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Exch. 298; Hope v, Hayley, 5 E. & B, 830; Head v. v. Poindexter, 6 Watts & S. 227; Chamley v. Dullas, Goodwin, 37 Me. 182.

8 id. 353. Also see Poorman v. Mills, 39 Cal. 345;

2 Am. Rep. 451; Hemmelman v. Hotaling, 40 Cal. In Tripp et al., plaintiffs in error, v. Curtenius,

111; 6 Am. Rep. 600. recently decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan,

n error, who were engaged in the business In the case of Dunbar v. Glenn, recently decided of banking, issued, on the 22d of October, 1873, a | by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, plaintiff, who certificate of deposit dated that day, signed by them was the owner of a spring, the water from which and reading thus: "Daniel Howard has deposited | was claimed to have certain curative properties, and in this bank eight hundred dollars payable to the which was known as the Bethesda Mineral Spring, order of himself in current funds on the return of and who had for many years sold the water in different this certificate properly indorsed.” It contained on | parts of the country under the name of the Bethesda its margin these words, “Certificate of deposit, not water, and had always marked the name “ Bethessubject to check, and no interest.” Howard in- | da" upon the packages containing the water, sought dorsed the certificate to one Dyckman, who, in Feb 1 to obtain an injunction restraining defendant, who ruary, 1876, transferred it to plaintiffs in payment was the owner of a spring some twelve hundred of an antecedent indebtedness, and plaintiff shortly

feet distant from her (plaintiff's) spring, from using after presented it for payment, when payment was the name Bethesda in connection with the water refused. An action being brought, defendants set from his spring, or packages containing the same. up that $462 had been paid on the certificate about | The defendant claimed that the word, as used by the time it was issued, and that while Dyckman, the plaintiff, denoted the kind, quality, character or first indorsee, held it, the balance due thereon had utility of the water of her spring, and therefore been tendered to him. The court held, reversing a

| could not be a lawful trade-mark, and in support of judgment for the plaintiff below, that the certificate his claim referred to the original meaning of the was in legal effect a promissory note payable on de- | word “Bethesda,” as defined by biblical writers. mand, and that to make one a bona fide holder of The court, however, held, that as plaintiff applied such paper, so as to preclude the defense of pay- | the name “ Bethesda " to her spring to mark or disment, he must take it within a reasonably short tinguish the waters thereof in the market, she had period of its issue. The decision, so far as it holds the right to its exclusive use. It was not intended such an instrument to be in effect a promissory note, to, nor did it indicate the quality or constituents of is supported by numerous decisions. See Cate v. the water, but rather its origin or ownership, and as Patterson, 25 Mich. 191; Miller v. Austin, 13 How. a name for distinguishing the water, by wbich it 218; Laughlin v. Marshall, 19 nl. 390; Carey v. Mc-| might be bought and sold. The general rule govDougald, 7 Ga. 84; Kilgore v. Bulkley, 14 Conn. 362; erning trade-marks in such a case is, that where the Bank of Orloans v. Merrill, 2 Hill, 295; Welton v. trade-mark, in its original signification or by assoAdams, 4 Cal. 37; Johnson v. Barney, 1 Iowa, 531. | ciation, distinctively points to the origin or ownerSee, however, Nat. Bank of Ft. Edward v. Wash. ship of the article to which it is applied, it will be Co. Nat. Bank, 5 Hun, 605, where it was held that a protected. But where it is a generic or geographicertificate of deposit issued by a bank and payable cal name, designating a city or district of country, on its return properly indorsed, was valid against or is merely descriptive of the article manufactured, the bank in the hands of a bona fide holder, notwith and which can be employed with truth by other standing it was not presented until seven years after manufacturers, it is not entitled to legal protection issue, and that in the meantime a payment had been as a trade-mark. See Amoskeag Manuf. Co. v. Spear, made to the original holder, and that such certifi 2 Sandf. 599; Coats v. Holbrook, 2 Sandf. Ch. 586; cate is not dishonored until it is presented. See, Congress and Empire Spring Co. v. High Rock Spring also, as holding that no mere lapse of time will ren- | Co., 45 N. Y. 291; 6 Am. Rep. 82; Canal Co. v. der a certified check part due or dishonored, Willets Clark, 13 Wall. 311; Brooklyn White Lead Co. v. v. Phonix Bank, 2 Duer, 121; F. & M. Bank v. B. Masury, 25 Barb. 416; Wolfe v. Goulard, 18 How. & D. Bank, 14 N. Y. 624; Smith v. Miller, 43 W. 64; Burke v. Cassin, 45 Cal. 468; 13 Am. Rep. 204; T. Rep. 176; Meade v. Merch. Bank, 25 N. Y. 147; Stokes v. Landgraff, 17 Barb. 608; Corwin v. Daly, Merch. Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. 648; Guard. 7 Bosw. 222; Caswell v. Davis, 58 N. Y. 223; 17 Am. Bank v. Bank of Penn., 39 Penn. St. 92. See, how- Rep. 233 (see points of counsel in this case, which ever, as supporting the principal case, Brumagin v. are very exhaustive); T'aylor v. Gillies, 59 N. Y. Tallant, 29 Cal. 503, where it is held that the statute 331; 17 Am. Rep. 333; Perry v. Truefit, 6 Beav. 66; of limitations begins to run against a banker's cer- Fetridge v. Wells, 4 Abb. Pr. 144; Coffeen v. Buinton, tificate of deposit payable on demand from the date 4 McLean, 516; Croft v. Day, 7 Beav. 84; Choynski of the same, and that no special demand is necessary | v. Cohen, 39 Cal. 501; 2 Am. Rep. 476; Meneely v. to put the statute in motion. See contra, Patterson | Mencely, 62 N. Y. 427; 20 Am. Rep. 489.

