attachment suit, is not thereby relieved from his liability to the assignee. N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1st Dept. Duffield, assignee, v. Horton, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 59. BANK. Payment of debts due insolvent bank.-Under the laws of Pennsylvania, the assignee of an insolvent bank cannot accept in payment of debts due the bank a protested draft drawn by such bank upon another bank, and sold by the payee to the debtor. Sup. Ct., Pennsylvania. Baschore v. Rhoads, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 72. CONVEYANCE. What necessary to make it, in fraud of bankrupt law : bad faith must be proved.-In order to render void a conveyance made by a bankrupt within four months of filing a petition with a view to give a preference, or a joint creditor who has taken a mortgage thereon as security for his debt. A judgment in personam cannot be taken against the wife of a bankrupt, or her executors, for the value of real or personal property conveyed to her in fraud of creditors. U. S. Sup. Ct. Phipps v. Sedgwick, assignee, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 64. BOOK NOTICES. PARSONS' ANNOTATED POCKET CODE. The Revised Code of Civil Procedure of the State of New York, as amended in 1877, according to the Standard Text deposited in the office of the Secretary of State by the Revision Commissioners. With Notes and References to Decisions bearing thereon. Also, the Temporary Act and the Suspension Act. Albary, N. Y. : John D. Parsons, Jr., pp. 640. other conveyance within six months, it must appear THIS is the most convenient, and, in some respects, that the person taking it knew that it was made in fraud of the provisions of the bankrupt act in the one case, or to prevent the property coming to the assignee, or from being distributed under the act, in the other. A conveyance made to secure an actual loan is valid if made and taken in good faith. Neither bad faith nor its equivalent, conduct wanting in good faith, is to be assumed, but must be proved. U. S. Dist. Ct., Vermont. Campbell, assignee, v. Waite, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 93. DEFENSE. When discharge is, and is not: conveyance in fraud of creditors: practice: cross-bill.—A discharge in bankruptcy cannot be set up as a general defense to an action by a creditor to set aside a conveyance in fraud of creditors pending at the time of filing the petition, where such creditor has not proved his claim in the bankruptcy proceedings, and the assignee has not interfered in the cause in any way. But the discharge may be set up in such action in bar of a personal judgment against the bankrupt other than the subjection of the property and claims reached by the creditor's bill to the satisfaction of the judgment. A conveyance made in fraud of creditors is voidable and not void, and the property embraced in it does not absolutely vest in the assignee as a portion of the bankrupt's estate. A cross-bill setting up defendant's discharge in bankruptcy is not defective in not making his assignee a party, where almost four years have elapsed since the appointment of the assignee, and he has made a final settlement and been discharged. Illinois Sup. Ct. Phelps v. Curts, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 85. DISCHARGE. Surety on guardian's bond.-A discharge in bankruptcy releases the bankrupt from liability as surety on a guardian's bond. Illinois Sup. Ct. Reitz v. People, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 96. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE. What is conveyance to wife when in failing circumstances: judgment against married woman.-Where one of the members of a firm, which is doing a very large but failing business on a limited capital, withdraws over one-third of his share of the capital to build upon property which he conveys to his wife, but which appears upon the firm books as an investment of the firm until charged up to him after an assignment by such firm prior to an adjudication in involuntary bankruptcy. Held, that such conveyance to the wife is void, and that the assignee in bankruptcy is entitled to the proceeds of the property as against the most useful edition of the Revised Code of Civil Procedure that we have yet seen. It is a novelty in this State to have a pocket edition of a law-book annotated, yet this edition is not only annotated, but the notes are very full, most of them containing a reference to all the cases, early and late, bearing on the section. The cases bearing upon each clause or sentence of a section are grouped, and the particular clause or sentence to which they relate is indicated by means of reference figures, thus rendering unnecessary any statement of the purport of the decision. The notes also indicate the source whence the section was derived by the Revisors - whether from the Old Code, the Revised Statutes, the General Laws, or otherwise. The side notes to the sections have been printed in full-face letter as leading lines, thus facilitating examination. Beside the Code proper, the book contains a Table of Corresponding Sections, showing at a glance where, in the New