« AnteriorContinuar »
the Strang suit was transferred to the United States To accomplish this, a cross-bill was necessary, and it Circuit Court. The suits were heard together, and a was accordingly filed. The decree upon this bill bedecision was made in favor of the North and South | ing, under the ruling in Ayres v. Carver, supra, interAlabama Railroad Company, and subsequently, upon locutory only, was superseded by that of July 6, which the application of that company, there was a sale or finally disposed of the cause in a manner entirely indered and a direction given to first pay the company's consistent with its provisions. It is clear, therefore, claim from the proceeds. From this order the com that the decree, as rendered, did, in effect, deny the plainants in the two suits appealed. The next day company the relief it asked, and that, if there were after the appeal was taken the Circuit Court again | nothing more in the case, redress might be had by an considered the cause, and, upon the application of appeal. those holding claims adverse to that of the company mentioned, ordered a consolidation of the two | THE RIGHTS OF A FINDER OF LOST PROPsuits and directed a sale of the property subject to
ERTY. the lien of the company. From this decree the company prayed an appeal to operate as a supersedeas, of SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND, JULY 21, 1877. fering the proper bond. The Circuit Court refused to
DURFEE V. JONES. grant the appeal or accept a supersedeas bond, being of the opinion that the company had no right to ap
A bought an old safe, and afterward offered it to B, whu
refused to purchase it. It was then left with B for sale, peal or to give bond to supersede the execution of the B having permission to use it. B found between the decree.
outer casing and the lining a roll of bank bills belong
ing to some person unknown, whereupon A first deThe South and North Alabama Railroad Company
manded the money and then demanded the safe and its thereupon petitioned the Supreme Court for man contents as they were when B received them. The safe
was returned, but the money retained by B. Held, that damus requiring the Circuit Court to grant the appeal
as against A, B was entitled to retain the money. and accept a good and sufficient supersedeas bond. The finder of lost property is entitled to it as against all the
world except the real owner, and ordinarily the place The Supreme Court, in granting the petition, said:
where it is found is of no consequence. This application is resisted upon the general ground
ASSUMPSIT for money found. The facts appear in that the South and North Alabama Railroad Company
A the opinion. The case was heard by the court, a cannot appeal, because its rights are uot injuriously
jury trial being waived. affected by the decree. That company was a party to each of the suits consolidated for the purposes of the
A. J. Cushing, for plaintiff. decree. It was, therefore, a party to the suit as con
Francis W. Miner, for defendant. solidated and entitled to be heard upon the plead DURFEE, C. J. The facts in this case are briefly ings as they stood before the consolidation, since no these: In April, 1874, the plaintiff bought an old safe change in that particular was ordered or deemed nec and soon afterward instructed his agent to sell it essary by the court. Among the pleadings in the again. The agent offered to sell it to the defendant Strang suit, thus brought into the consolidated suit, for $10, but the defendant refused to buy it. The was the cross-bill of this company praying affirmative agent then left it with the defendant who was a relief in the final determination of the cause. It mat blacksmith, at his shop for sale for $10, authorizing ters not that at a former day in the term a special decreo him to keep his books in it until it was sold or rehad been rendered upon the subject-matter of the claimed. The safe was old-fashioned, of sheet iron, cross-bill, and that an appeal from that decree had
about three feet square, having a few pigeon-holes and been taken, for “a cross-bill is a mere auxiliary suit a place for books, and back of the place for books a and a dependency of the original." Cross v. Duval, 1 large crack in the lining. The defendant shortly after Wall. 14. As we have said in Ayres v. Carver, 17 How the safe was left, upon examining it, found secreted 595, “both the original and cross-bill constitute one between the sheet-iron exterior and the wooden lining suit" and ought to be heard at the same time. Con- | a roll of bills amounting to $165, of the denomination sequently, “any decision or decree in the proceedings of the national bank bills which have been current for upon the cross-bill is not a final decree in the suit the last teu or twelve years. Neither the plaintiff nor and * * * not the subject of an appeal to this the defendant knew the money was there before it was court * * * . The decree, whether maintaining found. The owner of the money is still unknown. or dismissing the bill, disposes of a proceeding simply The defendant informed the plaintiff's agent that he incidental to the principal matter in litigation, and bad found