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high function of his office, "as turning a grave court of justice into a theatre, for "didactic exercises, and, by silly interference, making his labours ridiculous and his "rank contemptible”—in the solemn act of appointing his Commission to try the insurgents, as influenced by motives very different from the general maxims of equity, "and wrapping the ermined robe of the most awful attribute of Majesty, round the "acts of an individual, to screen them from public disgrace;" and, lastly, that treason might not want its palliative, the resentment of a humane and generous people against the assassins of the virtuous Lord Kilwarden, is attempted to be softened by making Government accessorial to his murder.

I thank God, Sir, in the sincerity of my heart, that these great and noble characters are too well known in England, too universally esteemed among their countrymen, to suffer a momentary degradation from the publication of such unfounded calumnies-but to the people of Ireland, who can know nothing but from report, who must, of necessity, place a confidence in the just appointment of the crown, the promulgation of such facts which Mr. Cobbett knew to be false (or which he published on the authority of an anonymous correspondent) must be attended with all those practical evils that are found in the train of Distrust, Disaffection, and Dismay.

It is an easy task to erect the Standard of Rebellion, when the mound that separates the governor and the governed is broken down; when the Lord Lieutenant is held forth to the people as a subject of ridicule and contempt; when the first Law Officer in the empire is represented as contaminating the fountain of public justice. But the conduct of Mr. Cobbett is consistent.-His observations on the army and navy are in unison with his general system of disaffection, of which the affairs of Ireland compose only a part.

I shall postpone, however, the consideration of these questions to a future opportunity, and in the mean time am,

Your's, &c. &c.
HORATIO.

CONCLUSION OF STRICTURES ON THE PAMPHLET, ENTITLED "A PLAIN ANSWER TO THE CURSORY REMARKS."

The very delicate subject of the negociation for the return of Mr. Pitt to his former official situation, is not treated, by the author of the " Plain Answer," in a manner that will appear satisfactory to those, whose zeal for the public service is not subservient to the promotion of party views. It is acknowledged, that "Mr. Pitt was fully aware of the great and increasing difficulties of the country; "and that he saw the necessity of a strong, vigorous, and efficient Government." Was it necessary, in order to remove the former, and accomplish the latter, that Mr. Pitt should be supported by an administration composed of the principal Members of the present and of the late Government? Such appears to have been the wish of the Right Honourable Gentleman. But may we not justly suspect, that Mr. Pitt's aim was, to propose arrangements for the return of the leading Members of the late Ministry, with a view to the ultimate exclusion from the cabinet of the

present confidential servants of the crown? The return of Lords Grenville, Spencer, and Melville, would probably have led to the resignation of those who are so ably qualified for the direction of public affairs, at this very arduous and critical period. The old Cabinet being once fully established, the same counsels to which we have to attribute the greater part of the evils which, during the late war, arose out of a system of ministerial government, calculated to divide, oppress, and ruin the empire, would again prevail, and conduce to the same national calamities and disasters.

On a former occasion, we offered the tribute of justice due to the general disinterestedness of Mr. Pitt's character. But we should have done well to have limited this recognition of political virtue to a disregard of the emolumentt, not of the ambition of office. The patriotism of the statesman is blemished with impurity, when lust of power is its chief incentive. Let us attempt to ascertain by what motive the political views of Mr. Pitt have been influenced. As we have before observed, he acknowledged that the increasing difficulties and dangers of the state required a vigorous and efficient administration. And he was either conscious of, or flattered himself with, the possession of those talents which, at such a crisis, might be employed in the accomplishment of important national services. But he required that overtures from the Throne should be made to him for his return to office, and that he should be at liberty to propose, for the approbation of his Majesty, an Administration suited to the exigencies of the times: and, if his proposition should be discountenanced, he reserved to himself the discretionary choice of declining the undertaking altogether, in the event of its being found impracticable to modify arrangements for the formation of a Ministry, calculated, in his opinion, to direct the affairs of the nation with a reasonable probability of success.

Let us, for an instant, reflect what would, under such circumstances as we have described, have been the conduct of a patriotic statesman, and what has been the conduct of the Right Honourable Gentleman.

