Courts of Equity (as has been already intimated) have established the doctrine, that after a great lapse of time, and long peaceable possession, they ought not to interfere to grant relief; for the policy of the law is to give quiet and repose to titles; and Courts of Justice ought not to countenance laches or long delays on the part of claimants. Indeed, after a great lapse of time, Courts of Equity will raise a presumption of some legal or equitable extinguishment of the adverse title, if the circumstances of the case will enable them to support it.2 § 814. On this ground, where a Bill was brought upon an old mortgage, by the representatives of the mortgagee, for an account and satisfaction; and a Bill of Revivor and Supplement was brought a long time after the death of the original plaintiffs, which (to account for the lapse of time) charged generally, that owing to infancy, coverture, or other disabilities, the plaintiffs had not been able, during a considerable part of the time, to assert or prosecute their several rights to the mortgage debt; and that the original suit, although abated, has never been dismissed; a plea was put in by the defendant, that he, and those, under whom he claimed, had been in the undisturbed posses on Eq. Jurisp. § 1519-1522; 1 Story on Eq. Jurisp. § 55, a, p. 73, § 529, and cases there cited. See also Cowne v. Douglas, 1 McClel. & Younge, 321; Portlock v. Gardner, 1 Hare, R. 594, 603, 604. 1 Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 2 Jac. & Walk. 1, 163–175, 192; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 273, note (≈); Campbell v. Graham, 1 Russ. & Mylne, 453; Clay v. Smith, Ambler, R. 645; S. C. 3 Bro. Ch. R. 639; Hercy v. Dinwoody, 2 Ves. jr. 86; Ellison v. Moffat, 1 John. Ch. R. 46; Arden v. Arden, 1 John. Ch. R. 313; Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. R. 152; Baldwin v. Pearl, 1 Younge & Coll. 453, 460; Brooksbank v. Smith, 2 Younge & Coll. 58; Galt v. Osbaldeston, 1 Russ. R. 158; Bradt v. Kirkpatrick, 7 Paige, R. 62; 2 Story on Eq. Jurisp. § 1520–1522, and notes. 2 Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 2 Jac. & Walk. 163-175, and cases before cited. sion of the premises in question for forty years, for their own absolute use and benefit, without any account or admission of any debt; and the plea was allowed by the Court.' The Court also thought, that the allegation of infancy, coverture, &c., to account for the delay, was so completely vague, that no issue could be taken upon it; and, therefore, that the plea was not affected thereby.2 § 815. So, where a Bill was filed for the payment of a rent charge, the defendant pleaded twenty-six years' possession of the premises, without accounting for, or paying over to the plaintiff any part of the rents and profits; and the plea was allowed." § 815, a. We have already had occasion incidentally to suggest, that the time, when the plea of the statute of limitations begins to run, where the case made by the Bill is one founded on fraud or mistake, will in Equity be held to be from the time, when the discovery of the mistake become first known, and not from the time, when the original transaction took place.1 1 Cooper, Eq. Pl. 288; Blewitt v. Thomas, 2 Ves. jr. 669, 671. 2 Blewitt v. Thomas, 2 Ves. jr. 669, 671; Cooper, Eq. Pl. 288; Beames, Pl. in Eq. 247, 248. The very plea is given at large in the Appendix to Beames, Pl. in Eq. 331–333. 3 Baldwin v. Peach, 1 Younge & Coll. 453; Ante, § 587. CHAPTER XV. PLEAS TO BILLS OF DISCOVERY. 816. HAVING thus considered the objections to Bills of Relief, which extend to the relief, and likewise to the discovery, sought for the purpose of obtaining the relief, it remains to treat of such objections, as are grounds of a plea to Bills of Discovery, strictly so called, which seek no relief. These are nearly the same as those, which have been already mentioned, as causes of demurrer to a Bill of Discovery, when the objection is apparent on the face of the Bill; and many of them are equally as good grounds for a plea to a Bill of Discovery, as they are for a plea to a Bill of Relief, when the objection is not so apparent. Upon this subject, therefore, our observations will be very brief.1 § 817. The grounds of pleas to Bills of Discovery, are, then, either, (1.) Pleas to the jurisdiction ; (2.) Pleas to the person; (3.) Pleas to the Bill, or frame of the Bill; (4.) Pleas in bar, properly so called. And, first, pleas to the jurisdiction. These properly apply, where the plaintiff's case is such, as does not entitle a Court of Equity to compel a discovery in his favor, although, for the purpose of avoiding a demurrer, it is differently and falsely stated in the Bill. The cases already suggested under the head of 1 Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 281, 282; Cooper, Eq. Pl. 291, 292; Beames, Pl. in Eq. 249. See Wigram on Points of Discov. 