« AnteriorContinuar »
complained of was done by the defendant, not as an attorney for the plaintiff and his client had made an officer but as a man. And then the Federal Court agreement whereby he was to be paid out of the amount could have determined that matter, and if it had collected a fee contingent upon the recovery, and been satisfied that the defendant was not acting as an that at the time of a settlement of the action between officer, or if he was, that he was misbehaving, then the parties the defendant agreed that he would pay all the case could have been returned to the State court costs to plaintiff's attorney, and the court granted a for trial. But if satisfied that the defendant was only | motion of defendant for discontinuance on the paydoing his duty as an officer, then he could have been ment of plaintiff's costs and disbursements, to be discharged. And from the judgment of the Circuit taxed. Held, that the order was proper. If the taxaCourt either party could have carried it to the Su ble costs were not such a compensation as the attorpreme Court of the United States.
ney was justly entitled to, a remedy might be had by But to this it is objected that the Federal Circuit an action on the agreement. Order below affirmed. Court has no power to do any thing with it if it were Wright v. Wright. (No. 1.) Opinion by Earl, J. sent to it, and, therefore, why send it?
[Decided June 5, 1877.] That is a mistake. If that were so, what would have 2. Lien of attorney on judgment for compensation: been the action of the Supreme Court of the United notice to defendant: what notice necessary to nullify setStates in the case last cited–The Mayor v. Cooper. It | tlement with plaintiff.-It was agreed between plaintiff would have sustained the action of the court below in and her attorney that the attorney should receive in dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction, but, in addition to the taxable costs as a couusel fee twentystead of that, it reversed the action of the court be five per cent of the amount of any recovery in the low, and said: “An order will issue that the cause will action. Held, (1) that the attorney had a lien for the be reinstated, and that the court below proceed in it stipulated amount upon the judgment in the action, according to law."
and was an equitable assignee of the judgment to Why “reinstate" it if it ought not to have been that amount; (2) but in the absence of notice of that there? Why "proceed in it according to law” if it lien the defendant in the judgment had the right, actcould not proceed at all?
ing in good faith, to pay the judgment to the plainThe question as to how the Circuit Federal Court tiff'; (3) that to nullify such payment and settlement will proceed, or what it should do, is not before us. proof of the giving of notice of the lien must be satIf there is any defect in the machinery Congress can isfactory and not depend upon uncertain inferences; supply it. Nor is there any difference between crim
(4) the insertion of such notice in a stipulation of a inal and civil cases so far as the power of removal is
time to answer given to defendant's attorney, which concerned, as we have already shown.
stipulation was not acted upon and was returned, and The points intended to be decided are (1) that the
its contents were not shown to have come to the act of Congress under which the removal was ordered knowledge of defendant's attorney, held not sufficient is constitutional; and (2) that the ruling of his honor,
to give the required notice to defendant. Order beJudge Cox, was proper.
low affirmed. Wright v. Wright. (No. 2.) Opinion There is no error. This will be certified.
by Earl, J.
[Decided June 5, 1877.) COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.
BILL OF LADING.
Mistake in quantity of goods named in, as shipped: AGENCY.
conditions in bill not conclusive. – Defendants shipped Agent cannot deal with principal's property for his
at Milwaukee a quantity of wheat by plaintiffs' vessel. own benefit.-If an agent, without the knowledge of
It was supposed by both parties that the quantity was his principal, assumes to act, the principal is entitled
18,000 bushels. The captain in charge of the vessel to all the benefits to be derived from such action. So,
had no control over the measurement, and only knew also, a trustee eannot profit by dealing with the property of the cestui que trust. Plaintiff, who was the
from the announcement of those employed at the ele- owner of certain railroad bonds, hypothecated them
vator where the grain was, the quantity. At the re
quest of plaintiffs, and without the knowledge or conto C., who wrongfully hypothecated them to an insur
sent of defendants, the captain signed a bill of lading ance company to secure a loan to him. Defendant was
for the wheat which had been prepared for him, which one of the trustees to buy the railroad for the benefit of the bondholders under a plan for reorganization,
stated that there had been shipped and put on board and was for some time the president of the road.
