with its right to control and regulate the right of a foreign corporation to do business within its borders.728 On these questions, Federal courts are not bound by state decisions construing provisions authorizing the imposition of such fees and if in effect such a statute or ordinance amounts to a regulation of interstate commerce as broadly defined, or a levying of a tax upon the Federal agency, it will be held void.729 As the supreme court said in a recent case,730 "In all cases of this kind, it has been repeatedly held that when the question is raised whether the state statute is a just exercise of state power, or is intended by roundabout means to invade the domain of Federal authority, this court will look into the operation and effect of the statute to discern its purpose.' In respect to the validity of a license fee imposed upon drummers, peddlers and auctioneers, as already suggested, the early cases. made no distinction between the occupation itself and the business carried on. The substantial business of both the merchant and a drummer or peddler is the sale of goods. A merchant has a fixed place of business, while a drummer has none, and solicits orders for merchandise to be subsequently shipped to the purchaser. A peddler, on the other hand, not only solicits the sale of goods. but transports these with him from place to place. The authorities hold, although there are some to the contrary,731 that the occupation of a drummer or merchant soliciting the sale of articles of license tax on mortgages held void. Citing Goldsmith v. City of Huntsville, 120 Ala. 182; Kimmel v. City of Americus, 105 Ga. 694; City Council of Camden v. Roberts, 55 S. C. 374. State v. Bevins, 70 Vt. 574, 41 Atl. 655; Prentice & E. Commerce Clause, p. 148. 728 No attempt will be made to make an exhaustive citation of authorities on this point. See Clark & 'M. Private Corp. pp. 786 et seq.; Cook, Corp. §§ 996 et seq.; 4 Thompson, Corp. §§ 5460 et seq.; Prentice & E. Commerce Clause, pp. 274 et seq. Osborne v. Florida, 164 U. S. 650. 729 Georgia Packing Co. v. City of Macon, 60 Fed. 774, 22 L. R. A. 775; Ames v. People, 25 Colo. 508; Jackson Min. Co. v. Auditor General, 32 Mich. 488. 730 Morgan's Steamship Co. V. Louisiana Board of Health, 118 U. S. 455, citing, also, as sustaining the text, Cannon v. City of New Orleans, 87 U. S. (20 Wall.) 587; Henderson v. City of New York, 92 U. S. 259; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275. 731 Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 33 Fed. 121; Hynes v. Briggs, 41 Fed. 468; In re Nichols, 48 Fed. 164; American Harrow Co. v. Shaffer, 68 Fed. 750; Weaver v. State, 89 Ga. 639; Metz v. Hagerty, 51 Ohio St. 521; State v. Pinckney, 10 Rich. Law (S. C.) 474; Biddle v. Com., 13 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 405 interstate commerce, or of peddlers selling goods in the original. packages, cannot be taxed through the exaction of a license fee.732 The authorities, however, universally hold that a state tax on peddlers who carry goods and deliver them upon the making of a sale is not a regulation of interstate commerce and therefore not unconstitutional, provided no discrimination is made against persons or property of other states," even though such merchandise 732 Ward v. Maryland, 79 U. S. (12 Wall.) 418; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489; Corson v. Maryland, 120 U. S. 502; Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S. 129; Brennan v. City of Titusville, 153 U. S. 289: In re Kimmel, 41 Fed. 775; In re White, 43 Fed. 913, 11 L. R. A. 284; In re Spain, 47 Fed. 208, 14 L. R. A. 97; In re Houston, 47 Fed. 539, 14 L. R. A. 719; In re Rozelle, 57 Fed. 155; In re Flinn, 57 Fed. 496; In re Mitchell, 62 Fed. 576; Ex parte Hough, 69 Fed. 330; In re Hennick, 5 Mackey (D. C.) 489; State v. Agee, 83 Ala. 110; Ex parte