A truly enlightened patriot would have been regardless of every object but the danger of the state. The safety of the country would have been the steady aim of his ceaseless vigilance,would have animated every active principle of his nature, and awakened every dormant energy of his soul. No private views would have dis verted his zealous efforts from the great end of his patriotic labours ;-no party consideration repressed the ardour of his generous exertions. Every instant of his existence, every faculty of his being, every power of his mind, would have been devoted to the sacred cause of national security.

What has been the complexion of the patriotism of Mr. Pitt? He refused his country the problematical benefit of his best advise and assistance, unless his Majesty should formally intimate to him that his services were thought essential.-Mr. Addington having wisely objected to the return of Lord Grenville into the cabinet, because he was abundantly convinced that his Lordship's political dissonance and personal antipathies would introduce a spirit of rancour and disunion into his Majesty's council, Mr. Pitt refused to listen to such an exclusion, and declined a proposal coupled with conditions inconsistent with what he felt due to his public situation, and with his views of the public service. Again, the "Plain Answer" states, in the true and appropriate language of the narrow, egoistical, and circumscribed

views of faction, that there can be no question but Mr Pitt is entitled "to consider 66 upon what terms he could return to office, consistently with his own credit, and "the public service."

We shall not enter any further into the minute details of this negociation. We may, however, assert, with reasonable confidence, that if Mr. Pitt had acted with ingenousness and candour, the negociation would have assumed a very different aspect. Ministers, and perhaps a considerable proportion of the country, were desirous that he should again preside over the direction of public affairs; and if he had generously resisted the selfish influence of party considerations, he would probably have been again invested with the high dignity of first minister of the British empire.

With these few observations on the circumstances of the negociation for the return of Mr. Pitt into office, we shall conclude our Cursory Strictures on this extraordinary pamphlet. We feel it unnecessary to enter upon an examination of the genera parliamentary conduct of Lord Grenville, Mr. Pitt, and Mr.Windham. The arguments which the author of the "Plain Answer" has attempted to advance in their favour, cannot but produce a feeble impression on the minds of the public, who have been long satisfied that their exculpation must be a fruitless undertaking. To us, (and we have no hesitation in asserting that our opinion corresponds with the general sentiment,) it is evident that Lord Grenville's parliamentary opposition has been uniformly fastidious and inveterate,-Mr. Pitt's unmanly and ambiguous,-and Mr. Windham's factious and proverbial.

With respect to the style of the "Plain Answer,"we feel it incumbent on us candidly to acknowledge, that it far surpasses that of the "Cursory Remarks," in correctness, purity, and elegance. But if the latter performance is occasionally turgid in language, and defective in perspicuity, it exhibits many strong statements of circumstances which receive, from the explicit manner in which they are treated, a character of fairness and truth. The Plain Answer, on the contrary, eloquent and argumentative as it is, considered as a production intended to support a declining party, is specious, sophistical and evasive.

TACTICS.

Of the Defence to be opposed to the French System of Attack by heavy Columns.

The present system of attack most commonly adopted by the French in forcing a line of posts, or an army ranged in order of battle, is by advancing in heavy columns.

This plan, so contrary to the practice of the last century, was lately revived by General HOCHE, in La Vendee; but in fact it is of very remote origin, having, as we find in Polybius, been first invented by EPAMINONDAS, who, principally by this means, gained both his famous battles of Mantinea and Leuctra, where, after having shewn a false front, he suddenly advanced his strongest wing in column, refusing the weakest.

It has been the favourite theory of battle, both for attack and defence, in the latter ages, to oppose as extended a front as possible, that the greater numbers might be engaged. It must, however, be observed, that this system operates both ways; inasmuch as if a long line gives more fire, it receives it also. The attack, however, by

solid columns, upon many points at once of a long line, cannot fail in the common order of battle, to force that line in every point so attacked.

The head of a column thus advancing, is no doubt for a short time exposed to a heavy fire, which it cannot well return; but it is also clear, that an army thus acting, will lose fewer men than if it advanced in line: for the time of action is very short, nothing in the ordinary mode of defence being able to resist it when it comes in contact: the line, therefore, is immediately forced, and the day is won with very little fighting. Such being, therefore, the great advantages attending the system now adopted by the French, it has become matter of the utmost military importance to consider of some construction of posts, some order of battle, that shall infallibly prepare an army against such an attack; and we here, therefore, beg to offer one, by which, we conceive, an army, though very inferior in point of force, shall be able to cut to pieces a number of columns thus advancing.

