« AnteriorContinuar »
RECEIVER — OF CORPORATION - ESTATE IN HANDS the company, and it was cancelled. G. died on the OF, LIABLE UPON COVENANT OF CORPORATION TO PAY | 16th of September, 1872. On the 12th of November RENT. — A corporation which had leased from plaint- plaintiffs, his administrators, tendered the amount of iffs certain real estate for a term of years was dis- | the premium to the Chicago agents, and demanded the solved and its affairs placed in tho hands of a receiver. policy. Held, that the policy never became valid as to The assets of the corporation were sufficient to meet G., and the company were not liable under it. Where all its obligations and leave a surplus for distribution there is a condition subsequent, and it is broken, relief among stockholders. Held, that by the dissolution of may be given upon equitable terms, but where it is prethe corporation tho lease was not terminated and the cedent, and neither fulfilled nor waived, no right or covenant to pay rent did not cease to be obligatory. title vests, and equity can do nothing for the party in Under the statute, upon tho dissolution of a corpora default. Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 229. Here there was tion, its assets become a trust fund for tho payment of clearly no performance by the applicant, and it is its debts, and these include debts to mature as well as equally clear that hence there was no contract or obliaccrued indebtedness, and all engagements entered | gation whatsoever on the part of the company. It into by tho corporation which have not been fully sat was the business of the applicant, if, after sending forisfied or cancelled. These cannot be cancelled without ward his application, he continued to desire a policy, the consent of the party holding them, and receivers to keep up the proper communication with the Chicago of dissolved corporations are authorized to retain out agents, and during his life-time to avail himself of the of their assets a sufficient amount to cancel and dis offer which the company had made. The proposition charge such open and subsisting engagements. R. S., of the company expired with his life. After his death part 3, chap. 8, tit. 4, art. 3. The lease in question was his legal representatives could not act vicariously for one of the class of engagements designated in the him. To allow them to enforce such a claim would be statute as open and subsisting. The receiver is au contrary to the plainest principles of both law and thorized by the statute to contract for its extinguish equity. Ins. Co. v. Young's Admr., 23 Wall. 106; Piedment, but until this is dono the lessors are entitled to mont Life Ins. Co. v. Ewing, 92 U. S. 380. Decree of payment of the rent as it accrues. The position of U. S. Circuit Court, N. D. Illinois, affirmed. Gid. receiver is analogous to that of executor. If he waives dings et al., appellants, v. Northwestern Mutual Life the term he cannot be charged as assignee of the lease, Insurance Co. of Milwaukee. Opinion by Swayne, J. but if the landlord does not choose to re-enter the [Decided Nov. 8, 1880.) estate of the testator, may be liable for the rent in tho due course of administration See Martin v. Black,
MARRIED WOMAN — DISAFFIRMANCE OF CONTRACTS 9 Paige, 644. The case Quain's Appeal, 22 Penn. St. 510, MADE BY, WHEN INFANT - WHEN NEED NOT BE, DURdoes not affect this rule. Orders of General and ING COVERTURE - ESTOPPEL- INFANT NOT BOUND BY. Special Terms reversed. People of New York v. Na
- Complainant S., a married woman, and an infant, in lional Trust Co. Opinion by Rapallo, J.
1817, joined with her husband in conveying, for a valua[Decided October 12, 1880.]
ble consideration, lands belonging to her, to E. At the time, complainant signed a statement that she had at
tained her majority. The husband had by threats inUNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AB duced her to join with him in selling the lands. STRACT.
She became of age in 1819. In 1870 she proOCTOBER TERM, 1880.
cured a divorce from her husband for his wrong, and immediately thereafter, for the first time,
disaffirmed the conveyance to E., and brought suit to APPEAL — EFFECT OF IRREGULAR BOND ON.- Where
recover the lands. At the time complainant acquired the bond upon appeal was insufficient in form either
title to the lands as to the rights of married women, for the purposes of a supersedeas or an appeal, as con
the common law prevailed in Indiana, where they were taining no security for costs, held, that does not neces
situated, though laws giving to married women the sarily avoid the appeal, but the court might impose
control of their separate property were passed in 1847 such terms on the appellants for the omission as under
and 1852. The wife did no act affirming the sale. Held, the circumstances should seem to be proper. Martin
that sho was entitled to recover the lauds. By the v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 361; Davidson v. Lanier,
marriage, complainant's husband acquired a vested 4 Wall. 454. Motion to dismiss appeal from U.S. Cir.