it, and offered it to him for the plaintiff; can only be reviewed on an appeal from the final de- but the agent declined it, stating that it did not belong cree disposing of the whole case. That appeal brings to either himself or the plaintiff, and advised the deup all the proceedings for re-examination, when the fendant to deposit it where it would be drawing inparty aggrieved by any determination in respect to terest until the rightful owner appeared. The plainthe cross-bill has the opportunity to review it as in tiff was then out of the city. Upon his return, being the case of any other interlocutory proceeding in the informed of the finding, he immediately called on case.” A cross-bill must grow out of the matters al the defendant and asked for the money, but the deleged in the original bill, and is used to bring the fendant refused to give it to him. He then, after whole dispute before the court, so that there may be taking advice, demanded the return of the safe and a complete decree touching the subject-matter of the its contents, precisely as they existed when placed in action. 2 Daniel's Ch. 1548. The South and North the defendant's hands. The defendant promptly gave Alabama Company deemed it necessary for the pro- | up the safe, but retains the money. The plaintiff tection of its rights in the mortgaged property, that brings this action to recover it or its equivalent. in 'any sale which was ordered, provision should be | The plaintiff does not claim that he acquired, by made for the payment of its claim out of the proceeds, | purchasing the safe, any right to the money in the safe insisting, for that purpose, that its lien was prior in as against the owner; for he bought the safe alone, not time to that of either of the other mortgage creditors. 'the safe and its contents. See Merry v. Green, 7 M. &
W. 623. But he claims that as between himself and chase, he might, on closer examination, change his the defendant his is the better right. The defendant, mind. And the defendant, having found in the safe however, has the possession, and therefore it is for something which did not belong there, might, we think, the plaintiff, in order to succeed in this action, to prove properly remove it. He certainly would not be exhis better right.
pected either to sell the safe to another, or to buy it The plaintiff claims that he is entitled to have the himself without first removing it. It is not pretended money by the right of prior possession. But the that he used any violence or did any harm to the safe. plaintiff never had any possession of money, except, And it is evident that the idea that any trespass or unwittingly, by having possession of the safe which tort had been committed, did not even occur to the contained it. Such possession, if possession it can be plaintiff's agent when he was first informed of the called, does not of itself confer a right. The case at finding. bar is, in this view, like Bridges v. Hawkesworth, 15 The general rule undoubtedly is, that the finder of Jur. 1079; 21 L. J., Q. B., 75, A. D. 1851; 7 Eng. L. & lost property is entitled to it as against all the world Eq. 424. In that case, the plaintiff, while in the de- | except the real owner, and that ordinarily the place fendant's shop on business, picked up from the floor where it is found does not make any difference. We a parcel containing bank notes. He gave them to the cannot find any thing in the circumstances of the case defendant for the owner if he could be found. The at bar to take it out of this rule. We give the defendowner could not be found, and it was held that the ant judgment for costs. plaintiff as finder was entitled to them, as against the defendant as owner of the shop in which they were found. “The notes," said the court, “never were in
PRESENTATION OF EXCEPTIONS UPON the custody of the defendant nor within the protec
APPEAL. tion of his house, before they were found, as they IN the case of Phænix Insurance Co., plaintiff in error, would have been if they had been intentionally de 1 v. Lanier, decided by the Supreme Court of the posited there.” The same in effect may be said of the United States at the present term, the plaintiff in notes in the case at bar; for though they were origin error complained that certain evidence was improperly ally deposited in the safe by design, they were not so admitted, and that incorrect instruction was given to deposited in the safe, after it became the plaintiff's the jury, but the record did not show that any excepsafe, so as to be in the protection of the safe as his tion was saved to the admission of evidence or to the safe, or so as to affect him with any responsibility for charge of the court. No bill of exceptions appears to them. The case at bar is also in this respect like have been made up or signed. In the transcript sent Tatum v. Sharpless, 6 Phila. 18. There it was held, up to the court it was stated that at the trial objection that a conductor, who had found money which had was made to the reception of certain testimony of been lost in a railroad car, was entitled to it as against witnesses, that the objection was overruled, and that the railroad company.