Code, any section of the Old Code may be found, the Temporary Act, the Suspending Act, the number of the sections of the Old Code not repealed, and a full index. This edition has also the certificates of both the Secretary of State and the Revision Commissioners. As a handy volume we doubt if it can be excelled. WILLIAMS ON EXECUTORS. A Treatise on the Law of Executors and Administrators. By the Right Honorable Sir Edward Vaughan Williams, late one of the Judges of Her Majesty's Court of Common Pleas. Seventh Edition. By the Right Honorable Sir Edward Vaughan Williams and Walter V. Vaughan Williams, Esq., of the Inner Temple, Barrister at Law. Sixth American Edition; in which the subject of Wills is particularly discussed and enlarged upon. By J. C. Perkins, LL. D. In three volumes. Philadelphia: Kay & Brother, 1877. This is probably the most elaborate work upon the subjects therein treated, that has yet appeared. The masterly production of Mr. Jarman upon the subject of wills, will probably, however, never be excelled, but the scheme and structure of that work, involving, as it does, the statement of cases at length, have rendered it impossible to use it as the foundation for a modern book, and the same reason would prevent its adaptation to the changes made in the English law by the statutes and decisions of our own country. For that reason there has been no English edition of Jarman since 1861, and no American edition since 1859. The present edition of the work before us is in three volumes, containing in all about 2,600 pages. The treatise is divided into five parts, the first of which is upon the appointment of executors and administra tors, and is divided into seven books. Book I treats of the origin of wills of personal estate, and of their nature and incidents; book II of the making, revocation and republication of wills of personal estate; book III of the appointment of executors, and the acceptance or refusal of the office; book IV of probate; book V of the origin of administration, and the appointment of administrators; book VI of the effect of probate, and letters of revocation, and the consequences; book VII of stamp duties. Part second contains four books upon these subjects: Book I on the time of vesting of the estate of an executor, and its quality; book II of the quantity of such estate in possession; book III of the quantity of such estate in action; book IV of the estate executors, several and sole, and that of different kinds of executors. Part third contains five books, which treat of the duties and powers of executors, of distribution, and of stamp duties. Part fourth is upon the liabilities of executors, and contains two books. Part fifth treats of the remedies for and against executors, and is also divided into two books. The American editor has made numerous additions to the original work in the way of notes, which, especially in reference to the subject of wills, are much expanded and enlarged. In fact, the three volumes before us furnish a complete treatise on the law of wills, as well as on that of executors and administrators. In addition to the authorities contained in the English edition, are some ten thousand other citations. The index to the volumes is well prepared, and refers to the contents of the notes, as well as to that of the text. The work will be found of the first importance to those interested in probate cases, as it contains every thing relating to the law administered in such cases. The books are thoroughly well printed and bound. MISSISSIPPI REPORTS, VOL. 52. Reports of Cases in the Supreme Court for the State of Mississippi. By Harris & Simrall, Reporters to the Supreme Court. Vol. LII. Containing cases decided at the April and October Terms, 1876. Published by authority. St. Louis: G. J. Jones & Company, 1877. Among the cases reported in this volume, the following seem to be of general interest: Long v. State, p. 23: In a trial for homicide, in which the doing of the act in self-defense was sought to be established, it was held that one need not always await the attack of his adversary, but may, in extreme cases, anticipate the attack, and take the life of his antagonist in order to save his own, and that the real or apparent danger which will justify such action, must be imminent, impending and present, but it need not be unavoidable, except by slaying the adversary, and a man need not avoid danger by flight if he is in a place where he has a right to be. Mobile and Ohio R. R. Co. v. Moseley, p. 127: An exemption from taxation contained in the charter of a corporation organized under it, is irrepealable and inviolable. Liverpool, London and Globe Ins. Co. v. McGuire, p. 227, and Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Green, p. 332: It is proper to refuse the petition of a party to remove a cause from the State court to the United States court, when it is not shown that either party is a citizen of the State. Holly Springs Sav. and Insurance. Co. v. Supervisors of Marshal, p. 281: Where a tax is imposed upon the capital stock of an incorporated company, regardless of its value, it is a tax upon the privilege of carrying on the business, and is