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SALE OF GOODS FOR UNLAWFUL USE. 'N Brunswick v. Valleau, 50 Iowa, 120; S. C., 32 Am. Rep. 119, it was held that in an action for the price of a billiard table it is no defense that it may be used for gambling, unless it was sold under a contract that it was so to be used; and knowledge of such intended use will not be inferred from the fact that it was accompanied by a pool set and rulcs for its use. This was founded on Tracy v. Talmadge, 14 N. Y. 162. The court said: "It was held, however, in Spurgeon v. McElwein, 6 Ohio, 442, that a carpenter could not recover for labor done in erecting a nine-pin alley, appurtenant to a coffee-house." "The sale of cards, with knowledge that they are to be used in gambling, would, under the doctrine of Spurgeon v. McElwein, be unlawful; and if cards were made for no other purpose the seller, under the authority of that case, would be deemed to have knowledge that they were to be used in gambling. Without such knowledge the sale is not unlawful."

In Michael v. Bacon, 49 Mo. 474; S. C., 8 Am. Rep. 138, it was held that in an action for work and materials on a house, it is no defense that the work was done and the materials were furnished with knowledge on the part of the plaintiff that the house was to be used by the defendant for purposes of gambling. In Hubbard v. Moore, 24 La. Ann. 591; S. C., 13 Am. Rep. 128, and Mahood v. Tealza, 26 La. Ann. 108; S. C., 21 Am. Rep. 546, the same was held of furniture sold with knowledge that it was to be used in a house of prostitution.

Tracy v. Talmadge contains a very elaborate review and discussion of this subject, and cites as authorities for its holding, the English cases of Faikney v. Reynous, 4 Burr. 206; Holman v. Johnson, Cowp. 341; Pellecat v. Angell, 2 C. M. & P. 311; Hodgson v. Temple, 5 Taunt. 181; distinguishes Briggs v. Lawrence, 3 T. R. 454; Clugas v. Penaluna,

4 id. 466; Waynsell v. Reed, 5 id. 599; Cannan v. Bryce, 3 B. & Ald. 179; McKinnell v. Robinson, 3 M. & W. 434; and disapproves Langton v. Hughes, 1 M. & S. 593. The court conclude as follows: "I consider it, therefore, as entirely settled by the authorities to which I have referred, that it is no defense to an action brought to recover the price of goods sold, that the vendor knew that they were bought for an illegal purpose, provided it is not made a part of the contract that they shall be used for that purpose; and provided, also, that the vendor has done nothing in aid or furtherance of the unlawful design. The law does not punish a wrongful intent, when nothing is done to carry that intent into effect; much less bare knowledge of such an intent, without any participation in it. Upon the whole, I think it clear, in reason as well as upon authority, that in a case like this, where the sale is not necessarily per se a violation of law, unless the unlawful purpose enters into and forms a part of the contract of sale, the vendee cannot set up his own illegal intent in bar of an action for the purchase-money."

An action cannot be maintained for rent of prem

ises knowingly leased for the purpose of prostitution (Girarday v. Richardson, 1 Esp. 13); nor, when the landlord was not aware of the purpose at the time of the letting, provided he afterward learned it, and might have evicted the lessee, can he recover rent accruing during the period when he willingly allowed such occupancy. Jennings v. Throgmorton, Ry. & M. 251.

An action may be maintained against a prostitute for clothes sold her (Bowry v. Bennett, 1 Camp. 348); or for washing her clothes (Lloyd v. Johnson, 1 B. & P. 340), although the plaintiff may have known the use made of them.

