small block-house and some huts of the pilots, who reside only here. The first of these secondary channels contains at present but eight feet water; the latter from 14 to 16, according to the seasons. The South pass, which is directly in front of the Mississippi, has always been considered as entirely choked up, but has 10 feet water. The South-west pass, which is on the right, is the longest and narrowest of all the passes, and a few years ago had 18 feet water, and was that by which the large ships always entered and sailed from the Mississippi. It has now but eight feet water, and will probably remain so for some time. In speaking of the quantity of water in the passes, it must be understood of what is on the bar of each pass; for immediately after passing the bar, which is very narrow, there are from five to seven fathoms at all seasons.

NAVIGATION EMPLOYED IN THE TRADE OF THE PROVINCE.

In the year 1802, there entered the Mississippi 268 vessels of all descriptions, 14 of which were public armed vessels, and the remainder merchantmen, as follows, viz.

Of the number of American vessels, 23 ships, 25 brigs, 19 schooners, and five sloops came in ballast; the remainder were wholly, or in part laden.

Five Spanish ships and seven schooners came in ballast. The united tonage of all the shipping that entered the river, exclusive of the public armed vessels, was 33,725 register tons..

In the same year there sailed from the Mississippi 265 sail, viz.

The tonnage of the vessels which went away in ballast, and that of the public armed ships, are not included in the foregoing account: these latter carried away masts, yards, spars, pitch, tar, &c. at least 1000 tons.

In the first six months of the present year, there entered the Mississippi 173 sail, of all nations, four of which were public armed vessels, viz. two French and two Spanish, whose tonnage is not enumerated.

In the same six months there sailed from the Mississippi 156 vessels, viz.

23,155 tons.

The present week affords but little intelligence, either foreign or domestic.—The principal circumstance we have this week to announce is that the health of his Majesty is nearly restored. He has, during the week, been sufficiently recovered to take both air and exercise, and but a few days are wanting to complete that event on whsch the hopes and happiness of England depend.

From the continent no news of any importance has been received, except the reported arrest of General Pichegru; who is stated to have been discovered in Paris. The Moniteur is, however, silent as to any further proofs of the great conspiracy.

Several gun-boats have been brought in from Boulogne: and various rumours are in circulation respecting the movement of our squadron off that port; which is now in very considerable force. We do not, however, think it either necessary or prudent to indulge in any conjectures upon the subject.

Printed by JAMES WHITING, FINSBURY PLACE

Published by J. PARSONS, Bookseller, Ludgate Hill; by CLEMENT, 201, Strand (to either of whom all Communications are requested to be sent) sold-and by A. HAMILTON, at his Musical Library, 221, Piccadilly; by E. KERBY, 2, Stafford Street, Old Bond Street; SEATON, 40, Oxford Street; THOMAS, 35, Old Bond Street; WOODHAM, opposite Chancery Lane, Holborn; PECK, Lombard Street; and by various Booksellers and Newsmen in Town and Country.

[PRICE NINE-PENCE.]

In attempting an exposition of the fallacies of Mr. Pitt's argument in his late at tack upon the Admiralty-the total want of foundation to all his charges-and the vast inconsistency of his conduct towards Earl St. Vincent, we have but undertaken a duty to the public, which the cause of truth demands; a duty which requires neither the aid of sophistry or eloquence; but in the performance of which so many incontrovertible facts arise for utterance, that the only difficulty lies in the profusion. As, therefore, in the fullness of our subject, we feel that many important points must be omitted, so shall we, without hesitation, reject all superfluous aids and ornaments, and at once proceed to the most simple method we can devise of dividing the question, so as to embrace it in the most comprehensive manner, which its magnitude, compared with our limits, will permit.

For this purpose, therefore, it appears to us that the first step is to set out in general terms all the charges which can be extracted from the Right Hon. Gentleman's speech; that the force, effect, and bearings of each may be ascertained as accurately as possible. These charges, then, will be found as follows-nor can any others be even traced!

FIRST. "That the Admiralty had not augmented that species of force which was most particularly adapted to the peculiar circumstances of the empire."

SECONDLY. That in several years of the late war, greater exertions than on the present occasion were made, both absolutely, and relatively with respect to the force of the enemy, as well in equipping ships as in the raising men.

THIRDLY." That a sufficient number of contracts for the building of ships of war have not been made by the present Board of Admiralty, either for the service of the present moment, or for the future preservation of the British navy."

Such is the substance of all the charges adduced by the Right Hon. Gentleman: and we challenge any one to say that we have not stated them as fairly and forcibly as possible. In fact, we can have no motives for diminishing the force of his accusation; as not upon that, but upon his proofs and his reasoning must depend the merits or demerits of our case: to his proof and his reasoning, therefore, we now come.