valid and constitutional, although the entire capital consists of non-taxable securities; aliter where the tax is imposed upon the value of the capital stock as property. Jelks v. Barrett, p. 315: The Statute of Frauds applies to sales of realty by auction. Lengsfield & Co. v. Richardson & May, p. 443: The rule requires that the entire professional intercourse between client and attorney, whatever it may consist in, should be protected; the exemption extends to all that passes between client and attorney in the course and for the purpose of business. Everman & Co. v. Robb, p. 653: A chattel mortgage upon crops to be grown annually, contained in a lease as security for rent, the lease being recorded, held to be valid against a subsequent creditor. Capitol State Bank v. Lane, p. 677: A bank which receives a note or bill for collection is bound to use due and proper diligence in making demand, and giving notice, and causing protests to be made so as to hold all parties liable, and in default of such diligence, the bank itself becomes liable to the party who deposited the note or bill. Memphis and Charleston R. R. Co. v. Green, p. 779: Where, through the negligence of a railroad company, a passenger who had purchased a ticket for a train, was prevented from taking the train, held that in the absence of all circumstances of malice, oppression, insult, mental or physical suffering, punitive damages would not be allowed, and a verdict of $1,500 set aside as excessive. The head-notes to the cases in the volume are carefully and accurately prepared. The index is good, and the book well printed and bound. CORRESPONDENCE. A HINT TO THE GOVERNOR. DREXEL BUILDING, NO. 3 BROAD ST.,} NEW YORK, August 13, 1877. To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal: SIR- On the 13th day of February, 1877, just six months ago, believing it to be my duty as a counselor at law, upon facts which came to my notice, I filed with the Governor of New York certain verified charges and specifications against the official arbitrator of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York. My communication was framed and presented under and in pursuance of section 2, chapter 495, of the Laws of 1865, the act which created the Court of Arbitration. I do not desire in any ex parte communication to a newspaper to spread before the public the contents and particulars of these charges, but I feel warranted in saying, here, that they were sufficiently grave in their character to require careful and impartial investigation, and that, if the facts as alleged by me are sustained by proof, they require the removal of the officer against whom they are exhibited. Since this communication was filed no notice whatever has been taken of it either by the Governor or by the person against whom the proceeding is directed, and no answers have been made to my repeated communications asking for the executive action upon it. I am left, therefore, under the imputation of having made a malicious and groundless attack upon a well-known member of the profession. This is a position I do not intend to occupy without protest, and I beg through your columns that the profession may be informed of the precise action taken by me; and that it may be known that I am ready to make proof of each and every statement I have made whenever the accused party shall demand, and the Governor shall order, an investigation. A MONG the foremost of the professional schools of this country is the law department of the Iowa State University. The Chancellor of this department, William G. Hammond, LL. D., is unequaled as an educator, and his assistants are men well known upon the bench or at the bar as able and learned lawyers. The name of Judge Dillon, who occupies the Professorship of Jurisdiction and Practice of Federal Courts, is known and highly honored by the profession all over the world. Judges Adams and Rothrock, of the Iowa Supreme Court, who lecture before the students, stand high among the judiciary of the west. Hon. James L. Love, the Professor of Commercial Law, is a gentleman of distinguished ability, and Messrs. Howe, Rogers, Duncumbe and Ross, who compose the remaining faculty, are all of them lawyers of experience and learning. The school possesses this advantage, that it offers to students an option between two courses, a longer and a shorter. The required course is embraced within a single year, but a second year's instruction is given to those who desire it and have already passed over the ground embraced in the regular course, and who have in fact already made progress enough to be admitted to the bar anywhere. The otherwise excellent publication, The Law and Equity Reporter, has the very bad habit of giving a resume of cases without any syllabus. We notice that the last number (No. 7, vol. iv) contains twenty-three cases, that nine of these have no syllabus, three of the nine being cases in the Court of Appeals of the State in which it is published. In these days of numerous reports lawyers examine such publications for the facility with which they can find points decided in advance of the regular reports. It is too much to ask that in order to determine whether the case is of any value to him he should read two or three pages of matter when a syllabus of six or eight lines would inform him in a moment. If a case is not worth the labor of a reasonable syllabus, giving its salient points, it is not worth publishing and ought not to be published. The practice of publishing cases without is a very careless and shiftless one, and the sooner it is discontinued the better. grave, and then the writer takes up the unfinished sentence of the letter thus Pistol or dagger will end your career. A cry will go to heaven for vengeance for the unlawful sentence on Mr. Price. Beware.