fare. This latter fact is well recognized and to municipal corporations is, therefore, given the power of legislation or of acting for themselves in local matters under proper restrictions.12 The legislative body to whom is delegated such functions is usually called a council and possesses, as derived from the municipal charter or general law, restricted legislative powers.13 Since they are, broadly speaking, legislative bodies of inferior or subordinate bodies, it follows that they do not have the right to act even in respect to local matters except as the right has been granted them; or, to state the proposition differently, their authority is limited and restricted because of their subordinate place in the scheme or plan of government.1 The legality of their legislative action, therefore, is tested or determined in the first instance by the extent of their powers as found in the municipal charter,1 or the general laws which warrant their creation, authorize their organization and direct their action.10 81 Wis. 440, 15 L. R. A. 561, and cases therein cited; Id., 83 Wis. 90, 17 L. R. A. 145, 35 Am. St. Rep. 27. 11 Hiestand v. City of New Orleans, 14 La. Ann. 330; Inhabitants of Camden v. Camden Village Corp. 77 Me. 530; People v. Ingersoll, 58 N. Y. 1, 17 Am. Rep. 178, and §§ 5 et seq., ante. 12 Harmon v. City of Chicago, 110 Ill. 400; City of Des Moines v. Hillis, 55 Iowa, 643; People v. Common Council of Detroit, 29 Mich. 108; City of Springfield v. Robberson Ave. R. Co., 69 Mo. App. 514; State v. Clarke, 25 N. J. Law (1 Dutch.) 54; Wendell v. City of Brooklyn, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 204; Beard v. City if Brooklyn, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 142; People v. Green, 64 N. Y. 499; Culp v. Com., 42 Pa. Law J. 288. See, also, §§ 5 et seq., and 108 et seq., ante. 13 Sylvester v. Macauley, 1 Wils. (Ind.) 19. Determining and defining the powers of legislation and liability of the members of the common council of Indianapolis. But action within their Hooper v. Emery, 144 Me. 375; Public Schools of Alleghany v. Alleghany County Com'rs, 20 Md. 449; Zane v. Rosenberry, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 382; In re Newport Charter, 14 R. I. 655. 14 Field v. City of Des Moines, 39 Iowa, 575; Fisher v. City of Boston, 104 Mass. 87; Wheeler v. City of Cincinnati, 19 Ohio St. 19; White v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Hill (S. C.) 571; City Council v. Pinckney, 3 Brev. (S. C.) 217; Schroeder V. City Council of Charleston, 3 Brev. (S. C.) 533; Moran v. Thompson, 20 Wash. 525, 56 Pac. 29. 15 Hewison v. City of New Haven, 37 Conn. 475; People v. Young, 38 Ill. 490; State v. Young, 3 Kan. 445. 16 Bates v. District of Columbia, 7 Mackey (D. C.) 76. A legislative body can arbitrarily transfer the exercise of certain powers and duties from the city council to other boards that it may create. Trenton Com'rs v. McDaniel, 52 N. C. (7 Jones) 107; Ferguson v. City of powers is conclusive and not subject to collateral attack unless reconsidered by them or reversed or held void in an authorized proceeding by a court of competent jurisdiction." Ordinarily the powers possessed by municipal councils are considered continuing in their character and the exercise or failure to exercise them at a particular time does not deprive them of the right to act at a subsequent time. This principle is true unless the particular thing authorized is directed to be done at a specified time or in a particular manner. 18 As a rule, the performance of duties entrusted to them by the legislature cannot be delegated.19 Snohomish, 8 Wash. 668, 24 L. R. 17 Bass v. City of Ft. Wayne, 121 Ind. 389; City of Indianapolis v. Consumers Gas Trust Co., 140 Ind. 246; Everett v. Deal, 148 Ind. 90; Joyes v. Shadburn, 11 Ky. L. R. 892, 13 S. W. 361; Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. 534. To establish a district sewer as such is within the exclusive powers of the municipal authorities of the city of St. Louis under § 22, art. 6, of the city charter, and in the absence of fraud or gross abuse of power will not be disturbed by courts. Ex parte City of Albany, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 277; McClain v. McKisson, 15 Ohio Circ. R. 517. 