If we limit this distinctness or independency of the existence of extension-of extension for itself

-even to the moment of the given perception, there would be a difficulty in reconciling the possibility of this with the Kantian view, as commonly accepted, of the purely ideal character of space. An extension in an ideal space could only be an ideal extension-not really distinct for a moment from the conscious act which apprehends it, or, if distinct, distinct illusorily. But it is questionable whether Hamilton ever fully or in an unqualified manner adopted the Kantian dogma on this point. It was quite consistent for him, in accordance with his general views, to hold space a form or law of perception, and yet not without its counterpart in the real world of experience. He may have held space to be a necessary law of perception, and yet not simply a merely subjective condition. And in this case he would have held it to be, in a sense, of pure or non-empirical origin. There is no more inconsistency in this—indeed, inconsistency at all—than in holding causality to be at once a law of thought of native origin, and yet a law of things as well. Cause is but the pure form of a

cause, as space might be the pure form of extension. Besides, it is rather a narrow sort of criticism which fixes on a solitary expression that occurs as an interpolation, almost of a passing nature, in one essay, and to set it up in contradiction with the general tenor of an author's teaching.

There is also the difficulty with regard to Hamilton of determining precisely his view about the relation of the primary or essential qualities -extension, &c.-to body. They are, no doubt, regarded as primary and essential in the act of perception, as distinct in nature from the consciousness of the percipient, as referable to something else. But it is not clear whether he regarded these as constituting in body an essential existence, independent of any human perception. The main feature of his realism seems to have been the acknowledgment of distinct reality in the perception, with, certainly, the possibility of the continuousness of this in some form or other apart from the perception. is, at least, all that Realism need contend for. The "common-sense" doctrine of Realism may be taken, in an irreflective form, as meaning the

This

continued subsistence of certain qualities of body as perceived. And this seems to be the only "Realism of Common-sense" here contemplated by M. Dauriac.

In reply to the question, What is Realism according to Common-sense? he says: "It is to believe in the existence of objective things; that is, in consequence, to refuse to believe that they disappear when we have ceased to think of them, and by the fact alone that we no longer think of them. After me, when I have ceased to be, the world will continue to subsist; I shall be nothing, but the sun will not cease to shine, the earth to become warm from the contact of its rays, plants to grow and animals to move." Once more:

"1

Reality is not an empty word; it subsists by its peculiar laws, and these laws, known by us, remain independent of those which regulate ourselves. The contrary supposition shocks our instincts, falsifies our most invincible beliefsthose upon which all others depend." 2

But Hamilton, in common with every enlightened realist, has recognised the need for reflection upon and analysis of the data-apparent 1 Croyance et Réalité, pp. 121, 122. 2 Ibid., p. 123.

data—of the ordinary common-sense judgments of mankind. Realists have never regarded commonsense as doing more than supplying the materials for analysis—for philosophy-any more than the scientific man regards the data of the senses as being more than the materials for observation, analysis, and generalisation. Probably it will be found that in the common - sense of mankind there is embodied the principle of continuity of an external reality. Philosophy, dealing with this, may discover that there is such a principle, the so-called phenomenalism is not all; and it may propose to itself to find, further, what this principle is. All this would be truly in accordance alike with the spirit of common-sense and with the method of philosophy.

Another point falls to be noted here. It is said that the man of common-sense alleges that the idealist, or Berkeleyan, denies the actual or phenomenal reality of the external world, whereas this is not the case. The question between the idealist and the realist is, truly, as to the interpretation of this perceived or phenomenal reality. Whether, for example, it consists simply of what are called sensations or conscious impressions, or

of these as coming from something beyond themselves; whether these are truly percepts, objects in no way mine, or a property of mine; whether, further, this perceived or phenomenal world has reality only in the moment of perception, or whether it subsists after the perception, and in what form. It is clear that the idealist may be allowed to admit the phenomenal reality of the world, and yet deny its objective reality in the proper sense of the term, and so to deny external reality. A difference of opinion as to the prime nature of the object perceived may fairly be characterised as turning on the reality or nonreality of the external world, even in the phenomenal sphere. This would be apart altogether from the question as to whether the perceived reality subsists after perception, or is representative of a substantial or transcendent world.

But there is more than this. Suppress extension, and consciousness-i.e., the soul-disappears. But equally, suppress consciousness and extension disappears. Extension only exists by relation to the subject; space has only reality of spirit. Between the soul and space there