769 or even officials to use public moneys for their own purposes,' appropriate the interest upon funds in their charge.770 § 415. Public revenue; limitations of amount in its disbursement. Aside from the limitation which involves a discussion of the purpose for which public funds may be used, and which will be considered in succeeding sections, is found that one based generally upon some charter or statutory provision limiting the right of a corporation to expend more than a specified amount in disbursements of a public character. Such limitations as to the amount may consist of a provision restricting the proper expenditure to a given gross sum of the public revenues, a certain per cent of either the assessable property or its total revenues, or limiting the annual expenses for current purposes to the yearly revenues.772 771 Limitations of amount for particular purposes. As a further restriction of the power of public corporations to expend money freely and extravagantly is found a limitation of the amount properly disbursable within a particular year for designated pur 769 Prewett v. Marsh, 1 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 17; People v. Wilson, 117 Cal. 242, 49 Pac. 135; People v. Van Ness, 79 Cal. 84; Moulton v. McLean, 5 Colo. 454, 39 Pac. 78. But a statutory provision forbidding any public officer to loan with or without interest any money received by virtue of his office does not apply to a deposit in a bank by an officer of public funds repayable on demand and without interest. See, also, as holding the same, Allibone v. Ames, 9 S. D. 74, 68 N. W. 165, 33 L. R. A. 585. Winchester Elec. Light Co. V. Veal, 145 Ind. 506, 41 N. E. 334, 44 N. E. 353; Henry v. State, 98 Ind. 381; Lee v. Marion Nat. Bank, 94 Ky. 41; Mott v. Pettit, 1 N. J. Law (Coxe) 298; Brownfield v. Houser, 30 Or. 534. A taxpayer cannot sue to recover misappropriated funds. State v. Boggs, 16 Wash. 143; Jones v. Reed, 3 Wash. 57, 27 Pac. 1067. A taxpayer has no right to prevent by injunction a city officer from misappropriating public funds. 770 Ramsey's Estate v. Whitbeck, 81 Ill. App. 210; Spratley v. Leavenworth County Com'rs, 56 Kan. 272. Private moneys of a railroad company deposited with the county treasurer in condemnation proceedings are public funds within the meaning of Kan. Gen. St. 1889, par. 1716, and the interest thereon belongs to the county. State v. Green, 52 S. C. 520; State v. Boggs, 16 Wash. 143. 771 See §§ 148 et seq., supra. 772 San Francisco Gas Co. V. Brickwedel, 62 Cal. 641; Weaver v. City & County of San Francisco, 111 Cal. 319; Putnam v. City of Grand Rapids, 58 Mich. 416; Lamar Wa 773 poses. Such limitations are usually applied to disbursement for works of internal improvement, the construction of local improvements or expenditures made in connection with the construction of plants for furnishing a supply of water and light. § 416. Purposes for which public moneys may be used. It is needless to repeat at this time the general principles of law and morals which control a public corporation in the expenditure of its funds raised by the imposition of taxes; these will be found clearly stated in other sections of this work and the cases cited. A general limitation exists. Public moneys cannot be expended for other than public purposes,775 and although legislative bodies are usually vested with a wide discretion in this respect, if this principle is violated, although apparently author ter & Elec. Light Co. v. City of Lamar, 128 Mo. 188, 32 L. R. A. 157; Atlantic City Waterworks Co. V. Read, 50 N. J. Law, 665; Weston v. City of Syracuse, 17 N. Y. 110. 773 Fitzgerald v. Walker, 55 Ark. 148; Nelson v. City of New York, 63 N. Y. 535; People v. Kelly, 76 N. Y. 475; Kingsley v. City of Brooklyn, 78 N. Y. 200; Hasbrouck v. City of Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 37; Howard v. City of Oshkosh, 33 Wis. 309. But see Foote v. City of Salem, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 87; Crawshaw v. City of Roxbury, 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 374; Dearborn V. Inhabitants of Brookline, 97 Mass. 466; Board of Finance of Jersey City v. Street & Water Com'rs, 55 N. J. Law, 230; Leonard v. Long Island City, 65 Hun (N. Y.) 621. Matthews v. Inhabitants of Westborough, 134 Mass. 555. A town cannot lawfully vote money to be given in charity, but it can lawfully and properly provide by vote for the payment of its debts and for the settlement of claims against it. Hitchcock v. City of St. Louis, 49 Mc. 484. "The diversion of the money of the taxpayers for any purpose other than that which is expressed in the charter is a perversion of the trust and an excess of authority. That there is no express power in the charter conferring authority to make donations, gifts or gratuities is too clear to require any argument." People v. Allen, 42 N. Y. 404; Brohead v. City of Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 624; State v. Tappan, 29 Wis. 664. 