.

MCGRATH V. VAN STAVOREN.

A testator gave to his niece specified railway bonds; held, that interest coupons on the bonds, duo at the time of testator's death, did not pass to the niece.

THIS

THIS action was brought by Emma H. McGrath and others against Emma Van Stavoren and others for the construction of some of the clauses of the will of George W. Van Stavoren, who died in 1861. To his niece the plaintiff named, testator, gave two $1,000 Erie Railway bonds, on which, at the time of his death, there were undetached interest coupons due to the amount of $280. The plaintiffs claimed that this sum belonged to the legatee. The court gave judgment for the defendants.

DALY, C. J. The coupons attached to the bond were due and payable at the time of the death of the testator and did not pass with the bond to the legatee, but form a part of the coupons of the estate. De Gendre v. Kent, L. R., 4 Eq. 283-5; Wright v. Tucker, 1 Johns. & Hem. 266; Brundap v. Brundap, 60 N. Y. 544, 551; Lock v. Venables, 27 Beav. 598; In re Rogers, 1 Drew & Small. 338; Paton v. Shephard, 10 Sim. 186; Earp's Will, 1 Parsons' Eq. (Penn.) 453, 464-5; Spear v. Hart, 3 Robertson, 420.

"Specific legacies," says Williams, "are considered as separated from the general estate, and appropriated at the time of the testator's death, and consequently, from that period, whatever proceeds accrue upon

them, and nothing more or less, belongs to the legatee." 2 Williams on Executors (4th Am. ed.), 1221. And it is equally an established rule that the bequest of a bond or other security does not pass the interest which has accrued and is payable on the security, unless there is something super-added to the bequest to show that such was the intention. Roberts v. Kuffin, 2 Atk. 112; Gibbon v. Gibbon, 13 C. B. (4 J. Scott) 217, per Maule, J.; 1 Roper on Legacies (2d Am. ed.), 285; Floyd on Wills, 227-8.

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The cases suggested-of a bond with coupons attached, given mortis causa (Walsh v. Sexton, 55 Barb. 251), or the bequest of a promissory note (Willard, J., in Tifft v. Porter, 8 N. Y. 516) - are not analogous. The gift mortis causa of a bond, with coupons attached which were then due and payable, shows by the delivery of the bond with the coupons the intention that the donee is to have both the bond and the interest that is due on the coupons. But no such intent is inferable by the bequest of a bond in a will, where nothing is said about interest which is then due upon coupons attached to the bond or which may become due at the time of the testator's death, and in the case of a promissory note drawing interest, the interest is payable, together with the principal, when the note becomes due, and necessarily passes, as incident of the note, by the transfer of a note to another.

CONFLICT OF LAW - LEGITIMACY OF CHILDREN BORN ABROAD.

ENGLISH HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, CHANCERY DIVISION, JUNE 12, 1880.

Re GOODMAN'S TRUSTS, 43 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 14. A child, illegitimate according to English law, but who has been, according to the laws of its domicile and of its parents' domicile, legitimized by a post-natal marriage, cannot take under the statute of distributions as one of the next of kin of an intestate dying domiciled in England. The word "children," in the statute of distributions means children according to the English law.

PETITION for payment out of court.

This was a petition for the distribution amongst the next of kin of Rachel Goodman, who died domiciled in England in 1878, of a lapsed share of residue paid into court by her executors under the Trustee Relief Act.

The question raised by the petition was, whether a respondent, Mrs. Pieret, who was illegitimate according to the law of England, but claimed to be legitimate and therefore one of the next of kin, on the ground that she had been legitimized according to the law of Holland by her parents' post-natal marriage, could take a share in the distribution of the fund.

The facts were as follows: The testatrix died in 1878, having bequeathed a third part of her residuary personal estate to a niece who had died during the testatrix's life-time. At the date of the death of the testatrix her sole relatives were the children of her two deceased brothers, Isaac and Leyon Goodman; of Isaac there were four children living, and the children of Leyon had formed the subject of a special inquiry directed in a suit of Goodman v. Goodman, 3 Gif. 643. That suit was a suit for the administration of the estate of Henry Goodman, the father of the present testatrix, who by his will bequeathed a share of his residue to the "children of Leyon Goodman."