But in Pearce v. Brooks, L. R., 1 Ex. 213, the defendant, a prostitute, was sued by coach builders for the use of a brougham. It was found that they knew her to be a prostitute, and supplied the brougham with knowledge that it would be, as in fact it was, used by her as part of her display to attract men, but there was no proof that they expected to be paid out of the earnings of her prostitution. Held, that the action could not be maintained. This was founded on Cannan v. Bryce, 3 B. & A. 179, and McKinnell v. Robinson, 3 M. & W. 434, cases of money lent for gambling. Pollock, C. B., said: "If a person lends money, but with a doubt in his mind whether it is to be actually applied to an illegal purpose, it will be a question for the jury whether he meant it to be so applied; but if it were advanced in such a way that it could not possibly be a bribe to an illegal purpose, and afterward it was turned to that use, neither Cannan v. Bryce nor any other case decides that his act would be illegal. The case cited rests on the fact that the money was borrowed with the very object of satisfying an illegal purpose." Bramwell, B., said: “I think the jury were entitled to infer, as they did, that it was hired for the purpose of display, that is, for the purpose of enabling the defendant to pursue her calling, and that the plaintiffs knew it. That being made out, my diffiulty was whether, though the defendant hired the brougham for that purpose, it could be said that the plaintiffs let it for the same purpose. If a man were to ask for duelling pistols, and say, 'I think I shall fight a duel to-morrow,' might not the seller answer, 'I do not want to know your purpose; I have nothing to do with it; that is your business; mine is to sell the pistols, and I work only to the profit of trade.' No doubt the act would be immoral, but I have felt a doubt whether it would be illegal; and I should still feel it best that the authority of Cannan v. Bryce and McKinnell v. Robinson concludes the matter. In this latter case the plea does not say that the money was lent on the terms that the borrower should game with it; but only that it was borrowed by the defendant and lent by the plaintiff 'for the purpose of the defendant's illegally playing and gaming therewith." Martin, B., said: "As to the case of Cannan v. Bryce, I have a strong impression that it has been questioned to this extent, that if money is lent, the lender merely handing it over into the absolute control of the borrower, although he may have reason to sup

pose that it may be employed illegally, he will not be disentitled from recovering."

In Pringle v. Corporation of Napanee, Ont. Q. B., it was held that an agreement to let a hall for the purpose of delivering lectures attacking Christianity is not enforceable.

In Hill v. Spear, 50 N. H. 253, where the authorities are very carefully reviewed, the doctrine of Tracy v. Talmadge is adopted, and that of Lightfoot v. Tenant and Pearce v. Brooks disapproved. Of the latter the court say: "So a sale of silks and jewels to a prostitute, if it be clearly shown that such sale was made for the express purpose of rendering her person attractive and seductive, and with the view of aiding her unlawful commerce, would be an illegal sale; but shall the seller of such merchandise be disabled from recovery merely because he knows the buyer to be a prostitute? Is such mere knowledge sufficient to render the contract void? We cannot believe that public policy requires the exercise of so much scrutiny into the designs of the purchaser, and the imposition of such restraints upon ordinary traffic, as the rule, so broadly stated in Pearce v. Brooks, would seem to imply; and directly contrary to such doctrine are the express decisions in Bowry v. Bennett, 1 Camp. 348; Appleton v. Campbell, 2 C. & P. 347, and Hodgson v. Temple, before cited." They also say, of Pearce v. Brooks: "Cannan v. Bryce is clearly distinguishable from this, and will not support the latter case; for, says Abbott, C. J., in Cannan v. Bryce, 'It will be recollected that I am speaking of a case wherein the means were furnished, with a full knowledge of the object to which they were to be applied, and for the express purpose of accomplishing that object.' Is there no valid distinction? In Cannan v. Bryce the money was loaned for the purpose of enabling the party to engage in illegal stock-jobbing transactions. If the money had simply been loaned to a person who, the lender knew, was engaged in such transactions, and would probably use the money for such purposes, would the contract be invalid? Money loaned to a gambler, for the purpose of being staked upon a pending game, cannot be recovered. Is it the same of money lent to one known to be a gambler, but concerning which loan and the unlawful game there is no other connection between the parties than that which results from a simple borrowing and lending of money?"

In Cheney v. Duke, 10 G. & J. 11, the action was to recover the price of a negro slave. There was a statute to prevent the unlawful exportation of such slaves, and the defendant had purchased the slave for the purpose of exporting him. It was held that the seller's knowledge of that purpose would not alone defeat his action for the price, but it must be shown that he was a sharer in the illegal transaction, or aided in its execution, or did something in furtherance of it. This is founded on Holman v. Johnson and Hodgson v. Temple. This doctrine, the court say, is " abundantly settled."