Manera la protection

separate States' rights, star against star, and stripe against EXTEMPORANEOUS SPEAKING.

stripe; but that the flag of the Union may keep its stars

and stripes corded and bound together in indissoluble THIS subject, which is of great interest to our ties. I hope I shall not see written as its motto, first Libprofession, was the text of a recent article in erty and then Union. I hope I shall see no such delusive

and deluded motto on the flag of that country. I hope to the New York Times newspaper, which disclosed a

see spread all over it, blazoned in letters of light and curious history of the most celebrated passage of proudly floating over land and sea, that other sentiment, American history. We refer, of course, , to the dear to my heart, Union and liberty, now and forever, peroration of Webster's reply to Hayne in the fed

one and inseparable." eral Senate. The subject possesses additional inter Now, if Mr. Gales is reliable, one thing is very est to us, also, because we once essayed a biograph- evident, namely, that this passage, instead of being ical sketch of the great orator in these columns. carefully thought out and pre-arranged, as has been While we quite agree with the great authority ( believed, was purely extemporaneous. Herein it quoted by the Times writer, that “the way to make

was different from the orator's custom, which, it is a good extemporary speech is to prepare it in ad well known, was to arrange his finest passages bevance,” yet, so far as our profession is concerned, forehand. Such was the case, for instance, with it must be assumed that, in general, preparation is the famous passage in the Bunker Hill oration, comimpracticable. With few exceptions, the lawyer mencing “Venerable men!” The version which has no opportunity for preparation. He must rise, Mr. Gales gives us sounds much more like an imperfresh from the evidence, and pour forth his unpre fect attempt at reporting than the practiced uttermeditated thoughts. This is true certainly of most ance, by a great orator, of a passage designed to be trials before juries. As to arguments in the higher the most impressive of the entire oration, and courts, it is different. There is ample opportunity which, one would suppose, not only according to for preparation, and indeed most of us carefully | his custom, but in view of its important office in print much of our arguments. Every lawyer must his speech, he would have written or thought out. feel, too, when he has delivered himself, how much But now let us print the orator's own deliberate better he could have done if he had had a few hours version of the same passage, and compare the two: for arrangement, and even for a little writing. It

“When my eyes shall be turned to behold for the last is said that Choate wrote immensely during his time the sun in heaven, may I not see him shining on the trials, and always had a pile of notes to speak from.

broken and dishonored fragments of a once glorious Union; What a blessed hour it is for the lawyer, when his

on States dissevered, discordant, belligerent; on a land

rent with civil feuds, or drenched, it may be, in fraternal antagonist precedes him, and he himself can make |

blood! Let this last feeble and lingering glance rather bea few notes of his discourse! And yet, on the aver

hold the gorgeous ensign of the republic, now known and

honored throughout the earth, still full high advanced, its age, can it be said that the plaintiff's attorney makes a better speech than the defendant's attorney? stripe erased or polluted, not a single star obscured, bear Under the circumstances, the wonder is with us not ing for its motto, no such miserable interrogatory as " What

is all this worth?" nor those other words of delusion and that lawyers do no better, but that they do so well.