The Right Hon. Gentleman, in his first charge, introduced with all that persuasive cloquence of his, so well calculated to delude the public, accuses (as we have seen) the present Board of Admiralty of not augmenting that force which the circumstances of the empire at this moment require. And the Overt Act upon which this accusation is founded, is, that until January, no contract was entered into for building GUN-VESSELS; and then, only for twenty-three; of which, five only are to be finished in three months, and the remainder not until the expiratiou of nine months. Having, therefore, made this the ground-work of his first charge, upon which he is pleased, most mercilessly, to arraign the Admiralty, for the most unpardonable neglect and delay, and to compare their guilty negligence with the prodigious exertions of his own Administration, we ask, was it not natural to have expected that he would, either before he stated this as a ground of censure, or at least in the course of his argument, have shewn that such GUN-VESSELS were of the description of force peculiarly adapted to the circumstances of the empire? That it is the corner stone of his argument cannot be denied: nevertheless, the Right Hon. Gentleman bas passed over this point almost in total silence, and has thought proper to take at for granted upon the proof of which the whole force of his argument depended.

The Right Honourable Gentleman, no doubt, had his prudential motives for this most unlogical omission; and it may fairly be conjectured, that he would not have lost this brilliant occasion of displaying his affected superiority of information, had he not been conscious of his incompetency to the subject—and had he not felt, that the less he therefore said, the better; inasmuch as, by a prudent silence, the public might be deceived in his conclusions-but that, should he have dared to agitate the question, there were men enough in that House to overthrow the preposterous and absurd proposition, “that flotilla of gun-boats was the most essen

tial force for this country in the present moment.” Yes! he well knew that there were near him men prepared to inform him, on the contrary, that the proofs of the superiority of larger vessels were almost innumerable-In fact, the number of guns to be brought into action, by means of frigates, or larger vessels, is much greater, in proportion to the number of men*, and to the whole expence and, from their steadiness+, the effect of their fire is no comparison more destructive; while the impression made by the enemy's shot, in return, is comparatively insignificantfor one good shot will send any gun boat to the bottom-so that, in a good breeze, scarcely any number of such vessels, are a match for a ship of force. The

*The complement of men, for such gun boats as were used last war, is 3)—they carry, at most, two guns. The complement of a six and thirty gun frigate, is 300; whereas, to fight six and thirty guns in gun-boats, requires 540 men, almost half as many more.

The ALEXANDER, last war, was engaged with near eighty Spanish gun-boats off Cadiz, for nearly two hours, within fhot of the batteries, in a perfect calm, and the water as smooth as glass, without receiving a single shot in her hull, though she crippled several of them, and compelled theш to sheer off with great loss.

only mode of attack the enemy's boats can ever succeed in, is by boarding; and the only ships against which exclusively they cannot use this mode of attack, are line of battle ships, frigates, or sloops of war; any less vessel, such as even the largest and best constructed GUN BRIG, is liable to be thus carried; and to make her at all secure against it, each would require a crew nearly equal in point of numbers to the crew of the enemy's boat-it is also self-evident, if such small craft was to be resorted to, in order to put the aggregate of such a force upon an equality with that of the enemy, there must be also, an equality in the numbers of the vessels on each side-filled, therefore, as these Flotillas of Bonaparte's are to be with armed soldiers, should they attack, how, on Mr. Pitt's principle, could the naval defence of this country be rendered adequate, but by sending to sea, and keeping at sea, such number of men as the country has not to command for that, or any other limited description of service? If, indeed, the reports of the force at Boulogne are correct, effectually to mask that port alone, would consume one half of the whole vote of seamen and marines, were they to be distributed in small boats, or even in brigssuch then are the inconveniences and disadvantages of gun-vessels! On the other hand, we will fairly ask, have they any countervailing advantages? We have indeed, never heard more than one point of superiority urged—namely, that they can be employed in shallow water, where larger vessels cannot act.-But let us ask the Hon. Gentleman, what proportion of shallow is there to deep water? how few parts are there where frigates can not act, and how many square leagues must not any invading flotilla pass, wherein even a FIRST RATE is competent to exert all her force?—But it is contended that such craft might approach the enemy's coast, to prevent the passage of their convoys from port to port-granted, if they were not interrupted by the land batteries and by heavy moveable artillery; but while this is the case, even this solitary possibility of any important service is denied them!

Here, therefore, we again ask what right had the Right Honourable Gentleman, to take for granted the superior excellence of the GUN BOAT SYSTEM-what right to raise the voice of censure upon a presumption so ill-founded ?—and ought he not at all events to have shewn, or in common decency at least have attempted to have shewn, the peculiar applicability of such vessels, to the present circumstanees of the empire, before he presumed to arraign the ADMIRALTY for the neglect, as he was pleased to say, of preparations indispensable to the existence of the country?—He did not, however, he could not! and if it were, therefore, on this account alone, we would pronounce, without hesitation, that his first charge is unfounded-unsupported and absurd!!!

But not upon principle alone shall we content ourselves in the exposure of the Honourable Gentleman's absurdities; we shall now look to what was done in the Gun Boat System during his own administration, that it may be seen, whether the ADMIRALTY had not good reasons founded in the experience of facts, as well as on the principle, to act as they have done-and whether they have not the support of every good reason for making the equipment of such vessels a very inferior consideration in their preparations for the defence of the coast.

To examine, therefore, and consider the vast exertions of the late Admiralty Board