freehold interest in her lands, and became entitled to cuit Court, Louisiana, allowed, unless appellant files
the rents and profits. His control over the usufruct proper bond. Sewurd et al., appellants, v. Comean et al.
thereof became absolute. His interest extended durOpinion by Waite, C. J.
ing the joint lives of himself and his wife, or at least LIFE INSURANCE – NON-PAYMENT OF PREMIUM IN so long as the marriage relation continued. It was au VALIDATING POLICY.-The charter of a Wisconsin life interest capable of sale. When, therefore, the deed insurance company contained this: “Every person was made to E., it gave to the grantee the wife's right, who shall become a member of this corporation by ef subject to disaffirmance, and the husband's right to the fecting insurance therein shall, the first time he effects | possession and enjoyment of the profits absolutely. insurance, and before ho receives his policy, pay the When the wife subsequently came of age she continued rates that shall be fixed upon and determined by the powerless to disturb the possession of the grantee so trustees." G. presented an application to the Chicago | long as her coverture lasted, for the grantee held not agents of the company in August, 1872, for insurance only her right but that also of her husband. The most on his life for $6,000. This was forwarded to the com she could have done was to give notice that she would pany by the agents. Tho company decided to issue a not be bound by her deed. That she was not bound to policy, and the same month sent to the agents a policy do. The land was not her separate estate. In regard in terms insuring the lifo of G. for $6,000, which con to it she was sub potestate viri, incapable of suing or tained this: “This policy shall not take effect and be, making any contract without her husband's assent, excome binding on the company until the premium becept such as might relate to separate property. She actually paid, during the life-timo of the person whose could not even receive a grant of land if her husband life is assured, to the company or to some person au dissented. Her disability during her coverture was thorized to receive it, who shall countersign the policy even greater than that of an infant, and it is settled on receipt of the premium." This policy tho agents that an infant cannot disaffirm his deed while his inkept until the 2d of October, wben the premium, which | fancy continues. Zouch v. Parsons, 3 Bur. 1808; Roof was $302.52, not having been paid, they returned it to | v. Stafford, 7 Cow. 183. The reason is, that a disaffirmance works a reinvestiture of the estate in the infant, number of cases which hold that silence during a much and he is presumed not to have sufficient discretion for less period of time will be held to be a confirmation of that. Why should not the greater disability of covert the voidable deed. But these cases either rely upon ure be attended with the same consequences? If a Holmes v. Blogg, 8 Taunt. 35 (which was not a case of wife cannot contract about any land which is not her an infant's deed), or subsequent cases decided on its separate property, how can sbe, without the concur authority, or they were rested in part upon other cirrence of her husbaud, do any act, the effect of which cumstances than mere silent acquiescence, such as is to transfer the title to land from another to herself? standing by without speaking while the grantee has The question is whether complainant did disaffirm made valuable improvements, or making use of the her deed within a reasonable time after she at consideration for the deed. The preponderance of tained her majority. What is a reasouable time is authority is that in deeds executed by infants, mere nowhere determined in such a manner as to furnish a inertness or silence, continued for a period less than rule applicable to all cases. The question must always that prescribed by the statute of limitations, unless be answered in view of the peculiar circumstances of accompanied by affirmative acts, manifesting an ineach case. State v. Plaisted, 43 N. H. 413; Jenkins tention to assent to the conveyance, will not bar the v. Jenkins, 12 Iowa, 195. It is an acknowledged rule infant's right to avoid the deed. And those coufirmathat when there are two or more co-existing disabili tory acts must be voluntary. As was said, one who is ties in the same person when his right of action ac under a disability to make a contract cannot confirm crues, he is not obliged to act until the last is removed. one that is voidable, or, what is the same thing, cannot 2 Sugd. on Vend. 103 (482); Mercer v. Selden, 1 How. | disaffirm it. Affirmance or disaffirmance are in their 53. This is the rule under the statute of limitations. nature mental assents. They necessarily imply the But complainant could not sue until after her divorce, action of a free mind, exempt from all constraint or and until the right the husband acquired by his mar disability. The complainant, having been a feme riage terminated. And had she given notice during covert until 1870, and never having done, during her her coverture of disaffirmance of her deed, it was in coverture, any act to confirm the deed which she made the power of her husband to disaffirm her disaffirm during her infancy, could effectively disaffirm it in ance. 2 Bish. on Marr. Wom., § 392. Giving notice, 1870, when she became a free agent, and her notice of therefore, which was all she could do, would have been disaffirmance and her suit avoided her deed made in a vain tbing. The law does not compel the perform 1847. And she was not estopped by her statement that ance of things that are vain. Bishop, in the work she was of age. An estoppel in pais is not applicable referred to, says that if an infant, who is also a married to infants, and a fraudulent representation of capacwoman, makes an instrument voidable because of herity caunot be an equivalent for actual capacity. Brown infancy, the disability of coverture enables her to post- v. McCune, 5 Sandf, 228; Keen v. Coleman, 39 Penu. pone the act of avoidance to a reasonable time after St. 299. A conveyance by an infant is an assertion of the coverture is ended. $ 516. In support of this his right to convey. A contemporaneous declaration he refers to Dodd v. Benthal, 4 Heisk. 