776 Stockton & V. R. Co. v. City 774 See §§ 145 et seq., and §§ 172 of Stockton, 41 Cal. 147; Talbot v. et seq., supra. 775 Jarvis v. Fleming, 27 Ont. 309; Town of Petersburg v. Mappin, 14 Ill. 193; Agnew v. Brall, 124 Ill. 312; City of Baltimore v. Gill, 31 Md. 375; Freeland v. Hastings, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 570. Hudson, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 417; In re Opinion of Justices, 175 Mass. 599, 49 L. R. A. 564; Lommen v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 65 Minn. 196, 33 L. R. A. 437; State v. Polk County Com'rs, 87 Minn. 325, 92 N. W. 216, 60 L. R. A. 161; Town of ized by direct legislation, the expenditure of public funds for a private purpose can be enjoined." There is no controversy about the soundness of this principle; the dispute arises in its application. What is or is not a public purpose has been considered by the courts in many cases where there has been a questionable expenditure of public moneys for purposes which result indirectly to the good, benefit and advantage of the community, and yet, which should not be permitted because in violation of a broad and underlying principle that sufficient purposes can be found, in respect to which there is no doubt, for the use of all funds raised by taxation, without creating an excessive burden upon the taxpayer, applying public funds to purposes as to the character of which grave doubts arise. Economy is not a characteristic of public officials or public corporations. Without considering the possibility of a corrupt or dishonest administration of public affairs, it stands undenied as an author has said: "That private self-interest stimulated by the hope of gain no less than by the fear of loss will drive a sharper bargain than will public authorities who have nothing particular at stake." The restraining influences should be invoked of every principle which can be made available to prevent unwise and extravagant expenditure of public moneys. However desirable or just it may seem that a questionable, in this respect, use of moneys should be authorized, the safest, and in fact the only public policy to be pursued, is the one above indicated. Limitations found in statutory or charter provisions. Independent of the principles stated, the uses to which public mon Guilford v. Chenango County Sup'rs, 13 N. Y. (3 Kern.) 143; Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n v. City of New York, 8 App. Div. 230, 40 N. Y. Supp. 607. Waterloo Woolen Mfg. Co. V. Shanahan, 128 N. Y. 345, 14 L. R. A. 481. The purpose for which moneys were appropriated by the legislature whether public or private in its character must be determined from the statute itself and from such considerations as the court can judicially notice. McCallie v. City of Chattanooga, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 317. It is not necessary that the object for which a tax is imposed by the corporate authorities should be within the corporate limits to make it a corporate purpose. If it is a matter of vital importance to the permanent interest of the corporation, it is sufficient, though beyond the corporate limits. The construction of a public work beyond the limits of a state, held authorized. 777 City of Frederick v. Groshon, eys can be appropriated by a particular organization may be limited by statutory or charter provisions. Expenditures for such purposes only will be valid.778 § 417. Same subject. It is assumed in the discussion of the use of public moneys as found in the succeeding sections that it is not necessary for a corporation to incur an indebtedness either by borrowing money temporarily upon its credit or by the issue of negotiable bonds. These subjects have been elsewhere considered. The money disbursed is to be found in the public treasury as the result of an 30 Md. 436; Hitchcock v. City of St. Louis, 49 Mo. 484; Merrill v. Town of Plainfield, 45 N. H. 126. 