The same doctrine was held in McGavock v. Puryear, 6 Cold. 35. The action was on a note, and the defense was that the note was discounted for

the purpose of enabling the owner to purchase horses, etc., for the use by the Confederate government against the United States. The court said that mere knowledge on the part of the bank of the illegal purpose to which it was intended to apply the money would not defeat a recovery, but that "it must be shown that the bank made the loan with the purpose, on its part, to furnish money to enable the borrowers to do the illegal act."

The same was held in Green v. Collins, 3 Cliff. 494, a case of liquors sold in Rhode Island for use in Massachusetts. The court approve Holman v. Johnson, Hodgson v. Temple and Tracy v. Talmage, and distinguish Langton v. Hughes, Cannan v. Bryce and Pearce v. Brooks. In regard to the latter they say: "The act of supplying a female engaged in such criminal practices would warrant a jury in finding that the articles were intended to facilitate the objects of her vocation."

The same was held in the similar case of Curran v. Downs, 3 Mo. App. 468; and in Michael v. Bacon, 49 Mo. 474, an action to recover for work and materials upon a gambling house. Pearce v. Brooks was denied as authority.

The same was held in Webber v. Donnelly, 33 Mich. 469, a liquor case, on the authority of Tracy v. Talmage and Hill v. Spear, and in Bishop v. Honey, 34 Tex. 245, an action for work done on a house of prostitution.

The contrary doctrine was held in Territt v. Bartlett, 21 Vt. 184. This was an action for the price of spirituous liquors sold in Vermont but delivered in New York. The plaintiff knew the defendant intended to sell them contrary to the statute. The court disapprove Hodgson v. Temple; distinguish Holman v. Johnson as involving the infringement of the law only of a foreign State; and approve Langton v. Hughes, Cannan v. Bryce and Lightfoot v. Tenant. There is little examination of the authorities, and the consideration of the principle is brief. But in Lander v. Seaver, 32 id. 114, the doctrine of the principal case was held where the sale was made in New York, and so in Tuttle v. Holland, 43 id. 542.

In Hannauer v. Doane, 12 Wall. 342, it was held that an action will not lie for the price of goods sold with knowledge that they were purchased for the Confederate government. This is founded on Lightfoot v. Tenant, Langton v. Hughes and Cannan v. Bryce, and Armstrong v. Toler is distinguished on the ground of the difference between malum prohibitum and malum in se.

In Adams v. Coulliard, 102 Mass. 167, the doctrine of Tuttle v. Holland and Lander v. Seaver was laid down; and it was held that mere reasonable cause of belief, without actual knowledge of the unlawful intent, would not defeat the action.

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Mr. Benjamin (Sales, §§ 506-508) says: The sale of a thing, in itself an innocent and proper article of commerce, is void when the vendor sells it knowing that it is intended to be used for an immoral and illegal purpose. In some of the earlier cases something more than this mere knowledge was held necessary, and evidence was required of an intention on the vendor's part to aid in the illegal pur

pose, or profit by the immoral act. The later decisions overrule this doctrine." He then argues that Faikney v. Reynous, and Petrie v. Hannay, 3 T. R. 418, are overruled by Booth v. Hodgson, 6 id. 405; Aubert v. Maze, 2 B. & P. 371; Mitchell v. Cockburne, 2 H. Bl. 379; Webb v. Brooke, 3 Taunt. 6; Langton v. Hughes, 1 M. & S. 594; Cannan v. Bryce, 3 B. & Ald. 179; McKinnell v. Robinson, 3 M. & W. 435; Pearce v. Brooks, L. R., 1 Ex. 212, and says, in these cases "the distinction between malum prohibitum and malum in se is positively repudiated." Of Hodgson v. Temple he says: "This decision was given in November, 1813, and is the more remarkable because the case of Langton v. Hughes had been decided exactly to the contrary, in the King's Bench, in the month of June, in the same year, and was not noticed by the counsel or the court in Hodgson v. Temple."

