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agreed that plaintiffs should have the right of absolute control over the goods at all times. Held, that Miller had no leviable interest in such property liable to seizure on execution. Sup. Ct., Minnesota, Sept. 28, 1877. Bentz v. Gussell (N. W. Rep.).

RECENT BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS.
FRAUD.

1. False swearing and fraud: omission of worthless debt from schedule.- If a bankrupt honestly regards a judgment held by him as worthless, he is not chargeable with false swearing or fraud if he omit it from his schedule. Even if it has value as an asset, and he considers it as having value, still its omission must be intentional in order to charge him with false swearing or fraud. U. S. Dist. Ct., W. D. Michigan. In re Winsor, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 152.

2. Keeping proper books of account.-A merchant or trader who, prior to his becoming such, has kept books of account showing the state of his affairs, is not required to carry their contents or any part of them into his books opened and kept as a trader, in order to satisfy the requirement of the statute as to a bankrupt keeping proper books of account while he is a merchant or tradesman. Keeping proper books of account, within the meaning of the bankrupt act, is the keeping of an intelligent record of the merchant's or tradesman's affairs, and with that reasonable degree of accuracy and care which is to be expected from an intelligent man in that business, and a casual mistake therein will not prevent a discharge. Ib.

3. Entry of chattel mortgage. It is not required that a chattel mortgage given to secure a debt shall be entered upon the merchant's or trader's books. An entry of notes upon the fly-leaf of the blotter is sufficient. Ib.

PARTNERSHIP.

1. Dissolution of: retiring partner must not impair partnership fund to detriment of creditors. If, on dissolution of a copartnership, the retiring partner takes out a portion of the assets of the firm for his individual use, he must do so without impairing the fund to which the creditors have the right in equity to look for payment; and it must be made clearly to appear that such remaining fund is ample. U. S. Dist. Ct., Wisconsin. In re Sauthoff & Olson, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 181.

2. Insolvent partnership: retiring partner: homestead. Where a copartnership is insolvent, or is possessed of assets not more than adequate for the payment of debts, one member of the firm cannot upon retiring rightfully withdraw beyond the reach of creditors, and to their injury, a portion of the assets and make a personal appropriation of those assets by placing them in the form of a homestead. Under such circumstances, though it takes the form of a homestead, the property is as much within the reach of a court of equity as before; and no such change in its character can give it new sacredness, or endow its possessor with new privileges in its ownership or use. Ib.

SURETYSHIP.

1. When assignment of equitable estate to indemnify sureties valid: consideration.-In North Carolina a bond for title given on an executory contract for the purchase of lands conveys an equitable estate in the land to the vendee which is assignable. An assignment of such estate to indemnify sureties, made with

out intent to delay or defraud creditors, is valid, and the assignee is entitled to priority over judgment creditors of the assignor. Such assignment is valid although no money is paid; the debt upon which the sureties are liable furnishes a sufficient consideration to support it. It need not be registered to be available against creditors, unless the time limited by statute for the registration of the bond has expired. U. S. Dist. Ct., W. D. North Carolina. In re Reynolds, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 158.

2. When sureties regarded as creditors.-Where the principal on a debt is insolvent, the sureties, in respect to their liability, are regarded in equity as creditors, and may retain any funds of the principal in their hands, even against an assignee for value, without notice. Ib.

3. What assignable.-An interest in lands, acquired at an administrator's sale, where the administrator has not made title, is assignable; and such assignment need not be registered under the laws of North Carolina in order to be valid against creditors. Such equitable interest is liable to the liens of judgment creditors, subject to the equities of a surety of the debtor who holds a prior assignment thereof as indemnity for his liability. Ib.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

Principal and agent: solicitor receiving money for his client: payment by solicitor in to his private account: money earmarked.-B., a solicitor, was employed by the trustee for the sale of an estate, his duty being to receive the purchase-moneys and pay them in to the trustees' banking account. B. received large sums, paid them in to his private account, and died insolvent. His banking account at his death showed a large credit principally made up of specific sums which corresponded with receipts by him on account of sales of the trust estate. Held, that these specific sums could be followed by the trustees, and that there could not be a set-off allowed in respect of sums alleged to have been paid by B. on account of the trust estate. Decision of Malins, V. C., affirmed on appeal. Ch. Div., April 13, 1877. Birt v. Birt, 37 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 943.

DAMAGES.