folly, “Liberty first and Union afterwards;" but everyWe are every day filled with admiration at the

where, spread all over in characters of living light, blazing superb unpremeditated rhetoric of the law courts. on all its ample folds, as they float over the sea and over Much of it is probably better than it would be after

the land, and in every wind under the whole heavens, that

other sentiment, dear to every true American heart, preparation. A great many of our profession are

Liberty and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable!” the reverse of Goldsmith, who "wrote like an

The general superiority of the latter version is angel, but talked like poor Poll." As to the Webster oration, the Times writer would

apparent, but we can hardly subscribe to the Times have us believe that the peroration in question was

writer's judgment, that the former is “clumsy"

and “involved," and that it more nearly approaches infinitely inferior, as uttered, to its present well

the ridiculous" than the "sublime." In some known form. He gives us the original short-hand

respects we even think the former preferable. For report of Joseph Gales, editor of the National Intelli

example, if the orator had extemporaneously spoken gencer, taken from Mr. Webster's lips, and from

of “the sun in heaven," we might not have critiwhich the orator prepared the printed version.

cised it, but we cannot understand why he should The contrast between the two may be reckoned one of the curiosities of literature. Mr. Gales' version

deliberately have preferred that expression to "the

meridian sun.” Again, we must say that the omisis as follows:

sion of the idea, "star against star and stripe against “When my eyes shall be turned for the last time on the stripe," was not judicious; that idea is one of the meridian sun, I hope I may see him shining bright upon my united, free, and happy country. I hope I shall not live to

best in either version. “Broken fragments" is see his beams falling upon the dispersed fragments of the tautological; “dispersed fragments" is better; structure of this once glorious Union. I hope I may not “dishonored fragments" alone better yet. It is see the flag of my country with its stars separated or obliterated; torn by commotions ; smoking with the blood |

apparent, from the report of Mr. Gales, that the of civil war. I hope I may not see the standard raised of | words “ what is all this worth?” had no place in

arms and trophies streaming in their original lustre, not a

the original, and the oration would be better with seem weak to the reader if he had not been accusout them; they are redundant, and weaken the tomed to the printed version, is somewhat queseffect of the true comparison, which is between tionable. The magnificent reference to the national “Liberty first and Union afterwards,” and “Liberty | ensign, floating in sight over the dome of the Senand Union," etc. Again, it may be asked, what ate chamber, with the orator's passionate depreca“trophies” are there on the flag? As to “dis- | tion of dishonor to that flag, was the prominent idea severed, discordant, belligerent,” we always had our | in both, and swallowed up all mere felicities of exdoubts whether the “God-like Daniel” really used pression. That was one of the great crises of orathose words, and it now would seem that he did tory, like that moment of old, when the Athenians, not, but they are magnificent, and we will let them fired by Demosthenes' appeals, rose as one man and stand. Finally, the climax in both versions is not cried, “let us go against Philip!” After all, it is properly emphasized; the stress should be on the ideas that count in oratory, and not mere words. perpetuity, not on the condition, of the Union. The man who has the great ideas is not so much in The words describing its perpetuity should imme- need of words; to the man of few or small ideas, diately succeed the emphasized "and.” Besides, they are indispensable. - forever" is a better word to pronounce in conclusion than “inseparable." So we would have it, "Liberty and Union, one and inseparable, now and

LAW FOR THE DOG-DAYS. forever.” The greatest superiority of the printed IF our recollection serves us, it was Mr. Curdle, the version consists in its elimination of the personal critical gentleman in Nicholas Nickelby, who was pronoun, although doubtless Webster's hearers felt such a stickler for the dramatic unities. Said that at the moment that the main thing after all was

acute gentleman, “the unities, sir, are a completewhat the speaker thought about the subject. Web ness — a kind of universal dovetailedness with regard ster was a superb egotist. When the dissolution to time and place — a sort of general oneness, if I of the Whig party was imminent he asked, “what may be allowed so strong an expression." It has is to become of me?"

