and completed in another it shall be deemed to have been committed in either, and may be dealt with, inquired of, tried, determined, and punished in either district, in the same manner as if it had been actually and wholly committed therein.' This provision takes an emphasis of signification from the fact that it was originally a part of the same section of the statute which defined conspiracy— that is section 30 of the act of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 484, c. 169. Nor has the provision lost the strength of meaning derived from such association by its subsequent separation, for it is provided in section 5600 of the Revised Statutes that "The arrangement and classification of the several sections of the revision have been made for the more convenient and orderly arrangement of the same, and therefore no inference or presumption of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the title, under which any particular section is placed.""

To the same effect was Buck Stove and Range Co., 226 U. S. 205; U. S. v. Marsh, 106 Fed. 474; U. S. v. Thomas, 145 Fed. 74.

Also, King v. McLean Asylum (64 Fed. 331), in which it was said:

"This section (5600) is expressly limited to arrangement and classification, and does not extend to changes in phraseology."

Page v. Burnstine, 102 U. S. 664

This was an appeal from a decree of the Supreme Court for the District of Columbia dismissing a bill by the personal representatives of Robert C. Page to recover for the estate the value of a life insurance policy issued November 22, 1866, over and above amounts due Burnstine for loans made by him to Page on the policy. Loans were made from time to time and assignments taken to the extent of lender's interest. On January 7, 1873, assignment of the policy was made purporting to transfer Page's entire interest. Plaintiffs admitted Burnstine's interest but prayed an accounting. The defendant resisted the suit on the ground that at the death of Page he was the absolute owner of the policy and entitled to all the proceeds. The life insurance company paid the amount due on the policy into court abiding the result of the suit. Some depositions were taken, among them being one of Burnstine with reference to the loans and the several assignments. As to this, plaintiffs contended Burnstine could not testify as to any transaction with or statement by the deceased unless called on by them or required by the court, relying on section 858 of the Revised Statutes. Defendant contended that his right to testify was determined by Sections 876 and 877 of the Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia. Plaintiff's bill was dismissed and appeal taken to the United States Supreme Court, where the decree was reversed and the cause remanded directing an account of the amount due Burnstine for loans or other payments made to keep the policy in force, and holding that Burnstine could not testify in the suit on his own motion. In view of the conflict between sections 876 and 877 of the Revised Statutes for the District of Columbia and section 858 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, the Supreme Court examined the legislative history of the basic statutes to determine the intent of Congress. The act of July 2, 1864, relating to the law of evidence in the District was carried into the Revised Statutes for the District of Columbia as sections 876 and 877, without change; the third section of the act of July 2, 1864, with respect to appropriations, and the amending act of March 3, 1865, were carried into the Revised Statutes of the United States as section 858, without change; and the act of February 21, 1871, was carried into the Revised Statutes for the District of Columbia as section 93. The court said that by the third section of the act of July 2, 1864, and the amending act of March 3, 1865, witnesses could not testify in such a case; that the act of February 21, 1871, made the rule applicable to the courts of the District of Columbia unless locally inapplicable, which it was not; and that this was the law as it existed at the time the two revisions went into effect. It said these provisions having been carried into the two revisions, respectively, without change, Congress did not intend to change the law with respect to the rule of evidence in the District of Columbia, having so provided by section 1296 of the Revision for the District and by section 5600 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. In this connection the court said:

"We should not, therefore, permit the mere collocation of rearrangement of the previous statutes in the new revisions, adopted on the same day, to operate to change the law, and thereby defeat the will of Congress * * *. For these reasons, we are of the opinion that Burnstine could not, on his own motion, testify as to any transaction with, or statement by, the decedent, Page. His deposition as to such transactions, and statements, must be excluded from consideration" (in the further proceedings in the lower court).

McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U. S. 619

Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

A decree was rendered April 17, 1878, and appeal was taken September 6, 1883. Defendant was sued in New York City upon the decree, judgment rendered against him, and he was thrown into jail, 1879. Appeal having been taken 5

years after entry of the decree, the Government contended that under section 1008 of the Revised Statutes no judgment or decree shall be reviewed by the Supreme Court unless the appeal is taken within 2 years after the entry of the judgment, except in case of some disability such as insanity. Appellant contended the statute of limitations was suspended by reason of his incarceration. It was held that in order for a disability to suspend the statute it must exist at the time the right arises, which here was upon entry of the decree, and before the appellant was jailed. Section 1008 of the Revised Statutes was taken directly and without change from the second section of the act of June 1, 1872. This last act was a revision of the twenty-second section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The language was substantially the same. The court said:

"The phraseology of the act of 1872, and of the one thousand and eighth section of the Revised Statutes is so nearly identical with that of the twenty-second section of the act of 1789, in reference to the point under consideration, that we must presume they were intended to have the same construction, and the act of 1789 contains no language which requires that it should have a different construction from that which had long been established in reference to all the statutes of limitation then known, whether in the mother country or in this. On the contrary, as we have seen, the terms of the act of 1789 fairly call for the same construction which had for centuries prevailed in reference to those statutes."

Upon a revision of statutes, a different interpretation is not to be given them without some substantial change of phraseology, some change other than what may have been necessary to abbreviate the form of the laws.

SEC. 5601. The enactment of the said revision is not to affect or repeal any act of Congress passed since the 1st day of December one thousand eight hundred and seventy-three, and all acts passed since that date are to have full effect as if passed after the enactment of this revision, and so far as such acts vary from, or conflict with any provision contained in said revision, they are to have effect as subsequent statutes, and as repealing any portion of the revision inconsistent therewith.

United States v. Auffmordt, 122 U. S. 197

Action by the United States against Auffmordt and others composing the firm of C. A. Auffmordt & Co., to recover $321,519.29 with interest for alleged false entry as to value of merchandise by reason of which defendants forfeited the value of goods in the above amount to the United States, consigned to them from a manufacturer in Switzerland. After the opening by the United States at the trial, defendants moved for a directed verdict on the ground that there was no statute of the United States whereby the value of the merchandise could be recovered by reason of the acts alleged to have been committed by the defendants. The District Court so ruled and directed a verdict for defendants. Judgment affirmed by the Circuit Court and the case went to the Supreme Court of the United States on writ of error.

Section 2864 of the Revised Statutes, as originally enacted, in providing for a forfeiture of merchandise omitted a provision in the basic act providing for forfeiture of the value thereof. The Revised Statutes were enacted on June 22, 1874, but embraced only the laws in force on December 1, 1873. The act of February 18, 1875, c. 80, 18 Stat. 319, entitled "An act to correct errors and to supply omissions in the Revised Statutes of the United States," amended section 2864 by restoring the omitted provision. It was contended by the United States that Congress intended by this amendment that R. S. 2864 should provide that the value of such goods should be forfeited. However, this amendment was in conflict with a statute passed on June 22, 1874, which did not provide for forfeiture of value. The court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court, saying the sole object of the act of February 18, 1875, was to correct errors and supply omissions in the text of the Revised Statutes, as its title indicated, so as to make the same truly express the statutes in force on December 1, 1873. It was in no sense new legislation nor a new law enacted to take effect from the date of its passage, in such wise as to alter any enactment made since the passage of the Revised Statutes. The intention was to make section 2864 read as it ought to have read in the printed volume, in the shape in which it was in force on the 1st of December 1873, as a part of section 1 of the act of March 3, 1863, c. 76, 12 Stat. 738. It left the act of June 22, 1874, to have its full effect in respect to section 2864, in like manner as if the words "or the value thereof" had been contained in that section, in the printed volume of the Revised Statutes. There was a law in force on December 1, 1873, and subsequently thereto, down to June 22, 1874, authorizing a forfeiture of the value of merchandise for the causes stated in section 2864, and the fact forfeitures of such value might have been incurred during the intervening period between December 1, 1873, and June 22, 1874, was a sufficient reason for the correction made in section 2864.

See also U. S. v. Mason, 34 Fed. 129; U. S. v. Bain, 40 Fed. 455; U. S. v. North American Commercial Co., 64 Fed. 145.

See also The North American Commercial Co. v. United States, 171 U. S. 110, where in reversing the Circuit Court as to the amount owed by the lessor, the Supreme Court said the Revised Statutes were approved June 22, 1874; that by section 5601 provision was made that legislation between December 1, 1873, and the date of enactment of the revision should take effect as if subsequently passed; that the act of May 24, 1874, giving the power of limitation to the Secretary of the Treasury operated by way of amendment to the Revised Statutes and removed the restrictions provided in sections 1960 and 1962 of the revision.

See also U. S. v. The "Grace Lothrop," 226 U. S. 527, holding section 5601 of the Revised Statutes provided the revision did not repeal subsequent legislation.