18 City of Augusta v. McKibben, 22 Ky. L. R. 1224, 60 S. W. 291. "It is also insisted that because the council did not proceed at the end of the forty days allowed by the ordinance of September 13th, it was erroneous for them to proceed afterwards. There was no statute regulating the subject. It was left to the discretion of the council how and when they should proceed in this matter and if they saw fit to wait and give appellees further time to reconsider and comply with the order, we are unable to see what ground of complaint the appellees, at least, can have. The contract was let on December 8th. The advertisement for the bids was made on November 29th, and, under the rulings of this court, both days cannot be counted, and so there was only nine days' notice of the bidding given. If the statute had required ten days' notice to be given, this would be a very serious objection to the proceeding, but there is no such provision in the statute. The only thing in the record is a direction by the council to its committee to advertise ten days. The failure of the committee to comply strictly with this direction does not invalidate the contract which the council saw fit to make itself, for the whole matter of the notice to be given rested in its discretion." Booth v. City of Bayonne, 56 N. J. Law, 268. 19 Blair v. City of Waco (C. C. A.) 75 Fed. 800; City of Oakland v. Carpentier, 13 Cal. 540; City of Chicago v. Stratton, 58 Ill. App. 539; City of St. Louis v. Meyrose Lamp Mfg. Co., 139 Mo. 560; State v. Garibaldi, 44 La. Ann. 809; Durant v. Jersey City, 25 N. J. Law (1 Dutch.) 309; Danforth v. City of Patterson, 34 N. J. Law, 163; Thompson v. Schermerhorn, 6 N. Y. (2 Seld.) 92, 55 Am. Dec. 385; In re Trustees of New York Presbytery, 57 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 500. The § 499. Council committees. The method of action by such a legislative body is generally prescribed with particularity.20 Large legislative bodies are unwieldy and act slowly. The investigation or determination of certain questions can be accomplished with great facility and thoroughness and with more efficiency by a less number of individuals, another illustration of the well recognized principle of government that in all respects a despotic government is more efficient. There are frequently found provisions in city charters which provide for the reference of certain matters to committees or subcommittees of the larger legislative body with power to investigate and recommend.21 These committees, equally with the legislative bodies from which selected, are not bodies of original power and do not have large powers of initiative if in determination of the manner in which particular public work is to be done cannot be delegated by the city council to a subordinate city official. Baily v. City of Philadelphia, 184 Pa. 594, 39 Atl. 494, 39 L. R. A. 837; Eureka City v. Wilson, 15 Utah, 67; State v. Winter, 15 Wash. 407. The rule in respect to the delegation of municipal powers has been well and concisely given by a recent author. Joyce, Elec. Law, § 236. "The general rule is that powers conferred by statute must be exercised in the manner and mode prescribed. Powers which are intended to be dependent in their exercise upon the judgment of those governing bodies of a municipality to whose deliberations and discretion they are confided cannot be delegated. Thus, a city empowered to act by ordinance upon a certain matter, by its common council, the mode and manner being left to its judgment as a deliberative body, cannot delegate its authority. In such cases it is the judgment of the deliberative body in whom the power is vested and discretion is confided that is required to be exercised and not the judgment of another body or person acting under a delegated power. This rule does not, however, exclude committees, appointed to ascertain and report facts, nor committees, persons or agents appointed to perform administrative or ministerial functions, or, as appears in some of the decisions, the appointment of committees and the empowering them to act in certain matters not purely administrative or ministerial, their acts being made subject to the approval of the appointing municipal body. 20 State v. Garibaldi, 44 La. Ann. 809. 21 Buckton v. People, 12 Colo. App. 86, 5 Pac. 871; Whitney v. City of New Haven, 58 Conn. 450; Holland V. State, 23 Fla. 123; State v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 39 Minn. 219, 39 N. W. 153; Dreyfus v. Lonergan, 73 Mo. App. 336; Salmon v. Haynes, 50 N. J. Law, 97, 11 Atl. 151; Van Vorst v. Jersey City, 27 N. J. Law (3 Dutch.) 