the decision by a majority, both in executive and legislative bodies, is opposed to the principle which we generally follow for obtaining rectitude of judgment, where our course is free, and unfettered by legal rules, nevertheless it is necessary for securing the advantages of corporate action; and that the evils flowing from the plan of counting votes, without reference to their intrinsic value, are counteracted and neutralized to a great extent, not only by the forms of business contrived for the purpose of controlling the direct and simple action of the numerical principle, but also by the spontaneous homage of the individual members of the body to the principle of authority.

§ 13. In all cases where the act of the majority of any political body is valid, it is highly desirable that the decision, when come to, should be considered as the act of the entire body; that the comparative numbers of the majority and minority should not be adverted to as a ground for impugning the decision; and that the law or other act should be obeyed without any question of its validity, on the ground of the smallness of the majority by which it may have been carried. Decision by a majority is a mode of cutting a knot which cannot be untied; it is, therefore, on every account expedient that the knot should be cut effectually.

For a similar reason, it is fitting that any section of a deliberative body, who may be unable to induce the majority to adopt their propositions, should acquiesce in its decisions, and should continue to attend its meetings, without seceding, on the ground that their advice is disregarded. In every popular assembly there is a minority which is unable to carry its views; and if such minorities were to be discouraged by the rejection of their motions, and to withdraw from their duties, the ultimate

success of their opinions could never take place, at least, not in consequence of their exertions. Unless a defeated minority is willing to act upon this principle, the unity of the body is weakened and impaired, and a disruption is produced, similar to that which took place in the Roman State when the Plebs separated themselves from the rest of the citizens, and seceded to the Mons Sacer.*

§ 14. It is likewise fitting that the members of a majority should bear in mind, that their assent to the propositions of the leaders of the assembly is voluntary; that the advice which is tendered to them by members of their body is merely advice, which they can reject or

* At the congress of the Achæan League, in 198 B.C., when the proposal of an alliance with the Romans was made, no one would speak. Aristanus the prætor, after urging them to deliver their opinions, concludes his exhortation thus: "Ubi semel decretum erit, omnibus id, etiam quibus ante displicuerit, pro bono atque utili fœdere defendendum."-LIVY, XXXII. 20. Compare Thirlwall, Hist. of Gr. vol. VIII. p. 301. In Polyb. V. 49, and Dion. Hal. A. R. XI. 56, there is likewise the expression of the same principle. Pliny states that, in the proceeding on a complaint of the Bithynians against Varenus, their pro-consul, a question was decided in favour of Varenus by the senate, and was afterwards, on an appeal to the emperor, remitted by him to the senate for their re-consideration. When the point was discussed on this re-hearing, most of the members who had voted against Varenus on the former occasion now voted for him; alleging that they were bound by the act of the majority:" Singulos enim, integrâ re, dissentire fas esse; peractâ, quod pluribus placuisset, cunctis tuendum."-Epist. VI. 13. Mr. Grote, Hist. of Gr. vol. IV. p. 478, remarks upon "the admirable conduct of the five dissentient generals [at Marathon], when outvoted by the decision of the polemarch against them, in co-operating heartily for the success of a policy which they deprecated." Story, Comm. on the Const. of the U. S. § 833, also speaks of the "baneful practice of secession."

adopt, as they think fit; and that, when any measure has been sanctioned by the deliberate vote of the assembly, it becomes the act of the entire body, whoever may have been its author and proposer. Unless this principle is kept in view, there is a tendency, when any measure has proved unsuccessful, (either from its own defects, or from untoward circumstances, or from the unskilfulness or neglect of the persons charged with its execution,) to throw the blame upon its originator, and to forget that it was deliberately approved and accepted by the entire body."

§ 15. It has been remarked above, that with respect to the members of an Executive body, the mode of their selection offers a considerable security for their special fitness, and, consequently, for rectitude of decision by the majority. In cases, however, where the members of a supreme assembly are determined by the choice of a popular constituency, the chances against a selection of fit persons are more numerous.