It should be observed that Bowry v. Bennett and Langton v. Hughes were both tried before Lord Ellenborough, who must have thought the cases distinguishable, as indeed they are, for selling clothes to a woman for her personal wearing apparel is very different from selling drugs to a brewer. The clothes might, and must sometimes, have been worn innocently and necessarily; but under the circumstances the brewer could hardly have wanted the drugs for any innocent purpose. So it seems to us that Pearce v. Brooks is distinguishable from Bowry v. Bennett, for it could hardly be possible that a prostitute, who, as the proof showed, could not read, should need a carriage for any purpose but the ordinary one of airing her charms to tempt men. But we much prefer the doctrine of the principal case and Tracy v. Talmage to that of Langton v. Hughes and Pearce v. Brooks.

THE DECLINE OF CIRCUIT LIFE.*

the olden time, when railways had not come into existence, and all travelling had to be done by road, on horseback, or in rumbling coach or chaise, going circuit was a formidable undertaking, involving much expenditure of both time and money, and so great an obstacle was the absence of good roads and travelling conveniences found to be, that though Assizes were directed to be held twice in every year in every county in the kingdom, an exception had to be made in favor of the remote parts, and especially of the four northern counties of Westmoreland, Cumberland, Durham and Northumberland, where they were held only once a year, viz., in the summer. Indeed, so important a feature was the question of roads and locomotion considered "upon the northern iter," that when the business of any Assize town extended into the Commission day of the next town, counsel wero privileged to appear in court on that day without their robes; the reason being that ordinarily these would have been consigned to the baggage-wagon, or the clerks, and were already en route for the next circuit town. Long after the reason for it had ceased to exist this rule was religiously observed by the members of the northern circuits as one of their especial privileges, and on the last occasion of its observance, not many years ago, we recollect how shocked the judge who, in the days of

*Extract from an article by John Kinghorn, Esq., in the Law Magazine for August, 1880.

his youth, had been at the equity bar, looked at the indignity put upon him, as he supposed, by this want of dress, and his puzzled and not altogether satisfied look, even after the explanation had been given and the privilege claimed.

In those days there was a certain amount of romance and adventure in circuit life when Thurlow rode the western circuit on a horse procured "on trial;" Eldou went the "northern iter" on a hired horse, but was obliged to borrow one for the youth who rode behind him, in charge of the saddle-bags, in the capacity of clerk; and North, afterward Lord Keeper Guilford, when riding the Norfolk circuit, got mellow and had to be put to bed in a public house, while "the rest of the company went on for fear of losing their market." Campbell's "Lives of the Chancellors," vol. iii, p. 441. Even the perils of the road had to be shared by the gentlemen of the long robe in comparatively recent times. Thus we find that Mr. Wood and Mr. Holroyd (both of whom were afterward raised to the bench), when crossing Finchley Common on their way to join the Northern Circuit, were stopped by a gentleman of fashionable appearance, who rode up to the side of the carriage and begged to know what o'clock it was." Mr. Wood, with the greatest politeness, drew out a handsome gold repeater and answered the question; upon which the stranger, drawing a pistol, presented it to his breast and demanded the watch. Mr. Wood was compelled to resign it into his hands, and the highwayman, after wishing them a pleasant journey, touched his hat and rode away. The story became known at York, and Mr. Wood could not show his face in court without some or other of the bar reminding him of his misfortune by the question, “What's o'clock, Wood?" Law and Lawyers, vol. i, p. 142, 1840.

The circuiteer set out on his biennial pilgrimage in a post-chaise if he was a man of means, or mounted on some sturdy steed if otherwise, while some beardless youth, seated among the saddle-bags on another nag, in the capacity of clerk, brought up the rear- the heavier baggage being consigned to the Circuit baggagewagon. But in whatever mode he journeyed, the etiquette of his profession had decreed that he should not avail himself of any stage-coach or other public conveyance, as he might thereby have an opportunity afforded him of meeting an attorney and "hugging" him, i. e., making himself agreeable to him and securing his briefs; and that would be taking an undue advantage of his brethren. Arrived at the Circuit town, he could not enter it before the judges, or at least not before midday of the Commission Day, so that all might have a fair start in the race for briefs; and even when he had got within the "happy hunting-grounds," he was not allowed to stay at or frequent any public inn, lest the same temptation to “hugging," and other undue influences should be presented to him, but he must go into lodgings, for which, of course, he had generally to pay an exorbitant price, there being no keener appreciators of Circuit etiquette than the landladies. In some of the northern towns they used to adopt a sort of sliding scale of charges—a certain price if you had no business, an extra guinea if you had. If he was fortunate enough to know an attorney in the place, or be related to one there, he could not stay with him, or dine with him, or even call on or be civil to him, without contravening the Circuit code; and were he even known to utter in public his opinion that any attorney was a most estimable and highly respectable gentleman," he was certain to have to pay a fine to the Circuit mess. Even the very judges were, so to speak, strangers in the land, an old statute of the 8 Richard II making it unlawful for any one to ride Circuit in a county of which he was a native, or in which he inhabited, without a writ of non obstante.