of the vessel 18,000 bushels of wheat, and that, "in Held, that a purchase by defendant of the bonds from
consideration especially of the rate of freight (i. e.,
twelve cents per bushel), the said carriers having the insurance company was for the benefit of the
supervised the weighing of said cargo on board, hereplaintiff, and a refusal by him to surrender to plaintiff the bonds purchased upon demand was tortious.
by agree that this bill of lading shall be conclusive, as
between shippers and assigns and carriers, as to the Judgment below affirmed. Smith v. Frost. Opinion by Miller, J.
quantity of cargo to be delivered to consignees at the [Decided Jnne 5, 1877.]
point of destination, and that they will deliver the full
quantity hereon named, or pay for any part of cargo ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
not delivered," etc., to be deducted from the freight. 1. Parties to action have right to settle : rights of attor- | The contract contained a provision subrogating the ney: discontinuance.--The parties to an action have carrier to any right the shipper might have against the the right to settle and discontinue the action at any warehouseman from whom the cargo was taken, for time without providing for the costs of plaintiff's at- deficiency, etc. The wheat, when delivered to defendtorney. He has no lien on the cause of action, and ants at Oswego, was found to be 282 bushels less than cannot intervene and insist that the action proceed 18,000, but plaintiffs delivered all the wheat received for his benefit. And where it was claimed that the at Milwaukee. Held, that, as between the original
parties thereto, the bill of lading was not conclusive out issue during the life of the testator; held, that the as to the amount shipped, but that plaintiffs might trust for the benefit of the son never took effect, and bring an action asking for a reformation of the con the gift over to H. took effect on the death of testator. tract by the insertion therein of the true amount Judgment below affirmed. McLean v. Freeman. Opinshipped, and upon the amended contract maintain an ion by Allen, J. action for the freight due. Judgment below affirmed. [Decided June 5, 1877.] Lynch v. Gardner. Opinion by Miller, J. [Decided May 22, 1877.)
ABANDONMENT OF PATENTED INVENTION. CHATTEL MORTGAGE.
THE case of Consolidated Fruit Jar Co., appellants, What is not: mortgage on vessel: title to vessel.
1 v. Wright, decided by the Supreme Court of the Plaintiff was on the register as owner of a vessel, but
United States at the term recently closed, was one he had executed an instrument in writing which was
in equity brought by the appellants to enjoin the described therein as a mortgage upon the vessel, but
appellee from infringing a patent for an improvement contained no power of sale or of taking possession, but
in fruit jars. The answer set up several defenses, two only a provision for foreclosure in case of default,
of which were as follows: after the manner usual in real estate mortgages. Held
1. That there had been “purchase, sale and prior not a chattel mortgage, and that the title to the vessel
| use" of the invention "more than two years prior" remained in plaintiff, who could maintain an action
to the application for the patent. for injury done by collision to the vessel, notwith
2. That the invention was abandoned to the public. standing the vessel was at the time in the possession
These objections are founded upon the 7th section of other persons, who took the profits thereof. Judg
of the act of 1839. Curtis on Pat. (4th ed.) 696. The ment below affirmed. Wilson v. Knapp. Opinion by
sale of a single lot of about a dozen and a half of the Folger, J.
jars in 1859 by the patentee and the distribution of [Decided June 5, 1877.]
several others among his friends was shown. The EVIDENCE.
patent was taken out in 1870. The court said: The Book account: copies from original entries.- A book statutory clause upon which the second objection is account, which was made up of a transcript from | founded is in the disjunctive. The language is “purmemoranda made by others, was verified by the testi chase, sale or prior use" * * * “for more than mony of the book-keeper keeping it as a correct tran two years prior" to the application for the patent. script, and the persons who made the original memo The phrase, “for more," as thus used, is loose and inranda testified that they were correct. Held, that an accurate, and is to be understood as if the language objection to the book that it was not an original entry were earlier than “two years prior," etc., or as if “for" was properly overruled. It is not always required were omitted from the sentence. This omission would that the memorandum produced to aid the recollec- produce the same effect. tion of a witness, or to serve itself as testimony, The defects specified are also in the singular. It folshould be the first or original note in writing of the lows that a single instance of sale or of use by the fact. Judgment below affirmed. Wilson v. Knapp. patentee may, under the circumstances, be fatal to Opinion by Folger, J.
the patent; and such is the construction of the clause [Decided June 5, 1877.]
as given by authoritative adjudications. VARIANCE.