In every line of posts, or order of battle, there must be certain ground by which such a column can best proceed in its attack. Such points, therefore, must be principally attended to in the defence.

It is proposed, then, that the line of defence, instead of being continued, is to be formed with considérable intervals in front, these intervals being left in such ground as the attacking columns are most likely to advance by: and in the rear of the several divisions in front, and in parallel lines, several battalions of infantry and cavalry are to be formed, one behind the other, at suitable distances to the right and left of the intervals, not directly opposite to one another, but in the alternate spaces, and again to the rear of these, one battalion in the centre of the interval.

Such a disposition being made, and the battalions in front being supposed to be either strongly posted on natural ground, or defended by strong works, we will first suppose, that when the enemy advances, in the spirit of his system he penetrates with all expedition into the intervals. Here he will have advanced a considerable way before he perceives the preparations made for his reception; and when he does perceive them, he will find it too late to retreat. At this moment, therefore, the retired battalion in the centre of the interval attacks the head of his column, while those on his flank charge him at right angles from the right and left, in as many points as there are battalions; at the same time that the troops in front are pouring a cross fire into that part of his column which has not penetrated.

Such an attack, unexpected, or expected too late, cannot fail to destroy him, though he be superior in numbers: his line, to use the sea term, and the analogy is complete, will be broken, his squadrons attacked in front, in flank, in rear, and he must inevitably either throw down his arms or be cut to pieceshis regiments, moreover, will be divided and broken up while those on the defensive may be kept together, and, by attacking in the alternate spaces, from right and left, can cut their way through and through his column.

It may be said, that at this moment he will be able to fall out of his line, and form also at right angles-but in addition to its being very improbable that any column would be cool enough for such a manœuvre, under such an attack, with his flanks, exposed moveover to a heavy fire of artillery-this may be prevented to a certainty, as will be hereafter explained.

:

But let it be supposed, that before the enemy has actually penetrated into the intervals, he perceives your defences, and changes his system of attack. In this case, he must either storm the strong ground or works in front, or form for an attack in line. Against the first you are equally well prepared; and doubly, nay, trebly supported by your battalions on the rear, who, upon this being notified to them, may issue out to attack his columns, thus checked, on either flank-for the advantage of his system ceases when the column is once checked. So, if he attempts to change his column into a line in front, you will at once have destroyed this vaunted system of attack, without a blow; and you will moreover be found in the best situation for maintaining the contest; inasmuch as you will be much sooner formed than he can be, because it is easier to form the line by battalions on the right or left division than to deploye into line from a long column; so that in this case also your disposition is the most favourable, and you may attack his yet unformed line with all your force. Thus, therefore, it should seem that the advantage is on the side of the defence, under any circumstances that may occur.

The system, moreover, will be found to be universal, and to be applicable either to the defence of ground that may be naturally favourable to the disposition, or to that of any required spot, let the ground be what it may.

As to the first point, little need be said; for an army acting generally on the defensive, has the choice of ground, and therefore may post itself so as to take advantage of any system. And in the second case, it will appear applicable in any ground, and that the most level Plain may be thus defended :-for this purpose, it requires only a few powerful works in the front line, and a series of smaller ones in their rear. If the enemy, therefore, refuses the principal redoubts, and penetrates into the intervals, these smaller works support and shelter the battalions that are to fall upon his flanks; and, at the same time, by their fire, keep him compressed into his first form; for if he attempt any manœuvre, they will enfilade him one way, while the issuing battalions take him the other. If, however, as in most cases may happen, these intervals can be so arranged as to lead into a road, or between woods, morasses, or inclosures, then no such works may be necessary, and the only business for the Engineer will be, to have as many cross roads over the main one, as there are battalions to act, since the battalion guns, forming to the right and left of their respective regiments, will in this case be sufficient to keep the column in its first position.

In short, no courage, no coolness, can extricate a column from such a cul de sac !! Hence it seems possible, in every case, to destroy all the superiority which the attack by columns has over the ordinary line of defence-by a disposition that, in many situations would require no works at all, and which, when they are wanted, needs fewer than are required for the defence of an extended line-by a disposition which, let the enemy' change his system as he pleases, even in the moment of attack, still insures the advantage to the army acting on the defensive.