occurred to us, in our anxious purveying for the If the orator had employed us to write out his legal taste, that we can unite legal instruction with peroration as he ought to have pronounced it, we

an artistic sense of propriety, in writing upon legal should have recorded that he said:

topics in the "dog-days,” by devoting a short chap

ter to dog-law, in which the books of late are very *When my eyes shall be turned for the last time on the meridian sun, may I not see him shining on the dishonored

rich. Thus we preserve, if not a “dovetailedness," fragments of a once glorious Union; on States dissevered,

at least a dog-tailedness with regard to time and discordant, belligerent; on a flag arrayed star against star place that would satisfy Mr. Curdle. and stripe against stripe; on a land rent with civil feuds,

In Muller v. McKesson, 10 Hun, 44, we find a case or drenched, it may be, in fraternal blood! Let their last feeble and lingering glance rather behold the gorgeous en

suited to our purpose. The defendants, in their sign of the republic, now known and honored throughout chemical factory, at Brooklyn, kept a large Siberian the earth, still full high advanced, streaming in its original

bloodhound as a watch-dog, chained by day, loose lustre, not a stripe erased or polluted, nor a single star obscured; bearing for its motto not those words of delusion

in the factory yard at night. It was part of the and folly, “Liberty first and Union afterwards;" but, blazing | duty of the plaintiff, who was in the employ of the in characters of living light on all its ample folds, as they

defendants, to open the gate of the factory yard in float over the sea and over the land, and in every wind under the whole heavens, that other sentiment, dear to

the morning, to admit the operatives. On the mornevery true American heart, Liberty and Union, one and ing in question, as he was returning from the exeinseparable, now and forever!”

cution of his duty, he was attacked by the dog, It is apparent that Webster, in the reconstruction thrown to the ground, and severely bitten on his of his peroration, had in mind his favorite poet posterior, his arm, and his ear, and his hand was Milton's description of Satan's banner, in the first

permanently disabled. The dog had before this book of “Paradise Lost:”.

bitten the defendant's superintendent, and he had

informed the defendant's general agent of the fact, * Th' imperial ensign, which, full high advanc'd, Shone like a meteor streaming to the wind,

and when the superintendent purchased the dog for With gems and golden lustre high emblaz'd,

the defendant, he was informed that the dog was bad Seraphic arms and trophies."

and would bite. The jury awarded the plaintiff The employment by the orator of the words itali- $1,500 damages, and this was affirmed by the Gencised, or equivalent expressions, but a single one of eral Term of the First Department. Judge Dykman which was contained in the spoken peroration, shows delivers an interesting opinion, in which he expresses that there was an unconscious or intentional imita- | himself in terms of severity on the reprehensible tion. Doubtless the passage was improved for the dog, and draws a pleasing contrast between such reader by this infusion of Milton, but whether | ferocious animals and the useful and kind domestic it would have been any more effective upon the animals, from which the latter may derive much sathearer, or whether the words actually spoken would isfaction and encouragement. The judge even drops into poetry, and professes to quote the following is bound to so secure it as to effectually prevent it verses:

doing mischief.” This is all right and just; we do " The ox toils through the furrow,

not object to it; but why does the judge speak of Obedient to the goad;

“ ferocious and overgrown dogs?" It is the underThe patient ass, up flinty paths, Plods with his weary load.

grown dogs that do the mischief. Big dogs, like With whine and bound the spaniel

human giants, are as a rule good-natured. It is the His master's whistle hears;

curs and dwarfs that are dangerous. But the courts And the sheep yields her patiently To the loud clashing shears."

give no locus penitentiæ to dogs. If they have once

bitten, the presumption is that they will go on doBut he does not give his author, and as we have

ing so. Quite different is the ruling in regard to never met the lines before, we have an uneasy sus

the dog's master. If a railroad switchman once negpicion that the learned judge is trying to palm off

lects his duty, and wrecks a train, it is not negligent some of his own verses on the profession. There is

for the corporation to continue him in their employ, a suggestiveness in the last two lines, that confirms

although he repeats the fault and injures the passenus in the belief that the verses must have been writ

gers. The presumption is that his forgetfulness is ten by a lawyer. We really hope the judge did not

not a habit but an accident, and that he will learn intend a sarcasm by this citation. As to the naughty

wisdom from experience. It may be that Mr. Bergh dog he observes: “The dogs have done more mis

may here find reason to insist that dogs “don't have chief than any other domestic animals, and their

a fair shake." cases have been oftener before the courts, and some judges have been inclined to the opinion that if a

VICARIOUS LIABILITY. person chooses to keep a dog that is savage and dan

THE report of the select committtee on employers' gerous, he does so at his peril, and is liable for any

