SECTION 6. Sound legislative reforms are impeded by opposite errors as to the authority of established institutions 7. Authority of parties and party leaders in politics. Its abuses. PAGE 382 384 1. Aristocracy is usually defined to be a government of the minority, and democracy to be a government of the majority of the people 2. The distinction between these two forms of government, is a distinction, not of kind, but of degree . 3. Necessity of caution in laying down general propositions respecting aristocratic and democratic government 403 404 . . . 409 4. The neglect of proper precautions in speculations upon government has rendered political science uncertain. 5. Province of political science. Its division into positive or descriptive, and ideal or speculative politics. 415 416 6. Importance of treating these two branches of political science separately 422 ERRATA. P. 78, Notes, line 6 from bottom, for “to extend,” read “ of extending.” ON THE INFLUENCE OF AUTHORITY IN MATTERS OF OPINION. CHAPTER I. ON THE NATURE OF AUTHORITY IN MATTERS OF OPINION. § 1. As the ensuing Essay relates to matters of opinion, it will be necessary for me, at the outset, without entering upon disputed questions of mental philosophy, to explain briefly what portion of the subjects of belief is understood to be included under this appellation, and what is the meaning of the generally received distinction between matters of opinion and matters of fact; a distinction which, though not scientifically precise, is, with a little explanation, sufficiently intelligible for the purposes of the present inquiry, and which marks, with tolerable accuracy, a distinction leading to important practical consequences. By a Matter of Fact I understand anything of which we obtain a conviction from our internal consciousness, or any individual event or phenomenon which is the object of sensation. It is true that even the simplest sensations involve some judgment: when a witness reports that he saw an object of a certain shape and size, or at a certain distance, he describes something more than a B mere impression on his sense of sight, and his statement implies a theory and explanation of the bare phenomenon. When, however, this judgment is of so simple a kind as to become wholly unconscious, and the interpretation of the appearances is a matter of general agreement, the object of sensation may, for our present purpose, be considered a fact. A fact, as so defined, must be limited to individual sensible objects, and not extended to general expressions or formulas, descriptive of classes of facts, or sequences of phenomena, such as that the blood circulates, the sun attracts the planets, and the like.* Propositions of this sort, though descriptive of realities, and therefore, in one sense, of matters of fact, relate to large classes of phenomena, which cannot be grasped by a single sensation, which can only be determined by a long series of observations, and are established by a process of intricate reasoning. Taken in this sense, matters of fact are decided by an appeal to our own consciousness or sensation, or to the testimony, direct or indirect, of the original and percipient Doubts, indeed, frequently arise as to the existmatter of fact, in consequence of the diversity eports made by the original witnesses, or the susness of their testimony. A matter of fact may again oubtful, in consequence of the different constructions ich may be put upon admitted facts and appearances, n a case of proof by (what is termed) circumstantial evidence. Whenever such doubts exist they cannot be settled by a direct appeal to testimony, and can only be resolved by reasoning; instances of which are afforded by the pleadings of lawyers and the disquisitions of *See Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, B. I. c. i., B. VIII. c. i., and B. XI. c. iii. historians upon contested fact is doubted upon reas becomes a matter of opinion fact, however, is not a gener question to be decided by a mony of witnesses. Matters of Opinion, not bein fact, are general propositions laws of nature or mind, princip conduct, future probabilities, dedu and the like, about which a doubt ma All doubtful questions, whether of specu tice, are matters of opinion. With regard ultimate source of our belief is always a proces. soning. The proper mode of conducting this process, guarding against errors of induction and deduction, of testing the soundness of existing arguments, and of establishing new truths by ratiocination; is the province * "I remember it was with extreme difficulty that I could bring my master to understand the meaning of the word opinion, or how a point could be disputable; because reason taught us to affirm or deny only where we are certain, and beyond our knowledge we cannot do either. So that controversies, wranglings, disputes, and positiveness in false or dubious propositions, are evils unknown among the Houyhnhnms."-SWIFT. The essential idea of opinion seems to be that it is a matter about which doubt can reasonably exist, as to which two persons can without absurdity think differently. The existence of an object before the eyes of two persons would not be a matter of opinion, nor would it be a matter of opinion that twice two are four. But when testimony is divided, or uncertain, the existence of a fact may become doubtful, and, therefore, a matter of opinion. For example, it may be a matter of opinion whether there was a war of Troy, whether Romulus lived, who was the man in the iron mask, who mere impression on his sense of sight, and his statement implies a theory and explanation of the bare phenomenon. When, however, this judgment is of so simple a kind as to become wholly unconscious, and the interpretation of the appearances is a matter of general agreement, the object of sensation may, for our present purpose, be considered a fact. A fact, as so defined, must be limited to individual sensible objects, and not extended to general expressions or formulas, descriptive of classes of facts, or sequences of phenomena, such as that the blood circulates, the sun attracts the planets, and the like. Propositions of this sort, though descriptive of realities, and therefore, in one sense, of matters of fact, relate to large classes of phenomena, which cannot be grasped by a single sensation, which can only be determined by a long series of observations, and are established by a process of intricate reasoning. Taken in this sense, matters of fact are decided by an appeal to our own consciousness or sensation, or to the testimony, direct or indirect, of the original and percipient witnesses. Doubts, indeed, frequently arise as to the existence of a matter of fact, in consequence of the diversity of the reports made by the original witnesses, or the suspiciousness of their testimony. A matter of fact may again be doubtful, in consequence of the different constructions which may be put upon admitted facts and appearances, in a case of proof by (what is termed) circumstantial evidence. Whenever such doubts exist they cannot be settled by a direct appeal to testimony, and can only be resolved by reasoning; instances of which are afforded by the pleadings of lawyers and the disquisitions of * See Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, B. I. c. i., B. VIII. c. i., and B. XI. c. iii. |