the defendant then and there excepted to such ruling of The plaintiff also claims that the money was not lost the court and assigned error thereon. And the transbut designedly left where it was found, and that there- cript stated that the judge gave substantially certain fore as owner of the safe he is entitled to its custody. instruction to the jury and added, “to which portion of He refers to cases in which it has been held, that said charge said defendant then and there excepted and money or other property voluntarily laid down and assigned the same as error.” The Supreme Court, in forgotten is not in legal contemplation lost, and that affirming the judgment, said: “Even if the facts of such money or property the owner of the shop or occurred as certified by the clerk, his statement that place where it is loft is the proper custodian rather they occurred does not bring them upon the record so than the person who happens to discover it first. as to make them the subject of review. There is but State v. McCann, 19 Mo. 249; Lawrence v. The State, 1 one mode of bringing upon the record and making a Humph. 228; McAvoy v. Medina, 11 Allen, 549. It may part of it the rulings of a judge during the progress of be questioned whether this distinction bas not been a trial, or his charge to the jury, and that is by a bill pushed to an extreme. See Kincaid v. Eaton, 98 Mass. of exceptions allowed and sealed or sigued by the judge. 139. But, however that may be, we think the money It is true that in the hurry of the trial the bill is not here, though designedly left in the safe, was probably often reduced to form and sealed or signed. Genernot designedly put in the crevice or interspace where ally an exception is only noted by the judge at the it was found, but that, being left in the safe, it proba time claimed and it is subsequently drawn up, but it bly slipped or was accidentally shoved into the place is not a bill of exceptions until it has been sealed, or, where it was found without the knowledge of the as is now sufficient, signed. The sealing or signature owner, and so was lost, in the stricter sense of the of the judge is essential for its authentication. And it word. The money was not simply deposited and for has been ruled that the judge's notes do not constitute gott
deposited and lost by reason of a defect or a bill of exceptions. They are but memoranda from insecurity in the place of deposit.
which a formal bill may afterward be drawn up and The plaintiff claims that the finding was a wrongful sealed. (Pomeroy v. The Bank of Indiana, 1 Wall. 592.) act on the part of the defendant, and that therefore There it was said: 'when exceptions are taken to the he is entitled to recover the money or to have it re ruling of the court in the course of a trial to the jury, placed. We do not so regard it. The safe was left such an entry is frequently made in the minutes of with the defendant for sale. As seller he would the case, or of the presiding justice, as evidence of properly examine it under an implied permission to the fact, and as a means of preserving the rights of the do so, to qualify him the better to act as seller. Also, party in case the verdict should be against him, and under the permission to use it for his books, he would he should desire to have the case re-examined in the have the right to inspect it to see if it was a fit depos- appellate tribunal, but it was never supposed that such itory. And finally, as a possible purchaser, he might an entry could be of any benefit to the party unless he examine it, for though he had once declined to pur- seasonably availed himself of the right to reduce the
same to writing, and took proper measures to have the
INDORSEMENT. bill of exceptions sealed by the judge presiding at 1. Waiver of demand and notice: what does not the trial, or in other words, such an entry in the min- | amount to. -- Plaintiff, the holder of a promissory note utes can only be regarded as evidence of the right of indorsed by defendant, was applied to by the maker the party seasonably to demaud a bill of exceptions, for an extension, which he agreed to give if the note but it is not the same thing, and it has never been so was kept secure. Subsequently, and before the note considered in the Federal courts.' And, again : ‘Un was due, plaintiff had an interview with defendant in less an exception is reduced to writing and sealed by relation to the matter and stated to him that he would the judge it is not a bill of exceptions within the extend the time if the note was kept secure. Defendmeaning of the statute authorizing it, and it does not ant then said he “guessed that could be fixed and he become part of the record.' No such bill is found in would get Kingsbury (the maker) in.” Plaintiff then the present case.”
went out to find the maker, but did not do so. Held,
not sufficient to dispense with need of demand and COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.
notice to hold the indorser. Judgment below reversed. APPEAL.