Trespass: coal mine: remoteness of damage.-The defendant trespassed on the plaintiff's coal mine and worked part of the coal, leaving large pillars of coal unworked. Evidence having been brought to show that the coal left unworked was rendered practically worthless. Held, that damages in respect of the coal so left were not too remote; and an inquiry ordered. Ch. Div., August 7, 1877. Williams v. Raggett, 37 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 96.

MARINE INSURANCE.

Sub-agent of broker: lien on policies for premiums paid by him: notice.-Plaintiff, a shipowner, employed S. & Co., insurance brokers, to effect marine insurances for him. S. & Co. had acted as plaintiff's brokers for about three years previously, and the ordinary course of business was for plaintiff to pay S. & Co. on monthly accounts between them. S. & Co. effected the insurances through defendant, as a sub-agent, who paid the premiums. Defendant had notice throughout the transaction that S. & Co. were acting as brokers for plaintiff, and also knew the ordinary course of business between plaintiff and S. & Co., as to monthly payments, but the plaintiff did not know,

until after the policies had been effected, that S. & Co. had employed defendant or any one else to effect them. Plaintiff, in one of his usual monthly settlements with S. & Co., was debited with the amount of the premiums on the policies, but the policies remained. in defendant's hands. S. & Co. never paid defendant the amount of the premiums. A loss occurred on the property insured, and plaintiff brought an action against defendant to recover the policies. Held (reversing the decision of the Exchequer Division), that the defendant had a lien on the policies for the amount of the premiums paid by him. Ct. App., May 31, 1877. Fisher v. Smith, 37 L. T. Rep. (N. S.)

18.

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RESTRAINT OF TRADE.

Covenant not to advertise former trade connection: breach: injunction.-A, for valuable consideration, covenanted with B that he would not carry on certain businesses within ten miles of the town of O., and would not by publication, advertisement, circular, or otherwise hold himself out to have been, nor seek to induce others to believe him to have been, formerly connected in trade, either as partner, manager, or servant, with B." A and B had carried on business in copartnership at M. and O., and B still continued to carry on business at those places. Held, that the covenant was not unnecessarily wide for B's protection, nor in general restraint of trade; and that an advertisement issued by A, in which he described himself as late of O. and formerly of M.," was a breach of the covenant, and an injunction granted accordingly. Ch. Div., May 3, 1877. Wolmerhausen v. O'Connor, 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 921.

SALE OF REAL ESTATE.

Vendor and purchaser: contract by letters: description of vendors: “proprietors:" stipulation for formal contract: condition precedent: statute of frauds. Certain real estate was offered for sale in lots delineated upon a plan on which various conditions were printed, the last of the conditions being that each purchaser would be required to sign a contract embodying the foregoing conditions, and providing (inter alia) for the completion of the purchase at the expiration of not more than two months from the date of the contract. A purchaser made a verbal offer to the agent of the owners to purchase certain lots for £1,000. The agent told him that he must purchase subject to the conditions on the plan, and promised to submit his offer to the proprietors. Having done so, the agent wrote to the purchaser that "the proprietors" had agreed to accept his offer to purchase the specified plots for £1,000, subject to the conditions and stipulations printed on the plan, and that he had requested the solicitors to forward him the agreement for purchase. The purchaser wrote in reply that his offer had better be reconsidered, unless the proprietors were prepared to leave him at liberty to delay building if he thought fit, to which the agent replied that his former letter was not intended to convey a conditional acceptance of the offer, and that the purchaser was at liberty to do as he might think best about building. Shortly afterward a formal contract was sent to the purchaser, who thereupon wrote repudiating the contract and refusing to complete. On an action by the vendors for specific performance of the alleged contract, held (agreeing with Jessel, M. R.), that the word "proprietors" was a sufficient description of the vendors to satisfy the statute of frauds, but (differing from Jessel, M. R.) that specific performance could

not be decreed, inasmuch as there was no final contract between the parties, the signing of a formal contract being on the construction of the documents a condition precedent to the parties being bound. Ct. App.. June 8, 1877. Rossiter v. Miller, 37 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 14.

SHIPPING.