Murray, 93 Ala. 78; Stratford v. City Council of Montgomery, 110 Ala. 619; McClelland v. City of Marietta, 96 Ga. 749; Wrought Iron Range Co. v. Johnson, 84 Ga. 754, 8 L. R. A. 273; City of Bloomington v. Bourland, 137 Ill. 534; McLaughlin v. City of South Bend, 126 Ind. 471, 10 L. R. A. 357; Martin v. Town of Rosedale, 130 Ind. 109; City of Huntington v. Mahan, 142 Ind. 695; City of Ft. Scott v. Pelton, 39 Kan. 764. City of Caldwell v. Prunelle, 57 Kan. 511: Where the question of interstate commerce is not involved, the fact that a larger license fee is required from a nonresident than a resident does not necessarily render invalid the ordinance. Fecheimer v. City of Louisville, 84 Ky. 306; Wilcox Cordage & Supply Co. v. Mosher, 114 Mich. 64, 72 N. W. 117; Coit v. Abb. Corp. Vol. II—4. 733 Sutton, 102 Mich. 324, 25 L. R. A. 819; Richardson v. State (Miss.) 11 So. 934; Overton v. City of Vicksburg, 70 Miss. 558; Ex parte Rosenblatt, 19 Nev. 439; State v. Bracco, 103 N. C. 349. See, to the contrary, Woodruff v. Parham, 41 Ala. 334; Id., 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 139. State v. O'Connor, 5 N. D. 629; Baxter v. Thomas, 4 Okl. 605; Rothermel v. Meyerle, 136 Pa. 250, 9 L. R. A. 366; Hurford v. State, 91 Tenn. 669; Ex parte Holman, 36 Tex. Cr. App. 255; Talbutt v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 64, 44 S. W. 1091; Clements v. Town of Casper, 4 Wyo. 494. 733 Howe Mach. Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 676; Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. S. 296; American Harrow Co. v. Shaffer, 68 Fed. 750; Preston v. Finley, 72 Fed. 850; Hall v. State, 39 Fla. 637; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 97 Ga. 114, 35 L. R. A. 497; Walton v. City Council of Augusta, 104 Ga. 757; L. B. Price Co. v. City of Atlanta, 105 Ga. 358; Chrystal v. City of Macon, 108 Ga. 27; City of South Bend v. Martin, 142 Ind. 31, 29 L. R. A. 531; State v. Montgomery, 92 Me. 433; People v. Sawyer, 106 Mich. 428; State v. Emert, 103 Mo. 241, 11 L. R. A. 219; State v. Snoddy, 128 Mo. 523; State v. Wessell, 109 N. C. 735. One engaged in selling sewing machines on his own account though manufactured without the state is not engaged in interstate commerce. Wrought Iron Range Co. v. Carver, 734 is still the property of a foreign corporation and is sold in the same form and shape in which the goods were imported into the state." The distinction should be had in mind at all times between an exercise of the police power in this respect or an attempted exercise of the power of taxation amounting in effect to a regulation of interstate commerce,' 735 and also between laws adopted in good faith for the regulation of peddlers or others and those of a discriminatory nature against nonresidents whether such be the ostensible purpose or otherwise.736 The law recognizes the difference between the occupations of a drummer and peddler, and the authorities quite generally hold that the occupation of peddling can be licensed as a legitimate exercise of the police power.737 118 N. C. 328; Com. v. Gardner, 133 Pa. 284, 7 L. R. A. 666; Com. v. Dunham, 191 Pa. 73; Saulsbury v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. R. 90, 63 S. W. 568; Kirkpatrick v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. R. 459, 60 S. W. 762; State v. Pratt, 59 Vt. 590; State v. Willingham, 9 Wyo. 290, 62 Pac. 797; Clements v. Town of Casper, 4 Wyo. 494. But see Racine Iron Co. v. McCommons, 111 Ga. 536, 51 L. R. A. 134, where the court said: "It appears very plain to us that when a traveling salesman so far departs from the vocation ordinarily pursued by a commercial traveler as to actually vend the goods for which he solicits orders he ceases to be a mere 'drummer' in the sense in which that term is used by Mr. Justice Bradley in Robbins' Case." See, also, note 14 L. R. A. 97. 