I liability for injuries to their servants is now in the injury he may do without any proof of scienter. hands of the public, and action will no doubt be taken There is great reason for holding this to be the rule, upon it in the next session. The subject is in itself of for in such a case the dog is in the class of animals great importance and difficulty; but it has, moreover, that are of a ferocious nature and disposition, and

a special interest as a chapter in the natural history of

legal institutions, and the student whose tastes lead ought to be looked upon the same as a lion, a tiger,

him that way will find good entertainment in the evior a bear.” The judge might have added, that

dence taken in the course of the inquiry. The comwhen people want to indicate that a man is going mittee itself was a thoroughly representative one; masto ruin, they say he is going to the dogs," a phrase ters, workmen, and lawyers all had their voices in it. derived from the ancient Greeks, who were wont to

The witnesses who came before it covered a still wider say this of ruined gamblers, their dice having ani

field of learning, experience and interests. As natur

ally happens in such a case, their examination often mals instead of dots on the sides, and the lowest or

became a discussion, and it is hard to imagine how a losing side always a dog.

more searching discussion of the whole matter could In State v. Lymus, 26 Ohio, 400; 20 Am. Rep. 772, it have been insured. The most obvious result, perhaps, is held that a dog is not the subject of larceny; that is to show the extreme difficulty of fixing any general it was not at common law, and is not included in the rule as to liabilities of this kind on grounds of pure

expediency. The committee, though appointed for a expression “goods and chattels” in the statute.

more limited object, found it impracticable to deal The unpopular dog appears again in Meibus v.

MEWUS V. with that object without considering the general quesDodge, 38 Wis. 300; 20 Am. Rep. 6. The defendant, tion of the liability of a master for his servants' acts. having driven to Waterloo, left his sleigh in the street | The rule is that a master is answerable for every thing in charge of a dog, which he knew was ferocious done by the servant within the scope of his employand accustomed to bite people. The plaintiff, an

ment; not merely, be it observed, for things done in

obedience to specific orders — for things done in direct infant of seven years, came to the sleigh, and in

disobedience to them may often make the master liaspired by the universal passion of male infants for

ble. Such is the law, it is believed, of all civilized whips, meddled with tho defendant's whip. The countries, and so it has long been settled in England. innocent babe incontinently sustained a Waterloo | It is accepted without examination, and gives rise to defeat, for the dog bit him, just two hundred and little complaint; yet it is curious to see, when one fifty dollars' worth, the jury said, and this was af

does examine it, how hard it is to find reasons for it.

The committee had witnesses before them whose firmed. Judge Cole reviews the case, and quotes

strong interest it was to do so, their contention befrom an opinion by Chief Justice Redfield (Browon

ing that the rule ought to be applied without limit. v. Carpenter, 26 Vt. 638), where a ferocious dog at For a limit in modern times has been set to it by the large was pronounced hostis communis. Now we judicial doctrine that a man who engages himself in think that our court, in pronouncing such radical an employment where accidents may happen must be doctrine against dogs, ought to pronounce it in our

presumed to take his wages as covering the risk of ac

cidents in the course of the service, though they may own tongue, so that the offending animal may have

be due to such acts of another servant as in the case fair warning; at all events, in dog-Latin. Judge of a stranger would give a right of action against the Redfield thinks that “one who keeps a savage dog | employer. It is possible to object to this limitation on various grounds. The simplest, and the only one striking at one distinct evil that arises from the prestaken on the side of the workmen by their advocates, ent state of things. A master being liable, one may is that the general rule of liability is just, and there is practically say, only for his own actual negligence and no reason for limiting it. Why they hold the general | not for that of his delegates, the law as it stands puts rule to be just is not so easy to discover; but their a premium on his giving as little personal atteution as prevailing idea seems to be that whoever is injured he can to the management of his own business; and without his own fault has a natural right to be in this unexpected and certainly undesirable result would demnified by somebody, and the employer ought to be be removed by the change proposed. liable, because he is as a rule the only person who can It is a significant fact, and seems hardly to have repay, and because the work is carried on for his profit. | ceived sufficient attention, that while the rule of vicaIf it is the essence of conservatism to defend against rious liability prevails under all civilized laws, the exall innovations an established rule for which it is not ception is unknown except in English and Americani easy to account, it must be said that the spokesmen of courts. It has been attempted indeed, but without the trade unions have in this case adopted an emi- success, to introduce it in France. The question still nently conservative line of argument. On the other remains where the rule came from. A modern lawhand, those who spoke from the employers' point of yer represents it to himself as allied to the doctrines view saw the natural justice of the case quite differ of agency. The agent represents the principal, and ently, and professed themselves unable to perceive