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With a body representing the bar of England — for in those days even chancery barristers went Circuit —

and some Circuits reckoned nearly 300 members - and thus feuced round with rules, the institution of the mess became a prime necessity. Those were the days when, in the words of a song, written and sung by a distinguished member of the Northern Circuit, as it originally existed, many of the juniors might have sung:

"All round the Circuit I goes without a guinea,

All round the Circuit for two months and a day,
And if any body axes me the reason why I goes it,

It's because I don't know how to earn it any other way." So numerous a body often for a fortnight in one town-could not be held together without rules for its guidance and control, and the appointment of officers whose duty it should be to execute them. These were as necessary for the guild in its perambulations as when located in its inns of court; and the Grand Court with its attorney and solicitor-general, its crier, its messengers, its Masters of the Revels and Poet Laureate, and even its bishop, had its distinct sphere of usefulness as well as its comic side. The High Jinks themselves tended to repress irregularities and malpractices, while adding to the hilarity and amusement of the members. The more serious business was of course transacted before dinner; but even in the afterdinner "quips and cranks" and uproarious mirth and chaff, a salutary hint could often be conveyed, and a warning given to one who was hovering on the brink of malpractice, and be the means of averting future unpleasantness and severe measures. These were, besides, but the reflection of the revels of the inus of court, where, as in the Middle Temple Hall, the Master of the Revels, after dinner, sang a "carol or song, aud commanded other gentlemen there then present to sing with him and the company;" or when, as in Gray's Inn, after dinner "a large ring was formed round the fireplace," when the "Master of the Revels taking the Lord Chancellor by the right hand, he with his left took Mr. Justice Page, who joined to the other serjeants and benchers, danced about the coal-fire, according to the ceremony, three times, while the ancient song, accompanied with music, was sung by one Toby Aston, dressed as a barrister," in 1773.

In those days when men were accustomed to sit far into the night, it was but natural that the mighty intellects and reverend seniors, after the labors of the day, should unbend a little under the influence of old port, and seek relaxation in the flow of soul and interchange of chaff, as well as reason.

One ceases to wonder that an occupant of the Woolsack, when a member of the Oxford Circuit, should have occupied the office of crier, holding a fire-shovel in his hand as the emblem of his office; that Lord Eldon, while he was attorney-general of the Northern Circuit mess, indicted Sir Thomas Davenport at the Grand Court at York, for murdering a boy "with a certain blunt instrument of no value, called a long speech;" or that Serjeant Prime was fined by the Grand Court of his Circuit for setting a boy to sleep by his eloquence. There even seems no incongruity in the practical jokes of those days that have since become historical; the hoax upon "Jack Lee" at York, with the dummy brief, Rex v. Inhabitants of Hum Town, drawn up by Wedderburn and Davenport; or that practiced on Boswell at Lancaster, when he moved for a writ of quare adhæsit pavimento; or that a late chief baron had been crowned with a punch-bowl at York, "in the days when he went circuiting;" and that such men as Alderson, Tindal, Serjeant Cross and others joined in a quadrille to the tune of "Fol de rol rol," but Alderson setting off wrong, put the rest out, and the whole was soon a scene of confusion."