601, and Mather of his right or of his age adds nothing to what is imson v. Daris, 2 Cold. 443. These cases certainly sustain plied in his deed. An assertion of an estoppel against the rule stated. In the former it was decided that an him is but a claim that he has assented or contracted. infant, who is also a married woman, has the option to | But he can no more do that effectively than he can dissent from her deed within a reasonable time after make the contract alleged to be confirmed. Decree of her discoverture, though her coverture may continue U. S. Ciro. Ct., Indiana, reversed. Sims, appellant, v. more than twenty years. And if this were not so, the Everhardt et al. Opinion by Strong, J. disability of coverture, instead of being a protection (Decided Oct. 25, 1880.] to the wife, as the law intends it, would be the contrary. But the continued coverture of complainant,
KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT. after she attained full age, is not the only circumstance of importance to the inquiry whether she disaffirmed
OCTOBER, 1880. her deed within a reasonable time. The circumstances under which the deed was made are to be considered. CONFLICT OF LAW - FOREIGN JUDGMENT – JURISThere was evidence that she was constrained by her DICTION — INTICING PARTY INTO STATE TO SERVE husband to execute the deed; that his conduct toward PROCESS. — A, by a device, induced his debtor B, who her was abusive, violent, and threatening in order to
ed a horse and wagon that was exempt under the induce her to consent to the sale; that she was intimi laws of Kentucky, to go with it into the State of dated by him; that a look from him would make her Tennessee, where such property was not exempt, in do almost any thing, and that she was in a weak and order to attach the horse and wagon, which he did, nervous condition. It is not strange that a woman and B not answering, recovered judgment, and so colbound to such a husband should delay during her lected his debt. On his return to Kentucky B sued A coverture disaffirming a contract which he had forced for damages by reason of the proceeding and recovher to make. The most that is alleged against her is ered judgment. Held, that the judgment in favor of that she was silent during her coverture. But silence B was proper and the action was not a collateral attack is not necessarily acquiescence. It is true that tho de upon the Tennessee judgment, but a direct one. A cisions respecting the disaflirmance of an infant's deed | judgment rendered by a Superior Court of another are not in entire harmony with each other. While it State may be attacked for want of jurisdiction is generally agreed that the infant to avoid it must dis of the subject-matter, or of the person, regardless afirm it within a reasonable time after his majority is of the recitals of the judgment or record. Wharattained, they differ as to what constitutes disaffirm ton on Conflict of Laws, § 811; Kerr v. Kerr, 41 ance and as to the effect of mere silence. Where there N. Y. 272; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46 id. 30; Thompson is nothing more than silence, many cases hold that an v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457; Knowles v. Gas Light and infant's deed may be avoided at any time after his Coke Co., 19 id. 59. The service of process on B in reaching majority until he is barred by the statute of Tennessee did not conclusively establish the jurisdiclimitations, and that silent acquiescence for any period tion of the court, and unless the jurisdiction properly less than the period of limitation is not a bar. Such attached, the judgment was a nullity. The device by was in effect the ruling in Irvine v. Irvine, 9 Wall. which the debtor was induced to go into Tennessee 627. See, also, Prout v. Wiley, 28 Mich. 164, a well was a fraud, and A could not be allowed to take adconsidered case, and Drake v. Ramsey, 5 Ohio, 251. vantage of his own wrong and thus acquire rights But on the other hand, there appears to be a greater | which he could not have had except for the fraud. It is an established principle that a valid act caunot be grades, for being voluntarily in a state of intoxication established by unlawful means, and that legal rights while engaged in, or when required by law to be encannot be acquired by fraud; for, in the language of gaged in, the discharge of official duties. One who Lord Coke, “It avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical engages to serve the public in an official capacity has or temporal.” Dunlap v. Cody (31 lowa, 260), 7 Am. po right voluntarily to unfit himself, to any degree, for Rep. 129. Wood v. Wood. Opinion by Hines, J. the faithful and intelligent discharge of the duties of CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – IMPAIRING OBLIGATION OF
his position; and the law-making power of the State CONTRACT — STATE LAW ALTERING REMEDY. - A stat.