the principal must answer for his acts. It is easy to why one man should be liable for another man's neg

see, however, that there is a fallacy in extending this ligence. It is possible, again, to disapprove of the

from transactions where the principal has invested limitation without approving of the rule. One may

the agent with real or apparent authority to bind him, say that the rule is itself open to dispute, but so long

and persons deal with the agent on the faith of such as it is in possession it ought not to be encroached authority, to cases where no such authority exists and upon by an artificial exception founded on a fictitious there is no question of giving credit at all. A duty to contract. This was the view of Lord Justice Brett, particular persons in particular relations is thus exwho spoke of the employers' present immunity in the panded into a duty to all the world. Such reasoning class of cases specially before the committee as a bad

is in truth one of the many after-thoughts invented exception to a bad law. But in answer to this it may to account for institutions whose real origin has been be said that the rule itself is an exception from the

forgotten. In this case there is reason to believe that general principle that a man is liable only for his own the principle of vicarious liability is realig a survival acts, and that the supposed exception only marks the from an extremely archaic stage of jurisprudence, and frontier line maintained by the general law. This was

is grounded on ways of thinking which at this day can in substance the opinion of Lord Justice Bramwell, hardly be found existing save among primitive naand is adopted by the report of the committee. Once

tions. The old Roman law gives us a fairly trustwormore, it is quite possible to lay the chief weight of the

thy clue. There the master of the family was liable objection on the manner in which the limitation has

for damage done by his slave, by a descendant under been introduced. Whether an existing rule of law be

his power, or by any animal or thing of which he was good or bad, it is startling to any but a strictly legal

owner; and this apart from the question whether he mind to find it cut down by a series of quite modern

was himself in fault. But in every case he could disdecisions in such a way as to make it practically in charge himself from further liability by delivering up operative in the very cases where its application (noxoe dedere) the offending person, animal, or thing would otherwise be most important, and where the

to the injured party; moreover, the liability was not reasons of policy on which the rule is supposed to be personal, but ran with the ownership or possession of founded appear to have the greatest force. So strong the offending body. If A's slaves damaged B’s propan instance of judicial legislation is open in a more erty, and A sold him to C before action brought, B than common degree to all the usual topics of ayi had to sue not A but C. In later times new remedies madversion; and the objection on this head is very de were provided for injuries caused by malice or neglicidedly expressed in the draft report prepared by Mr. gence, and in this and other ways large exceptions Lowe, which, though rejected by the committee in were made to the old law, for which, so far as it refavor of Sir H. Jackson's milder and more lawyer mained, the Roman lawyers invented more or less like composition, was supported by a considerable plausible reasons adapted to modern ideas, very much minority. The courts have indeed not only widened as English lawyers had done. But even in the develthe exception since the first introduction of it, but | oped Roman system there is enough to show that the have shifted its ground. They started from a not origin of the rule is probably to be sought (as lately very intelligible theory of “common employment," pointed out by an ingenious American writer) in the the real meaning of which seems to be that a work primitive notion that liability attaches directly to the man ought to know more about his fellow-workman thing doing the damage; or, to put it in what may be than the master does. Later cases have abandoned conjectured to be its true primitive form, that the this position to take up in its stead the fiction of an thing itself is guilty. Much may be found to confirm implied contract not to claim indemnity, and have this conjecture in archaic institutions elsewhere; extended the category of fellow-workmen till it in- among others the forfeiture of inanimate things causcludes persons who cannot be supposed to have the ing death under the name of deodands, which was least knowledge of one another's skill or control of part of English law within living memory. The treatone another's actions. The proposal at which the ment of things as responsible is the expression in ancommittee has now arrived is in effect to make a mas cient law of the doctrine, belief, or habit of thought ter who delegates his general authority liable for the called animism, which, whether strictly primitive or acts and defaults of his delegates as well as his own. not, is found deeply rooted among the lower races of This is a modest compromise, which does not affect to mankind. The fact is very singular, if so it is, that a settle any thing in principle, but has the merit of legal doctrine important in itself, and made of espe

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