By tho chief clerk's certificate in Goodman v. Goodman, it was found that Leyon Goodman had three children by Charlotte Smith, born respectively in 1815, 1818, and 1820, in London, and that in 1820 he left England with the intention of permanently residing

abroad, and went to Amsterdam, whither he was followed by Charlotte Smith and the three children, and that he resided there until 1826, and from that date until that of his death in 1832, he resided in Brussels; that whilst at Amsterdam he had by Charlotte Smith another child born in 1821 (afterward Mrs. Pieret), and that after her birth in 1822 he married Charlotte Smith at Amsterdam, and by the act of register of marriage it was declared that the parents intended to legitimize all the children before mentioned, and that after such marriage there was a fifth child born (afterward Mrs. Denis). It was also set forth that by the evidence taken the four children born before the marriage were, according to the law of Holland, legitimate. By an order of Stuart, V. C., made July, 1862, in Goodman v. Goodman, the chief clerk's certificate was confirmed, and it was declared that, it appearing that Leyon Goodman was domiciled in Holland at the time of the birth of Madame Pieret, she was entitled to an equal share with her sister, Mrs. Denis, in the legacy bequeathed by the will of John Goodman to the children of Leyon Goodman.

Mrs. Pieret now claimed to share with the four children of Isaac Goodman, according to the statute of distributions, in the lapsed share bequeathed by Rachel Goodman's will, and the amount was paid into court by the trustees of her will.

JESSEL, M. R., said that he agreed with the view taken by Kindersley, V. C., in Re Wilson's Trusts, L. R., 1 Eq. 247; 13 L. T. Rep. 576, as to Goodman v. Goodman, 3 Gif. 643; 6 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 641, which was only a decision that Leyon Goodman was domiciled in the Netherlands, and continued: But then there is the case of Boyes v. Bedule, 1 H. & M. 79; 10 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 131, which came before Lord Hatherley when vice-chancellor. It was decided in that case that the child or children of a person domiciled in England must mean the children according to English law, as distinguished from the children born before marriage and which were not legitimate according to English law. But the vice-chancellor said more than that. This is what he said: "I take it that the language of the statute of distributions would be dealt with in the same way. If an intestate dies domiciled in England, the division of his property is governed throughout by English law, and no person could take by representation under that statute, unless legitimate by the law of England." That is no doubt only a dictum, but it is a dictum entitled to very great respect. If I had any doubt upon this subject in this case I should follow the dictum, but I feel myself no doubt whatever. The words of the [statute under which these parties must come are "brother's and sister's children." When an intestate dies without children you go to the next of kin, but you must not carry in representation beyond brother and sister, and consequently this lady must prove herself to be a brother or sister to take at all, and the question is, whether the word does not mean exactly what Wood, V. C., saidchildren according to the law of England. I think that that is the meaning. Then I have in addition to that the authority of Kindersley, V. C., in Re Wilson's Trusts, where he entirely agrees with Boyes v. Bedale, and decides accordingly. He says: "Now, the will being a will made in England by an Englishman domiciled in England, must be construed according to the law of England. Every term in it must receive that interpretation which belongs to it according to English law. What is the interpretation which the law of England gives to the term 'children?' Undoubtedly children lawfully begotten, ex justis nuptiis procreatos, unless indeed there be something in the context which satisfies the court that the testator meant to use the expression in a different sense.' Therefore he quite agrees that under the particular

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to Boyes v. Bedale, and says: "I do not hesitate to follow that decision;" so that decision agrees with Boyes v. Bedale. I think, if it is agreed that those cases are decided rightly, in the case of a will of a domiciled Englishman, according to the statute of distributions, the word " 'children," wherever it occurs, must mean children according to the English law. It is impossible that there can be two meanings put on the same words in the statute. It must mean the same. Then as regards the actual decision, the declaration by Stuart, V. C., that they take under another will, cannot decide the question of legitimacy for all purposes.

Some further discussion took place, during which his lordship said that, as he understood, in Goodman v. Goodman, the opinions of Dutch advocates were taken, and that according to them all the brothers and sisters of Madame Pieret and Mrs. Denis were legitimate by Dutch law, and he did not at present see on what ground in that action any of them had been excluded from participating.