784 City of Carrollton v. Bazzette, 159 Ill. 289; State v. Wheelock, 95 Iowa, 577, 30 L. R. A. 429; West v. City of Mt. Sterling, 23 Ky. L. R. 1670, 65 S. W. 120; Rash v. Farley, 91 Ky. 344; Com. v. Newhall, 164 Mass. 338; Kimmell v. State, 104 Tenn. 184; Croy v. Obion County, 104 Tenn. 525, 51 L. R. A. 254. But see Pegues v. Ray, 50 La. Ann. 574; and City of Huntington v. Mahan, 142 Ind. 695. 735 Erie R. Co. v. State, 31 N. J. Law, 531, 86 Am. Dec. 226; Lumberville Delaware Bridge Co. v. State Board of Assessors, 55 N. J. Law, 529, 25 L. R. A. 134; State v. Gorham, 115 N. C. 721, 44 Am. St. Rep. 494, 25 L. R. A. 810. 736 In re Schechter, 63 Fed. 695; Ames v. People, 25 Colo. 508; Com. v. Myer, 92 Va. 809, 31 L. R. A. 379. 737 Howe Mach. Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 676; Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. S. 296, affirming 103 Mo. 241, 11 L. R. A. 219; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 33 Fed. 121; In re Tyerman, 48 Fed. 167; American Harrow Co. v. Shaffer, 68 Fed. 750; Hall v. State, 39 Fla. 637; Weaver v. State, 89 Ga. 639; Martin v. Town of Rosedale, 130 Ind. 109, 29 N. E. 410; Sears v. Warren County Com'rs, 36 Ind. 267; City of South Bend v. Martin, 142 Ind. 31, 29 L. R. A. 531; Cole v. Randolph, 31 La. Ann. 535; City of Grand Rapids v. Norman, 110 Mich. 544, 68 N. W. 269. A maximum amount of $15 per day held not unreasonable. City of $409. Road or poll tax. As an additional source of revenue imposed for specific purpose, it is clearly within the power of the legislature to require a prescribed service for the improvement of streets and highways from such individuals as may be designated, or, in lieu of personal service or labor, the payment of a money substitute.738 That a Duluth v. Krupp, 46 Minn. 435, 49 N. W. 235. State v. Wagener, 69 Minn. 206, 72 N. W. 67, 38 L. R. A. 677. Laws 1897, c. 107, pertaining to the license of hawkers and peddlers throughout the state held unconstitutional as contravening sections 33 and 34 of art. 4 of the constitution prohibiting partial and class legislation. State v. Shapleigh, 27 Mo. 344; State v. Parsons, 124 Mo. 436; State v. Snoddy, 128 Mo. 523; Wilmington Com'rs v. Roby, 30 N. C. (8 Ired.) 250; State v. Wessell, 109 N. C. 735; Wrought Iron Range Co. v. Carver, 118 N. C. 328; Metz v. Hagerty, 51 Ohio St. 521; Com. v. Walker, 3 Pa. Dist. R. 534; Port Clinton Borough V. Shafer, 5 Pa. Dist. R. 583; State V. Pinckney, 10 Rich. Law (S. C.) 474; Biddle v. Com., 13 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 405; State v. Richards, 32 W. Va. 348, 3 L. R. A. 705. McQuillin, Mun. Ord. p. 658. "A peddler, within the general accepted meaning of the word, is a small retail dealer, who carries his merchandise with him, traveling from place to place, and from house to house, exposing his goods for sale and selling them.' There are five elements which constitute a peddler: 1. He should have no fixed place of dealing, but should travel from place to place. 2. He should carry with him the wares he offers for sale, not merely samples thereof. 3. He should sell them at the time he offers them, not merely enter into an executory contract for future sale. 4. He should deliver the goods then and there, not merely contract to deliver them in the future. 5. The sales made by him should be to consumers and not confined exclusively to dealers in the articles sold by him. "The fact that the sales are to consumers and not to dealers is the distinguishing feature.'" 