SECTION 5. The supposed ill effects of the tyranny of the majority of the 6. The representative system of government is founded on a compromise between the Numerical Principle and the principle of Special Fitness; difficulty of arranging the terms of this compromise in each individual case NOTES to Chapter VIII. PAGE 273 278 282 CHAPTER IX. ON THE PROPAGATION OF SOUND OPINIONS, BY THE CREATION OF A TRUSTWORTHY AUTHORITY. 1. The chief permanent influences for the authentication of opinions. 286 2. I. The civil government. Duty of the state to encourage truth and discourage error, examined 288 3. The duty of the state with respect to religious truth and error depends upon its power. 290 4. Power of the state to promote religious truth by punishment 291 9. The state cannot effectually promote religious truth by any 10. Objections made to the neutrality of the state in religious questions. 11. Answer to these objections 12. Power of the state to promote truth in secular matters by literary endowments and public instruction 310 311 . 317 . 322 13. Extent to which the government ought to attempt to influence opinion in secular matters. 14. Moral authority of the government and effect of its example. 322 15. A government may countenance sound opinions by upholding good institutions 16. Censorship of the press in secular affairs 326 327 SECTION 17. The qualifications of professional persons may be authenticated by diplomas and degrees 18. II. Churches and ecclesiastical bodies. The influence of the heads of each church is exercised over the members of that church exclusively PAGE 330 332 19. Authentication of ministers of religion by ordination 333 23. IV. The periodical press. Origin and history of newspapers 339 24. Influence of newspapers upon opinion 342 25. The chief characteristic of newspapers is, that they are anonymous 343 26. Reasons of this peculiarity. Its evil consequences, and their correctives 343 27. Reviews and literary journals. Transactions of learned societies. Publications appearing in a series or set. Encyclopædias 28. The powers of literary judgment ought to be impartially exercised 29. Classes of subjects upon which the general diffusion of sound opinions is most important CHAPTER X. ON THE ABUSES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY. 1. Reasons for illustrating the evils which arise from the abuses of the principle of authority 2. The reverence for the authority of scientific teachers must not be excessive 3. Distinction between excessive reverence for authority and conscious adoption of a defective philosophy 4. Distinction between opinions handed down from antiquity, and opinions of aged men 5. The chief question at present as to the authority of antiquity concerns political institutions SECTION 6. Sound legislative reforms are impeded by opposite errors as to the authority of established institutions 7. Authority of parties and party leaders in politics. Its abuses. PAGE 382 . 384 1. Aristocracy is usually defined to be a government of the minority, and democracy to be a government of the majority of the people 403 2. The distinction between these two forms of government, is a distinction, not of kind, but of degree. 3. Necessity of caution in laying down general propositions respecting aristocratic and democratic government 4. The neglect of proper precautions in speculations upon government has rendered political science uncertain. 404 409 415 5. Province of political science. Its division into positive or descriptive, and ideal or speculative politics. 416 6. Importance of treating these two branches of political science separately 422 ERRATA. P. 78, Notes, line 6 from bottom, for "to extend," read " of extending." ON THE INFLUENCE OF AUTHORITY IN MATTERS OF OPINION. CHAPTER I. ON THE NATURE OF AUTHORITY IN MATTERS OF OPINION. § 1. As the ensuing Essay relates to matters of opinion, it will be necessary for me, at the outset, without entering upon disputed questions of mental philosophy, to explain briefly what portion of the subjects of belief is understood to be included under this appellation, and what is the meaning of the generally received distinction between matters of opinion and matters of fact; a distinction which, though not scientifically precise, is, with a little explanation, sufficiently intelligible for the purposes of the present inquiry, and which marks, with tolerable accuracy, a distinction leading to important practical consequences. By a Matter of Fact I understand anything of which we obtain a conviction from our internal consciousness, or any individual event or phenomenon which is the object of sensation. It is true that even the simplest sensations involve some judgment: when a witness reports that he saw an object of a certain shape and size, or at a certain distance, he describes something more than a B mere impression on his sense of sight, and his statement implies a theory and explanation of the bare phenomenon. When, however, this judgment is of so simple a kind as to become wholly unconscious, and the interpretation of the appearances is a matter of general agreement, the object of sensation may, for our present purpose, be considered a fact. A fact, as so defined, must be limited to individual sensible objects, and not extended to general expressions or formulas, descriptive of classes of facts, or sequences of phenomena, such as that the blood circulates, the sun attracts the planets, and the like.* Propositions of this sort, though descriptive of realities, and therefore, in one sense, of matters of fact, relate to large classes of phenomena, which cannot be grasped by a single sensation, which can only be determined by a long series of observations, and are established by a process of intricate reasoning. Taken in this sense, matters of fact are decided by an appeal to our own consciousness or sensation, or to the testimony, direct or indirect, of the original and percipient witnesses. Doubts, indeed, frequently arise as to the existence of a matter of fact, in consequence of the diversity of the reports made by the original witnesses, or the suspiciousness of their testimony. A matter of fact may again be doubtful, in consequence of the different constructions which may be put upon admitted facts and appearances, in a case of proof by (what is termed) circumstantial evidence. Whenever such doubts exist they cannot be settled by a direct appeal to testimony, and can only be resolved by reasoning; instances of which are afforded by the pleadings of lawyers and the disquisitions of *See Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, B. I. c. i., B. VIII. c. i., and B. XI. c. iii. |