The principle of decision by a majority is requisite, as well for the choice of a representative by a constituent

* Xenophon, Rep. Ath. II. § 17, complains that, if any evil consequence results from a measure agreed to by the people, they attribute it to the authors and advisers of the measure, who, they allege, persuaded them to it, contrary to their interest. Machiavel also remarks upon the tendency of the people to visit the failures caused by its own rash and foolish counsels upon the heads of its instruments, Disc. I. 53. He points out, in another place, the disposition of men to judge merely by the result, and the consequent danger of advising either a prince or a people; for if the advice turns out ill, the blame is imputed to the counsellor, even by those who voluntarily adopted it, having the power of rejection. Hence, he recommends every counsellor to give his advice with moderation and calmness, so that the people or prince who adopts it may seem to adopt it voluntarily, and not in consequence of the importunity of the adviser.-III. 35.

body, as for the acts of an executive board or a legislative assembly. The same reasons apply in this case as in the case of smaller bodies, only with more force. Unanimity, in a body which may consist of several thousand persons, is plainly impossible; decision by a majority is therefore necessary. But many of the securities for guiding the majority to a sound judgment, which exist in a legislative assembly, are here wanting; joint deliberation is nearly impossible, and the vote of each elector is frequently determined by accidental considerations, affecting his individual position. The decision is accordingly formed by an imperfect process.*

Cicero describes in strong terms the inconstancy of the people in the choice of magistrates, and the uncertainty of the event of an election in the comitia: "Non enim comitiis judicat semper populus, sed movetur plerumque gratia: cedit precibus facit eos a quibus est maxime ambitus. Denique, si judicat, non delectu aliquo aut sapientia ducitur ad judicandum, sed impetu nonnunquam, et quadam etiam temeritate. Non est enim consilium in vulgo, non ratio, non discrimen, non diligentia: semperque sapientes ea, quæ populus fecisset, ferenda, non semper laudanda duxerunt." -Pro Plancio, c. 4.

Again, in the oration Pro Murend, c. 17, he dwells on the uncertain event of the popular choice: "Quod enim fretum, quem euripum tot motus, tantas, tam varias habere putatis agitationes fluctuum; quantas perturbationes et quantos æstus habet ratio comitiorum? Dies intermissus unus, aut nox interposita, sæpe perturbat omnia; et totam opinionem parva nonnunquam commutat aura rumoris. Sæpe etiam sine ulla aperta causa fit aliud atque existimamus, ut nonnunquam ita factum esse etiam populus admiretur: quasi vero non ipse fecerit. Nihil est incertius vulgo, nihil obscurius voluntate hominum, nihil fallacius ratione totâ comitiorum." Compare also Seneca, de Vit. Beat. c. 1, cited above; c. 6, § 3. "Non ego ventosæ plebis suffragia venor," says Horace, Ep. I. 19, 37, who, in his first ode, speaks of the mobiles Quirites. Our word mob was abbreviated from the Latin, mobile vulgus, in the

The choice of a candidate by the majority of a popular constituency is thus subject to the same remark as the decision of a question by the majority of a popular assembly. It solves the practical problem, but leaves the question as to the real comparative merits of the candidates undecided. This imperfection is, however, inseparable from popular election, and it is counterbalanced by the advantages which result from the representation of apparent interests, and from the deference to the numerical principle in government. Moreover, in a popular constituency, the majority is practically influenced by the opinions and wishes of a minority, although this influence operates in a different manner from that in which a legislative assembly is acted upon.

There is, again, another serious difficulty in the way of an enlightened choice of representatives by a popular constituency, a difficulty, it may be observed, which extends to every mode of selection, and equally besets the choice of members of a house of peers by the Crown. The subjects which may be submitted to the decision of a supreme legislative assembly are unlimited, not only

reign of Charles the Second, as we learn from North's Examen. The expression seems to have been borrowed from the verse of Claudian : "Mobile mutatur semper cum principe vulgus," De IV. Cons. Honor. 302, which certainly is a singular origin for a saying upon popular instability.

For a curious illustration of the arts practised in canvassing a numerous constituency in ancient times, see the monitory tract De Petitione Consulatus, addressed by Q. Cicero to his brother, when about to come forward as a candidate for the consulship. On the election of magistrates by the senate under the empire, see Pliny, Epist. III. 20.

Mr. Macaulay says that the common people are constant to their favorites, but almost always choose them ill. Hist. of Engl. vol. I. p. 631.

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