738 Baader v. City of Cullman, 115 Ala. 539, 22 So. 19; Chiles v. State, 45 Ark. 143; Moore v. Town of Jonesboro, 107 Ga. 704, 33 S. E. 435; Macomb v. Twaddle, 4 Ill. App. 254; Village of Wapella v. Davis, 39 Ill. App. 592; Town of Fenton v. Peters, 50 Ill. App. 41; Wahl v. City of Nauvoo, 64 Ill. App. 17; Cooper v. Ash, 76 Ill. 11; Leedy v. Town of Bourbon, 12 Ind. App. 486, 40 N. E. 640; In re Hagan, 65 Kan. 857, 68 Pac. 1104; State v. City of Topeka, 36 Kan. 76; Stone v. Bean, 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 42; Town of Tipton v. Norman, 72 Mo. 380; Wallace v. Bradshaw, 56 N. J. Law, 339; Hampton v. Hamsher, 46 Hun (N. Y.) 144; Buncombe Turnpike Co. v. McCarson, 18 N. C. (1 Dev. & B.) 306. State v. Gillikin, 114 N. C. 832. The fact that a person does not use a road upon which he is required to work is no defense to his liability. State v. Joyce, 121 N. C. 610, 28 S. E. 366; Town of Grand Isle v. Towns of public or quasi public corporation exercise this right, it is necessary that the legislative authority exist.739 It follows that as the power is one derived or delegated, all the provisions of the granting statutes in respect to notice required,740 and the enforcement of the right, must be strictly followed, and only the property 741 Milton & Colchester, 68 Vt. 234; 698; State v. Sharp, 125 N. C. 628, State v. Sharp, 125 N. C. 628, and and cases cited; State v. Covington, cases cited; State v. Neal, 109 N. C. 125 N. C. 641. 859. See decisions collected in 27 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. p. 12, note, and see, also, Ex parte Grace, 9 Tex. App. 381, where it was held that the power "to open, widen, extend, improve or abolish streets" did not authorize a city to compel citizens to work the street subject to a fine upon a failure to do so. 739 Galloway v. Town of Tavares, 37 Fla. 58, 19 So. 170; Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Randle, 183 Ill. 364; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. People, 193 Ill. 539; Bradish v. Lucken, 38 Minn. 186; Wallace v. Bradshaw, 56 N. J. Law, 339; Ex parte Campbell (Tex. Cr. R.) 22 S. W. 1020. 740 State v. Snyder, 41 Ark. 226. It is necessary to allege how the notice was given in an indictment for failing to work the road after notice. Moore v. State, 52 Ark. 265; Lowry v. State, 52 Ark. 270; State v. Wainright, 60 Ark. 280; Wahl v. City of Nauvoo, 64 Ill. App. 17; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. People, 183 Ill. 196; Id., 184 Ill. 174; Heman v. St. Louis Merchants' Land Imp. Co., 75 Mo. App. 372; Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. Lancaster County, 4 Neb. 293. The failure to give the proper notice will not release land subject to the laws of the road tax. State v. Baker, 108 N. C. 799, 13 S. E. 214; State v. Yoder, 129 N. C. 544, 40 S. E. 3; State v. Telfair, 130 N. C. 645, 40 S. E. 976; State v. Pool, 106 N. C. 741 Kinney v. People, 52 Ill. App. 359. But the statutory provision that complaint shall be made within twenty days after a certain specified time against those not paying their poll tax held directory merely and the prosecution will not be barred by the lapse of more than twenty days. Reynolds v. Town of Foster, 89 Ill. 257. A person in an action brought against him to recover the penalty for neglect or refusal to work his road tax cannot raise the question of the existence of the highway. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. People, 197 Ill. 411; In re Ashby, 60 Kan. 101, 55 Pac. 336. Kan. Laws 1891, c. 114. The "eight-hour law" controlling the length of day's labor required by city laborers, applies to persons working out their poll tax. An ordinance requiring, therefore, a poll tax of two days' labor of ten hours per day is void. Tufts v. Inhabitants of Lexington, 72 Me. 516; Inhabitants of Sumner v. Gardiner, 88 Me. 584. But see the case of Auditor General v. Longyear, 110 Mich. 223, 68 N. W. 130. Lake Superior Ship Canal R. & Iron Co. v. Thompson Tp., 56 Mich. 493; Hamilton & Merryman Co. V. L'Anse Tp., 107 Mich. 419, 65 N. W. 282; State v. Tracy, 82 Minn. 317, 84 N. W. 1015; Madison County v. Collier, 79 Miss. 220, 30 So. 610; Wallace v. Bradshaw, 55 N. J. Law, 117, |