because the cable company had no pass-book, and because the money was not paid out upon checks, but upon bills, etc. Whether or not there was a pass-book in no wise affected or changed the mode of keeping the bank's accounts. The statements rendered to the cable company's book-keeper showed the deposits as well as the payments, in the same manner as if written up in the pass-book. That payments were made upon bills instead of checks could not affect the correctness of the accounts, the bills being treated as checks.

I think the preliminary evidence was sufficient to authorize the admission of the books of the bank, especially in view of the fact that statements of the bank's account had been regularly furnished to the cable company, thus giving it the opportunity to examine it and investigate its correctness. These statements being in evidence, and no objection having at any time been made to them, furnished at least prima facie evidence that the account of the bank was correct. The interest of Dare and Collins as officers of the bank does not seriously, if it at all, affect the question. Their interest on behalf of the bank was not greater than in transactions with any other customer, and it is well settled that books of account kept by banks are admissible in evidence. (See McLennan v. Bank of Californa, 87 Cal. 569, 575, and cases there cited.) The interest of parties to a transaction invites scrutiny just as the interest of a witness invites scrutiny; but such interest goes only to the weight of the testimony, not to its admissibility; even when a party was disqualified as a witness, because of his interest, he was permitted to testify to the correctness of his account and put that in evidence.

It has been seen that the notes upon which the first four counts are based, not having been executed by proper authority, are not evidence of a liability upon the express contract appearing upon their face; but, as it is also true that if the money represented by or named in the notes was furnished by the bank, and was received by and applied to the proper use and benefit of

the cable company, plaintiff is entitled to recover the same, the question arises whether the notes are admissible in evidence for the purpose of showing that the money represented by them was furnished by the bank.

The record does not disclose the circumstances under which nor by whose direction the secretary executed the notes. It does appear, however, that Collins and Dare were intrusted with the management of the finances of the cable company, and the only evidence in the record showing that money was received from any other source than the bank was given by Mr. Fisher, to the effect that he understood that the money was borrowed in the east; that he, Collins, and Dare, each made notes individually, the other two becoming indors ers, and he thought that in this way about $100,000 was raised, and that he did not know of the cable company borrowing in its own name.

The stumbling block in this case, however, seems to have been the double relation or agency of Collins, Dare, and Havermale, being at the same time officers and directors in both corporations. In Adams Min. Co. v. Senter, 26 Mich. 73, Captain Frue was the agent of the Adams Company, and also of the South Pewabic Company. Frue sold to Senter certain timber belonging to the Adams company in payment of a bill which the Pewabic company owed to Senter, in order that the latter company should be given additional credit, and this action was brought by the plaintiff against the defendant for taking said timber. After discussing other questions, Mr. Justice Campbell said:

"The question next arises, How far the double agency of Captain Frue affected his relations to his employers and to third persons. It was claimed that, upon the principle that a man cannot contract with himself, and cannot occupy positions involving a conflict of duties, all of his dealings whereby the property of one company was transferred to or used for the other should be held unlawful. There is no validity in such a proposition. The authority of agents may, where no law is violated,

be as large as their employers chose to make it. There are multitudes of cases where the same person acts under power from different principals in their mutual transactions. Every partnership involves such double relations. Every survey of boundaries, by a surveyor jointly agreed upon, would come within similar difficulties. It is only where the agent has personal interests conflicting with those of his principal that the law requires peculiar safeguards against his acts. There can be no presumption that the agent of two parties will deal unfairly with either. And when both deliberately put him in charge of their separate concerns, and there is any likelihood that he may have to deal with the rights of both in the same transactions, instead of lessening his powers it may become necessary to enlarge them far enough to dispense with such formalities as one man would use with another, but which could not be possible for a single person to go through with alone."

Collins and Dare were not the bank, though they were its agents; and in an action by the bank, or its receiver, it is not perceived why their acts and admissions as the agents of the cable company, in charge of its financial affairs, are not admissible in evidence against it in relation to those matters that were intrusted to their management by the latter company. If they had procured the money from another bank with which they were not connected, assuming that the notes were executed by the secretary by their direction, I think it would not be contended that the notes were inadmissible in evidence, in connection with the other facts, for the purpose of showing that the payee was the party lending the money.

I think the judgment and order should be reversed and a new trial granted.