In Pitts v. Hall, 2 Blatchf. 235, Mr. Justice Nelson Decision founded on, when not sustainable.- Plaintiff, said: “The patentee may forfeit his right to the inwho was entitled, under a contract with defendants, vention if he constructs it and vends it to others to to a royalty upon certain publications proportionate use, or if he uses it publicly himself in the ordinary upon the amount sold, brought action claiming that way of a public use of a machine at any time prior to defendants had fraudulently rendered their accounts two years before he makes his application for a patent. of sales to her, and made payments which she, believ That is, he is not allowed to derive any benefit from ing the accounts to be correct, received, to her dam- the sale or the use of his machine, without forfeiting age of over $5,000, and asked an accounting, and that his right, except within two years prior to the time he defendants be adjudged to pay her such sums as should makes his application.” See, also, Amer. Hide and be found due and for such other relief as to the court Leather Co. v. Amer. Tool Co., 4 Fisher, 291; McMilshould seem just. The case was referred by consent | lan et al. v. Barclay et al., 5 id. 189; McClurg v. Kingsand tried. The referee found in favor of defendants, land, 1 How. 208; Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 7 Wall. 584. on the ground that the accounts rendered plaintiff The result must always depend upon the purpose and were correct. The General Term, on appeal, affirmed | incidents accompanying the act or acts relied upon. the decision upon the sole ground that the cause of | After reciting some of the facts showing carelessness action stated in the complaint was an equitable one, and neglect on the part of the patentee in applying for whereas the cause of action proved was a legal one; a patent upon his invention, the court continues: It heid, that the General Term erred in basing its decision is enough to say, without recapitulating the facts, that, upon the ground named by it. Judgment below in our judgment, the defense of abandonment to the reversed. Williams v. Slote. Opinion by Earl, J. public is also clearly made out. [Decided June 12, 1877.)
He who is silent when he should speak must be silent WILL.
when he would speak, if he cannot do so without a Construction of : decease of beneficiary under, before violation of law and injustice to others. teslator: effect on bequests over. – Testator, by his last The supineness of the patentee is unexplained and inwill, created a trust estate for the benefit of his son A, excusable. A principle akin to the doctrine of equitaand upon the death of such son the estate was to go ble estoppel applies. to his issue, but upon his death without issue the es Inventors are a meritorious class. They are public tate was to be transferred to H. The son died with benefactors. They add to the wealth and comfort of the community, and promote the progress of civiliza- function, or was not known at the date of the patent tion. A patent for an invention is as much property | in question as a proper substitute for the one omitted, as a patent for land. The right rests on the same as in that event the defendant does not infringe. Robfoundation, and is surrounded and protected by the erts v. Harnden, 2 Cliff. 504. same sanctions. There is a like larger domain held in ownership by the public. Neither an individual nor the public can trench upon or appropriate what
RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. belongs to the other. The inventor must comply with
CASES RELATING TO WILLS. the conditions prescribed by law. If he fails to do this he acquires no title and his invention or discov
Codicil: mistaken date: revival of previous will.-A ery, no matter what it may be, is lost to him, and is
codicil referring to a previous will by its date does not henceforward no more his than if he had never been
necessarily revive the will referred to. A testatrix in anywise connected with it. It is made, thereupou,
made a will and afterward a codicil in the year 1876, as it were, by accretion, irrevocably a part of the do
and subsequently revoked the will and codicil of 1876
by a will in 1877. Afterward she wished to make a main which belongs to the community at large. The invention here in question is within this category.
codicil to the will of 1877, but, by mistake, called it in the instrument a codicil to the will of 1876. Held,
the mistake, if clearly proved, did not revive the will PATENT NOT SUSTAINABLE WHERE CLAIM of 1876, but was a codicil to the will of 1877. Prob. IS FOR A RESULT ONLY.