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT·

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mentioned is applied to prevent vexatious litigation
and is rigidly enforced in common-law actions, but in
equity will not be enforced unless the equity of tho
case requires. In this case the action and judgment
of Charmed only plaintiff and was enforced against
no part of the mortgaged premises. Judgment af-
firmed. Dougherty v. Remington Paper Company, ap-
pellant et al. Opinion by Earl, J.
[Decided Sept. 21, 1880.]

MANDAMUS-WILL LIE AGAINST TOWN BOARD OF
AUDIT TO COMPEL SPECIFIC EXAMINATION OF CLAIM.-

Relator, who was commissioner of highways of the town of Elmira, presented his bill to the town auditors, in proper form and duly verified, for twenty-seven days' service, specifying by its date each day for which payment was claimed. The rate of compensation of commissioners of highways fixed by statute is two dollars per day. The auditor allowed relator thirtyfour dollars as a gross sum, without allowing or disallowing any specific item alleged in the account, and without deciding that any definite or particular days were not necessarily spent in the service of the town. Held, that the action of the town board of auditors was improper and a mandamus would lie to compel a proper award. Within the range of their discretion boards of auditors are sufficiently powerful. The courts may not dictate their conclusion, but may jointly require that they arrivo at one in a just and intelligent way and with some reasonable respect for the possible rights of creditors. A claimant is entitled to the judgment of a board of auditors upon each item of his claim, and a mandamus framed to compel the performance of that duty will bo sustained. People v. Supervisors of Delaware, 45 N. Y. 196. Order affirmed. People ex rel. Thurston v. Board of Town Auditors of Elmira, appellants. Opinion by Finch, J. [Decided Sept. 21, 1880.]

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT
COURT ABSTRACT.*

FORMER ADJUDICATION ACTION BY PLEDGee of MORTGAGE TO FORECLOSE-PAYMENT OF JUDGMENT BY OWNER OF MORTGAGE RESTORES HIS RIGHT TO FORECLOSE. A executed a mortgage to B to secure the payment of $4,500. B assigned the mortgage to plaintiff in his action. Plaintiff assigned it to C to secure the payment of $1,334, and the assignment was expressed to be upon the condition that it should be void upon the payment of that sum. The sum secured by the mortgage was then due. The $1,334 not being paid as agreed, C commenced an action to foreclose the mortgage, all the parties to this action being made defendants. That action was defended by A, who set up that the mortgage was given for the sole purpose of securing against liability for indorsements upon notes which had been paid, and the mortgagee sustained no damage. Plaintiff in this action also appeared and denied personal liability. In that action judgment was given that C had a lien upon the mortgaged premises for the $1,334, and a sale of sufficient of them to pay that sum was ordered. The parties appearing appealed and the judgment was affirmed. Plaintiff paid the amount of the judgment and afterward commenced this action to foreclose the mortgage. The R. company, which had an interest in the mortgaged premises, appeared and set up the judgment in the prior action as a bar and defense to this action. Held, that the former judgment did not constitute a defense. The assignment by plaintiff to C constituted a pledge of the mortgage to him as security for the sum named. Hoskins v. Kelly, 1 Rob. 160; Campbell v. Parker, 9 Bosw. 322. Plaintiff remained the general owner of the mortgage. The court decided that Chad a lien upon the mortgaged premises to the extent of the sum named; that lien was discharged and the mortgage was restored to plaintiff as fully as she owned and possessed it before the assignment. The principle that there can be but one suit for the enforcement of one entire demand, and that where an action is brought for a part of the demand a judgment in such action is a bar to an action for another part of the demand (Phillips v. Berick, 16 Johns.136; Bendernagle v. Cocks, 19 Wend. 207; Fish v. Folley, 6 Hill, 54), has no application to this case. If C had proceeded to judgment and sale for a part only of his demand, the whole being due, and then brought another action, the principle might have been invoked against him. But plaintiffsidered. did not hold the mortgage under C. Upon satisfying his lien the pledge was restored to her unaffected by any thing the pledgee might have done. The principle