may punish him for so doing, in any manner not proute of Kentucky enacted in 1878, provided that in
hibited by the Constitution. But it cannot provide judicial sales of land there should be a valuation and
for a removal from office of an officer on conviction of appraisement and that two-thirds of the appraised
any offense, unless the Constitution expressly authorvalue should be realized before the sale could be made
izes it, where the Constitution regulates the matter, absolute, and the sale was mado subject to redemption
and particularly designates when removals from office within one year, during which time the debtor was
shall occur. (2) The phrase "misfeasance in office,"
at the time of the adoption of tho Constitution, had a entitled to the possession and profits of the land.
technical signification; to expound which belongs to Held, not to apply to contracts made previous to the
the courts, and not to the Legislature. The meaning enactment of the statute, otherwise it would impair
of the phrase is well settled to be merely the wrongthe obligation of a contract. “The obligation of a contract is that which obliges a person to perform his
doing of an official act, and nothing more. And this
does not embrace the offense of intoxication while discontract or to repair the injury done by a failure to perform it." Blair y. Williams, 4 Litt. 86. The laws
charging official duties. The Legislature cannot exin force when and where a contract is made enter into
tend a constitutional penalty to cases not designated. it and form a part of it. Von Hoffman v. City of
Cooley on Const. Lim. (4th ed.), p. 78; Lowe v. ComQuincy, 4 Wall. 535. The remedy is included in the
monwealth, 3 Meto. (Ky.) 241; Brown v. Grover, 6 Bush,
1; Commonwealth v. Barry, Hardin, 238; Commonwealth obligation of a contract (Blair v. Williams, supra), and
v. Chambers, 1 J.J. Marsh. 160. Commonwealth of Kencannot be altered so as materially to impair the obliga
tucky v. Williams. Opinion by Cofer, C. J. tion to any extent. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1; Edwards v. Kersey, 6 Otto, 601. The remedy has been said to be the breath or vital existence of the obliga MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. tion. Without it, the legal obligation is not enforce
OCTOBER, 1880. able, so that “want of right and want of remedy are the same thing" in effect - the non-existence of either
EJECTMENT-DEVISEE MAY BRING, BEFORE PROBATE being equally fatal to the claims of a party in a court
OF. WILL- A devisee of lands mav, before the probate of justice. For the efficacy of the law lies in the
of the will under which he derives title, bring an action remedial part of it, which is the very essence of the “protection of the law" guaranteed by the Constitu
in ejectment to recover such lands. There were un
doubtedly some techuical rules of common-law pleadtion. There is a great difference between taking away
ing which required an executor to make profert of his or dispensing with part of the remedy and regulating
letters in pleading. But for any other purpose the how or when it may be employed. If the remedy is
decisions are uniform that probate merely furnishes preserved as it existed when the contract was made,
the means of establishing by a peculiar kind of record legislative requirements, when reasonable, fixing a
evidence the validity of an existing right; and that time for invoking its enforcement, or designating the
for every valuable purpose touching the existence and forms by which it may be enforced, are not in conflict
transfer of title the probato was retroactive, and had with the constitutional provision. But the Legislaturo
the same effect as if it had been had at the time of the cannot do things in such manner as to operate as a
testator's death. And so far as the statutes have been destruction or decrease of the value of the remedy,
applied to devises there is no material difference. The por can it thereby dispense with any part of its force.