- Your wife will be a widow in a week or two. A second inclosure was as follows: LIVERPOOL Mr. Justice Hawkins.-Sir-If you value your life beware of yourself. If Price get to heavy sentence, Beware. On the reverse side of this sheet was the word "Revenge," and underneath a rude sketch representing "Mr. Justice Hawkins being stabbed by the revenger of Price." Below this again was another coffin with a pistol and dagger, and the words, "Your death will be soon; order your coffin." The lid of the coffin bore this inscription: "In memory of Mr. Hawkins, who was stabbed rightly by a revenger." It is believed that the police have information which will enable them shortly to arrest the writer of these threatening letters. A case of interest to stockholders in banks which are reducing their capital stock, was decided on the 17th inst. in the New York Court of Common Pleas, by Van Hoesen, J. The case was Seeley v. New York National Exchange Bank, and the question involved was whether a national bank may, after reducing the amount of its capital stock, retain as a surplus or for other purposes, the whole or any portion of the money which it received for the stock that it retired. The defendant reduced its capital stock from $500,000 to $300,000. The court held that the money was paid as capital, and if it be no longer needed for that purpose, and if it be not required for the payment of debts, it has accomplished the end for which it was subscribed, and it ought to be returned to the shareholders. The bank has gone out of existence as a corporation with a capital of $500,000. Under a modified charter it commences a new life with a capital of $300,000. So far as the $200,000 of reduced stock is concerned, the corporation must be considered as having surrendered its charter and wound up its business. This being so, there is no doubt as to the duty it owes to the stockholders who own the retired stock. Payment cannot be deferred because the directors believe it for a creditor's advantage to keep him out of his money. In conclusion the court said: "The controversy in this case really is, whether or not the defendant should be compelled to pay the plaintiff the value of five shares, the amount which the directors have determined to retain as a surplus. If ordering judgment for the value of these shares would bring the litigation to a close, I should go no further than make such an order. But it appears to be necessary to provide for the indemnification of the plaintiff for the loss of his twenty-five shares, the transfer of which the bank refused to make upon its books. If I should order judgment merely for the value of the five shares, it is possible that the defendant would refuse to give the plaintiff a new certificate of fifteen shares, and to pay him the $500 which the directors have ordered to be paid to those who consent to relinquish two-fifths of Mr. Justice Hawkins.-Sir-You will be dead very their shares. To give the plaintiff complete redress, soon, and you had better order your coffin. Either it seems to me to be necessary to order judgment for Here follows a sketch of a coffin, with a pistol and a the value of the whole twenty-five shares. The deskull on the one side and a dagger and a skull on the fendant is liable for that value, having refused to perother. Beneath the coffin is the representation of amit the shares to be transferred upon its books. At the Liverpool Assizes, on August 7th, Thomas Briscoe Price was brought up to receive judgment, having been found guilty of manslaughter. The prisoner was sent to ten years' penal servitude. In the interval between the conviction and the sentence, Mr. Justice Hawkins received an envelope, dated "Liverpool, Aug. 2, 1877," marked "private," addressed "Mr. Justice Hawkins, Liverpool Assize Court, Liverpool," and indorsed "Immediate-delay is dangerous!" The packet, which was unpaid, contained the following extraordinary communications: ALL communications intended for publication in the LAW JOURNAL should be addressed to the editor, and the name of the writer should be given, though not necessarily for publication. Communications on business matters should be addressed to the publishers. The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1877. CURRENT TOPICS. THERE is a growing disposition to tinker with the fundamental law that, unless checked, will soon create as much uncertainty in respect to that law, what it is and what it will be, as now exists in regard to the many parts of the statute law. Almost every State in the Union has, within