AGENCY-PAYMENT TO AGENT BY MISTAKE WHEN AGENT NOT LIABLE TO REPAY. It is a general rule that an agent, known and treated with as such, cannot be compelled to pay back money received by him under a mutual mistake of fact, and paid over to his principal. Holland v. Russell, 30 L. J. 312; 32 id. 297; Shand v. Grant, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 322-324; Newall v. Tomlinson, L. R., 6 C. P. 405; Buller v. Harrison, Cowp. 565-569; Frye v. Lockwood, 4 Cow. 454-456; Granger v. Hathaway, 17 Mich. 500; Morral v. McClellan, 1 Wend. 173; Costigan v. Newland, 12 Barb. 456. If the agent acts in bad faith, or with knowledge of his principal's want of right to receive the money, or is himself a party to an illegal exaction of the money, or is not authorized by his assumed principal to act for him, as where his power of attorney is a forgery, payment of the money over will be no defense. Miller v. Aris, 3 Esp. 231; Snowdon v. Davis, 1 Taunt. 359; Edwards v. Hodding, 5 id. 416 [*815]; Seidell v. Peckworth, 10 S. & R. 442. See, also, Story on Agency (8th ed.), $$ 300, 301, and notes. If the party receiving the money, though an agent in fact, does not disclose his agency to the party making the payment, there is of course no presumed consent or direction that he pay over, and payment to his principal will be no defense. In such a case, having acted as a principal, he will not be permitted to defend on the ground that he was not the principal. Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany, 1 Hill, 287, 293, 294; Bank of Commerce v. Union Bank, 3 N. Y. 230, and Kingston Bank v. Ettinge, 40 id. 391, conDistrict, S. D. New York, June 24, 1880. United States v. Pinover. Opinion by Choate, D. J.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMPAIRING CONTRACT-EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION · FEDERAL JURISDICTION. -The Legislature of a State may contract in a corporate character for exemption of the corporate property from taxation, unless there be some constitutional prohibition. Tomlinson v. Branch, 15 Wall. 460. Where a State has, by valid contract, exempted certain property from taxation, it cannot by subsequent legislation subject that property to taxation, nor prohibit the United States courts from using their injunctive powers to protect the contract from violation. the general rule is that courts will not enjoin the collection of taxes upon the mere ground that they are excessive or illegal, yet if their exaction is unconstitutional, and the party assessed has no other adequate remedy, or their enforcement will occasion irremediable oppression and produce a multiplicity of expensive suits, an injunction to restrain their collection will be granted. State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575. Circuit, M. D. Tennessee, 1880. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Gaines, Comptroller. Opinion by Baxter, C. J.

MARITIME LAW-SEAMAN CAN BE REQUIRED TO WORK ON SUNDAY. A seaman upon a schooner in the harbor of Frankfort, Michigan, where she was towed to receive a cargo of lumber, cannot refuse to work on Sunday, in loading the schooner, where the towing vessel is not able to enter the harbor by reason of an insufficiency of water, and is lying outside in the lake, awaiting the schooner, and is in a place of danger. Where the master of the schooner was of opinion that it was necessary, for the safety of the towing vessel, that the loading of the schooner (begun on Friday) should be completed on Sunday, and ordered tho work to be done, it was the duty of the crews to obey. In this case, held, that a seaman refusing to work on Sunday was rightfully expelled from tho schooner, and forfeited his wages for his disobedience. The Richard Matt, 1 Biss. 440. District, E. D. Pennsylvania, Aug. 2, 1880. Smith v. Schooner J. C. King. Opinion by Acheson, D. J.

PARTIES -TO SUIT TO DETERMINE VALIDITY OF WILL -PERSONS NOT IN ESSE. - In a suit to determine the validity of a will it is a settled rule of law that where there are contingent limitations and executory devises to persons not in being, the suit may proceed against those in being holding the prior estate, and that a judgment or decree against the latter binds the former in all respects as if they were in esse and parties to the suit. Especially is this so when the former are before the court by representation—that is, where the rights and interests which those not in esse would have if then in esse are the same with those of parties in being and before the court. Gifford v. Hort, 1 Sch. & Lef. 408; Story's Eq. Pl., §§ 145, 792; Mead v. Mitchell, 17 N. Y. 210; Baylor's Lessee v. Dejarnette, 13 Gratt. 152; Falkner v. Davis, 18 id. 651; Powell v. Wright, 7 Beav. 444-449; Lorrillard v. Costar, 5 Paige, 172; Palmer v. Flower, 1 Eng. Rep. 664; Bassnett v. Moxon, 13 Moaks, 716; Willis v. Slade, 6 Ves. 498; Lloyd v. Johns, 9 id. 37-52. Circuit, S. D. Ohio, July, 1880. McArthur v. Allen. Opinion by Swayne, C. J.