Ross v. Hurd. Opinion by Andrews, J. Appeal to Court of Appeals: claim not involving
2. What amounts to waiver of laches of holder of $500.- Plaintiff brought action to foreclose a mortgage,
note. — The note was not presented when due for pay. and defendant holding a judgment of $300, which was
ment, and no notice was given to defendant. At the a lien on the same premises, claimed a priority over
end of the time for which the extension was asked the mortgage therefor. Held, not to coustitute a case
the maker asked for a further extension, and an inter
view was had between the maker, plaintiff and defendappealable to this court, under $ 191 of the new Code.
ant. The plaintiff then spoke to defendant about the In any event, either party could not gain or lose over $300. Appeal dismissed. Petrie v. Adams. Opinion
extension and defendaut replied “you and Kingsbury by Allen, J.
can fix that as you are a mind to.” The maker then [Decided Oct. 10, 1877.]
asked plaintiff whether he “would have a new note or
what.” Plaintiff said, “I would let the old note stand CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
just as it was.” Defendant then said, “then I will Power of legislature to control corporations: requir
waive protest.” Held, a waiver of the previous failure ing railroad company to erect bridge for highway cross
to present for payment and give notice, and that the ing track. -- Chapter 618 of the Laws of 1874 enacted
defendant thereupon renewed his liability. (Turnbull that the Boston and Albany Railroad Company should,
v. Thorn, 16 Johns. 152; Story on Prom. Notes, SS 359, within one year, construct a bridge at the point of
362.) Ib. intersection of its railroad with a turnpike, in such a
3. Consideration not necessary to give effect to promise manuer as to conduct the turnpike over the railroad
to waive demand and notice.- To give effect to a promin the manner particularly specified in the act. Held,
ise by an indorser to not take advantage of the laches a valid exercise of the legislative power, both by reason
of the holder of a note in failing to demand payment of the general authority of the State to regulate the
and give notice, a new consideration moving between exercise by railroad corporations of their franchises
the parties is not necessary. Ib. (Munn v. Illinois, 4 Otto, 113), and of the fact that the
[Decided Oct. 2, 1877.] company was incorporated under chap. 917 of the Laws of 1869 authorizing the consolidation of railroad
PARTIES. corporations, hence taking its charter subject to the Action to restrain formation of village corporation: right of the legislature to alter or amend it (1 R. S. 600, when injunction denied for defect of.- An action was $ 8; Const., art. 8, § 1; Laws 1850, chap. 140, $ 48.) Order commenced to restrain certain persons from proceed. below affirmed. People ex rel. Kimball v. Boston & ing to incorporate a village under the provisions of Albany R. R. Co. Opinion by Earl, J.
chap. 291 of the Laws of 1870. The persons made de[Decided Sept. 25, 1877.)
fendants were those who signed the notice required by CONTRACT.
the act and the town officers who would be inspectors For personal services: failure to perform through ing
of the election. A temporary injunction was disbility of party performing. – A contract was made
solved, and the election was held; a majority of votes between plaintiffs and defendants, for performances
determined in favor of the incorporation, and the proin plaintiffs' theater, by the “ Wachtel opera troupe,”
ceedings were perfected and village officers chosen. A for a specified sum. The name and capabilities of
supplementary complaint demanded that all these acts Wachtel, after whom the troupe was named and who
be declared void. Held, that the village itself and the performed in it, had induced the plaintiffs to make
trustees exercising the franchise thereof were necesthe coutract, and his capabilities were what they relied
sary parties, and the plaintiffs were not entitled to an on to fill their theater and reimburse them for their
injunction in the action without their being parties. expenses, and the presence of the others of the com
Judgment below affirmed. People ex rel. Kingsland v. pany was but incidental to the employment of him.
| Clark. Opinion per Curiam. Held, that the sickness and inability of Wachtel to
[Decided Sept. 25, 1877.] perform without the fault of plaintiff would consti
PRESUMPTIONS. tute a valid excuse for the non-performance of their Presumption of ownership of crops from possession contract. Contracts for personal services are subject of agricultural land. The law raises no presumption to this implied condition, that the person shall be as to the character of the occupation of one cultivating able at the time appointed to perform them, and if be the farm of another with the instruments of husbandry, dies, or without his fault becomes disabled, the obli beasts of the plow teams and domestic animals of the gation to perform is extinguished. Judgment below owner of the farm, or as to the right of either to the affirmed. Spalding v. Rosa. Opinion by Allen, J. growing crops and products of the farm, but leaves it [Decided Oct. 2, 1877.]