the last fifteen years, more or less remodelled its constitution, and the federal constitution has, within the same time, received some very material additions. And in some of the States, where the existing organic law is of recent creation, movements are being made with the purpose of changing it in very many respects. The latest of these is in Georgia, where a convention has just brought forth, after six weeks' labor, an instrument, which, if adopted by the people, will hereafter be known as the constitution of that State. In some respects this proposed constitution is better than the one at present in force, but in others it is a change in the wrong direction. Like too many other enactments of this kind, it undertakes to go into details, and to do what might be safely left to the legislature. The judiciary are to be hereafter elected by the legislature, instead of appointed by the governor, and the terms of those now in office are cut short. The salaries of the Supreme Court judges are limited to $2,500 each per annum, but the number constituting that court is not increased. The effect of the changes made cannot be to elevate the character of the bench of the highest court, while the one not made, namely, increasing the number of those occupying that bench from three to five, would have, in many respects, made the court better and stronger. The instrument contains a provision forbidding the granting of any perpetual charter giving immunities to any corporation, and also one looking to the control of railway charges, and one forbidding the lending of the State credit to any private enterprise. The whipping-post is to be abolished, as is also imprisonment for debt. The homestead right is reduced to $2,500, and the husband is given the right to waive all but $300 of it. It is said that the prospects of the adoption of the proposed constitution is doubtful, the press of the State generally opposing it. Taking every thing together, it is perVOL. 16.- No. 9. | haps as well that it should be defeated, for its bad qualities compensate for its good ones, and a change should not be made except for the better. The subject chosen by the Committee on Prizes of the New York State Bar Association for the postgraduate prize of $250 is this: "The legal relations of capital and labor; the right of the State to interfere between employer and employed, and what legislation, if any, should be had on this subject." To say nothing of the manner in which the title of the subject is expressed, it seems to us that the subject itself is not such a one as a purely legal association would care about having discussed. It would be one proper enough for a political economist or a devotee of social science, but possesses little interest to a lawyer as such. Besides, even the most carefully prepared treatise upon such a topic would be principally theoretical, and therefore would have but little practical value. We look, therefore, as a result of the selection made, for a number of essays from those who are devoted rather to literature and philosophy than to law, and, as the law is a jealous mistress, from those who do not and will not rank high at the bar. A body of striking miners at the west have taken a practical way of finding out what are the legal relations of capital and labor, and how far the State will interfere between the employer and employed, by filing a petition in the United States District Court at Chicago, asking the court to arbitrate in relation to their grievances. The petition will undoubtedly not accomplish what those making it desire, but it is well enough for them to make a trial-much better than to resort to force. The application is probably prompted by the idea that a law resembling that at one time in force in England, authorizing compulsory arbitration (5 Geo. IV, chap. 96), prevails here. The workings of the English law were not at all satisfactory, and it was extensively modified by chap. 46 of 35 and 36 Victoria. It may be possible by some statutory provisions to secure amicable settlement of disputes concerning wages, but no amount of legislation can remove the question from the influence of the law of supply and demand, which seems to be what those who desire such legislation are striving to do. A writer in the Southern Law Review protests against the custom of lawyers, in writing the title given to one who executes a mortgage, "mortgagor." This is claimed to be erroneous, the correct spelling of the word being "mortgageor." The general rule is, that a final silent e is omitted when an affix beginning with a vowel is added, but when the affix begins with a or o, and the silent e comes immediately after c or g, it is not omitted. We think, however, the almost universal acquiescence of the lawyers, who are almost the only ones who ever have occasion to write the word, in the spelling "mortgagor," will justify such spelling. Webster, indeed, does not approve it, but Bouvier does, and it certainly is less liable to lead to mistakes than that advocated by the critics. The Nation keeps up its attacks on Judge Dillon, or perhaps we should say, permits the attacks to be kept up, as it disclaims any