493; City of Burlington v. Dennison, deed they are possessed at all.22 The legality of their action is, therefore, measured in all cases by the construction and significance of legislative or constitutional authority.28 500. Town meetings. Another body to which is given legislative powers in respect to local concerns is the New England town meeting or other organization possessing similar characteristics. At these meetings, as already suggested, the people of a particular district have the right to assemble and adopt local legislative measures having for their purpose the regulation and convenience of the people thus acting. The authority for these meetings, their powers, the mode of action and restrictions, have been considered in previous sections.25 § 501. Classification of legislative bodies. Legislative assemblies other than the town meeting,-and this statement is true both in respect to state legislatures or other organizations, are divided into branches, the purpose of such division being the creation of a check in the respective bodies upon the legislation or the acts of the other.26 These are usually desig 22 Van Vorst v. Jersey City, 27 N. J. Law (3 Dutch.) 493; Salmon v. Haynes, 50 N. J. Law, 97; Sharp V. City of New York, 40 Barb. (N. Y.) 256. A municipality will be bound by the representations of a committee authorized to act in respect to a certain business transaction. 23 Hitchcock v. City of Galveston, 96 U. S. 341; Branham v. Lange, 16 Ind. 497. The same rule will apply to a committee appointed by a state legislature. Com. v. Hillenbrand, 96 Ky. 407. A committee of aldermen is not authorized to investigate charges of corruption against certain of its members. Damon v. Inhabitants of Granby, 19 24 See §§ 101 et seq., ante. 26 Andrews' American Law, §§ 231 et seq. nated as the "Senate and House of Representatives" and in municipal corporations where such division occasionally exists, the two houses of the council or assembly are designated by appropriate terms. Under whatever name these branches may exist, in order that the purpose of their organization may be effective, concurrent action by the two is necessary in respect to all those questions or matters that are intended as general legislative measures or that are to become operative on the community at large.2 27 Darcantel v. People's Slaughterhouse & Refrigerating Co., 44 La. Ann. 632, 11 So. 239. "The next ground is that the ordinance is not operative for want of the 'concurrent approval of the board of health' as required by constitution. We have reproduced the resolutions of the board of health approving the ordinances, the genuineness of which is not disputed. But it apappears that when the ordinances were first presented to the board, it adopted resolutions declining to approve them, which action was communicated to the city council and it is claimed that after this the board could not rescind its action and grant a valid approval. The constitution requires nothing but that the ordinances shall be passed by the council and shall be approved by the board of health. We have before us the ordinances duly passed and the approval of the board of health expressed in a formal resolution adopted by the board. What more can we require? The constitution fixes no time or mode in which the approval of the board shall be made. The first disapproval by the board did not annul or cancel the ordinance. It simply remained ineffective for want of such approval. The council has never reconsidered or rescinded the ordinances. It still stands upon the city's records as an existing ordinance and since we hear no complaint from the council as to the time or method of the board's action, we may presume that it persists in its action as expressed thereby. We can perceive no reason why the board's action in first disapproving should prevent it from afterward changing its mind, for reasons doubtless good, and approving it so long at least as the council maintained the ordinance. The council could repeal the ordinance before or after approval by the board. Not having done so the ordinance and the approval coexist, and the constitutional requirement is satisfied. Nor can we listen to complaints of violation by the board of its own rules of parliamentary proceedings. We, and the public, are simply concerned with the fact and not with the method of the board's approval. The constitutional purpose was to protect the people against inconsiderate action by the council in establishing slaughter houses in localities where they might endanger the public health, and with that end in view, to require such ordinances first to receive the sanction of the authorities specially charged with the care of the public health, and so organized as to enable them to give an expert and scientific judgment on such matters. That purpose is fully accomplished in this case, in which |