executor may release a cause of action. Co. Litt. 2926. Green v. Biddle, supra. The ability to comply with
He may sell goods. Mayor of Norwich v. Johnson, 3 the obligation to perform, or render redress for not
Mod. 92. He may enter on a term and the entry be performing the contract, cannot be lessened, weakened,
good though he die before probate. 3 Dyer, 367. He impaired or taken away by the force of a law purport
may sell a term of years, though he die before probate, ing to regulate the remedy. Blair v. Williams, supra;
and the sale will stand. Brazier v. Hudson, 8 Simons, Lapsley v. Brashears, 4 Littell, 651; Planters' Bank v.
67. In Wankford v. Wankford, 1 Salk. 299 and notes, Sharp et al., 6 How. 301; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 id. 311.
the doctrine is quite fully discussed, and clearly laid The State has the right to alter tho remedy, subject to
down. And the practical result is said in Brazier v. the limitation that the alteration shall not impair the
Hudson to be that subsequent probate validates all obligation of contracts. There is no qualification an
acts that would be valid after. This may be a somenexed to this limitation upon the power of the Legis
what broad statement, but it is certaiuly true for most lature, and neither “policy nor humanity” is a safe
purposes, and authorities might be multiplied upon it. guide in construing a constitutional provision which
In the United States the rule has been tho same. After is without ambiguity. There are no degrees in the
probate a conveyance previous thereto by a devisee has Constitution, and none should be interpolated by con
been held valid. Spring v. Parkman, 3 Fairf. 127. And struction, although the alteration, to be valid, must be
in De Wolf v. Brown, 15 Pick. 462, it was held the material. A similar statute of Illinois, as to redemp
estate devised vested immediately both as to realty tion from a sale under mortgage, has been denied a
and personalty on the death of testator, so as to auretroactive effect by the Supreme Court of the United
thorize suit for a taking of property connected with a States, in Bronson v. MoKinzie, 1 How. 319, wherein
farm before probate. In Sutphen v. Ellis, 35 Mich. tho court says: “It such rights may be added to the
446, it was held that an assignment of a mortgage made original contract by subsequent legislation, it would
by the legatee of such mortgage, who died before the be difficult to say at what point they must stop."
will was proved, was valid. In 3 Redfield on Wills, 23, Hardin's Administrator v. Taylor. Opinion by Hines, J.
a similar doctrine is laid down. In 1 Salk. 302, 303, -LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AS TO CONTRACT OF before referred to, it is said that an action may be PUBLIC OFFICERS - REMOVING FROM OFFICE "MIS. brought before probate, but plaintiff cannot declare. FEASANCE IN FFICE." -(1) It is within the authority Several authorities are collected in Comyn's Dig. “Adof the Legislature to punish public officers of all I ministration," B. 9, to the effect that an action brought before probate is made good by subsequent probate, other, was insufficient to establish an attempt to “for it is sufficient if the probate appears upon the murder. So on an indictment under the same chapter declaration." In Thompson v. Reynolds, 7 B. & C. for attempting to discharge loaded fire-arms at a per123, the true doctrine was more distinctly explained. son, it was held in Regina v. Lewis, 9 C. & P. 523, that In that case upon an issue made by plea and replica- some act must be shown to prove the person did attion whether the plaintiff was executor in manner and tempt to discharge the fire-arms, and merely presentform as averred in his declaration, in which he actually ing them was not sufficient. Upon an indictment for made profert of his letters, he was allowed to recover, attempting to discharge a pistol loaded with powder although the proof showed the letters were not granted and ball with intent to murder, a witness testified, until some months after the declaration was filed. In “the prisoner took out a small pistol and said: 'I will equity also it has been held that proof of probate be settle you,' or 'I will do you,' and either half or full fore the hearing is sufficient, although occurring dur-| cocked the pistol, and pointed the muzzle at my ing the litigation. Humphreys v. Humphreys, 3 P. | brother,” with his finger on the trigger; yet it was Wms. 349. And see Comber's case, 1 id. 768. Richards held the charge of felony could not be supported as it v. Pierce. Opinion by Campbell, J.