responsibility for them, although it permits them to appear in its columus, and yields those columns only to the extent of allowing an abstract of Judge Dillon's defense. The newspaper press in all parts of the country have, however, expressed their disapproval of the course of the Nation, and their entire confidence in the slandered magistrate, so it is of little moment what any of the slanderers may say or print hereafter. The Code of Civil Procedure goes into effect today, supplanting to a great extent the law regulating practice known as "The Code of Procedure." The old Code, which is now as a whole a thing of the past, went into effect July 1, 1848, a little over twenty-nine years ago. It was the first attempt made to remove from the administration of justice a vast amount of ridiculous formality which embarrassed the conduct of legislation and made the practice of the law a trade in which success was dependent upon sharpnesss and trickery rather than upon learning and merit. The rules regulating procedure for a century or more had been the butt of novelists and satirists, and in the minds of the people justice and law were considered in no respect connected. The prominence given to questions of practice and pleading by the courts rendered the result of an appeal to them uncertain, and in that way made them shields for fraud and wrong rather than vindications of justice and ministers of equity. The Code changed all this, and the courts of justice now pass upon the disputes of suitors, and not, as they previously did, upon technical points in the pleadings or proceedings before them. The Code met with much opposition at first; in fact, both the Bench and Bar opposed it, and most of the leaders in the profession prophesied its early abrogation. The generation who occupied the high places upon the Bench or at the Bar when the old Code went into force, have nearly all passed away. Yet the Code has proved a success, and the old common-law practice has become an obsolete thing in almost every place where it prevailed in 1848. How long the new Code will remain the law of procedure it is too early to determine, but as movements of this nature never go backwards, it is not likely that we will see the entire old Code of Procedure in force again. NOTES OF CASES. N the case of Phelps v. Murray et al., decided in the Tennessee Court of Chancery, at the April, 1877, Term, the question arose as to the validity of a chattel mortgage given to secure an antecedent debt upon property described as follows: "Our entire stock of goods, and each and every article com prising the same, now in our store, Nos. 19 and 21 North College street, Nashville, and any other goods which may from time to time during the existence of this mortgage, be purchased by the grantors and put into said store to replace any part of said stock which may have been disposed of, or to increase or enlarge the stock now on hand." The debt was evidenced by notes to fall due at a subsequent time, and the mortgage was conditioned to be void if the notes were paid, and there was a covenant by the grantors to keep the stock up to its condition at the date of conveyance, and to apply the profits arising from the sale of the stock to the payment of the notes as they fell due. The mortgage also covered real estate, and the grantors remained in possession. Complainant was a judgment creditor of defendant, and claimed the mortgage upon the personalty to be void as to him, and the defendants, who were the mortgagees, demurred to the bill. The court overruled the demurrer, holding the mortgage void. The general tenor of decisions is that such a contract as the one in question is not valid at law as to afteracquired goods, but it has been held that equity would enforce it. See Brett v. Carter, 3 Cent. L. J. 286, decided in the United States District Court for Massachusetts. Many cases, however, hold that equity will not enforce such a contract. Robinson v. Elliott, 22 Wall. 513; Edgell v. Hart, 9 N. Y. 213; Moody v. Wright, 13 Metc. 17; Collins v. Myers, 16 Ohio, 547. See, however, Hickman v. Perrin, 6 Cold. 135; Holroyd v. Marshall, 2 De G. F. & J. 596; Mitchell v. Winslow, 2 Story, 630. It is said that the reason of the decisions against the validity of such deeds does not rest, as some think, on a presumption of fraud, in conflict with the general rule that the question of fraud arising out of the retention of possession by the grantor, with power of disposition, is one of fact to be determined by the circumstances of the particular case. It rests principally upon the ground that such a transaction, irrespective of fraud, is against public policy, throwing open too wide a door for possible fraud, and the contract does not fall within that class where a court of equity will enforce a specific performance. See, also, as to mortgages of property not in esse, Pennock v. Coe, 23 How. 128; Dunham v. Railway Co., 1 Wall. 254; Galveston R. R. Co. v. Cowdrey, 11 id. 459; United States v. New Orleans R. R. Co., 12 id. 362; Clay v. E. T. & V. R. R. Co., 6 Heisk. 421; Willink v. Morris Canal Co., 3 Green's Ch. 877; Dalton v. Landahn, 27 Mich. 529; Congreve v. Evetts, 10 |