778 Kelso v. Teale, 106 Cal. 477, 39 Pac. 948. But where a certain discretion is vested in public officials, their action will not be interfered with unless there has been a gross abuse of such authority. The court say: "Appellant further contends that, under the provisions of the charter the directors of the library had no right to make such an appropriation from the library funds as that here in question. And it is said: "The benefits to be derived by the taxpayers and patrons of the library from what might be learned by a delegate to a congress of librarians are too remote, too speculative, too chimerical to make the expenses of such a delegate a legal charge upon the public funds.' But the question of benefits to the library and its patrons from an expenditure like that here involved was one to be determined by the directors in the first instance; and, if there could be any state of circumstances under which an expenditure could be authorized it must be presumed that such a state was shown and was considered and act ed upon by the directors when they made the appropriation. The board was authorized to control and order the expenditure of all moneys at any time in the library fund,' and 'generally to do all that may be necessary to carry out the spirit and intent of this charter in establishing a public library and reading room.' In view of the action of the board and of the court below, we cannot say that the appropriation, under the circumstances shown, was not justifiable and proper." Schofield V. Eighth School Dist., 27 Conn. 499; Crofut v. City of Danbury, 65 Conn. 294; Koger v. Hunter, 102 Ga. 76, 29 S. E. 141; Huesing v. City of Rock Island, 128 Ill. 465, 21 N. E. 558, reversing 25 Ill. App. 600. A taxpayer may en join a municipal corporation from appropriating money to an unauthorized purpose; neither his motives nor the amount his tax would be increased are pertinent to the inquiry. Harney v. Indianapolis, C. & D. R. Co., 32 Ind. 244. See note on Tax-payers' Actions, 22 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 86. Claflin v. Inhabitants of Hopkinton, 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 502; Knapp v. Kansas City, 48 Mo. App. 485. exercise of a revenue producing power possessed by the public corporation. There are some extraordinary uses which, courts have held, come within the character of a public purpose, namely, encampment expenses, the expenses of a delegate to a congress of librarians, 780 those connected with the administration of justice. other than statutory costs,781 the support of institutions for "public good," 782 an appropriation for "the support and maintenance 779 State v. Kenney, 10 Mont. 488, 26 Pac. 383. The revenue for a fiscal year includes all taxes levied for that year though some of them may be uncollected. "Taxes levied for a fiscal year must be treated as revenues for that year, though they may not be collected and reach the treasury before the commencement of the following fiscal year and are to be considered in determining whether the appropriations by the legislature provide for expenditures which exceed the 'total tax provided by law,' which is prohibited by Const. Mont. art. 12, § 12, citing Evans v. McCarthy, 42 Kan. 426." 780 Kelso v. Teale, 106 Cal. 477, 39 Pac. 948. 781 Bates v. Independence County, 23 Ark. 722. The board and lodging of jurors in a criminal case. The case of Van Eppes v. Commissioners Ct. of Mobile, 25 Ala. 460, holds that the hire of carriages for the convenience of the grand jurors to a county jail is not a proper charge against the county. But see to the contrary, the case of Justices of Richmond County v. State, 24 Ga. 82. La Plata County Com'rs v. Hampson, 24 Colo. 127, 48 Pac. 1101; Talbot County V. Mansfield, 115 Ga. 766, 42 S. E. 72; Henderson v. Hovey, 46 Kan. 691, 27 Pac. 177. More than the amount appropriated cannot be disbursed. Tucker V. Common Council of Grand Rapids, 104 Mich. 631, 62 N. W. 1013; State v. Kenney, 9 Mont. 389. State v. Wallichs, 15 Neb. 457, 609. In the absence of a special appropriation, the expenses of returning prisoners from the penitentiary to other counties for retrial cannot be paid by the state. Tompkins v. City of New York, 14 App. Div. 536, 43 N. Y. Supp. 878. The charges of an expert witness. Whittle v. Saluda County, 59 S. C. 554, 38 S. E. 168. The constitutional right that the accused in criminal prosecutions shall have the right of obtaining his witnesses does not make a county liable for serving subpœnas. 782 Goodykoontz V. People, 20 Colo. 374. An appropriation for "the soldiers' and sailors' home" is authorized by the constitution. But see State v. City of New Orleans, 50 La. Ann. 880, as holding that appropriations to charitable institutions based solely upon the laudable objects for which they are established and maintained are illegal within the prohibitions of La. Const. art. 56, relative to the loaning or granting of public funds to any person or persons, association or corporation public or private. And see also Farmer v. City of St. Paul, 65 Minn. 176, 33 L. R. A. 199. |