Div. and Adm. Div., Feb. 27, 1877. In the Goods of
Ince, 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 519; S. C., L. R., 2 P. D. 111. THE case of Fuller et al., appellants, v. Yentzer et Conditional: clause of revocation: unfulfilled condiI al., decided by the Supreme Court of the United tion: earlier will admitted to probute.-A testator made States at its last term, was an action for infringement his will, and subsequently with his wife started for a upon a patent for an improvement in mechanism for long journey by railway, but being afraid of an accimarking cloth in a sewing machine, and the question dent, he and his wife before starting made a joint will, whether a claim for a result 'could be patented arose. which was to take effect if they both were killed at The court said: Patents for a machine will not be sus the same time by the same accident. The joint will tained if the claim is for a result, the established rule contained a clause revoking all former wills and debeing that the invention, if any, within the meaning claring the joint will to be their last will and testaof the patent act, consists in the means or apparatus | ment. They did not meet with an accident, but reby which the result is obtained, and not merely in the turned safe home again. The husband died some years mode of operation, independent of the mechanical later, leaving the wife surviving him. Held, that the devices employed; nor will a patent be held valid for intention to revoke all former wills was in common a principle or for an idea, or any other mere abstrac with the other provisions of the joint will, subject to tion. Burr v. Duryea, 1 Wall. 570.
the condition on which that instrument had been Valid letters-patent undoubtedly may be granted for made dependent, and that the condition not having an invention which consists entirely in a new combina | been fulfilled, the instrument did not operate as a retion of old elements or ingredients, provided it appears vocation of the earlier will, which was accordingly that the new combination of the ingredients produces a admitted to probate. Prob. Div. and Adm. Div., Feb. new and useful result, but the rule is equally well set 20, 1877. In the Goods of Hugo, 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) tled that the invention in such a case consists merely 518; S. C., L. R., 2 P. D. 73. in the new combination and that a suit for infringe- Construction : residuary clause : general words suffiment cannot be maintained against a party who con- cient to pass real estate : "whatever I may be possessed structs or uses a substantially different combination, I of at my decease."-By his will a testator, after apeven though it includes the exact same elements or pointing his wife executrix, and directing all his debts, ingredients, if the combination is in fact new and use etc., to be paid, proceeded to dispose of his property ful and substantially different from the one which in these words: “First, I give and bequeath to my said preceded it. Gill v. Wells, 22 Wall. 14.
wife all my household furniture, linen, glass, china, Such an invention, if it produces a new and useful plate, farming stock, and all my personal estate and result, is the proper subject of a patent, and such a effects whatsoever and wheresoever, and of what napatent is valid and operative, but the right of the ture and kind soever or whatever I may be possessed patentee under it differs in one respect from those of a of at my decease to and for her own sole use and benpatentee for an invention which consists of an entire efit.” At the time of his death the testator, bemachine, or of a new and useful device, as the rights of sides his personal property, was possessed of some cota patentee for a mere combination of old ingredients tages and gardens for an estate of inheritance in fee are not infringed unless it appears that the alleged simple in possession. Held, that this real property infringer made, used, or sold the entire combination. passed to his wife under the latter part of the bequest. Gould v. Rees, 15 Wall. 194; Prouty v. Ruggles, 15 Pet. Exch. Div., Feb. 8, 1877. Evans v. Jones, 36 L. T. Rep. 341; Vance v. Campbell, 1 Black, 428.