Carriage of merchandise: warranty of seaworthiness: ship seaworthy whilst lying in port of loading, but becoming unseaworthy at time of sailing on voyage with cargo on board.-The implied warranty of seaworthiness into which the owner of a ship enters with the owner of her cargo, attaches at the time when the perils of the intended voyage commence, that is, when she sets sail with the cargo on board for her port or destination; and this warranty is broken if she is then unfit to encounter these perils, although she may have been seaworthy whilst lying in the port of loading, and also at the times of starting from her anchorage for and arriving at the place of loading appointed by the charterer, and of commencing to take on board her cargo. The defendants were the owners of a vessel, and chartered her for a voyage to D., from the port of S., where she was then lying in a seaworthy condition. Pursuant to the terms of the charterparty, and by the orders of the plaintiff, the vessel proceeded to a wharf situate in the port of S., and there loaded on board a cargo of cement belonging to the plaintiff. At the time when she commenced taking in the cargo she was seaworthy; but by the time of setting sail on her voyage she had from some unknown cause become unseaworthy. The defendants were not guilty of negligence in sending her to sea in the condition in which she then was. Soon after starting from S. she began to leak; but the wind being fair for the voyage to D., the master resolved to keep his course for D., and he was not guilty of any negligence in not returning to S. The vessel did not reach D., but foundered at sea, and the plaintiff's cargo of cement was totally lost. Held, that the warranty of seaworthiness implied by law upon entering into the charterparty had been broken, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the value of the cargo shipped by him on board the vessel. Cohn v. Davidson, L. R., 2 Q. B. D. 455.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

Parol promise to give house: agreement in consideration of marriage: possession: part performance: incumbrances: statute of frauds.-A father, whose daughter was about to be married, verbally promised her and her intended husband that he would give them a certain leasehold house as a wedding present for his daughter. With this view he had just purchased the house, which was subject to a charge in favor of a building society. Immediately on the marriage the young couple entered into possession of the house, and remained there until the father's death, paying the ground rent rates and taxes, but no rent being demanded of them by the father. A few years afterward the father died intestate, £100 still remaining due to the building society in respect of the charge upon the house. Held, affirming the decision of Malins, V. C., that the giving possession of the house was a part performance sufficient to take the case out of the operation of the statute of frauds, and that the agreement to give the house, without any mention of incumbrances, being established, the husband and wife were entitled to have an asssigument of the house free from incumbrances, and to have the balance due

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to embrace the whole body of the law relating to civil actions and defenses. This volume covers these subjects: Carriers, Action on the Case, Cemeteries, Certiorari, Charities, Charter-Party, Chattel Mortgages, Nature and Ownership of Chattels, Choses in Action, Churches (including religious corporations), Commodatum or Loan for use, Common Law, Contribution, Corporations, Action of Covenant, Covenants, Creditor's Bill, Damages, Death, Action of Debt, Deeds, Deposit, Detinue, Bill or Suit for Discovery, Divorce, Domicile, and Easements. The plan, purpose and scope of this work were noticed and explained by us in a review of the first volume at page 215 of volume 15 of this journal, and we need only say that the present volume is, in every respect, fully up to the promise made in the first volume. The work, when completed, will be a valuable addition to the legal compilations of the age.

WOODMAN & TIDY'S FORENSIC MEDICINE. Forensic Medicine and Toxicology. By W. B. Woodman, M. D., and C. M. Tidy, M. B. 1 val., 8vo., pp. 1083. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston, 1877.

This is a valuable work, but for medical experts only, for, instead of being, as its title imports, a treatise on Forensic Medicine, it is more properly a treatise on the practice of medicine in its incidental relations to chemistry and the administration of justice. The authors must have so intended it themselves, when in their volume of 1,083 pages they devoted nearly 500 to the chemistry of poisons alone, with chapters upon the surgery of wounds, surgical fever, diet-tables, the law of projectiles, and only some seventy-five pages to the great subject of mental unsoundness. Even on this topic they have given us descriptions alone of the medical aspect in gross of insanity, represented by some forty cases, while at the same time omitting to give us the judicial aspects of these cases or telling us what principles they serve to illustrate in the law of insanity. We have no fault to find with the authors, because being physicians they write as physicians, and we take pleasure in bearing witness to the great variety of physical topics they have embraced in their work, and the skillful manner in which they are handled. It cannot be otherwise than a most valuable contribution to the boundless subject of medical jurisprudence, but must always remain a practically incomprehensible volume to lawyers, nor is this to be wondered at. It has long ago been admitted that no work on medical jurisprudence can be successfully written either by a physician or a lawyer, and the history of the literature of that subject fully justified this assertion. In every case where this has been attempted it will be found to be the invariable rule, and one in complete consistency with the despotism of professional training, that the physi

