NOTE TO CHAPTER V. Note A. (p. 144.) SOME of the numerous guesses of diviners have, as is not wonderful, hit the truth with great exactness. Thus John Cario, the astrologer of Joachim I., elector of Brandenburg, published in the year 1522 a Prognosticatio, constructed according to the rules of the art, in which he predicted a destructive inundation, famine, pestilence, and civil and ecclesiastical troubles, for the year 1524,* and the birth of Antichrist for the year 1693. But the year 1789 was to be the most terrible of all. In this year, there were to be great and marvellous events, changes, and catastrophes. Adelung, who reports this prediction in a volume published in 1787, does not doubt that the astrologer will prove to be as much mistaken with respect to the year 1789, as he had already proved to be with respect to the year 1693.-Geschichte der Narrheit, vol. iii. p. 118. There is likewise a curious prediction of the extinction of the independence of Venice, in the Satire of Luigi Alamanni, an Italian poet, who died about the middle of the sixteenth century, and whose poems were published at Lyons in 1532-3. In Satira xii. is the following address to Venice :— Se non cangi pensier, l'un secol solo Ginguené, who first called attention to this passage, (Hist. Littéraire d'Italie, tom. ix. p. 144, ed. 2,) remarks, that the election of the first doge falls in 697; and that if to this epoch we add 1100 years, we obtain the year 1797, which is the precise year next after that in which Venice ceased to be independent. Few predictions, however, were so lucky as those of Cario for the year 1789, and of Alamanni for the year 1796; and, accordingly, it was in general necessary to alter them after the event, in order to * It seems that the astrologers had predicted the destruction of the world by inundation in 1524, and that some persons had provided themselves with ships in order to be prepared against the calamity.-BODIN. de Rep. IV. c. ii. produce a close agreement between the prediction and the thing foretold. Thus in the Quatrains of Nostradamus, first published in 1555, there was the following stanza: Gand et Bruxelles marcheront contre Anvers, Senat de Londres mettront à mort leur roy: Pour eux avoir le regne en desarroy. After the execution of Charles I., this passage of Nostradamus was applied in France to the striking event, and it was long considered by his admirers as a strong proof of his prophetic power. Adelung, however, considers the supposed prophecy as taking its origin in the troubles in Flanders, which were contemporary with its composition; and he refers "leur roy" to the Flemish cities, not to the senate of London. He understands Nostradamus to have meant, that the English government would put to death some supposed King of Flanders.-Ut sup. vol. vii. p. 133. Another more remarkable example of the subsequent perversion of a prophecy, in order to adapt it to an important event, may be added: A German writer, named Gaspar Brusch, published the following prophetic verses in the year 1553:— Post mille expletos a partu virginis annos, Si non hoc anno totus malus occidet orbis, The most remarkable event of the year 1588 was the Spanish armada. The prediction was forgotten for two hundred years, and was reprinted in the Mercure de France in the middle of the last century, with the substitution of "septengintos" for "post quingentos," in v. 2, and a story about its having been found in the tomb of Regiomontanus, at Liska, in Hungary. Since the French revolution—which recalled attention to the supposed prophecy-the true origin of the verses, and the nature of the fraud, have been pointed out.-Biog. Univ. in Brusch. It is singular that, by some similar adaptation, a Jacobite should not have applied it to the English revolution of 1688. Compare the remarks of Mr. Grote, Hist. of Gr. vol. vi. p. 214, upon the flexibility of the Greek prophecies, and the manner in which they were moulded to suit any striking Occurrence. We must not, however, suppose that all astrological diviners were conscious impostors, and intentionally fabricated their predictions in such a manner as to admit of no certain interpretation. Many, or perhaps most, of them doubtless believed, to a certain extent, in the reality of the art which they practised. Thus Andrew Goldmayer, who was offered the professorship of mathematics at Strasburg in the year 1635, composed a chronicle of that city upon astrological principles. He complained that ordinary historians paid no attention to the state of the stars, in connexion with the events which they narrated; whereas these events could not be understood without their causes, and their causes could only be explained by astrology. He began, therefore, to compose, not only a history of Strasburg, but also a universal history, according to this method, and believed that he would thus throw great light both upon astrology and history. For this purpose, he extracted the chief events out of chronicles; he calculated the position of the stars backwards, and believed himself, by this process, to have discovered the true cause of every important event.-ADELUNG, ut sup. vol. iv. p. 215. The process here described is a scientific process, and was an attempt to found judicial astrology upon inductive reasoning. It therefore proves the good faith of the astrologer. Compare also Kepler's astrological doctrine in Bethune's Life of Kepler, c. vii.; and the opinions of Bodinus de Rep. IV. c. 2. CHAPTER VI. ON THE NUMBER OF THE PERSONS COMPETENT TO GUIDE OPINION ON ANY SUBJECT, AS COMPARED WITH THE NUMBER OF THE REST OF THE COMMUNITY. § 1. IT has been shown, in the preceding pages, that the men of special information and experience, combined with the proper moral and intellectual qualifications, are the competent judges on each branch of knowledge, and therefore the legitimate guides of opinion. Now if we take each subject, whether of speculation or practice, in succession, these persons must always be a small section of the community; in fact, a mere handful, as compared with the entire population. In sciences and arts, the persons versed in those particular departments of knowledge, in history, historians; in general literature, literary men and poets; in practical questions of law, medicine, architecture, navigation, &c., the men of the respective professions-who form respectively the standard and canon of authority, are but few in number, if set against the body of their fellow-countrymen. Moreover, even with respect to each of these classes, it is principally the ablest, the most learned, the most experienced, the most skilful, whose opinion constitutes authority. So long as we admit the maxim, "Unicuique in suâ arte credendum," the class or body of persons competent to judge in each matter must be numerically insignificant in comparison with the whole people. If we divide the nation into two parts-one consisting of a profession, or body of persons specially conversant with a particular subject, the other consisting of the rest of the population, the numbers of the latter portion will immensely preponderate: The few, by nature formed, with learning fraught, Born to instruct, as others to be taught. § 2. In each subject, therefore, the opinion of the great bulk of the people is, taken as a standard of truth and rectitude, unworthy of consideration, and destitute of weight and authority. It is the opinion of uninformed and inexperienced persons, whose incapacity to judge is not cured by the multiplication of their numbers. The mere aggregation of incompetent judges will not produce a right judgment, more than the aggregation of persons who have no knowledge of a matter of fact, will supply credible testimony to its existence.* This is equally the case, whether the multitude agree in opinion with the few competent judges, or disagree with them. If they agree, the opinion of the unscientific or unprofessional many, whether right or wrong, can scarcely fail to be derived, more or less remotely, from that of a few persons either being, or considered to be, competent judges. Now, whether the opinion be sound or unsound, it is in general derived without any adequate process of examination or verification, and is held merely upon trust; so that the concurrence of the multitude adds little or no weight to the judgment of the former.† * "An quicquam stultius quam quos singulos (sicut operarios, barbarosque,) contemnas, eos esse aliquid putare universos ?"CICERO, Tusc. Quæst. V. 36. + "Les hommes, en général, approuvent ou condamnent au hasard, et la vérité même est, par la plupart d'entre eux, reçue |