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- REPRESENTATTA ÆT

R Commous or rimenice. Thus,

sole I ther nature are named after others

CARE for instance, one of the mdicate that m man which, a

1 adequately represented by ary mitative. When" says Max Tie ir te first time to grasp and exI will be noticed that he could

at this unti. he had entirety ate formation of the very earliest te poay and something else withir him

ay at easy name that suggested itself
prenti. seemed something immaterial
te and it was clearly connected with

me bacy, far as soon as the breath
DUCT became extinct.
Hence the

2.1 originally meant breath, was
the principle of life as dis
ng body, and afterwards the
the undying, the undecaying,
hs soul his mind, his self."
however, in which the two things
sused may be compared; and
there is a process analo-
wars by imitation. As in imi-
the mouth is made to refer to
sound, because the two sounds
for one conception is made

As the two conceptions are alike.
contains a large number of

Notice, for instance, the way in
Seved from the word kin. In

posed to be enemies, except

those belonging to the same tribe or of the same kin; only these therefore were kind to one another. But after a while all whose actions could be compared to those of kinned-men were called kind. Again, for centuries subsequent to the time when Christianity had been accepted by the cities of the Roman Empire, the inhabitants of the villages, or the pagani as they were termed, remained heathen; after a while all those who could be compared to the pagani, on account of their religious beliefs, were termed pagans. Later, in Europe the disciples of the great theologian Duns Scotus, were called Dunses. After a while all who might be compared with these, in that their views differed from those held ordinarily, were called dunces.

In forming words by comparison, as by association, terms applicable literally only to material conceptions come to refer after a time to those that are immaterial. Take words, for instance, describing the operations of the mind. We say that a man's thoughts are pure, clear, mixed, muddled, or clouded, and that he expresses and impresses them upon others; but only to material things like water, wine, or the atmosphere, can the former class of terms be applied literally; and only into or out of a material thing can another, and this only a material thing, be literally pressed. Evidently terms of this kind are used as a result of comparing the mental to the material process, to which in some regards it is analogous. Were it not possible to symbolize the one process in the other, it is obvious that many things which we desire to communicate, would remain forever unexpressed. We see, therefore, how essential to the very existence of language is this power which enables us to figure or picture an object or operation through referring to something which, though

yous, is wholy fifferent from it in .om it as the paint and canvas of a lesh and bind of the person porow the element of representation, ... art, is a factor in the very constiom which prenc art is feveloped. cans of representation ae uished and operations nature, and this pealing to the re sounds ed, but also by use ameling to ..ce of which suggests verds like fact, the uses to vich the sights e thus constantly put, make litere this of Wordsworth:

Save learned

, not as in the hour

, but hearing oftentimes

of humanity.

-nes Composed above Tintern Aidey.

watere would be the music, the ubolism, through which only

、out to those at all acquainted Rough continuing the kinds of Na mentioned, one word may e number of very different for instance, as Trench Words," is the old past parindicates any thing that is we speak of railway stock, trade, live stock, stocks from the word post,

yos, military post, official

post, posting a ledger and a letter, a post-office, posthaste, etc.

Though all languages are largely composed of words, the meanings of which can be traced with comparative ease to causes similar to the ones just mentioned, these words are so familiar to us, we have become so accustomed to their conventional significance, that we seldom pause to inquire how they came to mean what they do. I can remember distinctly the moment when, as a boy, it flashed upon my mind that a term, having so obvious an origin as the Fourth of July, was not a grandiloquent word of many syllables, originated for the purpose of necessarily suggesting gunpowder and fireworks; but merely a phrase indicative of the fourth day of the seventh month. A similar revelation is constantly awaiting the mind that makes a study of other words. Similar revelations, multiplied by almost the whole number of words employed, must flash light through all the hidden depths that underlie the surface forms of one's vernacular, before he can understand them, and use them with absolute appropriateness. Especially is this so in the case of the words with which we are now dealing,-the words formed as a result of comparison; because these contain, far more decidedly than those derived from association, a representative or picturesque-what grammarians term a figura tive-element. But before we go on to exemplify this statement, and in doing so, to trace out further than has yet been done how naturally the representative language of poetry is developed from ordinary language, let us consider the subject in another aspect.

CHAPTER XVI.

MEANINGS OF PHRASES AS DETERMINED BY ASSOCIATION

OR COMPARISON.

Language, a Process in which Words and Ideas represented by them are used consecutively-How Words in Progression can represent Mental Processes-How Acts in Progression do this in Pantomime-How this is done when Words, as Symbols, are substituted for the Acts in Pantomime-How Subject, Predicate, and Object are put together-Subject, Predicate, and Object of a Complete Sentence, are the Beginning, Middle, and End of a Complete Process, of which all the Parts of Speech are Logical Parts-Examination of Certain Sentences-How the Meanings of them, considered as Wholes, depend on the Principle of Association or of Comparison.

AS was said, when treating of the representative nature

of sounds, language is a form for thought, and thought implies mental activity, a process, a series of sensations and experiences, all of them exerting more or less influence upon one another. A single idea might be represented in a single word, but a series of ideas necessitates a series of words. How, now, can these series of words represent, with any thing like accuracy, internal processes of the mind, together with the necessary relationships and interactions that must exist between their constituting elements? Or, to begin at the right place, how can any series of external and material elements, even though they do represent a process, represent a process that takes place in thought? If we can come to understand this, it will be