was not proved that the prisoner drew the trigger. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE — INNOCENT VENDEE
Reg. y. St. George, id. 483 (38 E. C. L. R.). Parke, B., FROM ONE FRAUDULENTLY SELLING, PROTECTED.-F.,
said: “Here a trigger was to be drawn and it is not who was indebted to V. to the amount of $1,000, sold
drawn. It seems to me the object of this act was to him merchandise for $1,600, V. giving his own nego
punish proximate attempts, that is those attempts tiable notes for the difference between the debt and
which immediately lead to the discharge of loaded the purchase-price. In an action by V. against a
fire-arms." It is true in People v. Bush, 4 Hill, 133, a sheriff who had attached the goods at the suit of cred
conviction was sustained for an attempt to commit a itors of F., the court below ruled that if V. purchased
felony, where the act proved was as remote from the in good faith in payment of an actual debt from F. to
crime intended to be perpetrated as the act proved is himself and gave to F., for the difference between the
in the present case. That ruling, however, rests on a debt and the price of the goods, his negotiable promis
statute of New York which contains language not in
the English act cited, nor in the Pennsylvania statute. sory notes, he got a good title as against creditors, even though F. may have sold with intent to defraud
It has the additional words, “and in such attempt them. Held, that this was correct. Where a person
shall do any act toward the commission of such
offense." Pennsylvania Sup. Ct., Oct. 25, 1880. Stabbuys for the sole purpose of obtaining payment of an
ler v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Opinion by honest debt the circumstance that the seller intends to hinder or defraud bis creditors does not make the sale
Mercur, J. void. It must be made out that the buyer participated
GRAND JURY – OBJECTION TO COMPETENCY OF in the fraudulent intent. Hill v. Bowman, 35 Mich.
JUROR - WHEN IT WILL AND WHEN IT WILL NOT LIE. 191; Loomis v. Smith, 37 id. 595; Jordan v. White, 38
-(1) The expression of an opinion that an accused perid. 253; State Bank v. Chapelle, 40 id. 447; Dudley v.
son is guilty, by a grand juror before he was sworn, Danforth. 61 N. Y. 626. The sale was an outside thing
appears never to have been a ground of challenge in and it was either good or bad. It was not divisible so
the English courts. Some respectable authorities in as to leave so much as the prior indebtedness repre
this country hold that it is, but these generally hold sented, good, and so much as the notes represented,
that tho exception must be taken before the grand jury bad. As the notes were negotiable and given in time
is sworn. The common law requires grand jurors to they might be enforced against the maker and there
be good and lawful freeholders and inhabitants of the was ground for regarding them as payment. Beur
county; and where that law prevails a disqualified mann v. Van Buren. Opiniop by Graves, J.
grand juror may be challenged before indictment found. 3 Bac. Abr., Juries, A; 1 Chitty on Crim. Law,
309; United States v. Williams, 1 Dill. 492. In People CRIMINAL LAW.