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Much has been written and said as to the value, for purposes of discipline, of the Circuit Grand Court, "held foribus clausis among the barristers themselves, in which toasts were given, speeches were made, and

verses were recited, not altogether fit for the vulgar ear" (Campbell's "Lives of Chief Justices"), where the privilege of unrestrained freedom of speech which prevailed was reduced to the following rule by an attorney-general of the Northern Circuit (Lycester Adolphus): "Never sacrifice your friend to your joke, but remember that man is not your friend who would stand in the way of your joke." There seems to be a general consensus of opinion as to the tendency of the amusements of the Circuit table to promote friendship and to bring the leaders of the profession in contact with the juniors, and thus produce a feeling of harmony and good will amongst the bar, which was productive of the best effects. The terms of intimacy in which the counsel who went the Circuit lived, are pointed to as one of the chief characteristics of those days; and the free interchange of opinions between seniors and juniors as giving rise to sentiments of kindness and respect, and indeed, the strictness with which the etiquette of the har is maintained in England is alleged to be owing, in a great measure, to the institution of the Circuit Court for the trial of all breaches of professional etiquette.

The methods of procedure of such a tribunal were doubtless admirably adapted to secure the objects in view; it could pass "from grave to gay, from lively to severe," and could find the venial offender half in jest, while the graver breaches of etiquette could be visited with all the severity they deserved -even to the extent of expulsion from the mess. Thus in Lord Eldon's time, we find in the Northern Circuit fines for the following offenses: "Lancaster, Grand Night, 29th March, 1783. Jno. Scott, Esq., for having come into Lancaster the day before the Commission Day, and having taken up his abode that evening at the King's Arms in Lancaster, fined one gallon." "Carlisle, Grand Night, 14th August, 1784. Mr. J. Scott, convicted of travelling between Durham and Newcastle in company with Mr. Clayton, an attorney, fined one gallon." "Lancaster, Grand Night, August. 1784. The following gentlemen were fined a bottle each for making a party to dine from the rest of the Circuit, at a different house than the Circuit house, in violation of the rules of the Circuit." "Lancaster, Spring Assizes, 1783. Mr. S. Heywood was congratulated on coming in his new carriage, and Mr. J. Scott congratulated for the like." On the other hand there have been instances in very recent times, of appropriate action being taken in the case of graver offenses, in which the offenders have, with all due formality, been either admonished or expelled from the body altogether, though happily such instances are rare.

The palmy days of Circuit life, however - when the Grand Court flourished and revelry ran high- were in the times when locomotion was difficult, when turnpike trusts were not, and roads were bad; and people and their business could afford or were obliged to wait. Then the advent af the legal army was an event in the dreamy life of an Assize town; Assize balls and other festivities abounded, and a Circuit "Bespeak" was an honor sought after by the lessee of the local theatre a every Assize town. We can still remember threading our way, with a late baron of the Exchequer (then a gay circuiteer), to the Theatre Royal, Durham, and listening to a noble army of two announcing to the villain of the play that resistance was useless, as they had surrounded the house. The glories of the festivities on an Assize Sunday at the residence of John Jones, of Ystrad, in his time a leader of the old Carmarthen Circuit, and the dinners of "Lawyer Fawcett" to the members of the Northern Bar, in Lord Eldon's time, when there were such struggles between the claims of "consulation" and the host's old port, are enshrined in history; while the hospitality extended to the Northern Circuit by the Lord of Lowther Castle was continued down to a very recent

period (curiously enough, this having originated at a time when there was only one Assize in the year in those parts, it was given only during the summer Assizes).

But times have changed since then. As the Arab Sheik said to the author of "Eothen," "Puff! puff! there is nothing like steam;" it has displaced the stage-coach, the chaise, and even the roadster. The baggage-wagon lingered longest, but even it had to succumb a quarter of a century ago on most Circuits, though it still exists on the western, and might, until recently, have been seen at the accustomed times in the Temple ready for the reception of the baggage of the Circuit; but so little were its uses dreamed of, that it has ere now been mistaken for a prison-van. Now the leader or the junior, who, by the aid of the midnight mail and the Pullman car, can be in London today and in the remotest part of the country to-morrow, is no longer placed under circumstances favorable to the cultivation of the old Circuit life and its attendant associations. The clannish or tribal spirit has vanished, and that cosmopolitan idea- the outcome of the steam engine and other facilities for intercommunication which would obliterate nationalities, has left its impress indelibly marked on this as on other institutions. The circuiteer, if a silk or leading junior-"heavy juniors" they call themselves is no longer thrown into the society of his fellows for two months at a stretch; he does not pass a great part of every year in their company, in social intercourse with them, at the mess-table or elsewhere; but he comes down to his Circuit more like one in possession of a special retainer, who, the moment his work is done, is whisked back to London. If ever he does deign to honor the mess with his presence, it is more after the manner of a patron than of the boon companion of old.