(N. S.) 218. Beyond doubt that rule is correct, but the mere sub | Discretion of trustees : lunacy of cestui que trust: stitution of another old ingredient for one of the in | provision by settlement: fund for maintenance. -A tesgredients of a patented invention is not a good defense tator gave real and personal estate to trustees upon for an infringer if the substitute performs the same trust "in their discretion, and of their uncontrollable function as the ingredient for which it was substi- | authority” to apply the whole, or such part of the intuted, and was well known at the date of the patent come as they should think expedient for the mainas a proper substitute for the omitted ingredient; but | tenance and benefit of his wife during her life. The the rule is otherwise if the ingredient substituted wife was a lunatic, and was entitled to considerable was a new one, or performed a substantially different | property under her marriage settlement. Held (affirm
ing the judgment of the court), that under the words of ume will compare favorably with those of the same the will the trustees were justified in applying the in- series preceding it. In common with every one of the come of the testator's estate only to supplement the volumes of the Pennsylvania State Reports, it con. wife's separate income, and not in discharge of it. H. tains many valuable opinions. Abstracts of all of of L., April 17, 1877. Gisborne v. Gisborne, 36 L. T. these have heretofore appeared in our columns, and Rep. (N. S.) 564.
we need notice only a few of those worthy of mention. General devise : falsa demonstratio.-A father by will | Pennsylvania R, R. Co. v. Morgan, p. 134. It was held devised all that part of R. estate purchased by him, that a charge in an action against a railroad company consisting of L. meadow, F. meadow, K. field, G. for injuring a child by running over it, that “where a field, B. meadow, and M. meadow, to trustees upon child is upon the track, those in charge of an approachtrust to permit his son to receive the rents during his ing train are bound to stop when seeing it, because life, and after the son's death to the use of such of the they have no right to assume that the child kuows its son's children as the son should by deed or will ap-danger, or has the capacity to flee from it, as in the point. The son by will appointed that “all that part case of an adult," was erroneous, the question whether, and parts of the property comprised in and devised in the given case, the railway employees were negliby the hereinbefore recited will of my late father, as gent, being for the jury. Thompson v. McElarney, is and are therein described as that part of R. estate p. 174. A license for the enjoyment of certain privipurchased by my said father, consisting of L. meadow, | leges in land obtained under an executed verbal conK. field, F. meadow, and M. meadow," should after tract, founded upon a sufficient consideration, is irrehis death go to the use of his two eldest sons, their vocable by the licensor or those claiming title to the heirs and assigns, as tenants in common. Held (af- land under him. Miller v. Wentworth, p. 280. In the firming the decision of Jessel, M. R.), that G. field absence of fraud or duress upon a wife, a certificate of and B. meadow passed under the appointment in the | an acknowledgment of a deed by her is conclusive of son's will. Ct. App., March 23, 1877. Travers v. the facts therein stated. Federal Ins. Co. v. Robinson, Blundell, 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 341.
p. 357. Where the payment of usurious interest was Gift of residue: precatory trust: beneficial interest. made upon process of execution, and there was no alleA testatrix gave the residue of her real and personal gation of actual collusion to evade the statute, it was estate to trustees upon trust, to convert into money held not recoverable in a new suit. The only remedy such parts thereof as might not consist of money, and the defendant would have would be to apply for an after certain payments thereout, to hold the residue opening of the judgment. Seely v. City of Pittsburgh, of the said moneys upon trust for such of her nieces, | p. 360. The frontage rule of valuation usually applied P. and T., as should be living at her death, “my de in assessments for city street improvements held sire being that they shall distribute such residue as not applicable in country districts, and a law directthey think will be most agreeable to my wishes." ing the application of the rule to such districts held Held, that M. and T. took the residue for their own
| unconstitutional. Darlington v. United States, p. 382. benefit. Briggs v. Penny, 3 Mac. & G. 546, commented
The United States have the right to take private propon. Ch. Div., April, 1877. Stead v. Mellor, 36 L. T. erty for public use under the power of eminent doRep. (N. S.) 498.