Ta question of fact to be determined by a jury upon the evidence. Accordingly, a verdict directed upon the
JUDGMENT. assumed presumption that the isolated fact that one is | When provable as a debt.-A judgment recovered upon agricultural lands, and working them with the pending the bankruptcy proceedings in an action beteams and implements of the owner, and with the con gun before, and based upon a provable debt, is itself sent of such owner, is evidence that the crops raised provable. A creditor having such a judgment has an belong to him and not to the owner of the land, held, interest in the question of discharge and a right to be erroneous. Judgment below reversed. Rawley v. heard thereon. Such judgment will be released by a Broun. Opinion by Allen, J.
discharge duly granted to the bankrupt judgment [Decided Oct. 10, 1877.]
debtor. U. S. Dist. Ct., Nevada. In re Stansfield, 16
Nat. Bankr. Reg. 268.
LIMITATION. an action of replevin for certain personal property When suit burred by section 5057.- A suit by an asdefendant set up that plaintiff, having title to the signee to recover debts due the estate is barred by the property, pledged the same to defendant's wife to se limitation contained in section 5057, where the sumcure a debt due her from plaintiff, and that the prop
laintiff, and that the prop-| mons was not issued within two years from the time erty was in her possession as such pledgee. No con when the cause of action accrued, although the petinection of the defendant with the title of his wife was tion in such suit was filed within such time. U. S. alleged. Held, that plaintiff had title and right of Circ. Ct., W. D. Missouri. Walker, assignee, v. Towner, possession against all the world but the wife, and the
| 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 285. answer of defendant was no defense to the action, as
PARTNERSHIP. against plaintiff he had no right of possession of the
1. Real estate belonging to partnership: rights of property. Judgment below reversed. Stowell v. Otis.
bankrupt partner.-In a contest between the assignee Opinion by Earl, J.
and third parties to ascertain their respective rights as [Decided Oct. 2, 1877.)
to real estate which had been purchased by the bankWILL.
rupt and such parties under an agreement to furnish 1. Construction of : joint tenancy and tenancy in com- the outlay and share in the profit and loss equally, it mon : perpetuities: devise of estate in trust.-By a will is necessary to adjust the partnership dealings to the the residuary estate of the testator was devised to time of the commencement of the proceedings in trustees in trust for the grandchildren of the testator, bankruptoy and ascertain the exact interest of the "share and share alike, and is to be paid and conveyed bankrupt and each of his partners in such transaction. to each of said children as they each become of age, U. S. Dist. Ct., Vermont. Thrall v. Crampton, asin equal shares," and a direction was given that “in the signee, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 261. meantime," i. e., until the termination of the trust the 2. Lien of partner of bankrupt.-Where there are income of the estate should be applied to the support partnership debts still outstanding, on which the of the grandchildren. There were nine grandchildren bankrupt’s partner is liable, such partner is entitled to at the death of testator. Held, that the will created a a lien upon such real estate until the debts are paid, tenancy in common and not a joint tenancy: that the and to indemnify him in case he is compelled to pay trust terminated as to each share when the beneficiary | them. Ib. arrived at the age of twenty-one years; that there was
PRACTICE. no unlawful suspension of the power of alienation. Un 1. Setting off exempt property.-A register has no der the will the trustees took the legal title to the resid- | authority to set off exempt property to the bankuary estate upon separate and several trusts in favor of rupt, nor to direct the assignee in the matter. U. S. each of the nine grandchildren, and each of the grand Dist. Ct., Colorado. In re Peabody, 16 Nat. Bankr. children a vested remainder in fee on his or her share Reg. 243. upon the termination of the trust at his or her ma 2. Irregular order.-An ex parte order approving the jority. Judgment modified and as modified affirmed. schedule of property set aside to the bankrupt, or conStevenson v. Lesley. Opinion by Andrews, J.