v. Jewett, 3 Wend. 314, it is said. "There are causes
of challenge to grand jurors, and these may be urged ATTEMPT -- SOLICITATION TO ANOTHER TO COMMIT by those accused, whether in prison or out on recogCRIME, NOT. – A Pennsylvania statuto provides that, nizance, and it is even said that a person wholly disin"if any person shall attempt to administer any poison terested may as amicus curiæ suggest that a grand or other destructive thing, or shall attempt to cut, or juror is disqualified. But such objection, to be availstab or wound, or shall shoot at any person, or shall ing, must be made previous to the juror's being imby drawing a trigger, or in any other manner attempt panelled aud sworn. In the case of United States v. to discharge any kind of loaded arms at any person, or Burr, before the Circuit Court of the United States at shall attempt to drown, suffocate or strangle any per-| Richmond, Va., the prisoner was allowed to challenge son, with intent, in any of the cases aforesaid, to com- grand jurors, on the ground that they had formed and mit the crime of murder, he shall, although no bodily expressed opinions of the prisoner's guilt. But the injury be effected, be guilty of felony. Defendant, challenges were made before the grand jury was imwho had ill-feeling against W., solicited N. to place panelled and sworn. Burr's trial by Robertson, 38. In poison in a spring belonging to W. so that W. and his Tucker's case, 8 Mass., the court said that Burr's case family should be poisoned, and handed N. some poison, was solitary in allowing challenges to grand jurors, directing how it should be administered, and offering and a juror objected to by the amicus curiæ was sworn. N. a reward. N. refused to have any thing to do with In Commonwealth v. Smith, 9 Mass. 107, it was held the matter and handed back the poison. Several days that objections to the persoual qualifications of a grand after he found the poison in his overcoat pocket. Held, juror, or to the legality of the returns, cannot affect that there was not sufficient on the part of N. to con any indictments found by the jury after they hare stitute an attempt to administer the poison. Mere | been received by the court and filed. In Musick v. soliciting one to do an act is not an attempt to do that People, 40 Ill. 268, it was held that if an expression of act. Rex v. Butler, 6 C. & P. 368; Smith v. Common opinion by a grand juror were a ground of challenge, wealth, 4 P. F. Smith, 209. In Kelly V. Common- the objection must be taken before the juror is sworn. wealth, 1 Grant, 484, it was held that acts were neces. | In Indiana, a person under prosecution for crime, and sary to constitute an attempt. Under a similar statute in custody or on bail, may challenge, for good cause, in Regina v. Williams et al., 1 Car. & K. 589, it was any person returned or placed on the grand jury. held that the delivery of poisou to an agent with di- Hudson v. State, 1 Blackf, 317; Jones y. State, 2 id. rections to him to cause it to be administered to au- | 475; State v. Herndon, 5 id. 75; Hardin v. State, 22
Ind. 347; Mershom v. State, 51 id. 14. Iu Hardin v. both. We note the following: Matter of Leszinsky, p. State the court say that “no doubt challenges to the 9.--A statute provides for a pecuniary penalty, for a polls may be made where any of the jurors have not fine, and for imprisonment. A civil judgment for the the necessary qualifications. These challenges, how- penalty does not bar a criminal prosecution for the ever, must be made before the jury are sworn and fine or imprisonment. United States v. Buffalo Park, charged.” In Pennsylvania, the defendants in the case p. 189.-A racing park association are not liable to of Commonwealth v. Clark, 2 Browne, 325, being in taxation as conducting a “ public exhibition of feats of jail on a charge of homicide, were allowed to challenge | horsemanship," or a “show." Robinson v. Mutual grand jurors for favor, before the grand jury were Benefit Life Ins. Co., p. 194.-A policy procured by a sworn. In New Jersey, the court in the case of the husband on his own life for his wife's benefit is assignState v. Rockafellow, 1 Halst. 332, held that it was a able by both. U. S. v. Bennett, p. 338.-The celebrated good plea in abatement to an indictment for rapo that conviction for mailing obscene matter. Matter of one of the grand jurors by whom the bill was found Gallagher, p. 410.-A municipal permit, revocable at was not a freeholder as required by the statutes of pleasure, to occupy a market stand, is property passing that State. In State v. Richey, 5 Halst., a plea in to an assignee in bankruptcy. Grace v. American abatement of tho indictment, that two of the grand Central Ins. Co., p. 433.- A sub-insurance broker, who jurors who found it had expressed an opinion before procures an insurance, is the agent of the insured for they were sworn, was not sustained. See, also, United the purpose of notification of the cancelling of the States v. White, 5 Cranch's C. C. 457; Boyington v. policy, under a provision, that any person, other than State, 2 Port. (Ala.) 100; State v. Easton, 30 Ohio St. the insured, who procures the insurance to be taken, 542. lf a disqualification discovered after indictment shall be deemed the agent of the insured and not of found can be taken advantage of, it must be one that the insurer, “under any circumstances whatever, or is pronounced such by the common law, or by the in any transaction relating to this insurance," The statute (if it be a matter of statute), and one that ab- Southern Home, p. 447.