main. But where the United States was endeavor*Heirs," meaning of: direction to divide personalty, ing to condemn four sites for public buildings for the after life estate, among "heirs :" blood relation enti purpose of experimenting on the different values, held, tled.-A testator bequeathed his personal estate to his that the proceedings to condemn the fourth site were wife S. for life, and after her decease, “to be divided irregular. Insurance Co. v. O'Maley, p. 400. A condiamong my heirs and to their children with H. R. P., tion of a fire insurance policy was, “ The insurance by share and share alike." The testator had five brothers this policy shall cease at and from the time that the and sisters, some of them died in his life-time, leaving property hereby insured shall be levied on or taken issue; others survived him and died in the life-time of into possession or custody under any proceeding in S., leaving issue. Held, that by the word “heirs” was law or equity;" held not to apply to real estate levmeant next of kin, exclusive of the widow; that it ied on and advertised for sale, but only to personal was a gift to a class to be ascertained at the testator's property which is usually seized in fact when a levy death, and consisting of the brothers and sisters liv is made. Reed's Executors v. Reed, p. 420. A real ing at the death of the testator, the children of broth estate broker who procured a person who entered into ers and sisters then dead, and H. R. P., and that an arrangement looking to the purchase of real estate, those persons took vested interests. Ch. Div., April but was prevented from completing the purchase by 20, 1877. Re Peppitt's Estate; Chester v. Phillips, 36 the sale of the premises to a third party, held enL T. Rep. (N. 8.) 500.
titled to the stipulated commission for the sale. Wentworth's Appeal, p. 469. In the contemplation of the
act giving preference to the claims of laborers, BOOK NOTICE.
“laborers" are those who perform with their own
hands the contract they make with their employer. NORRIS'S REPORTS, VOLUME I.
Hutchinson and Batchelder v. Commonwealth, p. 472. Pennsylvania State Reports. Vol. LXXXII, comprising
Bishop, holding accepted orders for oil upon the Union Cases adjudged in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. By A. Wilson Norris, State Reporter. Vol. I. Con Pipe Line Company, and wishing to store the oil with taining Cases argued at May and October and Novem H. & B., gave them the orders, that they might take ber Terms, 1876. Philadelphia: Kay & Brother, 1877.
the oil which was undistinguished and miugled with CHANGE in reporters is rarer in Pennsylvania other oil in the pipe line company's tanks and pipes. A than with us in this State; but it does sometimes H. & B. deposited those orders with the company, and take place, as it has now, and we have the initial vol. drew the amount of oil represented by them, and used ume of the latest appointee now before us. The new the oil in their general business, and were unable to reporter shows himself fitted for his task, and his vol- I deliver it when demanded by Bishop; held, that H.
& B. were guilty of larceny as bailees. The volume evidence that the knife produced had inflicted the contains a good index, a table of cases cited, and is wound.” “If you were trying the knife," said Baron well printed and bound.
Dowse, “such evidence might be very essential, but
you are trying a prisoner, and the question is whether OBITUARY
or not he inflicted the wound with that or any other
knife.” Then the jury began to see it, and the man SAMUEL WARREN.
was eventually convicted. MR. SAMUEL WARREN, the well-known English M author and jurist, died on the 31st ult. He was
Samuel was a man of the strictest integrity. When born in Denbigshire, Wales, May 23, 1807, and was the
| Saul was installed sovereign, Samuel retired from his son of a clergyman. He first studied medicine in Ed
office as judge with a public testimony to his honesty, inburgh, but abandoning the profession for that of law
integrity and thorough uprightness. He stood forth he entered the Inner Temple, and in 1831 began prac
before the assembly at Gilgal, and said: “I have tice as a special pleader, being called to the bar in
walked before you from my childhood unto this day; 1837. He began the publication in Blackwood in 1839
witness against me before the Lord, and before His of his well-known novel “Ten Thousand a Year,"
anointed: whose ox have I taken? or whose ass have which had a great immediate success, and for some
I taken? or whom have I defrauded? whom bave I time continued to be generally read. “Tittlebat
oppressed? or of whose hand have I received a bribe Titmouse" became a familiar name even to those who
to blind mine eyes therewith ? and I will restore it to never saw the book. His law writings best known
you.” Then the whole assembly responded in one are: "A Popular and Practical Introduction to Law
unanimous approval of his conduct. “Thou hast not Studies," originally issued in 1835, but subsequently re defrauded us, nor oppressed us, neither hast thou written and enlarged; “Select Extracts from Black
taken aught of any man's hand." Yet again Samuel stone's Commentaries;” “Moral, Social and Profes
put it to them, lest any haste should have led them to sional Duties of Attorneys and Solicitors;” “ Parlia
affirm what might be subsequently questioned. To mentary Election Law of the United Kingdom;" Mr.