firming a report of sale of assets, made on the day 2. Whether devisees take per stirpe or per capita: such schedule or report is filed, is irregular, and thereafter-born children.-The testator, when the will was fore not binding upon the creditors. The bankrupt made, had nine grandchildren, four, the issue of a de court has power to set aside such orders at any time ceased daughter, and five, the issue of a son, who sur during the pendency of the proceedings, where an agvived him. Held, that the distribution between the grieved party moves therefor within a reasonable time grandchildren was to be per capita, not per stirpe. after notice. Ib. Aleld, also, that a child of the son, born subsequent to 3. Rights of creditors.-Creditors are not bound to the death of the testator and before the time for the except to the schedule of exempt property within distribution of any part of the corpus of the estate twenty days after it is filed, where the assignee has had arrived, was entitled to a share therein. Ib. failed to file it within twenty days after the assigu(Decided Sept. 25, 1877.)
4. Exemption in Colorado.--Under the statute of
Colorado a merchant is not entitled to an exemption RECENT BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS.
of $200 worth of goods as “stock in trade;" he is enDISCHARGE.
titled to a horse, as a “working animal," but not to a Discharge obtained by fraud: decree annulling dis buggy. Ib . charge.-A discharge obtained by fraud will be va. 5. Misconduct of assignee.-On an application by the cated. A decree annulling a discharge cannot be set assignee for his discharge, any miscouduct on his part aside except upon due notice to the parties to be af in respect to the estate is a proper subject for examfected thereby. Sup. Ct., Dist. Columbia. In re nu ination. Ib. genstein, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 252.
6. 18sue of fraud.-Every fact which is relied on to
establish fraud should be distinctly stated and veri- | bursed $1,500, leaving a balance of $1,857. Admission fied; and the creditor raising the issue should give se- | fees had been received from 356 members, which may, curity for costs. Ib.
therefore, be considered the numerical strength of the 7. Cost of keeping property covered by lien.- Where Association at this time. property taken by the assignee is charged with a lien, | Mr. John F. Seymour, chairman of the Committee the reasonable cost of keeping and disposing of it, in- on Grievances, made a short report touching ou cluding the assignee's fees, should be charged upon it. | contracts with clients to share recoveries, and on the No charge can be allowed for the services of an auc fact that persons who are not members of the bar astioneer, unless it be shown that such services were sume frequently the privileges of attorneys, but no necessary; nor can such fund be charged with attor action or recommendation was reported. ney's fees for services rendered to the assignee in his The Hon. Matthew Hale reported from the Comcontest with the lienor respecting such property. Ib.
mittee on Law Reform, that a majority of the memPREFERENCE.
bers were not in favor of the repeal of the New Code; 1. Mortgage executed with view to.-Where the mort
but were in favor of the adoption of the remaining gage sought to be set aside was executed within the
nine chapters. The Committee, however, doubted the time specified in the bankrupt act, with a view to give
propriety of some of the changes made by the Coma preference, the fact of repeated promises to pay,
missioners, and regretted that so many verbal alter
tion's had been made with no substantial object to be which were not kept, together with knowledge on the
attained. The report concluded with a recommendapart of the creditor of a large amount of debts due by the bankrupt at or prior to that time which he was
tion that the Committee meet in this city, in January, unable to pay, held, to be reasonable cause for the
for consultation and conference regarding the Code.
Mr. Elliott F. Shepard, from the Committee on Prizes, creditor to believe that the insolvency which in fact oxisted did exist. U. S. Dist. Ct., Vermont. In re
reported that they had received 25 essays, and that the Armstrong; Root v. Hilliard, 16 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 275.
prize had been awarded to Mr. Walter Howe, of New 2. Knowledge of creditor, what constitutes.- Where
York. The Committee also recommeuded that another the creditor taking such mortgage knew of other un
prize be founded, to be called the New York State Bar secured debts which his debtor could not pay, and
Association Prize, and to be opened to a wider rauge
of competitors. that a large part of the property was common to all from which to get their pay, held, that he knew that
The Hon. Sanford E. Church then presented Mr. the mortgage was made in fraud of the provisions of
Howe with the prize – $250 gold -- and accompanied it the bankrupt law. Ib.
with some well-timed advice to the Association, and
some well-turned complimeuts to Mr. Howe. REAL ESTATE.