cian sees and writes best when he writes as a physician, and the lawyer, in like manner, when he confines himself alone to legal topics. The two most useful works ever written upon medical jurisprudence, in point of utility to lawyers, were works cf combined authorship, the first being that of Paris and Fonblanque, in England, and the next that of Wharton and Stillé, in our own country. And the merit of these works lies in the simple fact that in each, the medical topics were treated by a physician and the legal ones by a lawyer. For practical utility, therefore, these works, other things being equal, may be considered as models of what a legal treatise on this subject should be. Should any lawyer, however, desire to sound the depths of such physical topics as are treated in this volume, he will be abundantly rewarded. It is not only well written, but profusely illustrated by colored drawings, thus giving an exceptionally high value to the discussion of the subjects embraced in the text.

MAINE REPORTS, VOL. LXVI. Reports of Cases in Law and Equity determined by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. By Josiah D. Pulsifer, Reporter to the State. Maine Reports, Volume LXVI. Portland, Me.: Dresser, McLellan & Co., 1877.

This volume appears to contain a large number of valuable cases. Among them we notice the following: Adams v. Blethen, p. 19: The liabilities implied by indorsing a promissory note can be qualified or restricted only by express terms. Wing v. Wing, p. 62: The words "A B stole windows from C D's house," are not in themselves actionable as imputing either a charge of larceny, or an act of malicious mischief upon real estate. Haverly v. Bass, p. 71: A statute conferring upon municipal officers power to remove a person infected with a disease dangerous to public health, is not unconstitutional. Meader v. White, p. 90: A loan of money made on the Lord's day is void, and a promise to repay it cannot be enforced. Ladd v. Patten, p. 97: A contracted to pay B a stipulated price to do certain work, and "to find help" to aid him. B used a machine owned and invented by him in the work, which dispensed with the need of "help." Held, that A was not liable to pay for the use of the machine. Dillingham v. Blood, p. 140: A note given for intoxicating liquors sold in violation of law, is good in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice, and of his assignee who had notice when he took the note. Ryder v. Mansell, p. 167: The rule forbidding a tenant to deny his landlord's title applies between the hirer and letter of a house standing upon the land of a third person as personal estate. Inhabitants of Stockton v. Staples, p. 197: The domicile of a party in any particular locality is acquired by a union of intent and of presence. Lindsay v. Hill, p. 212: In order to render a contract void for usury, it must be tainted with that offense at its inception, but a subsequent receipt of usurious interest upon a valid contract will render the lender liable to the penalty or forfeiture incurred. Averill v. Longfellow, p. 237: A claim for damages for assault and battery is not assignable. Little v. Boston and Maine Railroad, p. 230: A common carrier is liable for the loss of a parcel, however valuable, though ignorant of its contents, unless he make a special acceptance. White v. Bradley, p. 254: Ways of necessity over adjoining land of a grantor do not include ways of convenience to all parts of the lot granted. State v. Haynes, p. 307: The owner of a dwelling-house who burns it in the night time is not liable to indictment

Larabee v. Sewall,

for arson under the common law. p. 376: Where two alternatives to avoid collision are presented to the traveler on the highway, either of which might be chosen by a prudent person, it is not negligence to take either. Proprietors of Baptist Meeting-House v. Webb, p. 398: A corporation is not dissolved by merely neglecting to exercise its corporate powers. Proprietors of Union Meeting-House v. Powell, p. 400: The owners of pews in a meeting-house owned by a corporation have simply an easement in the freehold. Shanny v. Androscoggin Mills, p. 420: The servant whose duty it is to keep machinery in repair is not a fellow-servant with the one using it, so as to exempt the master for liability to the latter for the neglect of the former. State v. Maine Cent. R. R. Co., p. 488: Immunity from taxation is not one of the franchises of a corporation. Cragin v. Cragin, p. 517: A procured a policy upon his life" for the benefit of his wife and children," and had it made payable to them, and died intestate. Held, that the policy will not go to the administrator as assets, but to the beneficiaries by virtue of the contract, and not by descent. The reporting is excellently done, and the volume is well printed and bound.

SMITH'S ELEMENTS OF THE LAWS.