- A vessel is not liable for the solutely disqualifies, as alienage or the want of a free consequences of not keeping a look-out, when the hold. (2) One of several defendants indicted by a omission is caused by the disabling of the crew by the grand jury pleaded in abatement that there were not yellow fever. The Niagara, p. 516.-A vessel carried twelve members of the grand jury who were in favor fine table salt in sacks, and powdered arsenic in casks; of finding a true bill against him, but that the foreman the casks became broken, and the arsenio penetrated stated to them that they could not find a true bill some of the sacks and was distributed throughout the against the others unless they included him, and that vessel; the sacks were indiscriminately discharged; his name was included because the grand jurors nothing but an analysis could determine whether any thought it necessary in finding a true bill against the of the salt was fit for consumption; held, that the vesothers. The State's attorney demurred to this plea. sel was liable for the difference in value of all the salt, Held, that the court could not allow any evidence as to as sound, and what it produced for fertilizing purposes. the proceedings within the grand jury room, which, The Fidelity, p. 569.-A steam-tug, belonging to and by their oath, the jurors were to keep secret, and that used by a city in performance of municipal duties, is the State's attorney had no authority by demurrer or not liable to seizure in a suit for damages inflicted by otherwise to admit the plea. It was early decided that the tug while actually engaged in the performance of a grand juror should not be allowed to swear what was such duties. given in evidence before them, because he is sworn not to reveal the secrets of his companions. 12 Vin. Abr.,
INDEX OF AMERICAN DECISIONS. B., art. 5, 20, Evidence H. 4; State y. Fassett, 16 Conn. Inder lo the American Decisions and the Editor's Notes thereto, 465. It was also decided at an early day that the clerk of
with a table of the Cases re-reported Volumes one to a grand jury could not be compelled to testify what
twenty, inclusive. 1760-1830. By A.JC. Freeman, San took place before that body. 12 Vin. Abr. 38, Evidence
Francisco: A. L. Bancroft & Co. 1880. Pp. 663. B. And the principle which would prevent disclosure This is a very important accessory to the excellent by a grand juror must extend to all persons required series which it accompanies. We have so ofteu exby law to be present; for such persons are equally in- pressed our sense of the usefulness of the American terested in the administration of the penal law. 1] Decisions that it would be superfluous now to enlarge on Greenl. Ev., $288. They are not permitted to disclose the subject. This volume is a gift, and a very generous who agreed to find the bill of indictment, or who did and timely gift, to the subscribers. It seems, aud we not agree; nor to detail the evidence on which the have no doubt is, well executed in every particular. accusation was founded. Sykes v. Dunbar, Selw. N.
THOMPSON'S LIABILITY OF OFFICERS AND AGENTS OF P. 815 (1059); Huidekoper v. Cotton, 3 Watts, 56. And in Regina v. Marsh, 6 Ad. & El. 236, which was an in
CORPORATIONS, dictment for a misdemeanor, the court refused to
The Liability of Directors and other Officers and agents of
Corporations. Illustrated by leading cases and notes. receive the affidavit of a grand juror as to the number
By Seymour D. Thompson. St. Louis: Wm. H. Stevenson, of grand jurors who concurred in finding the bill. See,
1880. Pp. xxxix, 722. also, Regina v. Russell, 1 Car. & Marsh. 247; State v. Baker, 20 Mo. 338. Connecticut Supreme Court of
From the rapidity with which this author has been Errors, May term, 1879. State of Connecticut v. Ham
pouring forth law books this year, it might be suslin. Opinion by Hovey, J. (To appear in 47 Conn.
pected that the quality would not keep pace with the Rep.)
quantity. But of this we discover no indication. We
can see no marks of padding, inaccuracy, or want of NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. consideration. In Mr. Thompson's recent election to
the bench the profession have lost one of their best auXVI BLATCHFORD'S REPORTS.
thors. The present work is on the same plan as those Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Circuit on Negligence and Carriers, which we regard as among
Court of the United States for the Second Circuit. By the most useful of recent treatises, and it seems to be Samuel Blatchford, Circuit Judge of the Second Judicial equally excellent. It grows out of and supplements Circuit. Volume XVI. New York: Baker, Voorhis &
his Liability of Stockholders, and the lino of study inCo. 1880. Pp. xi, 60%.
volved in the preparation of that excellent work must WE do not understand that Judge Blatchford really have given the author a large advantage in the prepara
W argued any or decided all of the causes reported tion of this. There are six chapters, as follows: per in this volume, although the title page says he did | sonal liability of contracting agents of corporations or