SEARLS, C., and BELCHER, C., concurred.

For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion the judgment and order appealed from are reversed and a new trial granted.

HENSHAW, J., TEMPLE, J., MCFARLAND, J.

[No. 15838. Department Two.-April 4, 1895.]

T. J. HORGAN, RESPONDENT, v. E. ZANETTA, AP

PELLANT.

CHATTEL Mortgage-GroWING CROP-EXTINGUISHMENT OF LIENREMOVAL FROM LAND.-The lien of a chattel mortgage on a growing crop continues only as long as the same remains on the land of the mortgagor; and is prima facie extinguished when the crop is removed from the land.

(D. REMOVAL TO LAND OF CREDITOR-ATTACHMENT

ESTOPPEL.-The

fact that a creditor of the mortgagor who attached the crop after removal thereof from the land of the mortgagor to his land represented that the land of the mortgagor was not suited to the placing of a machine for the threshing of the crop, and requested him to take the grain on to his land as more adapted to the threshing of it, the creditor not at the time knowing of the existence of the mortgage, does not estop the creditor from attaching the grain after its removal from the land of the mortgagor to his land, notwithstanding the existence of the mortgage was known prior to the levy of attachment, it appearing that the mortgagee did not use any care and diligence in looking after the crop when harvested, or pay any attention to the grain until it had been attached nearly a month subsequently to its removal from the land of the mortgagor.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Benito County and from an order denying a new trial.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

N. C. Briggs, John L. Hudner, S. F. Geil, and John J. Wyatt, for Appellant.

Plaintiff's mortgage lien was lost when the mortgagor removed the grain from the land which he had leased. The lien of a mortgage on a growing crop continues on the crop after severance, whether remaining in its original state or converted into another product, so long as the same remains on the land of the mortgagor. (Civ. Code, sec. 2972.) This section of the Civil Code was adopted in 1878, and took effect from its approval. Prior to that time the lien of the mortgage only continued until the crop was severed from the land, and then ceased, unless the crop was delivered to

and taken into the possession of the mortgagee. (Stats. of 1856, p. 87; Quiriaque v. Dennis, 24 Cal. 154; Goodyear v. Williston, 42 Cal. 11.) Section 2972 of the Civil Code, above cited, extended the lien after the crop had been harvested, so long as it remained on the land of the mortgagor, and no longer. (Waterman v. Green, 59 Cal. 142.) The only exception which has ever been allowed to this rule is that, when the crop has been tortiously removed from the land of the mortgagor by a third party, the lien of the mortgage is not lost. (Wilson v. Prouty, 70 Cal. 196; Martin v. Thompson, 63 Cal. 4; De Costa v. Comfort, 80 Cal. 507.) Defendant was not estopped from justifying the seizure under the writ of attachment in the case of Cole v. Murphy, as his representations and statements as to the removal and threshing of the grain were all true, and no misrepresentations were made. (Bigelow on Estoppel, 3d ed., 476, 484; Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255; Griffeth v. Brown, 76 Cal. 260; Boggs v. Merced Mining Co., 14 Cal. 279-367; Stockman v. Riverside etc. Co., 64 Cal. 57; Dean v. Parker, 88 Cal. 283; Brant v. Virginia Coal etc. Co. 93 U. S. 326; Morrill v. St. Anthony Falls etc. Co., 26 Minn. 222; 37 Am. Rep. 399; Bowen v. Brown, 30 N. Y. 519; 86 Am. Dec. 406.)

George P. Burke, for Respondent.

The removal of the crop from the land of the mortgagor did not divest it of the lien of plaintiff's crop mortgage. (Wilson v. Prouty, supra; Rider v. Edgar, 54 Cal. 127; Martin v. Thompson, 63 Cal. 4; Byrnes v. Hatch, 77 Cal. 242; Campodonico v. Oregon etc. Co., 87 Cal. 566.) Defendant was estopped by his actions in inducing the removal of the grain from justifying the attachment. (Bigelow on Estoppel, 345; Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 266.)

MCFARLAND, J.-In 1893 James Murphy was the lessee of a parcel of inclosed land called field No. 1. D. W. Cole owned adjoining land called field No. 2. Murphy had executed a chattel mortgage of the crop of grain growing on his said leased land to the plaintiff,