Comparatively few men now go all round a Circuit, the majority restricting themselves to those towns where they are known; others only go at certain times of the year; while some even require special fees to go to certain towns on their own Circuit, and will only take special jury causes at others.

Even the "Cock of the Circuit," who sticks to it and goes all round, spends most of his time in the society of his papers, or if in one of the more populous towns that can boast a club, he may disport himself there, and give entertainments to his friends and admirers, and thus become, instead of a supporter, a formidable rival of the Circuit mess. For that loyalty to the Circuit mess, which used to be one of its chief characteristics, and a breach of which was invariably the subject of fine in the old days-and we have even known instances of the messengers bringing a deserter into Grand Court at York, from the judges' table - has been completely set at naught, and its rules have become very much like a royal prerogative, viz., that law in the case of a junior which is no law at all in the case of a senior, and we no longer find the leaders regularly dining at the mess and entering into its social enjoyments as of old, under the last generation of leaders, such as Stephen, Temple, James, Bliss, Quain, etc. Under such circumstances it need scarcely be matter of surprise that the mess languishes, that the attendance is but spasmodic (ranging from 50 or 60 down to 3), and that whereas not so many years ago it was no uncommon thing to see from 80 to 90 at Grand Court at York, and 130 to 140 at Liverpool; from 60 to 70 would now be a large muster, and of these threefourths would be "provincials; " so that now we have not a homogeneous body but different elements to deal with at each place, and without a sufficiently numerous body going all round to make it any one's interest to keep up the ancient traditions. In old times, when, as Lord Campbell has stated, there were not more than three or four Queen's Counsel on any Circuit, it was a matter of just pride to be like Serjeant Cockell, "The

Almighty of the North," or, "The Cock of the Circuit," in the days of Law and Scarlett, when men were conscious of a power and dignity that required no bolstering-up. But now, when Q. C.'s are thick as the "leaves in Vallombrosa," and every one considers himself a " Cock," the distinction has, as an eminent legal luminary (Lord Chelmsford) observed, become "all stuff," and must be hedged round with a due amount of reserve-the traditionary glories and observancies of Circuit being left to the care of the junior members, to whom they are but traditions. Thus the men who owe their rank and position to their being members of the Circuit, are perhaps unconsciously -working out the disintegration of the institution which has raised them, and are kicking the ladder from under their feet. For it is tolerably certain that many of those who have obtained rank in the profession, owe it entirely to the fact of their being members of the Circuit and to their "sticking to it," and thus obtaining practice and reputation among a comparatively small and local body, when otherwise they might, like Viola, have

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RROR to review a judgment in favor of the defendant in error. The opinion states the case. ELBERT, J. On the trial below, Juan B. Cordoba, Manual Abeyta and Casimero Romero were sumn.oned with others as jurors. Upon his voir dire each answered that he did not understand the English language. The plaintiff in error made this ground of a challenge for cause; the challenge was overruled by the court, and the persons named were impanelled and sworn and served as jurors upon the trial.

Other errors were assigned, but by stipulation of counsel the cause is submitted upon this assignment alone.

Is inability on the part of persons called as jurors, to speak the English language and to understand it when spoken, necessarily a disqualifying fact? The question is not without difficulty.

The statute declares that "all male inhabitants of the State, of the age of twenty-one years, who are citizens of the United States, or have declared their intention to become such citizens, and who have not been convicted of felony, shall be competent to serve as grand and petit jurors in all courts and judicial proceedings in the State."

These are the general statutory qualifications of a juror. One possessing them, however, is still subject to challenge. Section 161 of the Code provides, that either party may challenge peremptorily or for cause, limiting peremptory challenges to four. Section 162 enumerates seven several grounds upon which challenges for cause may be taken. It is unnecessary to advert to them further than to say, that inability to

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