Elements of the Laws, or Outlines of the System of Civil and Criminal Laws in force in the United States and in the several States of the Union. Designed as a text book and for general use, and to enable any one to acquire a competent knowledge of his legal rights and privileges in all the most important political and business relations of the citizens of the country, with the principles upon which they are founded, and the means of asserting and maintaining them in civil and criminal cases. By Thomas L. Smith, late one of the Judges of the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana. New and revised edition. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1877. This work is intended as an elementary treatise covering the entire field of legal science, and giving general principles in a concise form fitted for popular study and reading. It appears to us to be a very excellent book; the best that we have yet seen for the purpose it is designed. Most treatises purporting to give the law in a shape fitted for popular study, are very unsatisfactory productions, and do little to aid an unprofessional man in obtaining an insight into the mysteries of the law. The book, however, if carefully read, cannot fail to impart an excellent knowledge of the general principles - enough to meet the needs of those not designing to become lawyers. It will also be found useful to the law student, being as good a book as he can start in, and we would recommend it to every young man who hopes to join our profession. The book is well printed and bound, but lacks an index, which detracts from its value.

BUMP ON BANKRUPTCY, TENTH EDITION. Law and Practice in Bankruptcy. The Practice in Bankruptcy; with the Bankrupt Law of the United States as amended, and the Rules and Forms, together with Notes referring to all decisions, reported to September 1, 1877. By Orlando F. Bump, Register in Bankruptcy. Tenth edition. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1877.

Bump on Bankruptcy has long been recognized as the standard work upon the subject upon which it treats, and each succeeding edition places it farther out of the reach of rivalry. The present edition is, in many respects, much superior to any of its predecessors. It contains references to all cases reported up to September 1, 1877, and in addition all cases decided under the acts of 1800 and 1841, so far as they are applicable, are cited, so that the work contains refer

ences to every thing of value that has ever been decided in this country. And it embraces not only such cases as pertain to practice in bankruptcy, but also those having to do with collateral questions arising out of bankrupt cases, such as constitutional law, the rights of the assignee, suits to recover choses in action, the limitation of two years, and the effect of a discharge, questions that are continually arising in litigations in State courts. The volume is, therefore, of value, not merely to those of the profession who attend to bankrupt practice, but to every practicing lawyer. The aim of the author has been, as he states in his preface, to make a practical, not a theoretical work, to show what is established, not what may be decided, to follow rather than anticipate decisions, to furnish a useful guide rather than brilliant theories. The success which the work has met has justified the wisdom of this aim. As the work in its previous editions is well known to the profession, we need only say that the present edition is fully up to the former ones in execution, and superior to some of them in the style in which it is produced. We would, however, make a criticism upon the author's method of citation. He denotes the Pennsylvania State Reports as simply "Peun." The official name of the reports is "Pennsylvania State," and they should always be cited as "Penu. St." or "Pa. St." Any other way of citing them is apt to mislead.

ANGELL ON WATER-COURSES, SEVENTH EDITION. A Treatise on the Law of Water-Courses; with an Appendix containing Statutes of Flowing, and Forms of Declaration. By Joseph K Angell. Seventh edition, revised and very much enlarged by the addition of new matter to the text, and notes. By J. C. Perkins, LL. D. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1877.

The editor of this edition of this standard work has made numerous important additions to the case law embodied therein, all the important and leading cases on the subject that have been published since the sixth edition was issued in 1869, being embraced. Besides, he has added, in an appendix, various concise and convenient forms adapted to proceedings to obtain redress for injuries done by water and watercourses, collected from authentic and approved sources. These forms are peculiarly adapted to the method of procedure prevailing in Massachusetts, but will be found useful in the way of suggestion to practitioners in other States. The work in its earlier editions has been so long before the profession, and is so well known, that any thing we might say in its commendation would be needless. It is, as formerly, elegantly printed and bound, and is a book that every lawyer of learning or taste would love to see in his library.

TOWNSHEND'S LAW OF SLANDER AND LIBEL.

A treatise on the Wrongs called Slander and Libel and on the Remedy by Civil Action for these Wrongs. To which is added in this Edition a chapter on Malicious Prosecution. By John Townshend. Third Edition, New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1877.

There are few American law writers deserving of more unstinted commendation than Mr. Townshend. While his performances have not been numerous, they have been uniformly good. The work that his hands find to do is done with a pains-taking and an honesty which are the exception and not the rule among the law writers of to-day. This Treatise on Slander and Libel is his chief work, and it is one on which he may safely rest his reputation. In the scientific method in which he has treated his subject, in the excellence

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MR. BARBOUR'S DIGEST.