147 – 153, 1st. edit., p. 55; Id. 347, 348. 2 Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 282; Cooper, Eq. Pl. 292; Beames, Pl. in Eq. 252; 1 Mont. Eq. Pl. 261–263. Demurrers, and Pleas to Relief, afford sufficient illustrations on this head.' Among them are the objection, that the subject of the suit is of a political nature; that another Court is competent to give the discovery ; or that the tribunal, or the cause, is not of such a character, as the Court will aid by a discovery; as if the cause be before arbitrators; or be of a criminal nature;2 or the plaintiff has no title or interest in the suit.3 These are § 818. Secondly; Pleas to the person. (as we have seen) either to the person of the plaintiff; that he has no right, or title, or ability, to call on the defendant for the discovery; or that he (the defendant) is not liable, or compellable, to make the discovery sought by the Bill. The defendant may, therefore, to a Bill of Discovery, plead, that the plaintiff is outlawed; or excommunicated; or an alien enemy; or a person attainted; or an infant; or a feme covert; or an idiot; or a lunatic; or a bankrupt disabled to sue. So, if the plaintiff has no title to the character, which he assumes in the Bill of Discovery; as if he sues as administrator, executor, heir, partner, or creditor; the defendant may, by plea, negative, that he is 1 Ante, § 549-607, 710-722. 5 2 Beames, Pl. in Eq. 252-254; Cooper, Eq. Pl. 292, 293; Ante, § 551-555; Hare on Discov. 110, 116, 119. 3 Mendizabel v. Machado, 1 Sim. R. 68; Hare on Discov. 41, 42, 46-60, 127; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 154, 231, 233, 282; Tarlton v. Hornby, 1 Y. & Coll. 172; Quilter v. Mussendine, Gilb. Eq. R. 228, 229; Vernon v. Vernon, 2 Mylne & Craig, 145; Crouch v. Hitchin, 1 Keen, R. 385. 4 Beames, Pl. in Eq. 254, 255; Cooper, Eq. Pl. 293, 294; Ante, 493-496; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 228-230, 232, 233. 5 See Lowndes v. Taylor, 1 Madd. R. 423; S. C. 2 Rose, R. 363; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 66, 67, 232, 233, 282, note (n); Tarlton v. Hornby, 1 Y. & Coll. 172; Beames, Pl. in Eq. 254, 255; Ante, § 495, 516, 726. 6 Ante, § 722 - 734. administrator, executor, heir, partner, or creditor.1 So, the defendant may, in like manner, plead to the discovery, that he has no interest in the subject-matter of the controversy; but he is a mere witness; or that he does not sustain the character, in which he is sued; such as administrator, executor, heir, partner, or creditor; or that there is a want of privity between him and the plaintiff to sustain the Bill.3 2 § 819. It should be here observed, that if a claim of interest is alleged by a Bill against a person, who has no interest in the subject-matter, he cannot by demurrer protect himself from a discovery; but he must resort either to a plea or to a disclaimer; by either of which means, it should seem, he may protect himself from making by answer that discovery, which he may properly be required to make, if called upon as a witness. If the defendant pleads to a Bill of this sort, the plea must by averment meet the charge of interest, and the plea must be supported by an answer denying such claim.5 In some cases, however, the Court has allowed a defendant to protect himself by answer, denying the charge of interest, from answering to matters, to which he may be afterwards called upon to answer, in the character of a witness. And perhaps, in justice to those, against whom he may be afterwards called upon to give evidence, as a witness, he 1 Ante, § 493-496; Beames, Pl. in Eq. 120-128, 254, 256, 257; Cooper, Eq. Pl. 293, 294; Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 187, 230, 282, 283; Hare on Discov. 41, 42, 46. 2 Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 188, 283; Beames, Pl. in Eq. 130, 131, 256, 257; Hare on Discov. 63-83; Cooper, Eq. Pl. 294, 295; Ante, § 262, 323, 519, 570, 671. 3 Mitf. Eq. Pl. by Jeremy, 158, 159, 234; Hare on Discov. 63–68, 105-109; Ante, § 513, 571; Cooper, Eq. Pl. 294. 4 Cooper, Eq. Pl. 294, 295. 5 Ibid.; Beames, Pl. in Eq. 265. |