A Committee of two from each judicial district was 1. Character of distributable assets not determined by
appointed to nominate officers, and, after advising, bankrupt law.–The bankrupt law does not prescribe
reported as follows: any rule or furnish any method for ascertaining the
President. — Hon. J. K. Porter. character of distributable assets. That is a subject of
Vice-Presidents. – First district, Charles O'Conor, preliminary judicial inquiry, to be determined by legal
N. Y.; 2d district, John M. Mason, Yonkers; 3d disprinciples of recognized controlling applicability. U.
trict, Samuel Hand, Albany; 4th district, Platt Potter, 8. Circ. Ct., W. D. Pennsylvania. In re Zug & Co., 16
Schenectady ; 5th district, William C. Ruger, Syracuse; Nat. Bankr. Reg. 280.
6th district, Horatio Ballard, Cortland: 7th district, 2. Local law governs tenure of real estate.-As to
James L. Angle, Rochester; 8th district, Myron H. questions touching the tenure of real estate, the Fed
Peck, Batavia. eral courts are to be governed by the laws and decis
Executive Committee - First district, E. F. Shepard, ious of local tribunals of the country where such real
Albert Mathews, C. A. Hand; 2d district, Wm. M. estate is situated. Ib.
Irvin, A. E. Suffern, George J. Greenfield; 3d district,
Esek Cowen, M. T. Hun, R. H. King; 4th district, NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION.
H. E. Smith, Stephen Brown, J. R. Putman; 5th disTHE proceedings of the Annual Meeting held in trict, Albertus Perry, G. N. Kennedy, J. D. Kernan; 1 the Assembly Chamber on Tuesday last were 6th district, G. M. Diven, J. M. Glover, Charles L. - aside from the address of the President-not of a Kennedy; 7th district, M. W. Cooke, Wm. Rumsey, very interesting character, and need encroach but J. H. Camp; 8th district, D. H. Bolles, Frauklin D. slightly upon our space. The Chamber was comfort- Locke, Henry A. Childs. ably filled, and it was a noticeable feature that a large Committee on Admissions – First district, Lewis L. proportion of those present were men of position and | Delafield, Benj. F. Dunning, Charles A. Peabody, ability at the Bar.
Henry D. Sedgwick; 2d district, John J. Armstrong, After the President's address, which was received Wm. H. Robertson, Walter Farrington, D. P. Barnard; with great enthusiasm, an attempt was made to elect | 3d district, Peter S. Danforth, Irving Browne, Arthur a large number of honorary members from among the C. Butts, Hugh W, McClellan; 4th district, Robert S. public men of this continent, whether occupying | Hale, Frothingham Fish, James Gibson, Jr., LW. judicial positions or not, but wiser counsels prevailed Russell; 5th district, Ward Hunt, Jr., J. G. Vann, R. and all such nominations were sent to the committee | H. Tyler, Joseph Mullin, Jr.; 6th district, 0. P. Hurd, on that subject.
0. W. Chapman, M. J. Shoecraft, L. L. Bundy; ith The Executive Committee gave a brief, generalized district, A. J. Abbott, F. A. Macomber, F. O. Mason, report, but which was unimportant because it gave no | Ralph T. Wood; 8th district, A. P. Laning, D. k. details of the work done.
Richardson, H. C. Kingsbury, John T. Joyce. The Treasurer, Mr. Rufus W. Peckham, on the other Committee on Grievances - First district, Fred. R. hand, gave facts instead of fancies. He reported that | Coudert, H. E. Howland, Charles F. Stone; 2d district, he had received during the year $3,357 and had dis- | Theo. F. Jackson, John G. Wilkin, Hamilton F180, who