make their utterances more solemn, he said: “The Warren also published a number of pamphlets, and his
Lord is witness against you, and His anointed is witcomplete literary notes were collected in five volumes
ness this day, that ye have not found aught in my in 1853–55. He was made Queen's Counsel in 1851,
hand.” At once the multitude responded : “He is Recorder of Hull in 1854, and Member of Parliament
witness." Thus, with an untarnished reputation, for Midhurst in 1856. He was re-elected for the same
Samuel laid down his office. From The Quiver for July. borough in 1857, but vacated his seat upon being appointed a Commissioner of Lunaoy in 1859. He will
In the House of Commons lately, in a discussion on probably be best remembered by the general public by
the Supreme Court of Judicature (Ireland) bill, Mr. his novel, “ Ten Thousand a Year," and by the pro
Meldon submitted as an amendment that the office of fession by his “Introduction to Law Studies," which
Lord Chancellor of Ireland should be limited to memby far excels every other work ever published relating
bers of the Irish bar; but the Attorney-General for Ireto the same subject.
land objected, pointing out that the present Lord Chancellor of England is an Irishman, and the amend
ment was negatived by a vote of 202 to 106. — A man NOTES.
in England wanted, the other day, to register a certain THE Notaries' Journal is a quarterly magazine, Greek word as a trade-mark for an ink which he mauI edited and published by Robert Owen, and issued ufactured, but the registrar refused, on the ground at 110 Broadway, New York. It is, as its title indi- that “a mere word” could not be a trade-mark accates, devoted to the interests of notaries public and cording to law, which defines it as "a distinctive demust be found a valuable assistant to those officers in | vice," etc. The case was carried into court, where the the performance of their duties. It is published | plaintiff's counsel quoted Longfellow's authority for quarterly, its first issue appearing in February last. the word “excelsior" being a “strange device," but We have seen only the August number, the contents the practical judge declined to recognize the poetical of which are an essay on The Law of Protest; precedent, and judgment was given on the other side. The rules governing the issue of passports; an article upon the subject of Affidavits; a number of An Irish lawyer, Sullivan by name, has commenced cases upon the subjects of Commercial Paper Pro- | his career at the bar by throwing up a brief. It haptests, etc., from the reports old and new; Extracts pened a few weeks ago, when an important case comfrom the New Code, giving the sections of interest ing on, a firm of London solicitors who were conto notaries, namely: § 842, S 844, 923, S 924, 925, cerned for one of the parties gave a brief to Mr. Sulli$ 937 and $ 960; Mooted Questions; General Intelli- van. He accepted it and went over to Dublin to. gence;" Recent Decisions, eto., .of interest to no appear in the case. When he arrived he found that taries. The three numbers thus far issued contain two other counsel, whom he was expected to lead, together 108 pages, and the one before us is well printed | felt some, possibly pardonable, scruples about appearon good paper.
ing in a case as juniors to a man, compared with whom,
on the question of standing at the bar, they were Baron Bowse of the Irish bench, the other day, was much the seniors. Mr. Sullivan ascertaiued this fact, trying a shoemaker who was charged with having and admitting the reasonableness of the objection, at stabbed his wife. The guilt was brought home to the once returned his brief, preferring to sacrifice his fee prisoner beyond all dispute, and indeed the man did rather than the feelings of other people. There are not deny having committed the offense. Some of the more than a million of wills on deposit in the courts jury, however, were not convinced, and one of them of York, England, the accumulation of upwards of sapiently observed that he "did not see any clear five hundred years.