To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

SIR-Referring to my complaint that certain cases bearing upon the question of "Set-off," are not to be found under that head in the " Digest of New York Reports," "O. L. B." (Mr. Barbour I presume), in your issue of October 20th, says: "It ought to be held a sufficient answer (if it be true) that they do not belong there."

How effectually he disposes of his parenthetical "if it be true," and proves the cases to belong where I placed them, I leave the readers of your valuable journal to determine, while I assign a few reasons why the disagreements of digesters respecting the precise method of marshaling cases decided," have nothing to do with the subject of my complaint.

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First. The cases of Smith v. Felton and Smith v. Fox admit of no such disagreement, because the sole question in each case is one of set-off, which the court below refused. As reported, the decision in the latter case is simply: "Held error, on authority of Smith v. Felton, 43 N. Y. 419," which plainly will not admit of its being cited elsewhere than under such prior ruling.

Second. In point of fact there exists no such disagreement among the digesters in regard to these

cases.

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In Brightly's Digest of New York Reports, both are found under "Set-off," vol. 2, p. 3435, and nowhere else. See table of cases. In Abbott's New York Digest, the former case is found under "Set-off," in vol. 5, p. 514, and nowhere else; the latter case, strange to say, is not to be found in that valuable work. See table of cases. In the index to 43 N. Y., Smith v. Felton is found under Equitable Set-off," "Partnership," and "Assiguee for Benefit of Creditors," and in the index to 48 N. Y., Smith v. Fox is found under "Set-off" and " Assignment for Benefit of Creditors." So far, no disagreement among the digesters is manifest, for all agree in placing the cases under "Set-off," where they properly belong. It was specially reserved for Mr. Barbour, by misplacing the cases, to furnish the disagreement, and for "O. L. B." to advance it in mitigation of the mistake.

"Bathgate v. Haskin," says "O. L. B.," "is not a case of set-off, but of counter-claim. The reporter's head-note contains not one word respecting set-off." Are we to infer from this statement that the "Digest of New York Reports" is based upon the reporter's head-notes? If so, its value as an original work is considerably impaired, for a digester is supposed to

examine every authority, and to say, with Mr. Brightly in the preface to his Federal Digest, "in no case has the syllabus of a reporter been implicitly relied on, but the case itself has been collated, and the result given in the author's own language." That this is the Messrs. Abbott's view of a digester's duty is apparent from the fact that Bathgate v. Haskin is found under the head of "Set-off," at p. 157 of the "Addenda" to their New York Digest.

Brightly's New York Digest closes with the 58 N. Y., and cannot, therefore, embrace the present case, which is reported in vol. 59 of those reports. Thus fortifying his previous position, the complainant here rests his case.

His sole object in pointing out these errors is the fulfillment of that duty which every lawyer owes to his profession, viz.: to lessen the labors of his brethren, by calling attention to these inaccuracies, which are inseparable from digests of the law. NEW YORK, October 22, 1877.

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THE NEW RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR.

To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

SIR-I was one of the members of the graduating class of the law department of the University of the city of New York; but at the time I graduated, I was not a citizen of the United States, and therefore could not take the oath of office.

Under the then existing rules of the Court of Appeals, I was entitled to be (assuming that I was a citizen) admitted to the bar by taking the oath of office and being sworn in, and the question now arises, what effect will the new rules of the Court of Appeals have in this case.

Hoping, Mr. Editor, that you will kindly inform me what, in your opinion, will the effect of said new rules be in my case, I remain,

Respectfully yours, NEW YORK, Oct. 15, 1877.

A STUDENT.

[We have received a number of communications of like tenor with the above, from young men who had commenced the study of the law with the anticipation of an early admission to the bar, and for one reason or another, had not acquired the right to style themselves attorneys and counselors, when the new rules regulating admission went into effect. To all these communications we would return this answer: Those who were not members of the bar when the new rules went into effect must be admitted under those rules, and in no other way. And the fact that the candidate was almost over the boundary line which divides the profession from the rest of the world on the last day of September, 1877, gives him no advantage over others not in that position. The attendance at the law school by our correspondent will be counted in estimating the time of his clerkship, either one or two years, as the case may be, precisely as it would had he not been graduated until after the adoption of the rules. Some of those who have written us intimate that the new rules, so far as they apply to those who were already entered as students at the faw schools,are unconstitutional, as violative of a contract. There is, however, nothing in this idea. The State has full power to determine who may practice as attorneys in its courts, and the Federal Constitution imposes no limit upon this power.-ED. A. L. J.]

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