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officer's return on an original writ cannot be controverted by the defendant except as provided by statute; and in Estes v. Cooke, 12 R. I. 6, it was decided that the return on an execution was conclusive on the parties in a subsequent action. In other States, with two or three exceptions, the rule is that the return is conclusive on parties and privies until set aside in some direct proceeding. Swift v. Cobb, 10 Vt. 282; Bates v. Willard, 10 Metc. 62, 80; Campbell v. Webster, 15 Gray, 28; Whitaker v. Sumner, 7 Pick. 551; Sykes v. Keating, 118 Mass. 517, 520; Bramford v. Melvin, 7 Me. 14; Huntress v. Tiney, 39 id. 257; Messer v. Bailey, 31 N. H. 9; Herman on Executions, § 242. The return is in fact a part of the record, and while it stands is as conclusive as any other part of it. Barrows v. National Rubber Co. Opinion by Durfee, C. J. [Decided June 18, 1880.]

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE-CONVEYANCE IN CONSIDERATION OF MARRIAGE NOT VOLUNTARY.-Marriage is deemed in law a valuable consideration. A conveyance, therefore, in consideration of marriage, stands upon a different footing from a voluntary conveyance. All the authorities agree to this extent, at least, that a man, though indebted, may settle a portion of his property on his intended wife, and that, in the absence of fraud, the settlement, if no more than a reasonable provision for the wife, will be upheld against existing as well as subsequent creditors. Campion v. Cotton, 17 Ves. Jr. 264; Armfield v. Armfield, Freeman (Miss.), 311; Croft v. Arthur, 3 Des. 223; Buckner v. Smyth, 4 id. 371; Davidson v. Graves, Riley's Eq. 232; Magniac v. Thompson, 7 Pet. 348; Marshall v. Morris, 16 Ga. 368; Smith v. Allen, 5 Allen, 454; Bonser v. Miller, 5 Oregon, 110. National Exchange Bank v. Watson. Opinion by Matteson, J. [Decided July 3, 1880.]

STATUTE OF FRAUDS CONVEYANCE OF REALTY WITH RENTS RESERVED IMPLIED CONTRACT. - A conveyed to B certain realty by a deed poll in which specified rents were reserved for periods of time described. B entered under the deed. Held, that by his entry B contracted to pay the rents as reserved. Held, further, that B's contract being an implication of law was not within the statute of frauds. The contract to pay the rent reserved was not an express contract but an implied contract, or a contract raised by law from the nature of the transaction, and it has been repeatedly held that such contracts are not within tho statute of frauds. Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510; Fletcher v. McFarlane, 12 id. 43; Felch v. Taylor, 13 Pick. 133; Sage v. Wilcox, 6 Conn. 81; Allen v. Pryor, 3 A. K. Marsh. 305; Browne's Stat. of Frauds, § 166. In Goodwin v. Gilbert, the doctrine is broadly laid down that, where land is conveyed by deed poll and the grantee enters under the deed, certain duties being reserved to be performed, as no action lies against the grantee on the deed, the grantor may maintain assumpsit for the non-performance of the duties reserved, and the promise being raised by the law is not within the statute of frauds. In Pike v. Brown, 7 Cush. 133, Shaw, C. J., in delivering the opinion of the court, instances the case of rent reserved in a lease by deed poll as a signal and familiar illustration of the doctrine. And that occupation under the lease is not indispensable to the recovery, if only the lease has been accepted, was distinctly decided in Kabley v. Worcester Gas Light Co., 102 Mass. 392, in a case in which the lessees never occupied at all. "It is enough," say the court, "that they accepted the conveyanco which gave them the right of immediate and exclusive occupation. The law would imply from such acceptance a promise to comply with the terms of the lease, and such a promise is not within the statute of frauds." Providence Christian Union v. Elliott. Opinion by Durfee, C. J. [Decided July 3, 1880.]

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